Edward Beiting, et al. v. Christopher Adams, et al.

(1) When no response has been provided to the request for discovery; or (2) When a court has allowed the moving party to submit--in place of a separate statement--a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute." Plaintiff moves "for an Order to Enforce Plaintiffs' Deposition Subpoena as to Ashton Carroll, General Manager of DCH Tustin Acura. Plaintiffs further request an order compelling the production of all documents requested in the deposition subpoena, as well as an award of monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.480(j) and 1992 as to Defendant under an ostensible agency theory, or, alternatively, against Mr.

Carroll and/or Mr. Carroll's potential counsel, if this Court does not believe an agency theory applies. Further, Plaintiffs request sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.440(b) and 2020.240 against Ashton Carroll to ensure that his deposition moves forward prior to the time Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is scheduled to be heard." (Notice of Motion, p. 2, lines 4-12).

A deposition subpoena served to a non-party such as Ashton Carroll must be personally served. There are no competent facts to establish proper service by personal service. In fact, the proof of service of the deposition subpoena verifies that Ashton Carroll was not personally served but instead service was apparently effectuated upon an individual named Erik Cespedes at 9 Auto Center Dr, Tustin, CA 92782. Without proper personal service of a deposition subpoena, a non-party deponent cannot be compelled to comply with the deposition subpoena. Thus, Ami Pera, et al.' Motion to Enforce Deposition Subpoena as to Ashton Carroll is denied without prejudice.

Sanctions Plaintiff's request for sanctions is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

- SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Amy N. Carter Monday, August 24, 2026 Department M Calendar No. PROCEEDINGS Edward Beiting, et al. v. Christopher Adams, et al.

1. Christopher B. Adams, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication TENTATIVE RULING Christopher B. Adams, et al.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Background

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on March 19, 2026. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. This is a residential unlawful detainer as to the following property: 5448 W. 142 nd St. Hawthorne CA 90250.

Request for Judicial Notice Defendants' request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) and (h).

Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication "is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) "Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and 'all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence' and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Adler v.

Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.) "On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact." (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication "has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." CCP Sec. 437c(p)(2). "Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." CCP Sec. 437c(p)(2). "If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted." Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467.

"A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(p)(1).

"When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP Sec. 437c(c).)

Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1161 states, in relevant part: "A tenant of real property is guilty of unlawful detainer: 3. When the tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform other conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which the property is held . . . and three days' notice, . . . in writing . . . shall have been served; 4. Any tenant, subtenant, or executor or administrator of that person's estate heretofore qualified and now acting, or hereafter to be qualified and act, assigning or subletting or committing waste upon the demised premises, contrary to the conditions or covenants of the lease."

Plaintiff also has the burden to establish the existence of a landlord/tenant relationship. See Fredricksen v. McCosker (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 114, 116-17. Plaintiff must also show that the notice was proper which can be done by attaching the notice. See Wilson v. Sadleir (1915) 26 Cal.App. 357, 359.

Defendants move for summary judgment. Defendants identify the following three grounds: "(1) Plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law because the Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit dated March 8, 2026, on which the Complaint is exclusively predicated, is fatally defective and void on its face under Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, in that it overstates the amount actually and lawfully due [...]; (2) [...] Plaintiff cannot establish a valid underlying tenancy because the operative June 14, 2024 Lease's own express condition precedent (Clause 39, requiring an executed personal-guaranty addendum) was never satisfied; and (3)[...]

Plaintiff lacks standing to prosecute this action because he sues solely as Trustee of a trust never shown to be a party to, or the owner under, the operative Lease." (Notice of Motion, p. 3, lines 8-24). Defendants alternatively move for summary adjudication based on the first ground identified above.

Defendants have met their initial burden to show that the cause of action for unlawful detainer cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. CCP Sec. 437c(p)(2).

"A three-day notice must contain the amount which is due. A notice which demands rent in excess of the amount due does not satisfy this requirement. This rule ensures that a landlord will not be entitled to regain possession in an unlawful detainer action unless the tenant has had the opportunity to pay the delinquent rent." Bevill v. Zoura (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 694, 697 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Defendants submitted evidence that the three-day notice overstates the amount of rent due because it failed to take into account the $10,350 deposit. The lease specifically states that "[t]his additional deposit shall be applied to rent monthly over the final three (3) months of the occupancy of the property." (Defendants' Ex. B, Section 3). Defendants states that this amount was not applied to the final three months of the occupancy. (Decl., Christopher Adams, P. 5).

Defendants also point to Section 39 of the lease which states: "An addendum to this agreement is a personal guarantee by William and Jacqueline Adams ensuring the payment of the rent. This is (sic) lease agreement is contingent on this addendum is (sic) an integral part of the agreement." Defendants presented evidence that no personal guaranty was ever effectuated which by the terms of the lease invalidates the lease agreement. (Decl., Christopher Adams, P.P. 13-15).

Finally, Defendants submitted evidence that the lease was signed by an individual named Edward Beiting. However, the Complaint was filed by Edward Beiting, Trustee of the Edward J Beiting I Revocable Living Trust, which is not the named lessor on the lease. Plaintiff submitted no evidence that the Trust is the successor to the named landlord. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Button (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 651, 652-653 (stating that a successor in interest of the lessor has standing to maintain an action so long as sufficient evidence of the assignment is presented).

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to provide evidence to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. CCP Sec. 437c(p)(2). Plaintiff failed to file any written opposition to the motion. Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 26TRCV01070 Hearing Date: August 24, 2026 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT - SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Amy N. Carter Monday, August 24, 2026 Department M Calendar No. PROCEEDINGS Tariq Al Shaltoni, et al. v. Hyundai Motor America, et al. 26TRCV01070 1. Hyundai Motor America's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action TENTATIVE RULING Hyundai Motor America's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action is granted.

Background

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on March 24, 2026. Plaintiffs allege the following facts. Plaintiffs allege that their 2025