Tominaga et al. v. Palo Alto Cuisine, et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 12 Honorable Nahal Iravani-Sani, Presiding Courtroom Clerk, Ryan Nguyen 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: (408) 882-2230

DATE: 08/19/2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. and 9:01 A.M.

LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING LINE 1 23CV424431 Eslambolchizadeh MOTION TO COMPEL v. Sonicwall Inc. Off Calendar per Stipulation and Order 8/12/2026 LINE 2 23CV425156 Katrina Vallejo et. al MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE v. Richard Hansen et al. Plaintiff’s motion for trial preference pursuant to CCP section 36(b).

Notice is proper. The Court has received no opposition from Defendants. “[T]he failure to file an opposition creates an inference that the motion or demurrer is meritorious.” (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Good Cause Appearing, Plaintiff’s motion is granted. The case shall proceed to trial within 120 days. Counsel to meet and confer and appear on 8/19/26 for trial re-setting scheduling. (Please be advised the Court is DARK the weeks of 12/21/26 and 12/28/26.)

Plaintiff to prepare the final order, accompanied by the necessary Forms EFS-020, within 7 days of the date of the hearing.

LINE 3 24CV438575 H.J. DEMURRER v. Doe 1 and County of Santa Clara Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Line 3 LINE 4 25CV456689 Richard Chamberlain MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS v. Santa Clara Public Defender’s Office et al. Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Line 4 LINE 5 25CV457483 Richard Chamberlain MOTION TO STRIKE v. Jason Chamberlain Moot in light of ruling on Motion for Summary Judgement; Off calendar LINE 6 25CV463225 Bejar Moreno et al. MOTION TO COMPEL v. Bernice Chavez Off calendar per dismissal filed 8/6/2026 LINE 7 25CV471884 Tominaga et al. DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE v. LINE 8 Palo Alto Cuisine, et al. Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Line 7 - 8

Calendar Line 7 - 8 Case Name: Xiaoyan “Stacey” Tominaga, et al. v. Palo Alto Cuisine d.b.a. Imperial Treasure, et al. Case No.: 25CV471884

Plaintiffs Xiaoyan “Stacey” Tominaga (“Tominaga”), Shengdong “Udon” Wu (“Wu”), Hongmei “Jenny” Sun (“Sun”), Guoping “Jack” Chen (“Chen”), Honglin Li (“Li”), Shaoliang “Jackson” Yue (“Yue”), Mingyu “Jake” Yang (“M. Yang”), Yi Liang (“Liang”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege causes of action against Defendants Palo Alto Cuisine doing business as Imperial Treasure (“Imperial Treasure”), Cheng “D-Day” Han (“Han”), Kun Yang (“Yang”), and Does 1-10. Defendants Imperial Treasure, Han, and Kun Yang (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Also before the court is Defendants’ motion to strike (“Motion to Strike”).

Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED in its entirety. Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs worked for Imperial Treasure. (SAC, ¶¶ 17-18, 20-26.) Plaintiffs allege that they were underpaid, their tips were misappropriated, that they did not receive wage statements, and that they were denied meal and rest breaks. (SAC, ¶¶ 27-64.) Plaintiff Tominaga further alleges that she was subjected to pregnancy-related harassment and discrimination. (SAC, ¶¶ 65-85.) Plaintiff Wu reported concerns about pay and tips and was subsequently threatened and terminated. (SAC, ¶¶ 86-96.)

Tominaga alleges causes of action for (1) sexual harassment; (2) sex discrimination; (3) disability discrimination; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process; (5) failure to provide reasonable accommodation; (6) retaliation; (7) failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, or retaliation against Defendant Imperial Treasure. Plaintiff Wu alleges a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy against Defendant Imperial Treasure.2 Plaintiffs further allege Labor Code violations in causes of action nine through fifteen, though not all causes of action are brought by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants as detailed further below.

