SCHEIBER vs PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

26CV167534: SCHEIBER vs PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES; filed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a California corporation (Defendant) CRS# 138191392732 in Department 22

Tentative Ruling - 09/04/2026 Han N. Tran

The Motion to Strike (not initial pleading) DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES filed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a California corporation on 08/04/2026 is Granted in Part.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff Andrew Scheiber (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint on January 29, 2026 and a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 18, 2026 against Pacific Gas & Electrice Company (“Defendant” or “PGE”). The court previously granted Defendant’s motion to strike excerpts of the FAC with leave to amend. In response, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on June 5, 2026. The SAC brings numerous employment-related causes of action for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and seeks punitive damages.

The SAC alleges that Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from October 2021 through March 2022 as an Associate Project Manager. (SAC, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor was David Perez. (Ibid.) Plaintiff asserts that he was 51 years old at the time he left employment with Defendant and undergoes annual pancreatic cancer screenings due to an extensive family history with the disease. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff contends that he told Perez of his need for annual screenings, shortly after which he was told to sit out a project because he “needed some geriatric rest.” (Id. at ¶ 9.)

Around February 2022, Plaintiff’s wife suffered from serious medical conditions, requiring Plaintiff to use two days of sick leave to care for his wife during and after surgery. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.) Plaintiff took a few more hours off work to tend to his wife a few weeks later. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff contends that Perez was dismissive of Plaintiff’s needs, told Plaintiff he was taking too much time off, and became hostile towards Plaintiff following these absences. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 13.) Perez allegedly attempted to dock Plaintiff’s pay for the absences and began imposing unreasonable demands and deadlines on Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on March 25, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 14.) He learned of his termination at a Microsoft Teams meeting attended by Perez and Ben Moffat, who Plaintiff believes was the Special Projects and Program Manager overseeing the department Plaintiff worked in. (Ibid.) Plaintiff contends that the only reason he was given for his termination was that he was not suitable for the position. (Ibid.) Plaintiff brings this suit alleging that he was terminated for discriminatory and retaliatory reasons arising out of his age, disability, his wife’s disability, requests for accommodation, and use of sick leave.

Defendant now moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. LEGAL STANDARD A party may move to strike “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 436(a), (b).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which 26CV167534: SCHEIBER vs PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES; filed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a California corporation (Defendant) CRS# 138191392732 in Department 22 the court is required to take judicial notice.” (§ 437(a); see also § 425.10(a)(1) (A complaint must contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”).)

“Before filing a motion to strike . . ., the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (§ 435.5(a).) “A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike.” (§ 435.5(a)(4).)

To be entitled to an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a).) The definition of “malice” includes “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (§ 3294(c).) “Despicable conduct” is conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. (See CACI 3946.)

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to strike the portions of the SAC related to Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. Defendant contends that the SAC does not allege facts showing that any PGE employee engaged in conduct rising to the level of oppression, fraud, or malice, and that no PGE officer, director, or managing agent engaged in or ratified such conduct towards Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends in opposition that the SAC sufficiently alleges facts as to Defendant’s conduct to support a demand for punitive damages.

The court previously granted Defendant’s motion to strike on the grounds that the FAC’s allegations were conclusory as to Defendant’s motivations and did not set forth facts establishing that Mr. Moffatt was a managing agent who acted with the requisite malice, fraud of oppression towards Plaintiff. Defendant contends in this renewed motion to strike that, despite adding several pages of new allegations, the SAC suffers from the same defects.

The SAC’s newly added allegations provide more detail into Mr. Moffatt’s role with Defendant. Plaintiff describes Mr. Moffatt as overseeing the entire project management division Plaintiff worked in, that Plaintiff’s supervisor Perez reported directly to him, and that Mr. Moffatt managed multiple project management groups covering different regions of California. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff contends in the SAC that this demonstrates that Mr. Moffatt exercised “substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of [Defendant’s] business operations[.]” (Ibid.) Plaintiff cites to White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 577, in which the California Supreme Court found that a zone manager who managed eight stores and sixty-five employees and reported to department heads in the corporation’s retail management department, was a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV167534: SCHEIBER vs PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES; filed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a California corporation (Defendant) CRS# 138191392732 in Department 22 managing agent for purposes of Civil Code section 3294(b).

The court agrees with Defendant that the allegations as stated remain deficient. While the additional allegations as to Moffatt provide more information as to his role, they still do not support a punitive damages reward even if true. The SAC does not allege that Moffatt had a role in creating or directing company policy. Plaintiff’s citation to Ultramar is unpersuasive because (1) the court found that the supervisor in that case made significant decisions that determined corporate policy; and (2) it ignores the matter of the size of the defendant entity.

Mr. Moffatt’s supervisory authority over more employees than his counterpart in Ultramar is not an apples-toapples comparison given the mammoth size of PG&E as an entity and number of workers it employs. The same can be said of the other case Plaintiff cites, Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 413, 428. The supervisor at issue in Wysinger was Vice President of District Office Operations with jurisdiction over offices in Southern California, Texas, Hawaii, and New Mexico, managed “[e]verything that goes on except for the sales of membership and insurance...[and was] responsible for day-to-day operations and strategy.” (Id. at 428-429.)

Plaintiff’s allegations as to Moffatt do not demonstrate such a level of control over Defendant’s policies or operations.

Moreover, the SAC’s allegations regarding Plaintiff’s alleged mistreatment by Defendant are largely unchanged. The SAC still alleges that Plaintiff’s supervisor Perez made one insensitive comment about Plaintiff’s age, was dismissive when Plaintiff informed him of his need to take time off to care for his wife, attempted to dock his pay for the time he took off, and became more demanding of Plaintiff following his time away. Similarly, the SAC still makes conclusory assertions that Defendant was motivated by discriminatory and retaliatory animus in terminating him.

The SAC also alleges in conclusory fashion that because Mr. Moffat, whom Plaintiff contends is a managing agent under Civil Code section 3294, was involved, Defendant “acted with oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious intent.” The SAC does include new allegations as to the alleged “shock and anger” his trainer, Anthony Chin, expressed when he learned that Plaintiff was being given unreasonable assignments and, later, the termination of his employment. This does not establish a basis for a punitive damages award.

Nor does Defendant’s refusal to explain to Mr. Chin why it made the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.

The court remains unpersuaded that these allegations support a claim for punitive damages or that the SAC’s additional allegations establish Mr. Moffatt as a managing agent for purposes of Section 3294. The court is also unconvinced that further amendment is likely to rescue the demand.

However, the court is not inclined to strike Plaintiff’s references to the applicable union contract. Plaintiff does not bring a cause of action for breach of that contract (which would be preempted). His allegations that Defendant’s actions were in breach of the union contract may stand as additional factual context in support of his existing causes of action.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV167534: SCHEIBER vs PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES; filed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a California corporation (Defendant) CRS# 138191392732 in Department 22

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the punitive damages allegations. The motion is DENIED as to allegations referencing the applicable union contract.

The court’s separately-issued order on Defendant’s demurrer will provide instructions on Plaintiff’s further amendment of the complaint.

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