HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

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25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 16D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant The Regents of the University of California’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiff Charity Hale’s complaint is ruled upon as follows.

In this action, Plaintiff alleges numerous employment related causes of action, including a claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”). Plaintiff, a pharmacist, alleges that Defendant retaliated against her and ultimately terminated her employment for disclosures that she made related to patient safety.

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s allegations which it claims are related to a collective bargaining agreement and Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations.

A motion to strike is appropriate to strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any pleading and the Court may strike out all or any party of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the law. (See Code Civ. Pro. § 436 (a)-(c).) A motion to strike challenges portions of a cause of action that are substantively defective on the face of the complaint. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-83; see also Code of Civ. Proc. § 437.) More specifically, a motion to strike should be granted to remove 'any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading,' or where the pleadings are drawn in violation of a law, rule or court order. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 436.) Examples of 'improper' matters include allegations which are 'at variance with the contract.' (California Sugar & White Pine Agency v. Penoyar (1914) 167 Cal. 274, 279.

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc, § 436.) A motion to strike is limited to the face of the challenged pleading or any matter of which the Court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 437(a).) The use of the motion to strike should be cautious and sparing. It should not be a procedural 'line item veto'. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 1683.)

Paragraph 83

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 16D

Defendant’s motion is denied.

Paragraph 83 alleges as follows: “Because the termination was classified as a layoff, Defendant was required to provide the union a list of pharmacists that the Defendant is retaining and the ones it is laying off, based on seniority. The University did not provide such a list. Dr. Hale was the only pharmacist laid off and was one of the most senior pharmacists within the campus. Per union contract, Dr. Hale was to have “bumping rights” based on seniority and had a multitude of positions she could have been moved to.

In addition, Defendant had been actively hiring at that time and continued doing so after Dr. Hale’s separation from Davis. Plaintiff alleges based upon information and belief that the layoff was a contrived pretext. In actuality, Plaintiff was unlawfully terminated due to her legally protected whistleblowing. Defendant did not honor Dr. Hale’s bumping rights because she was not actually laid off and Defendant wanted to get rid of a whistleblower.” (Comp. ¶ 83.)

Defendant moves to strike the majority of paragraph 83 on the basis that the Court cannot address the allegations regarding “bumping rights” without interpreting Plaintiff’s collective bargaining agreement which is a matter reserved for arbitration.

“ ‘It is the general rule that a party to a collective bargaining contract which provides grievance and arbitration machinery for the settlement of disputes within the scope of such contract must exhaust these internal remedies before resorting to the courts in the absence of facts which would excuse him from pursuing such remedies.’ ” (Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 (1971) 4 Cal.3d 888, 894.) As noted by the Third District Court of Appeal, “[a] party to a collective bargaining agreement containing an express grievance and arbitration mechanism can bypass arbitration only if it can be said “ ‘ “with positive assurance” ’ ” the clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” (Service Employees Internat.

Union, Local 1000 v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 866, 870.) In that case, the Third District affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustained a demurrer without leave to amend for failure to exhaust the grievance and arbitration remedies in a collective bargaining agreement. (Id. at 876.)

Here, the complaint does not attach the “union contract” referred to in paragraph 83, nor any collective bargaining agreement. There is no allegation in the complaint, nor any judicially noticeable material which would show that the “union contract” contains any grievance and arbitration provision covering any dispute referred to in paragraph 83. Defendant’s argument regarding any deficiency in paragraph 83 related to a collective bargaining agreement is not revealed from the face of the complaint. On this basis alone, the motion is denied.

In any event, Defendant seeks to strike much of paragraph 83 despite the fact that it refers to more than matter which Defendant contends relates to a collective bargaining agreement. To that end, paragraph 83 alleges that Plaintiff was the only pharmacist laid off and was one of the most

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 16D

senior pharmacists. This does not refer to any collective bargaining agreement. Essentially Plaintiff is alleging that any layoff was a pretext and that her employment was terminated due to her whistleblowing. “[M]atter that is essential to a cause of action should not be struck and it is error to do so.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281.) Defendant has failed to show that the entirety of paragraph 83 which it seeks to strike could not be used either to support the causes of action in the complaint or provide relevant context. In reality, Defendant appears to be doing nothing more than improperly seeking to use a motion to strike as a procedural “line item veto”. (PH II, Inc., supra, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1683.) This is improper. The motion to strike directed to paragraph 83 is denied.

