Lorenzo vs. Chartwell Staffing Services, Inc.

the Fourth, Sixth, and Twelfth Causes of Action. IT IS ORDERED THAT any amended complaint shall be filed by Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days of this ruling.

LCC Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint, joined by Partners, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The court GRANTS LCC Defendants’ requests for judicial notice of the Complaint in this action and the PAGA Notice Public Search – Case Detail for Plaintiff’s PAGA Notice retrieved from the California Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) online searchable PAGA case database (LWDA Case No. LWDA-CM-1115519-25). (Cal. Evid. Code §§ 452(c), (d).) The court DENIES LCC Defendants’ requests for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s December 17, 2024 PAGA Notice received by D.F. Stauffer, as it is not the proper subject of judicial notice.

LCC Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Pay for all Wages Earned; the Sixth Cause of Action for Failure to Maintain Accurate Payroll Records; the Twelfth Cause of Action for Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.; and the Eighteenth Cause of Action for Civil Penalties Pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699 on the grounds of failure to state each claim.

A. Fourth Cause of Action: Only as to Claim for Failure to Pay for all Wages Earned

The Fourth Cause of Action alleges two claims: Failure to Pay Minimum Wages (in violation of Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1197) and Failure to Pay for All Wages Earned (in violation of Labor Code § 204). (Compl. at p. 19.) However, LCC Defendants only demur to a portion of the Fourth Cause of Action: the claim for failure to pay for all wages earned in violation of Labor Code § 204.

“[A] general demurrer does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly pleaded, the demurrer will be overruled.” (Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Ct. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 446, 452.) “A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 97, 119.) “[I]n some cases a portion of a cause of action will

be substantively defective on the face of the complaint.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 1682.) “Although a defendant may not demur to that portion,” “when a substantive defect is clear from the face of a complaint, such as a violation of the applicable statute of limitations or a purported claim of right which is legally invalid, a defendant may attack that portion of the cause of action by filing a motion to strike.” (Id. at 1682-1683.)

As a demurrer is not the proper method for challenging a portion of a cause of action, the court overrules LCC Defendants’ Demurrer as to the Fourth Cause of Action.

B. Sixth Cause of Action: Only as to Claim for Failure to Maintain Accurate Payroll Records

The Sixth Cause of Action alleges two claims: Failure to Maintain and Produce Accurate Payroll Records (in violation of Labor Code §§ 1174 and 1174.5) and Improper Wage Statements (in violation of Labor Code § 226(a)). As with the Fourth Cause of Action, LCC Defendants demur to only a portion of the Sixth Cause of Action: the claim for failure to maintain and produce accurate payroll records in violation of Labor Code §§ 1174 and 1174.5.

As stated above, a defendant cannot demur to only a portion of a cause of action. Thus, the court OVERRULES LCC Defendants’ Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action.

C. Twelfth Cause of Action for Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.

LCC Defendants demur to the Twelfth Cause of Action under the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) for violation of California Business and Professions Code §17200 on the grounds that equitable relief provided under the UCL is unavailable since Plaintiff purportedly has adequate remedies at law. LCC Defendants argue that Plaintiff already asserts separate causes of action in the Complaint for each of the purported violations underlying her UCL cause of action, and thus has adequate remedies at law available through these other underlying causes of action.

“While the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, its remedies are limited.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1144.) “A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered.” (Id.) Under the UCL, “[p]revailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.” (Id.) “[I]t is axiomatic that a court should determine the adequacy of a remedy in law before resorting to equitable relief.” (Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs. (1992) 503 U.S. 60, 75-76.) “[T]he proper inquiry would be whether monetary damages provided an adequate remedy, and if not, whether equitable relief would be appropriate.” (Id. at 76.)

Courts have held that a plaintiff “c[an] not maintain its UCL claims, which [a]re equitable in nature, [when] it ha[s] an adequate remedy at law—its other causes of action for which it sought money damages, which the court ruled was ‘true even if the plaintiff's non-UCL claims ultimately fail.’” (Aton Ctr., Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. (2023) 93 Cal. App. 5th 1214, 1248 [affirming trial court’s judgment].)

However, “if the violation of another law does not create a private right of action, if the violation constitutes unfair competition, it is actionable.” (McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc. (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1475.) As LCC Defendants claim that some of the alleged Labor Code violations do not provide for a private right of action and/or relief under PAGA may not be available due to the specific requirements under that statute, equitable relief may be available under the UCL. Further, restitution is available under PAGA for withheld wages, as they are not considered damages. “[O]rders for payment of wages unlawfully withheld from an employee are also a restitutionary remedy authorized by [the UCL].” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co. (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 163, 177.)

While LCC Defendants have shown that Plaintiff may have other legal remedies for some of the claims, LCC Defendants have not demonstrated that the remedies are adequate such that equitable relief is unavailable. The court finds no reason to preclude Plaintiff from offering these alternative theories of liability at the pleading stage. The court overrules LCC Defendants’ demurrer as to the Twelfth Cause of Action.