Defendants demurred to the SAC and moved to strike the SAC’s references to punitive and duplicative damages and “conclusory agency and ratification allegations” on February 25, 2026. (Motion to Strike, 6:18-19.) Plaintiffs opposed on August 5, 2026 (“Opposition”).

I. DEMURRER

A.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading. (Trs. Of Capital Wholesale Elec. Etc. Fund v. Shearson Lehman Bros. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 617, 621.) Consequently, “[a] demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.” (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 762, internal citations and quotations omitted; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd.

2 This cause of action is the eighth cause of action in the SAC.

(a).) “It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s conduct. ... Thus, ... the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be.” (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958, internal citations and quotations omitted.)

In ruling on a demurrer, the allegations of the complaint must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Glennen v. Allergan, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) Nevertheless, while “[a] demurrer admits all facts properly pleaded, [it does] not [admit] contentions, deductions or conclusions of law or fact.” (George v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120.)

B. Discussion

1. Tominaga’s Causes of Action against Imperial Treasure

First Cause of Action (Sexual Harassment)

Defendants demur to Plaintiff Tominaga’s cause of action for sexual harassment because the SAC “does not clearly distinguish between alleged conduct that could constitute harassment and alleged employment decisions that form the basis of discrimination or retaliation claims,” thus making the SAC’s allegations uncertain or ambiguous. (Demurrer, p. 11:17-19.)

A pleading is subject to demurrer where it “is uncertain.” (§ 430.10, subd. (f).) For purposes of demurrer, the term “ ‘uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Ibid.) “Demurrers for uncertainty . . . are disfavored. [Citation.] ‘A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.’ [Citation.]” (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) “It is the well established rule that a special ‘demurrer should not be sustained where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet. [Citations.]

A special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach the failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading, but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Butler v. Sequeira (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 143, 145-146.)

Here, Plaintiff Tominaga alleges that she “was subjected to discriminatory comments about women and pregnant women and decisions that singled her out as a pregnant woman.” (SAC, ¶ 65.) Tominaga further alleges that Defendant Han, who was responsible for payment of wages and other working conditions at Imperial Treasure, told her not to hire women because women are “dramatic,” and referred to women as being harder to manage and “having periods, and being weak.” (SAC, ¶¶ 36, 66.) The SAC states that when Tominaga told Han she was pregnant, he texted her “I do not know how to arrange work for pregnant women, what time to give what work...You also know that it’s impossible for our store to stop and wait for you to give birth...you also know that when I contacted you last year, I specifically mentioned this matter, and you also promised not to get married or have children within three to five years.” (SAC, ¶ 70.)

The SAC also alleges that Han yelled at her in person and over the phone. (SAC, ¶¶ 72, 73.) The SAC pleads sex-based harassment and specifies the conduct alleged to be harassment. The SAC thus sufficiently apprises Defendants of the nature of Tominaga’s allegations of sexual harassment.

Defendants’ demurrer to the SAC’s first cause of action for sexual harassment is OVERRULED.

Second and Third Causes of Action (Sex Discrimination and Disability Discrimination)

Defendants demur to Plaintiff Tominaga’s second and third causes of action for sex discrimination and disability discrimination, arguing that those causes of action cannot be maintained against individual defendants and are duplicative.

As Plaintiff points out in opposition, the SAC clearly states that the second and third causes of action are advanced “(By Plaintiff TOMINAGA Against Defendant IMPERIAL TREASURE).” (Opposition, p. 7:12-21.) Defendants’ arguments about individually named Defendants are inapposite.

Duplicative causes of action can be a basis for sustaining a demurrer. (See Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290.) However, “under California’s primary right theory of code pleading, we determine the causes of action alleged in the complaint based on the injury to the plaintiff, not on the legal theory or theories advanced to characterize it. [Citations] Thus, if a plaintiff states several purported causes of action which allege an invasion of the same primary right he has actually stated only one cause of action. On the other hand, if a plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s single wrongful act invaded two different primary rights, he has stated two causes of action[.]” (Choi v. Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 308, 335, internal quotation marks omitted.)

The Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), on which the second and third causes of action are based, makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer, “because of the ... physical disability ... [or] sex ... of any person, ... to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Cal. Gov’t Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) Here, Tominaga has asserted that the same wrongful acts invaded two primary rights: both her right to be protected from sex discrimination as well as her right to be protected from disability discrimination. Thus, Tominaga has stated two distinct causes of action. (See also Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 585 [“discrimination based on each protected characteristic is a separate claim under FEHA”].)

Defendants’ demurrer to the second and third causes of action is OVERRULED.

Fourth through Seventh Causes of Action (Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process; Failure to Provide a Reasonable Accommodation; Retaliation; Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation)

Defendants demur to the Plaintiff Tominaga’s fourth through seventh causes of action because those causes of action cannot be maintained against individual defendants. Much like the second and third causes of action, the SAC states that the fourth through seventh causes of action are advanced by Tominaga against Imperial Treasure. Defendants’ arguments about individually named Defendants are thus inapposite.

As such, Defendants’ demurrer to the SAC’s fourth through seventh causes of action is OVERRULED.

Eighth Cause of Action (Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy brought by Plaintiff Wu against Defendant Imperial Treasure)

Defendants demur to the SAC’s eighth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, which is brought by Plaintiff Wu against Imperial Treasure. Defendants argue that “the SAC does not identify any independent public policy basis, distinct adverse conduct, or separate damages supporting the 8th Cause of Action apart from the alleged statutory retaliation,” and is improperly duplicative. (Demurrer, p. 17:15-22.)

A discharge is actionable as against public policy only if it violates a policy that is: “(1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) ‘substantial’ and ‘fundamental.’” (Carter v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922, 929, internal citations omitted.) Here, the SAC identifies Labor Code section 1102.5 as a statute implicating public policy concerns. (SAC, ¶ 156.)

The SAC alleges that Plaintiff Wu was terminated for engaging in protected activity under Labor Code section 1102.5. (SAC, ¶ 157.) The SAC thus properly pleads wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (See Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 77 [“broad public policy interest in encouraging workplace whistleblowers to report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation” under Labor Code section 1102.5.]; Diego v. Pilgrim United Church of Christ (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 913, 923 [wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim can be based on Labor Code retaliation protections].)

To the extent that Defendants argue the eighth cause of action is improperly duplicative of statutory retaliation claims, this too cannot be a basis for sustaining Defendants’ demurrer to the eighth cause of action because Plaintiff Wu does not bring any statutory retaliation claims. The other retaliation claims in the SAC are brought solely by Plaintiff Tominaga. In addition, as Plaintiffs point out in opposition, “[i]f Defendants are claiming that Plaintiff Wu’s claim restates itself because the claim relies on Labor Code section 1102.5, their argument is nonsensical: a claim cannot be duplicative of or restate itself.” (Opposition, p. 17:22-24.)

Defendants’ demurrer to the SAC’s eighth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Ninth through Fifteenth Causes of Action (Failure to Pay Minimum Wage; Failure to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages; Meal and Rest Break Violations; Pay Statement Violations; Misappropriation of Tips; Late Payment of Final Wages; Failure to Indemnify Necessary Expenditures)

The ninth cause of action for failure to pay minimum wage is brought by Plaintiff Tominaga against all Defendants. The tenth cause of action for failure to pay minimum and overtime wages is brought by Plaintiffs Wu, Sun, Chen, Li, Yue, M. Yang, and Yi Liang against all Defendants. The eleventh cause of action for meal and rest break violations is brought by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants. The twelfth cause of action for pay statement violations is brought by Plaintiffs Tominaga, Wu, Sun, Chen, Li, Yue, and Liang against all Defendants.

The thirteenth cause of action for misappropriation of tips is brought by Plaintiffs Tominaga, Sun, Li, Yue, and M. Yang against all Defendants. The fourteenth cause of action for late payment of final wages is brought by Plaintiffs Tominaga, Sun, Li, Yue, and M. Yang against all Defendants. The fifteenth cause of action for failure to indemnify necessary expenditures is brought by Plaintiff Tominaga against all Defendants.

