Edward Beiting, et al. v. Christopher Adams, et al.

recourse would be to file a motion to compel further responses to request for production of documents. Thus, the Court will also analyze the motion as if it might have been intended to be a motion to compel further responses to request for production of documents.

The motion to compel further responses is denied because Plaintiff failed to set forth a meet and confer declaration in sufficient compliance with CCP Sec.Sec. 2031.310 and 2016.040. As noted by both parties, Defendant served a further response on August 12, 2026. However, there is no indication that Plaintiff met and conferred with Defendant regarding the further response that was served on that date. Instead, Plaintiff's counsel simply states the following: "Consistent with the parties' August 3, 2026 agreement, Defendant served its Second Supplemental Responses to RFP Nos. 1 and 3 on August 12, 2026.

As to RFP No. 1, Defendant's Second Supplemental Response reasserts, verbatim, the same "never existed or have never been in possession, custody, or control of JLRNA" position set forth in its June 16, 2026 Supplemental Response. As to RFP No. 3, Defendant abandoned its own June 16, 2026 representation that it "will comply in whole and produce nonprivileged responsive documents pursuant to a protective order," and instead asserted, for the first time, that the requested documents "never existed."

Attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of Defendant's Second Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, served August 12, 2026.

20. To date, notwithstanding two supplemental responses, more than three months since the Court's Order issued, and Plaintiff's extensive, good-faith meet-and-confer efforts, Defendant has produced no documents responsive to RFP No. 1 and has expressly retreated from producing anything further responsive to RFP No. 3." (Declaration, Camilo Fernandez, P.P. 19-20).

Plaintiff's meet and confer declaration must show "a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference" to resolve the issues informally with opposing counsel, including whether the parties conferred on the retention of a court reporter for the hearing. CCP Sec.Sec. 2016.040(a)(b). There is no indication that any meet and confer process was initiated after the most recent further response that was served on August 12, 2026. Perhaps Plaintiff's counsel believed that it would be futile to meet and confer. However, this does not excuse the meet and confer requirement which is mandated by statute.

As to the request for terminating sanctions, the motion is denied. "In the context of sanctions against a party for willful refusal to furnish discovery, it has been held that the responding party has the burden of proving the lack of willfulness of his failure to perform." Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 201. Defendant's opposition shows that there has not been a willful refusal to furnish discovery. Instead, the motion and opposition simply indicate a dispute with respect to whether Defendant's discovery responses are complete and sufficient.

Finally, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's request for monetary sanctions is also denied. Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 26TRCV01004 Hearing Date: September 9, 2026 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT - SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Amy N. Carter Wednesday, September 9, 2026 Department M Calendar No. PROCEEDINGS Edward Beiting, et al. v. Christopher Adams, et al.

1. Christopher B. Adams, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication TENTATIVE RULING Christopher B. Adams, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication is denied.

Background

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on March 19, 2026. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. This is a residential unlawful detainer as to the following property: 5448 W. 142 nd St. Hawthorne CA 90250.

Request for Judicial Notice Defendants' request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) and (h).

Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication "is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) "Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and 'all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence' and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Adler v.

Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.) "On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact." (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication "has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." CCP Sec. 437c(p)(2). "Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." CCP Sec. 437c(p)(2). "If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted." Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467.

"A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(p)(1).

"When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP Sec. 437c(c).)

Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1161 states, in relevant part: "A tenant of real property is guilty of unlawful detainer: 3. When the tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform other conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which the property is held . . . and three days' notice, . . . in writing . . . shall have been served; 4. Any tenant, subtenant, or executor or administrator of that person's estate heretofore qualified and now acting, or hereafter to be qualified and act, assigning or subletting or committing waste upon the demised premises, contrary to the conditions or covenants of the lease."

Plaintiff also has the burden to establish the existence of a landlord/tenant relationship. See Fredricksen v. McCosker (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 114, 116-17. Plaintiff must also show that the notice was proper which can be done by attaching the notice. See Wilson v. Sadleir (1915) 26 Cal.App. 357, 359.

Defendants move for summary judgment. Defendants identify the following three grounds: "(1) Plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law because the Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit dated March 8, 2026, on which the Complaint is exclusively predicated, is fatally defective and void on its face under Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, in that it overstates the amount actually and lawfully due [...]; (2) [...] Plaintiff cannot establish a valid underlying tenancy because the operative June 14, 2024 Lease's own express condition precedent (Clause 39, requiring an executed personal-guaranty addendum) was never satisfied; and (3)[...] Plaintiff lacks standing to prosecute this action because he sues solely as Trustee of a trust never shown to be a party to, or the owner under, the operative Lease." (Notice of Motion, p. 3, lines 8-24).