Punitive Damages (¶¶ 105, 106 and Prayer No. 5.)

Defendant’s motion is granted.

While Defendant’s memorandum of points and authorities refers to paragraphs ¶¶ 107 and 108, those sections do not refer to punitive damages and the notice of motion does not mention those sections. The reference appears to be a typographical error.

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations on the basis that punitive damages are not available against a public entity. Defendant is correct.

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Gov. Code § 818.) Government Code § 811.2 defines public entity to include Defendant. (Id. § 811.2.)

Plaintiff argues that Government Code § 8547.10, which was enacted years after § 818 was enacted, provides an exception to § 818’s prohibition of punitive damages against a public entity. § 8547.10(c) provides as follows: “In addition to all other penalties by law, any person who intentionally engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a university employee for having made a protected disclosure shall be liable in an action for damages brought against him or her by the injured party.

Punitive damages may be awarded by the court where the acts of the offending party are proven to be malicious.” (Gov. Code § 8547.10(c).) Plaintiff reasons that since the § 8547.10(c) refers to “person” and since § 8547.2(d) defines a “person” as “an individual, corporation, trust, association, a state or local government, or an agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing” punitive damages are thus permitted against Defendant.

However, this Court concludes that § 8547.10(c) only permits punitive damages against individuals. First, the fact that the WPA was enacted long after § 818 does not assist Plaintiff. As seen above, § 818 begins with the language “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” “When the Legislature intends for a statute to prevail over all contrary law, it typically signals

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 16D

this intent by using the phrase ‘notwithstanding any other law’ or ‘notwithstanding other provisions of law.’” (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 332 (citations omitted).) Such a clause applies to current and later-enacted statutes. (People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105.) If the Legislature “had intended that the [statute’s notwithstanding clause] would not necessarily apply to later enacted statutes, it would have so specified.” (Id. at 122.) For example, a Penal Code statute enacted in 2018 which did not expressly bar pretrial diversion in DUI cases did not override a Vehicle Code statute enacted in 1981 which barred diversion in DUI cases. (Tellez v.

Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 439.) The Legislature’s decision not to include “notwithstanding” language in the later enacted statute meant that “the Legislature intended that the decades-old prohibition against diversion for DUI offenses should prevail.” (Id. at 448.) Here, Government Code § 818’s use of the “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law” applies to later enacted statutes like § 8547.10(c) and § 8547.10(c) contains no express language to override § 818. “[W]hen a statute is enacted against a ‘legal backdrop,’ we assume the background legal rules continue to apply absent a ‘definitive indication’ that the Legislature intended to displace them.” (Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at 335.)

Further, § 8547.10(c) specifically provides that a person shall be liable in an action for damages brought against “him or her by the injured party.” The very next sentence states that “[p]unitive damages may be awarded by the court where the acts of the offending party are proven to be malicious.” (Gov. Code § 8547.10(c).) The use of the term “him or her” supports the conclusion that the term “offending party” in the very next sentence refers to “him or her” or rather, an individual. Thus, § 8547.10(c) is properly interpreted to permit punitive damages against an individual but not a public entity. This interpretation harmonizes § 818 and § 8547.10(c).

A similar statutory scheme exists in the Education Code and that scheme has been interpreted by the Fifth District Court of Appeal to only permit punitive damages against individuals, not public entities. (Visalia Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2019) 43 Cal. App. 5th 563, 568-570.) In that case, a trial court denied a motion to strike punitive damages after concluding that Education Code § 44114(c) superseded Government Code § 818. The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court erred.

Education Code § 44114(c) provides: “In addition to all other penalties provided by law, a person who intentionally engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a public school employee or applicant for employment with a public school employer for having made a protected disclosure shall be liable in an action for damages brought against him or her by the injured party. Punitive damages may be awarded by the court where the acts of the offending party are proven to be malicious.” (Educ.