Defendants demur to the SAC’s ninth through fourteenth causes of action because the causes of action do not sufficiently plead individual liability and fail to state a claim as to any Defendant. The ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action are asserted against all defendants. The thirteenth cause of action is addressed to Imperial Treasure only. Accordingly, the court rejects the argument based on individual liability as to the thirteenth cause of action.

The ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action (for failure to pay minimum wage, failure to pay overtime wage, meal and rest break violations, pay statement violations, and late payment of final wages respectively) are all asserted under Labor Code section 558.1, which forms the basis for individual liability. Labor Code section 558.1 states that “any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of work...may be held liable as the employer for such violation.” (Lab.

Code, § 558.1, subd. (a).) To be personally liable, “an individual must have engaged in some affirmative action beyond his or her status as an owner, officer or director of the corporation. However, that does not necessarily mean the individual must have had involvement in the day-to-day operations of the company, nor is it required the individual authored the challenged employment policies or specifically approved their implementation. But to be held personally liable he or she must have had some oversight of the company’s operations or some influence on corporate policy that resulted in Labor Code violations.” (Espinoza v.

Hepta Run, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 44, 59.)

Here, the SAC alleges that Defendant Han was responsible for “payment of wages and other working conditions” and that Defendant Kang was a Chief Financial Officer and Chief Executive Officer with authority over Han. (SAC, ¶¶ 35, 36.) The SAC further alleges numerous instances of Han directing or instructing employees, distributing tips to employees, and terminating or hiring employees. (SAC, ¶¶ 27, 38, 39, 67, 69, 93.) The SAC thus alleges that Han and Kang had some oversight over the company’s operations such that they could be individually liable for Labor Code violations. (See also Usher v. White (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 883, 897 [“whether an individual could be liable under section 558.1 ‘cannot be determined by any bright-line rule, as this inquiry requires an examination of the particular facts in light of the conduct, or lack thereof, attributable to the [individual].”].)

Defendants also demur on the basis that causes of action nine through fourteen fail to state a claim as to any Defendant. Defendants argue that the SAC “asserts multiple wage-andhour claims on behalf of numerous plaintiffs who worked in different positions, during different time periods, and under different alleged compensation arrangements, yet it does not distinguish which alleged decisions or actions by the individual defendants relate to which plaintiff or which statutory violation. The use of generalized group pleading in this context renders the claims uncertain and fails to provide adequate notice of the factual basis for personal liability.” (Demurrer, p. 10:5-10.)

Defendants further argue that “SAC does not allege representative workweeks, identify specific pay periods in which statutory violations occurred, or plead calculations showing how compensation resulted in minimum wage or overtime violations for particular plaintiffs during identifiable periods of employment.” (Demurrer, p. 12:18-22.)

Defendants do not provide any authority establishing that Plaintiffs are required to plead wage violations with the granular level of detail suggested. (See People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282 [a point asserted without argument or authority in support is without foundation and requires no discussion].)

Defendants further argue that the twelfth cause of action for pay statement violations “does not plead facts showing a knowing and intentional failure to comply with Labor Code section 226 or facts showing injury resulting from the alleged deficiencies, both of which are required elements of the claim.” (Demurrer, p. 13:8-11.) This point is again made without authority. Moreover, “an employee has a statutory right to an accurate pay stub, and “a very modest showing...[of injury] will suffice” to recover damages under the statute. (Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1306.)

Defendants advance a similar argument with respect to the SAC’s fourteenth cause of action for late payment of final wages. Defendants argue that the SAC does not sufficiently plead waiting time penalties because it does not plead that the delay was willful as required by Labor Code section 203, but Defendants provide no supporting authority for that proposition. (See People v. Dougherty, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 282.)

