12513 KNOTT STREET, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company vs. SIEV

Superior Court of the State of California County of Orange

Hon. ANDRE MANSSOURIAN Department C12 – (657) 622-5212

TENTATIVE RULINGS

Court will make every effort to post tentative rulings by approximately 3:00 p.m. on the court day before the date the motion is to be heard. If the parties agree to submit on the Court’s tentative ruling, please call Department C12 directly to inform the court that all parties submit to the Court’s tentative ruling. Reminder: Court does NOT provide court reporters. No filings or briefs of any kind will be accepted after the tentative ruling is posted. Parties are welcome to be present in court for the law and motion calendar or appear by Zoom. To make an appearance via Zoom please click the following link. If you are unable to log in, please call the department for an alternative arrangement. https://www.occourts.org/civil-remotehearings.

August 28, 2026

# Case Name Tentative 1. 12513 KNOTT STREET, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company vs. SIEV

26-01579581

1. Ex Parte (Appointing Receiver & TRO) 2. Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff 12513 Knott Street, LLC’s Application for Appointment of a Receiver and Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED in PART and otherwise DENIED without prejudice.

“[S]ection 564 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the appointment of a receiver on the application of the plaintiff or of any party whose right or interest in the property or funds is probable and where it is shown that the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured, and also in all cases where receivers have heretofore been appointed by courts of equity.” (Snidow v. Hill (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 702, 704.)

“A receiver may be appointed, in the manner provided by this chapter, by the court in which an action or proceeding is pending in any case in which the court is empowered by law to appoint a receiver.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 564(a).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 564(b) provides, in relevant part: “A receiver may be appointed by the court in which an action or proceeding is pending, or by a judge of that court, in the following cases: (1) In an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase of property, or by a creditor to subject any property or fund to the creditor’s claim, or between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund, on the application of the plaintiff, or of any party whose right to or interest in the property or fund, or the proceeds of the property or fund, is probable, and where it is shown that the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured. (2) In an action by a secured lender for the foreclosure of a deed of trust or mortgage and sale of property upon which there is a lien under a deed of trust or mortgage, where it appears that the property is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, or that the condition of the deed of trust or mortgage has not been performed, and that the property is probably insufficient to discharge the deed of trust or mortgage debt . . . . [¶¶.] (9) In all other cases where necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party. [¶.] (11) In an action by a secured lender for specific performance of an assignment of rents provision in a deed of trust, mortgage, or separate assignment document.

The appointment may be continued after entry of a judgment for specific performance if appropriate to protect, operate, or maintain real property encumbered by a deed of trust or mortgage or to collect rents therefrom while a pending nonjudicial foreclosure under power of sale in a deed of trust or mortgage is being completed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 564(b)(1), (2), (9), (11).)

“[T]rial courts enjoy a large measure of discretion, albeit not an entirely uncontrolled one, in deciding when to exercise their authority to appoint a receiver.” (Medipro Medical Staffing LLC v. Certified Nursing Registry, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 622, 627, internal quotes omitted.) “Because the appointment of a receiver transfers property— or in this case, a business—out of the hands of its owners and into the hands of a receiver, the appointment of a receiver is a very drastic, harsh, and costly remedy that is to be exercised sparingly with caution.” (Id. at p. 628, internal quotes & citations omitted.)

Thus, “[d]ue to the extraordinary nature of this remedy and the special costs it imposes, courts are strongly discouraged—although not strictly prohibited—from appointing a receiver unless the more intrusive oversight of a receiver is a necessity because other, less intrusive remedies are either inadequate or unavailable.” (Ibid., internal quotes omitted.)

The moving papers must establish one of the statutory grounds for appointment of a receiver by the preponderance of the evidence. (Miller v. Oliver (1917) 174 Cal. 407, 410; Moore v. Oberg (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 216, 220 [preponderance of the evidence standard].) “[B]ecause of the drastic character of the remedy, the discretion is not an entirely uncontrolled one but must be exercised with due regard for the facts in a particular case . . . Ordinarily, if there is any other remedy, less severe in its results, which will adequately protect the rights of the parties, a court should not take property out of the hands of its owners. [Citations.]” (Golden State Glass Corp. v. Superior Court (1939) 13 Cal.2d 384, 393; Alhambra-Shumway Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold Mine Corp. (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 869, 872.)

The moving party must also show a compelling need for such an appointment. (Hoover v. Galbraith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 519, 539.) Lastly, because a receivership is an equitable remedy, there must be a showing of irreparable injury and inadequacy of other remedies. (Golden State Glass Corp. v. Superior Court (1939) 13 Cal.2d 384, 393; Alhambra-Shumway Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold Mine Corp. (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 869, 872.)

Here, Moving Party has failed to show by a preponderance of evidence circumstances that warrant imposition of a receivership, along with the associated costs and effort involved in establishing and overseeing a receivership.

With respect to Code Civ. Proc. § 564, subds. (b)(1), (2), and (9), Moving Party has not shown that the subject property is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured if a receiver is not appointed. Moving Party has not shown that the value of the subject property is probably insufficient to satisfy the underlying debt secured by the deed of trust.

With respect to Code Civ. Proc. §564, subd. (b)(11), Moving Party, has shown that the deed of trust here incorporates a provision providing for the appointment of a receiver. But Moving Party has shown no compelling need for a receiver, risk of irreparable injury, and inadequacy of other remedies.

Specifically, Moving Party has failed to show why appointment of a receiver is necessary to prevent diversion of rental income generated by the subject property during the pendency of this action. A preliminary injunction restraining Defendant from diverting, concealing or otherwise disposing of rental income generated from the subject property is sufficient to protect Plaintiff’s interests without involving an unnecessarily costly process of appointing and overseeing a receiver. Furthermore, such an injunction would not cause substantial prejudice to Defendant. Moreover, Defendant’s interests can be protected by requiring Plaintiff to post an undertaking. (See Code Civ. Proc. §529.) Plaintiff has proposed an undertaking in the amount of $10,000. The Court considers this to be sufficient and an appropriate amount.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for appointment of a receiver without prejudice, but GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for entry of a preliminary injunction. Within 30 days, Plaintiff shall lodge a proposed preliminary injunction for the Court’s signature. The proposed preliminary injunction shall restrain Defendant from diverting, concealing, or otherwise disposing of any rental income obtained from the subject property without Plaintiff’s prior written consent and shall require Plaintiff to post an undertaking of $10,000 prior to the injunction taking effect.

Moving Party to provide notice. .

2. American Express National Bank vs. Turcotte

25-01530865

1. Motion to Quash Service of Summons 2. Case Management Conference

Defendant Stephen Turcotte’s Motion to Quash Service of the Summons is DENIED.

A motion to Quash Service of Summons is governed by Code Civ. Proc. §418.10. A motion to Quash is available where the plaintiff has not achieved valid service of summons on a defendant because until valid service of a valid summons has been made, the court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant. (See Code Civ. Proc. §418.10, subd. (a)(1); see also Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 371.) That a defendant has actual knowledge of the complaint does not cure defects in service of summons. (See Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.)

When a defendant moves to quash service, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. (School Dist. of Okaloosa County v. Superior Court (1997) 58