Code § 44114.) This section is essentially identical to Government Code § 8547.10(c). Visalia noted that the later enacted Education Code contained no language expressly repealing § 818 and thus the question was whether there was a repeal by implication. (Visalia, supra, 43 Cal. App. 5th at 569.) Visalia first set forth the relevant standards. “‘When a later statute supersedes or substantially modifies an earlier law but without expressly referring to it, the earlier law is repealed or partially repealed by implication.’ Since

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 16D

the Act contains no express repeal language, the issue is whether it accomplishes a repeal of Government Code section 818 by implication. The courts assume the Legislature in enacting a statute ‘was aware of existing related laws’ and ‘intended to maintain a consistent body of rules.’ Thus, ‘[a]ll presumptions are against a repeal by implication.’ ‘Absent an express declaration of legislative intent, we will find an implied repeal ‘only when there is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes [citation], and the statutes are ‘irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.’ ‘[T]he courts are bound to maintain the integrity of both statutes if they may stand together.’ The stringent standards for finding an implied repeal are ‘designed to act as a legal bulwark against judicial trespass into the legislative province.’ ‘Also relevant when the seeming inconsistencies appear in separate codes is the rule declaring that the codes blend into each other and constitute a single statute for the purposes of statutory construction.’” (Id. [citations omitted].) “Using the above standards, we find there was not an implied repeal.

Government Code section 818 employs the phrase ‘Notwithstanding any other provision of law,’ which is a ‘very comprehensive phrase[] [that] signals a broad application overriding all other code sections unless it is specifically modified by use of a term applying it only to a particular code section or phrase.’ To say the Act supersedes Government Code section 818’s bar on punitive damages merely because the two statutes conflict on a subject and the Act was passed later in time, would be to omit the phrase ‘Nothwithstanding any other provision of law’ from Government Code section 818.

We presume, as we must, the Legislature was aware of Government Code section 818 when it ratified the Act. When the Act and Government Code section 818 are read in conjunction, they correlate perfectly to mean that punitive damages may, under Education Code section 44114, subdivision (c), be imposed against all ‘persons,’ except public entities.” (Id. at 569-570 [citations omitted].) “Moreover, Government Code section 818 has been a fundamental part of California tort and public entity liability law since its 1963 enactment We are not persuaded the Legislature would have silently decided to depart from Government Code section 818 when such important public policy concerns are involved Instead, we are confident that had the Legislature intended to create an exception to Government Code section 818 in the Act, it would have expressly done so.” (Id.)

The Court finds that the analysis in Visalia is equally applicable to the essentially identical language in Government Code § 8547.10(c). When the WPA and § 818 are read in conjunction, “they correlate perfectly to mean that punitive damages may, under [Government Code § 8547.10], subdivision (c), be imposed against all ‘persons,’ except public entities.” (Visalia, supra, 43 Cal. App. 5th at 570 [citations omitted].) “

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the California Supreme Court has suggested that punitive damages are available against public entities. The cited authority only dealt with the issue of whether an employee was required to exhaust certain administrative remedies. (State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 963.) The issue of whether punitive damages may be recovered against a public entity under the WPA despite § 818’s prohibition was not discussed in any manner.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 16D

Plaintiff suggests that the entirety of Prayer no. 5 is not subject to being stricken because it refers to punitive damages in addition to “other penalties recoverable by law.” Plaintiff provides no argument as to how this portion of the prayer is proper given the prohibition in Government Code § 818. To the extent Plaintiff suggests that she is also permitted to recover attorneys’ fees, she has prayed for such fees in prayer no. 4 and Defendant did not move to strike that prayer.

As a result, Defendant’s motion to strike ¶¶ 105, 106, and prayer for relief no. 5 is granted as to moving Defendant. The Court does not address here whether or not these allegations and prayer may be maintained as to yet-to-be-identified Doe defendants.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of a 2018 tentative ruling from an Orange County Superior Court case is granted. However, this Court is not bound by the opinion of another trial court which has no precedential value. (Harrot v. County of Kings (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1138, 1148.)

In summary, the motion to strike is granted as to the punitive damages allegations but denied in all other respects.

Where the motion was granted, the motion is granted without leave to amend. Given the inability to recover punitive damages against a public entity, the Court finds there is no reasonable possibility that Plaintiff could amend the complaint to assert such a claim against Defendant.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.