D. Eighteenth Cause of Action for Civil Penalties Pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699

LCC Defendants demur to the Eighteenth Cause of Action under PAGA on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts to establish standing and because the PAGA claim is time-barred on its face based on the allegations of the Complaint. Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition, questions of standing and statutes of limitation may be decided at the demurrer stage. (Robinson v. S. Ctys. Oil Co. (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 476, 481 [“Standing is the threshold element required to state a cause of action and, thus, lack of standing may be raised by demurrer.”]; Van de Kamps Coal. v. Bd. of Trs. of Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist. (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1044 [‘The defense of statute of limitations may be asserted by general demurrer if the complaint shows on its face that the statute bars the action.”].)

Under the current PAGA statute, there are three prerequisites for serving as a putative PAGA plaintiff: (1) qualifying as an “aggrieved employee,” (2) providing written notice to the LWDA, and (3) satisfying PAGA’s statute of limitations. (Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932, 941, review granted 2025 Cal. Lexis 4161 (July 9, 2025).)

First, under the current PAGA statute applicable to the facts in this action, an “aggrieved employee” means “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and personally suffered each of the violations alleged during the period prescribed under Section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” which sets forth a one year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty . . .” (Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(c)(1); CCP § 340(a).) This amendment to the standing requirement was added to “permit[] only those who suffer an alleged Labor Code violation during the one-year statute of limitations to bring a representative PAGA claim.” (Osuna v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc. (2025) 111 Cal. App. 5th 516, 526.)

Second, “to be a PAGA plaintiff, a private individual—prior to filing suit—must first provide ‘written notice’ to the [LWDA] and to the employer, and this notice must specify ‘the specific labor violations alleged, along with the facts and theories supporting the claim.’” (Williams, 110 Cal. App. 5th at 941.) “Because a PAGA plaintiff must first satisfy the notice requirement and because the statute of limitations is tolled during the 65-day period for the [LWDA] to review the notice, a PAGA action is timely if notice is served on the Agency

within one year of accrual of the action.” (Id. at 942.)

Third, the PAGA plaintiff must satisfy “the statute of limitations.” (Williams, 110 Cal. App. 5th at 941.) “Because a PAGA action is an action ‘upon a statute for a [civil] penalty ... given to an individual, or to an individual and the state,’ the statute of limitations period for a PAGA action is one year.” (Id.) “[A] PAGA action accrues when the Labor Code violation last occurred; as applied here, when a PAGA plaintiff is no longer employed by the violator-employer, the violation last occurred (and the cause of action accrues) on the PAGA plaintiff's last day of employment.” (Id. at 942.)

Thus, the one-year limitation under CCP § 340 applies to the statute of limitations for the PAGA claim, the timing of the PAGA notice (i.e. pre-filing notice requirement), and the definition of an aggrieved employee (i.e. standing).

Courts have held that “the statute of limitations is tied to the PAGA plaintiff's individual claims, and that the PAGA plaintiff must bring a PAGA action ([] by serving notice on the [LWDA]) within one year of the last Labor Code violation he or she individually suffered.” (Williams, 110 Cal. App. 5th at 942.) The Williams court reasoned that allowing otherwise would permit Labor Code violations to continue “for years without being remediated or deterred,” the evidence of those violations would have become “stale,” and the LWDA “would be hard pressed to make an informed decision about allocating scarce resources” to investigate. (Id. at 943.)

Further, the Williams court opined that “absent the requirement of a timely individual claim, all that would be required for a private individual to sue is a violation by the defendant-employer at some point in the past—and this would enable the rise of a class of “professional PAGA plaintiffs” having no skin in the game except being enticed by the prospect of a share of the civil penalties, and would enable the rise of a stable of lawyers enticed by the prospect of statutory attorney fees.” (Id. at 944.)

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was “wrongfully terminated on July 30, 2024.” (Compl. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff had to file her PAGA Notice with the LWDA no later than July 30, 2025 to satisfy PAGA’s pre-filing notice requirements within the one-year statute of limitations period based on her date of termination. As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff’s PAGA Notice was mailed to Defendants on December 17, 2024, but the California Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”)

online searchable PAGA case database (subject to judicial notice) reveals that Plaintiff’s PAGA Notice was filed with the California Labor Workforce and Development Agency (“LWDA”) on July 30, 2025 (at 11:51 p.m.). (See Thompson Dec. ¶ 3, Ex. B.) However, whether Plaintiff submitted her notice on July 30, 2025 or sometime before that, her notice to the LWDA was timely. This action was filed October 17, 2025. (ROA 2.)