In addition, while the SAC does assert multiple wage-and-hour claims on behalf of numerous plaintiffs, the SAC specifies which allegation and cause of action is brought by which plaintiff against which defendant and clearly alleges that Plaintiffs worked for Defendants and were not paid minimum or overtime wages, not given meal or rest breaks, not given pay statements, not given tips appropriately, and not given their final wages within 72 hours. (SAC, ¶¶ 162-164, 168-170, 173-182, 186-188, 192, 196-202.) “To survive demurrer, a plaintiff is only required to plead ultimate facts . ...

Whether [they] can produce at trial, or in response to a motion for summary judgment, evidence that will in fact support all or any of [their] allegations ... is another matter.” (Roger v. County of Riverside (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 510, 533, internal citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)

Defendants contend they are demurring to all causes of action but fail to make any argument regarding the fifteenth cause of action. As such, to the extent the demurrer is targeting the fifteenth cause of action, Defendants’ demurrer to the fifteenth cause of action is OVERRULED. (See WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 895 [arguments unsupported by legal analysis or record citations are deemed forfeited].)

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ SAC is OVERRULED.3

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

3 The court acknowledges Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend in Plaintiffs’ opposition papers to add plaintiffs to certain causes of action. A request for leave to amend must include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a)(1).) Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend to add plaintiffs to certain causes of action is denied for not being filed in accordance with rules of court.

A.

Legal Standard

A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter asserted in a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) A court may also strike out all or any part of a pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of the State of California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) The court’s decision to strike the petition pursuant to section 436 is discretionary. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 436 [“The court may . . . strike”].)

B. Punitive Damages

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages in the SAC on the grounds that the SAC “does not identify particular acts constituting despicable conduct, facts showing a willful and conscious disregard of rights, or factual allegations demonstrating advance knowledge, authorization, or ratification by an officer, director, or managing agent as required[.]” (Motion to Strike, p. 5:26-28.)

Civil Code section 3294 allows for punitive damages on a showing that a defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) states that an employer cannot be liable for punitive damages for the actions of an employee unless “the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) “With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Ibid.)

“The term managing agent includes only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy. [T]o demonstrate that an employee is a true managing agent ..., a plaintiff seeking punitive damages would have to show that the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation’s business. But the determination of whether certain employees are managing agents does not necessarily hinge on their level in the corporate hierarchy. Rather, the critical inquiry is the degree of discretion the employees possess in making decisions ... .” (Powerhouse Motorsports Group, Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 867, 886, internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)

Defendants move to strike “[a]ll allegations seeking punitive damages, including but not limited to paragraphs 117, 122, 127, 133, 139, and 148, and the corresponding portions of the Prayer for Relief, on the grounds that such allegations are conclusory and fail to satisfy the requirements of Civil Code section 3294, and in part seek relief not recoverable as a matter of law.” (Motion to Strike, p. 7:22-26.) Paragraphs 117, 122, 127, 133, 139, and 148 of the SAC all seek punitive damages under the first six causes of action wherein Plaintiff Tominaga alleges that Defendants discriminated against her based on her sex and disability, failed to engage in the interactive process, failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, and retaliated against her. (SAC, ¶¶117, 122, 127, 133, 139, and 148.)

Plaintiff Tominaga alleges that Defendant Han made discriminatory comments and yelled at her multiple times. (SAC, ¶¶ 65, 66, 72, 73.) The SAC’s punitive damages allegations are thus not conclusory or insufficient to show oppression, fraud, or malice. (See Zirpel v. Alki David Productions, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 563, 580 [punitive damages proper where agent of employer yelled at and terminated employee for reporting workplace safety concerns]; Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 204, 221-222 [punitive damages proper in sexual harassment case].)

