KNECHT, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al.

25CV014440: KNECHT, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

25CV014440: KNECHT, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s (“GM”) motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Dawn and Herb Knecht’s complaint for “Violation of the Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act” (“MMWA”) is ruled upon as follows.

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3)-(4).

Opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(1) and (3)-(4).

Both moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

Factual Background

Plaintiffs Dawn and Herb Knecht commenced this action on 6/18/2025, filing a complaint for violation of the MMWA based on their 2023 purchase of a 2021 Chevrolet Tahoe. On 8/7/2025, defendant GM filed its answer to complaint and on 1/26/2026, defendant GM filed the present motion for summary judgment. This matter has not yet been set for trial but a Case Management Conference is set for 8/26/2026.

Moving Papers. According to the Notice of Motion, defendant GM now seeks summary judgment “pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437(c) [sic]” on the ground “Plaintiffs cannot maintain a [MMWA] claim without a viable state law cause of action, of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014440: KNECHT, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

which there is none here.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:2-8.) In support of this motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs, defendant GM has filed a Separate Statement which sets forth Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-8 which generally assert that the subject 2021 Chevrolet Tahoe purchased by plaintiffs in 2023 was not a new vehicle but rather a used one with 25,614 miles on the odometer and that defendant GM did not provide to plaintiffs any new or additional warranty coverage in connection with their 2023 purchase, thereby entitling them only to the remainder of the original warranty which commenced when the subject vehicle was delivered to its original owner(s) in 2021.

Opposition. Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that this motion seeking summary judgment based on the complaint’s failure to “separately caption a state-law breach of warranty cause of action” is “a pleading argument, not a factual showing that Plaintiffs cannot establish any element of their warranty claim.” (Opp., p.3:3-7.) According to the opposition, summary judgment should be denied because defendant GM did not meet its initial burden to present evidence showing that plaintiffs cannot establish one or more element of their claim: GM has presented no evidence that the subject vehicle conformed to its written warranty, that any nonconformities were repaired, that the warranty expired before plaintiffs sought repairs, or that plaintiffs did not suffer damages. (Id., at p.3:8-12.)

Therefore, the opposition maintains that “the motion fails at the outset, and the burden never shifts to Plaintiffs” inasmuch as “GM presents no evidence that the Subject Vehicle was ever repaired to conform to its written warranty.” (Id., at p.3:12-14.)

Plaintiffs also contend “GM’s motion also improperly conflates an alleged pleading deficiency with the absence of any viable warranty theory at all,” given that the complaint clearly alleges GM issued a written warranty, plaintiffs presented the vehicle to authorized repair facilities during the warranty period, GM failed to repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts, and plaintiffs suffered resulting damages. (Opp., p.3:15-19.) The opposition insists these allegations establish a viable warranty theory sufficient to support the alleged MMWA cause of action and if necessary, plaintiffs can amend the complaint “to expressly plead[] a common law breach of express warranty claim based on GM’s transferable written warranty, a theory not foreclosed by Rodriguez v.

FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189.” (Id., at p.3:19-23.) In this regard, plaintiffs add that leave to amend is liberally granted in the furtherance of justice and this policy favoring leave to amend is so strong that it is an abuse of discretion to deny amendment unless the adverse party can show meaningful prejudice, something which GM cannot demonstrate here. (Id., at p.3:19-p.4:3.)

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a three-

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014440: KNECHT, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

step process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014440: KNECHT, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.) In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1); see also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion for summary judgment.

Objections to Evidence

The Court finds no written objections to evidence on file.

Discussion

The threshold question here is whether the moving papers here are sufficient to satisfy defendant GM’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the sole ground on which summary judgment is sought: “Plaintiffs cannot maintain a [MMWA] claim without a viable state law cause of action, of which there is none here.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:4-8.) As noted above, defendant GM’s moving Separate Statement sets forth UMF Nos. 1-8 which generally assert that the subject 2021 Chevrolet Tahoe purchased by plaintiffs in 2023 was not a new vehicle but rather a used one with 25,614 miles on the odometer and that defendant GM did not provide to plaintiffs any new or additional warranty coverage in connection with their 2023 purchase, thereby entitling them only to the remainder of the original warranty which commenced when the subject vehicle was delivered to its original owner(s) in 2021.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014440: KNECHT, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

After careful review and consideration of the specific factual assertions made in UMF Nos. 1-8 along with the evidence cited in support thereof, this Court concludes that defendant GM has failed to carry its initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the sole ground on which summary judgment is sought: “Plaintiffs cannot maintain a [MMWA] claim without a viable state law cause of action, of which there is none here.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:4-8.) Indeed, even if the specific factual assertions in UMF Nos. 1-8 were established, defendant GM fails to satisfy its burden in demonstrating as a matter of law that plaintiffs cannot as a matter of law maintain a MMWA claim.

As this Court has addressed in other matters, it is not accurate that state law remedies are entirely precluded simply because a consumer purchased a used vehicle and was not the direct recipient of the new vehicle warranty when originally purchased. Thus, defendant GM fails to establish the legal correctness of what appears to be the unspoken premise upon which defendant relies in offering UMF Nos. 1-8. In fact, none of the 8 UMFs purport to establish either that “Plaintiffs cannot maintain a [MMWA] claim without a viable state law cause of action” or that they have not alleged any “viable state law cause of action.”

As to the latter assertion of what plaintiffs have alleged, defendant GM’s UMF Nos. 1-8 make no reference at all to the complaint’s allegations, much less whether such allegations include a sufficient basis for a MMWA claim. Indeed, while citing authority for the proposition that “failure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constituted a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss” (Mov. MPA, p.3:25-26 [quoting Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 833]), defendant offers no asserted UMF regarding the actual allegations set forth in plaintiffs’ complaint.

Moreover, to the extent defendant GM intended to rely merely upon plaintiffs’ labeling of its first cause of action as “Violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act” as itself constituting the undisputed fact that the complaint also does not include any other allegations supporting a warranty claim under state law, this does not satisfy defendant GM’s initial burden of production. This is especially true given that pursuant to California’s pleading standards applicable to rulings on demurrer, the label or legal theory a plaintiff attaches to a cause of action does not determine whether a viable cause of action has been alleged or the viable theories of liability which are supported by the factual allegations. (See generally, Quelimane Co., Inc. v.

Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39; New Livable Calif. v. Association of Bary Area Governments (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 709, 714-715; Adelman v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 352, 359; Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998.) Therefore, while defendant GM’s UMF Nos. 1-8 include nothing pertaining to what plaintiffs have actually alleged and thereby constituting enough of a deficiency to deny the present motion, even if defendant had included the mere reference to the label on plaintiffs’ first cause of action, such would also not satisfy defendant’s initial burden of demonstrating that the complaint does not include

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV014440: KNECHT, et al. vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

allegations sufficient to constitute “a viable state law cause of action,” as referenced in Daugherty, supra.

Because the Court has determined that the moving papers are not sufficient to satisfy defendant GM’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the sole ground cited in the Notice of Motion, summary judgment in favor of defendant GM must be denied regardless of whether plaintiffs filed any opposition or produced evidence which adequately establishes the existence of any triable issue of material fact and the Court need not proceed further.

Disposition

Having determined that the moving papers are not sufficient to satisfy defendant GM’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) with respect to the sole ground on which summary judgment is sought (i.e., “Plaintiffs cannot maintain a [MMWA] claim without a viable state law cause of action, of which there is none here.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:4-8)), defendant GM’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Dawn and Herb Knecht’s complaint is DENIED in its entirety.

Moving defendant to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)