AGUILAR ESPINAL vs THE MONTAGUE COMPANY

Thus, the touchstone for section 301 preemption analysis is the nature of the plaintiff's underlying claim.” (See also Rymel v. Save Mart Supermarkets, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 853, 861.) 26CV167143: AGUILAR ESPINAL vs THE MONTAGUE COMPANY 06/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer STATEMENT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT; filed by The Montague Company (Defendant) CRS# 488675225403 in Department 21 The test is as follows: If cause of action involves a right that exists solely as a result of the CBA, the claim is preempted. (Curtis v.

Irwin Industries, Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 913 F.3d 1146, 1152.) “[I]f not, we proceed to the second step and ask “whether a plaintiff's state law right is substantially dependent on analysis of [the CBA],” which turns on whether the claim cannot be resolved by simply ‘look[ing] to’ versus ‘interpreting’ the CBA. [citation.] We have stressed that ‘interpretation’ is construed narrowly in this context. [citation.] At this second step of the analysis, ‘claims are only preempted to the extent there is an active dispute over ‘the meaning of contract terms.’ [citation.]

Accordingly, a state law claim may avoid preemption if it does not raise questions about the scope, meaning, or application of the CBA.” (Id; see also Ruiz v. Sysco Food Services (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 520, 529 [citing Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 213]; In Rymel v. Save Mart Supermarkets, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 853, 861.)

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - Violation of California Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, and 1198 (Failure to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages). The Complaint at para 46 asserts “During the relevant time period, Defendants willfully failed to pay all wages, including minimum and overtime wages, owed to Plaintiff and similarly situated employees.”

Defendant does not argue that the claim for failure to pay minimum wages under Labor Code 1194 is preempted. Furthermore, the right to minimum wage for all hours worked is based on statute and cannot be waived by contract. (Gutierrez v. Brand Energy Services of California, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 786, 799–801.) The minimum wage rate is set by statute and not by the CBA. The Court does not find the claim to be preempted.

The claim for failure to pay the regular rate for purposes of overtime is “substantially dependent on analysis” of the CBA. (Def Opening at 16-17) The claim is “substantially dependent on analysis” of the CBA. The CBA at Article V concerns “Hours and Overtime” and states: “Section 2. Work performed before and after the regular working hours of the shift in which the employee is normally employed beyond eight (8) hours in a single workday, or forty (40) in a week, shall be paid for at the rate of one and one-half (1-1/2) times the employee's regular hourly rate of pay.” The Court will need to interpret the CBA, including “regular rate,” to determine the rate and is dependent on it to resolve the statutory claim. (McKinley v.

Southwest Airlines Co. (C.D. Cal. 2015) 2015 WL 2431644, at *8 [court found preemption where liability hinged on whether the employer properly calculated the regular rate of pay, requiring evaluation of “many different provisions” of the CBA]; Blackwell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2008) 2008 WL 5103195, at *14-15 [court held overtime, meal, and rest period claims were preempted because determining the plaintiff's regular rate required interpreting the CBA’s pay categories and differentials].)

The claim is preempted.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - Violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512(a) (Meal Periods). Defendant argues that “the CBA’s provisions cover paid meal periods for employees on their third shift. (RJN, Exhs. D-E, CBAs Article VI Shifts.)” (Def Opening at 12- 13.) CBA Article VI describes a regular “First Shift” with a starting time of 7:00 AM, a “Second

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV167143: AGUILAR ESPINAL vs THE MONTAGUE COMPANY 06/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer STATEMENT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT; filed by The Montague Company (Defendant) CRS# 488675225403 in Department 21 Shift” that follows and provides additional compensation, and a “Third Shift” with still more compensation. CBA Article VI states: “Third Shift: A seven and one-half (7-1/2) hour period less thirty (30) minutes for meals on the employer's time. Employees assigned to third shift will receive a 75-cents per hour premium.” The CBA provision that workers on the Third Shift receive “A seven and one-half (7-1/2) hour period less thirty (30) minutes for meals on the employer's time” provides compensation that is greater than the compensation provided by the Labor Code, which does not require compensation for meal periods.

This is a right that exists solely as a result of the CBA and is therefore preempted. (Curtis v. Irwin Industries, Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 913 F.3d 1146, 1152.) The claim is preempted.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - Violation of California Labor Code § 226.7 (Rest Periods). Defendant argues “Plaintiff’s rest period claims also arise from the CBA” and that “the Labor Code materially differs from the bargained-for rest period provision found within the CBA. The CBA states that “employees who are scheduled to work more than two (2) consecutive hours of daily overtime shall be entitled to a ten (10) minute break, paid at the applicable overtime rate.” (RJN, Exhs. D-E, CBAs Article XVI Rest Period.)” (Def Opening at 13-14.)

