Motion to enforce settlement agreement
(Stanley Mosk Courthouse: Dept. 508) May 20, 2026 |
Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 508 ASCOT INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, vs. BLACKBIRD DISTRIBUTION LLC, Defendant. | Case No.: |
| Hearing Date: | May 20, 2026 | Hearing Time: | 10:00 a.m. | [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF ASCOT INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. SECTION 664.6 AND FOR ENTRY OF FINAL CONSENT JUDGMENT | | | | | | | Background On July 14, 2023, Plaintiff Ascot Insurance Company ("Ascot") filed a complaint against Defendant Blackbird Distribution LLC ("Blackbird"), alleging one causes of action for negligence.
On December 16, 2024, the Court found "that the following cases, 24STCV14446, 23STCV16544 and 24STCV12281, are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a) . 23STCV16544 is the lead case." (Minute Order 12/16/24.) Ascot now moves to enforce the terms of their settlement agreement with Blackbird. Blackbird opposes. Ascot replied. Legal Standard " If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.
If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. " (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 664.6, subd. (a) .) "Although a judge hearing a¿ section 664.6 ¿motion may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment, nothing in¿ section 664.6 ¿authorizes a judge to¿ create ¿the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms¿ the parties themselves ¿have previously agreed upon." (Weddington Productions, Inc. v.
Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 [internal citations omitted, emphasis in original] .)
Discussion
At issue in this case is whether the parties actually entered into a settlement agreement. Blackbird contends they did not, whereas Ascot contends the parties agreed to a valid, binding settlement agreement. Ascot explains that the complaint in "[t]his action arises from a fire that occurred on November 4, 2022, in the building located at 3121 and 3125 E. 12th St. in Los Angeles, California (hereinafter 'Fire'). The building was owned by Payou LLC. Blackbird and Ritz Systems occupied separate portions the building as tenants of Payou LLC.
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The fire originated in that portion of the building occupied by Blackbird. Plaintiff contends the Fire was caused by Blackbird. The fire damaged the building, Ritz Systems' business and business property, and neighboring businesses and buildings." (Mot., 3:21-26.) Ascot contends that the parties have a valid settlement agreement because the parties agreed to settle, and "[o]n December 23, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff sent a Release that was drafted and executed by Ascot ... and counsel's W-9 federal tax form to Blackbird's counsel." (Mot., 4:25-28; see Kiernan Decl., P.P. 9-11, Exs.
E-F.) Then, on February 6, 2025, Ascot's counsel received a proposed Settlement Agreement from Blackbird's counsel, and Ascot's counsel responded, "request[ing] that the phrase 'Client Trust Account' be deleted from the
proposed Settlement Agreement that is attached to Exhibit G hereto and to which was attached another copy of my firm's federal W-9 federal tax form." (Kiernan Decl., P.P. 12-13; Exs. G-H.) Then Ascot's counsel explains that Blackbird's counsel sent an email on September 22, 2025 with the Settlement Agreement, incorporating the changes Ascot's counsel requested in the email from February 6, 2025. (Kiernan Decl., P. 16; Ex. I.) However, Ascot's counsel then received an email "from counsel for Blackbird on November 24, 2025, which stated that Blackbird was not moving forward with the settlement because the settlement was based on Blackbird's settlement with plaintiffs in the San Louis Textile matter." (Kiernan Decl., P. 19; Ex.
L.) Ascot contends that "Blackbird made an offer to Ascot, Ascot accepted the offer, and Ascot performed all acts required by Blackbird to finalize the Agreement. Therefore, there was an Agreement," and the settlement should be enforced. (Mot., 7:4-5.) However, in response, Blackbird asserts that "Plaintiff relies on an unexecuted settlement agreement that Plaintiff signed and returned, coupled with settlement communications and a notice of settlement. However, Plaintiff's own evidence confirms Defendant did not execute the agreement and that defense counsel repeatedly communicated that execution/approval was still pending.
For example, when defense counsel circulated the 'proposed Settlement Agreement' on February 6, 2025, defense counsel stated, 'sending to my client on a parallel track' and that counsel would advise if the client had changes. Later, on September 22, 2025, defense counsel again stated, 'continu[ing] to wait for my client regarding the settlement agreement.' Those objective communications defeat any claim that Defendant agreed to be bound by the later-signed settlement agreement within the meaning of section 664.6." (Opp., 2:17-25.)
Although "[a] well-established principle of contract law" denotes that "when parties agree on the material terms of a contract with the intention to later reduce it to a formal writing, failure to complete the formal writing does not negate the existence of the initial contract" (CSAA Ins. Exch. v. Hodroj (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 272, 276), this principle is not followed under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Blackbird correctly asserts in opposition that Code of Civil Procedure "[s]ection 664.6 is an expedited enforcement device that requires strict compliance." (Opp., 2:8; see Critzer v.
Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1262 ["The fact that not all of the parties gave their personal consent to the Settlement precluded the court from granting a motion to enforce under section 664.6, even though the Critzers themselves personally consented to the oral Settlement. [Citations.] While, on the surface, this result may seem to exalt form over substance, the statute is clear and '[b]ecause of its summary nature, strict compliance with the requirements of section 664.6 is prerequisite to invoking the power of the court to impose a settlement agreement.'"] .) "In order to be enforceable pursuant to the summary procedures of section 664.6, a settlement agreement must either be entered into orally before a court ... or must be in writing and signed by the parties.
The reason for the party-signature requirement is that 'settlement is such a serious step that it requires the client's knowledge and express consent. [Citation.]'" (Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810.) Here, the parties never
executed a formalized settlement in writing that would be subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 because " section 664.6 ... expressly requires the writing to be signed by the 'parties.'" (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (199 9) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 305.) Although the agreement was in its final steps, the presented evidence demonstrates that only Ascot signed the settlement agreement. Without Blackbird's signature, the parties do not have a valid written settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.
The parties also do not have an oral settlement agreement, because there is no argument or evidence to suggest they orally stipulated in front of the Court. (See Conservatorship of McElroy (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 536, 551 ["Unambiguous assent, expressed orally, is required in order to 'minimize[] the possibility of conflicting interpretations of the settlement. [Citations.]'"].) In response, Ascot avers that "[m]onths after negotiations had concluded and for an alleged 'condition' that was not in the settlement agreement, Defendant tried to repudiate the agreement. (Kiernan Decl. para. 19 and Ex.
L) C.C.P. Section 664.6 is not intended to shield such conduct. The record conclusively establishes mutual assent to the terms, finality, and enforceability, of the settlement agreement." (Reply, 2:2-5.) However, the law is clear that the settlement agreement must be signed and executed on paper or stipulated to in a judicial proceeding. Ascot does not demonstrate that this occurred. Thus, based on the foregoing declarations and evidence, the parties did not enter into an enforceable written or oral settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Ascot's motion to enforce settlement is DENIED. Ascot is ordered to provide notice of this Order. DATED: May 20, 2026 _____________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court Case Number: 24STCV25635 Hearing Date: May 20, 2026 Dept: 508 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 508 Apple Valley COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Plaintiff, vs. SUN-UP VENTURE, INC., et al., Defendants.