ZeroCarbon Offsets SPV I, L.P. v. Four Thirteen, LLC

On April 9, 2024, the Court signed and entered an order, pursuant stipulation of the parties, retaining jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement. (ROA 324.)

However, the parties are in dispute about what constitutes the settlement agreement. They agree that a written Settlement Agreement signed by all parties was entered into on March 22, 2024 (Hayden Decl., ¶4, Exhs. 1-2.) Under the Settlement Agreement, Four Thirteen was to pay Plaintiff $3,248,978.39 on or before September 22, 2025. (Hayden Decl., Exh. 1 at ¶ 1.1(a).) The Settlement Agreement provides that if the amount is not paid by September 22, 2025, judgment shall be entered in the Sea Purity Action for Sea Purity for the unpaid amount jointly and severally against Four Thirteen, Gagliano, Norton Individually and Norton as Trustee. (Id. at ¶ 1.1(c).)

When Four Thirteen failed to pay the amounts due by the September 22, 2025 deadline, the parties entered into three subsequent “Letter Agreements,” each extending the deadline further. (Hayden Decl., Exhs. 3-5.) In each of these Letter Agreements, Plaintiff agreed not to seek judgment, and Sea Purity agreed to pay interest at the rate of 10% plus a fee to cover legal fees for the extension period. (Ibid.)

In December 2025, with the settlement amount still not having been paid, the parties executed an “Amendment to Settlement Agreement.” (Hayden Decl., ¶29, Exh. 6.) Notably, however, Defendant Jay Rogers was not a signatory to the Amendment to Settlement Agreement. This was expressly addressed in Par.

7.

The Amendment to Settlement Agreement purports to revise the payment terms of the Settlement Agreement by providing that the funds will be paid to Plaintiff by way of Letter of Credit. (Hayden Decl, Exh. 6 at ¶ 2.)

In Plaintiff’s opening brief, Plaintiff contends that the Amendment to Settlement Agreement is not valid because it was not signed by Jay Rogers, and the original Settlement Agreement expressly provides that “This Settlement Agreement may only be amended in a writing, signed by duly authorized representatives of all Parties.” (Hayden Decl, Exh. 1 at ¶ 8.6.)

Plaintiff further argues that “Rogers is an individual defendant in the underlying action and therefore necessarily has an interest in the disposition of the case, including enforcement of the Settlement Agreement. This is clearly why Rogers was required to and did sign the Settlement Agreement – not only as a representative of certain entity defendants, but as an individual defendant himself. Even if he is not individually required to make payment under the Settlement Agreement,

his interest in the enforcement of the Settlement Agreement and ultimate disposition of this case remains material.” (Mtn at 14:24-15:1.)

In opposition, Defendants contend that the Amendment to Settlement Agreement is valid and enforceable, and that Jay Rogers’ signature on the Amendment was not necessary. Defendants further contend that they have complied with the terms of the Amendment to Settlement Agreement by initiating a Letter of Credit.

As noted above, Section 664.6 is only intended to provide a summary procedure, and is extremely limited in its application. The Court is not able to determine, based on the evidence provided, what Jay Rogers’ interest is in the settlement, and therefore declines to make a determination at this juncture as to the validity of the Amendment to Settlement Agreement. Further, the Court questions the effect of the three Letters of Extension on the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Amendment to the Settlement Agreement, insofar as it appears that Four Thirteen has already paid some prejudgment interest to Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

Plaintiff to give notice.

108 Premier Financial Services, LLC vs. 520 Capital, LLC., 25-01534382 Plaintiff Premier Financial Services, LLC’s Application for Writ of Possession against Defendant David Kent Riemann aka Dave Kent Riemann for the 2012 Mercedes Benz SLS AMG Roadster, VIN WDDRK7HA0CA009440 (the “Vehicle”) is GRANTED.

The Court ORDERS Defendant David Kent Riemann aka Dave Kent Riemann to turn over to Plaintiff the Vehicle which is believed to be located at 17 Cornflower Street, Coto De Caza, CA 92679 within 20 days. The failure to turn over the Vehicle to Plaintiff may subject Defendant to being held in contempt of court. The Court waives the requirement for Plaintiff to post an undertaking since the amount owed is higher than the estimated value of the Vehicle.

Defendant’s re-delivery bond shall be $131,830.85.

The Case management Conference is continued to 9/17/2026 at 1:30 p.m.

Moving Party is to give notice. 109 Stellantis Financial Services, Inc. vs. Nurkashev, 26-01538453 Motion off-calendar.

110 Clay vs. Delgadillo, 23-01359983 Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant, Jerome Anthony Clay, Jr. (“Clay”), and Cross-Defendant, The Law Office of Jerome A. Clay, A.P.C. (“Clay Law Office”) (collectively, “Cross-Defendants”) move for an order quashing the Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records issued by Defendants/Cross- Complainants, Frank Delgadillo, Jr.; Dessau, Inc.; and M86CEM, LLC (collectively, “Cross-Complainants”) to Wells Fargo National Association on January 8, 2026 (the “Deposition Subpoena”).

Cross-Defendants bring the subject motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1987.1

Cross-Defendants contend that the Deposition Subpoena consists of 27 document requests which seek documents relating to several Wells Fargo accounts tied to Clay’s personal CLAY J PREFERRED CHECKING xxxxxx2531, Law Office operating LAW OFFICE OF JEROME A CLAY A DDA xxxxxx9821, and IOLTA xxxxxx5122 accounts, as well as internal bank records reflecting transactions and account activity. Cross-Defendants contend these requests violate Cross-Defendants’ constitutional right to privacy under Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution, including confidential personal and law practice financial information and the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine.

Cross-Defendants additionally assert that the Deposition Subpoena is overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case. Cross-Defendants thus contend that the Court should exercise its discretion under section 1987.1 to quash the Subpoena in its entirety, or alternatively, enter a protective order to ensure any compelled discovery is narrowly tailored, proportionate, and subject to confidentiality safeguards.

Defendants/Cross-Complainants, M86CHEM, LLC; Dessau, Inc., and Frank Delgadillo (“Delgadillo Jr.”) (collectively, “Cross-Complainants”) contend that the motion should be denied as the Deposition Subpoena is narrowly tailored, directly relevant to the claims and defenses, and supported by bank records produced in prior discovery. Cross- Complainants contend that the information sought in the Deposition Subpoena is specific to the instant wire transfer of $2,640,000 from Meiwa Engineering in Japan to the IOLTA of Clay Law Office as fiduciary for M86CHEM, LLC, the legal grantor, secondary beneficiary, and only “client” of the clienttrust fund, and that the additional requests seek records showing whether those funds were transferred to authorized recipients or to persons and accounts outside the permitted disbursement instructions.

Cross-Complainants contend that the document requests do not violate Cross-Defendants right to privacy as the records sought are directly relevant to Cross-Complainants’ claims of fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty that goes to the very heart of the asserted