In addition, the SAC alleges that Defendant Han acted as a managing agent of Defendant Imperial Treasure because the SAC alleges that Han was responsible for “payment of wages and other working conditions,” and mentions numerous instances of Han directing or instructing employees, distributing tips to employees, and terminating or hiring employees. (SAC, ¶¶ 27, 36, 38, 39, 67, 69, 93.) The SAC thus adequately alleges that Defendant Han acted as a managing agent of Defendant Imperial Treasure and Han’s conduct towards Plaintiff Tominaga is sufficient to allege oppression, fraud, or malice.

Accordingly, the motion to strike punitive damages is DENIED.

C. Agency Allegations

Defendants move to strike “the conclusory agency and ratification allegations in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the SAC.” (Motion to Strike, p. 6: 18-20.) Defendants argue that “no facts are stated showing how any defendant authorized or controlled the others, what specific scope of authority existed, or how any defendant manifested consent to another’s acts. Without factual detail as to the specific agency relationship or showing ratification with knowledge and intent, these claims are indistinguishable from mere conclusions.” (Id. at p. 6:12-17.) Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the SAC are excerpted below.

DOES 1–10 (hereinafter, “Doe Defendants”) are individuals whose true identities and capacities are as yet unknown to the Plaintiff and her counsel, despite diligent inquiry and investigation, and who are responsible in some manner for the occurrences and Plaintiff’s injuries, as herein alleged. The true names and capacities of Doe Defendants will be substituted as they become known. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that at all times herein mentioned, Doe Defendants were the agents, servants, and/or employees of each of the other Defendants and/or Doe Defendants and were acting with the permission and consent and within the course and scope of said agency and employment.

For purposes of this Complaint, IMPERIAL TREASURE’S policymakers, administrators, and/or persons with supervisory or decision-making authority regarding the issues that are the subject of this Complaint are designated as DOES 1–5. DOES 6–10 are IMPERIAL TREASURE’S employees without supervisory or decision-making authority who may be liable on the Complaint but who have not yet been discovered and named. DOES 1–10 are sued herein in their individual capacities. (SAC, ¶ 15.) At all times herein mentioned, each Defendant was an employee and agent of each remaining Defendant and acted within the scope of said employment and agency when committing the acts and omissions described in this Complaint.

Plaintiff believes and alleges that each wrongful act and omission was committed with express or implied approval of every other Defendant and that each Defendant ratified and approved all acts and omissions of others. (SAC, ¶ 16.) The SAC does not make conclusory allegations about agency and ratification such that paragraphs 15 and 16 should be stricken, as the SAC alleges facts regarding each Defendant’s agency and ratification elsewhere. The SAC alleges that Defendant Imperial Treasure is a California corporation for which Defendants Han and Kang worked, and Defendant Han was responsible for “payment of wages and other working conditions” while Defendant Kang was a Chief Financial Officer and Chief Executive Officer with authority over Han. (SAC, ¶¶ 11-13, 35, 36.)

The SAC further alleges numerous instances of Han directing or instructing employees, distributing tips to employees, and terminating or hiring employees. (SAC, ¶¶ 27, 38, 39, 67, 69, 93.) The SAC thus sufficiently alleges that Defendants Han and Kang acted within the scope of their employment while working for Defendant Imperial Treasure. Moreover, even if the SAC did not make those additional factual allegations, “general allegations of agency suffice to establish...that defendants are the agents of plaintiffs,” and “an allegation of agency...is a statement of ultimate fact,” not a conclusion of law. (Skopp v.

Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 437, 439.)

Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 15 and 16 of the SAC is DENIED.

D. Duplicative Penalties

Defendants also move to strike “the portions of the Prayer for Relief seeking duplicative penalties, restitution, or other monetary recovery for the same alleged wage-andhour conduct, on the grounds that duplicative recovery is impermissible as a matter of law.” (Motion to Strike, p. 8:2-6.) Defendants provide no authority or argument on this point. Defendants’ motion to strike references to duplicative penalties in the SAC is DENIED. (See WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 895 [arguments unsupported by legal analysis or record citations are deemed forfeited]; People v. Dougherty, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282.)

Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED in its entirety.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED in its entirety. Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED in its entirety.

The court will prepare the Order.

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