After Plaintiff submitted her PAGA notice with the LWDA, the LWDA’s 65-day investigation period tolled the one-year statute of limitations during that time. (Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(e) [“The periods specified in this section are not counted as part of the time limited for the commencement of the civil action to recover penalties under this part.”].) Accordingly, based on the allegations in the Complaint as to when Plaintiff was terminated and that Plaintiff had provided notice to the LWDA, the statute of limitations expired on October 3, 2025 (1 year + 65 days after Plaintiff’s termination on July 30, 2024).

Yet, Plaintiff did not file her Complaint in this action, which contained her civil PAGA claim, until October 17, 2025. (ROA 2.) As Plaintiff pleads no additional basis for tolling the applicable one-year statute of limitations, based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is time-barred pursuant to CCP § 340.

Plaintiff cites to Osuna v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc. (2025) 111 Cal. App. 5th 516, to argue that PAGA standing has no timing limitation, but that case analyzes a previous version of the statute that did not impose the 1-year statute of limitations on the definition of aggrieved employees. The previous version of the statute (effective prior to June 30, 2024) defined aggrieved employee as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (Cal.

Lab. Code § 2699(c) [eff. June 27, 2016 to June 30, 2024].) Accordingly, the Osuna court stated that “[a]n employee therefore has PAGA standing so long as ‘one or more of the alleged violations was committed’ against [them].” (Id. at 526.) The court reasoned that “[r]equiring the employee to have a remedy for the violation—e.g., by ensuring that PAGA's statute of limitations has not yet run—'would add an expiration element to the statutory definition of standing.’” (Id.) The court thus found it was sufficient to survive demurrer that “Osuna has alleged numerous violations during his employment with Spectrum, including ongoing violations,” to establish standing. (Id. at

529.) The court noted that in the previous version of the statute, “[t]he Legislature defined PAGA standing in terms of violations, not injury.” (Id.) Thus, “[Osuna] became an aggrieved employee, and had PAGA standing, when one or more Labor Code violations were committed against him.” (Id.)

Here, based on the date of the LWDA notice, the current PAGA statute with the time limitation on the aggrieved employee definition applies. (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699(v)(1)- (v)(2) [“[T]he amendments made to this section by the act adding this subdivision shall apply to a civil action brought on or after June 19, 2024,” unless the PAGA notice “was filed before June 19, 2024”].) Under the current statute, an “aggrieved employee” is a person “who was employed by the alleged violator and personally suffered each of the violations alleged during the [one-year] period prescribed under Section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure[.]” (Cal.

Lab. Code § 2699(c)(1); CCP § 340(a).) As Plaintiff was not employed by Defendants at any point during the applicable PAGA standing period (i.e. one year plus 65 days prior to October 17, 2025, or August 13, 2024 to October 17, 2025), LCC Defendants argue that she could not have “personally suffered” any alleged Labor Code violations occurring within this period. As Plaintiff does not plead facts showing any Labor Code violations she suffered within the relevant time period, Plaintiff fails to plead facts supporting standing to bring her PAGA claim.

LCC Defendants also contend that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring claims on behalf of other aggrieved employees for violations that occurred after Plaintiff was terminated. Courts have held that a PAGA plaintiff has no standing to pursue a PAGA claim for “violations he alleged to have occurred after he ended his employment with the defendant.” (Brown v. Dave & Buster's of California, Inc. (2025) 116 Cal. App. 5th 164, 169 [internal citation omitted]; see also Robinson, 53 Cal. App. 5th at 485 [rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “he has standing to pursue claims based solely on violations alleged to have occurred after his termination”].)

Plaintiff suggests in opposition that certain causes of action may accrue after her termination, but cites to no case law to support this argument or any facts pled in the Complaint that demonstrate any Labor Code violations that accrued after Plaintiff’s employment was terminated.

Based on the foregoing, the court sustains LCC Defendants’ demurrer as to the Eighteenth Cause of Action with leave to amend to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to allege sufficient facts to cure the defects in her Complaint with respect to standing and the statute of limitations for the PAGA claim.

As for the Motion to Strike, LCC Defendants’ Motion to Strike seeks to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint based on the same arguments raised in the demurrer. As the court sustains LCC Defendants’ Demurrer with leave to amend as to the PAGA claim, the pleadings are still unsettled and it would be premature to rule on the Motion to Strike as to the portions of the Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action which depend on the viability of the PAGA claim and as to the Eighteenth Cause of Action, which is the PAGA claim itself. Thus, the court DENIES LCC Defendants’ Motion to Strike without prejudice as to the Fourth, Sixth and Eighteenth Causes of Action.

The court DENIES LCC Defendants’ Motion to Strike as to the Twelfth Cause of Action for violation of the UCL. As the court stated above, LCC Defendants have not demonstrated that Plaintiff’s UCL claim for equitable relief is barred due to adequate remedies at law.

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.