Defendants alternatively move for summary adjudication based on the first ground identified above. Defendants have met their initial burden to show that the cause of action for unlawful detainer cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. CCP Sec. 437c(p)(2).

Plaintiff has met his burden to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to his cause of action. "A three-day notice must contain the amount which is due. A notice which demands rent in excess of the amount due does not satisfy this requirement. This rule ensures that a landlord will not be entitled to regain possession in an unlawful detainer action unless the tenant has had the opportunity to pay the delinquent rent." Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 697 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Defendants submitted evidence that the three-day notice overstates the amount of rent due because it failed to take into account the $10,350 deposit. The lease specifically states that "[t]his additional deposit shall be applied to rent monthly over the final three (3) months of the occupancy of the property." (Defendants' Ex. B, Section 3). Defendants states that this amount was not applied to the final three months of the occupancy. (Decl., Christopher Adams, P. 5). Defendants also argue that Plaintiff implemented an unlawful rent increase pursuant to Civ.

Code Sec. 1947.12 - The Tenant Protection Act of 2019. Defendants contend that any rent increase was required to be capped at 8.2 percent, but, that the July 2024 rent increase was 9.87 percent. Defendants also state that the 3-Day Notice is defective because it demands rent accrued after the landlord elected to terminate the tenancy.

Defendants also point to Section 39 of the lease which states: "An addendum to this agreement is a personal guarantee by William and Jacqueline Adams ensuring the payment of the rent. This is (sic) lease agreement is contingent on this addendum is (sic) an integral part of the agreement." Defendants presented evidence that no personal guaranty was ever effectuated which by the terms of the lease invalidates the lease agreement. (Decl., Christopher Adams, P.P. 13-15).

Finally, Defendants submitted evidence that the lease was signed by an individual named Edward Beiting. However, the Complaint was filed by Edward Beiting, Trustee of the Edward J Beiting I Revocable Living Trust, which is not the named lessor on the lease.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to provide evidence to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. CCP Sec. 437c(p)(2). On August 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed a written opposition to the motion. Plaintiff met his burden to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to his cause of action for unlawful detainer. Plaintiff submitted competent evidence showing that the disputed $10,350 deposit amount had already been credited toward the rental payments owed. (Decl., Beiting, P.P. 12-13, Ex. 2). In addition, Plaintiff submitted evidence that the notice did not demand post-forfeiture rent due. (Id. at P.P. 15-16).

As to the alleged unlawful rent increase, Plaintiff submitted the following authority. Civ. Code, Sec. 1954.52(a)(3)(A) states: "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an owner of residential real property may establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates for a dwelling or a unit about which any of the following is true: (3)(A) It is alienable separate from the title to any other dwelling unit or is a subdivided interest in a subdivision, as specified in subdivision (b), (d), or (f) of Section 11004.5 of the Business and Professions Code."

Plaintiff submitted evidence that the property is a single family residence and thus subject to the provision above with respect to rent increases. (Decl., Beiting, P. 7). Plaintiff also established the existence of a triable issue of fact by showing that any rent increase occurring prior to August the increase is to be calculated from the CPI amount published in April and thus that the declaration and evidence submitted by Plaintiff does not support the amount calculated by Defendant.

As to the alleged guaranty issue, Defendant submitted evidence that it was a continuing guaranty, and that the original guaranty had already been executed in January 2020. (Id., at P.P. 17-18, Ex. 3).

Finally, Plaintiff submitted competent evidence that the named Plaintiff and the landlord are the same entity, that Defendants are estopped from challenging standing, and, thus, that Plaintiff does not lack standing to prosecute this action. (Id. at P.P. 3-9). "In the usual unlawful detainer case, the tenant is estopped from challenging his or her landlord's title because (1) the tenant previously agreed to pay the landlord rent; and (2) if some third party has title to the property, the tenant nonetheless has no right to possession.

In such a case, the tenant may not question his landlord's title to the property because regardless of [w]hether the tenant won or lost his claim that the landlord's title was defective, it would not affect [the tenant's] right to possession of the property. California law does not prohibit an unlawful detainer defendant from interposing a defense involving title issues, so long as the defense, if established, would result in the tenant retaining possession of the premises." Coyne v. De Leo (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 801, 818 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has established the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to his cause of action for unlawful detainer. Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication is denied. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 26TRCV01131 Hearing Date: September 9, 2026 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT - SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Amy N. Carter Wednesday, September 9, 2026 Department M Calendar No.