CBA Article XVI states: “The Company agrees to grant all employees covered by this Agreement two (2) tenminute rest periods to be taken at times prescribed by California law. Such rest periods shall be taken without loss of pay. Employees who are scheduled to work more than two (2) consecutive hours of daily overtime shall be entitled to a ten (10) minute break, paid at the applicable overtime rate, between the end of the regular shift and the start of the overtime period. Employees who work two (2) hours or more of overtime before their regular shift begins shall be entitled to a ten (10) minute break prior to the beginning of their regular shift.” The text of the CBA provides contractual rights to rest period that are substantially different from the Labor Code.

Determination of the claim for rest breaks will require the Court to interpret the phrase “applicable overtime rate” under the CBA and to consider the timing of the rest breaks as set out in the CBA. The claim is preempted.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - Violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 – 203 (Failure to Pay Wages Timely Upon Termination). Defendant argues: “The CBA addresses the issue of waiting time penalties. (RJN, Exhs. D-E, CBAs Article VIII Wages.)” (Def Opening at 17.) CBA Article VIII states: “Section 2 When an employee is discharged, he/she shall be paid on the date of discharge. When an employee quits, he/she shall be paid within 72 hours of the date of quit.” Determination of the claim for failure to pay wages timely on termination will require the Court to interpret this article by addressing any ambiguity in the distinction between “When an employee is discharged” and “When an employee quits.” The claim is preempted.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION - Violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 (Reimbursement of Necessary Business-Related Expenses). Defendant did not argue that this claim is preempted.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV167143: AGUILAR ESPINAL vs THE MONTAGUE COMPANY 06/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer STATEMENT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT; filed by The Montague Company (Defendant) CRS# 488675225403 in Department 21 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION – Violation of California Labor Code § 226(a) (Accurate Itemized Wage Statements). Defendant argues: “Plaintiff’s other claims, including failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements under Labor Code section 226 and unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., are derivative of Plaintiff’s claims that arise from the CBA language.” (Def Opening at 14.) This claim is derivative of the Labor Code claims and is therefore preempted to the extent the underlying Labor Code claims are preempted..

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION – Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200. Defendant argues that the claim is derivative. This claim is derivative of the Labor Code claims and is therefore preempted to the extent the underlying Labor Code claims are preempted.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION – Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

The Complaint at para 99 asserts: “Under California Labor Code § 1171.5, workers are entitled to all protections available under California law, regardless of immigration status.” The Complaint at para 101 asserts that Plaintiff complained of harassment and then: “Defendants’ supervisors were apparently getting tired of Plaintiff’s complaints about this ongoing harassment, which led to one of Defendants’ supervisors to make a threatening remark directed at Plaintiff – “ICE is paying $1,000 per heard so that means I already have $1,000 with you.”

Defendant asserts that the claim concerns “working conditions” subject to the CBA. The CBA at Article XVII states: “The Company and the Union agree jointly and separately not to discriminate, in violation of the law (State or Federal) against any employee or applicant for employment, in terms or conditions of employment on the basis of age, race, color, sex, creed, religion, or national origin.”

The CBA for the second time period has a materially more expansive anti-discrimination statement, stating: “The Montague Company does not tolerate and prohibits discrimination, harassment, or retaliation of or against job applicants, contractors, interns, volunteers, or employees by another employee, manager, vendor, customer, or third party based on actual or perceived race, color, creed, religion, age, sex, or gender (including pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions), sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression (including transgender status), national origin, ancestry, marital status, protected medical condition as defined by state law (including cancer or genetic characteristics), physical or mental disability, military and veteran status, reproductive health decision making, genetic information, or any other characteristic protected by applicable federal, state, or local laws and ordinances. The Company is committed to a workplace free of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.”

The Court finds that neither CBA addresses discrimination on the basis of immigration status. California Labor Code § 1171.5 is the only basis for protection from discrimination based on

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV167143: AGUILAR ESPINAL vs THE MONTAGUE COMPANY 06/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer STATEMENT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT; filed by The Montague Company (Defendant) CRS# 488675225403 in Department 21 immigration status. This claim is not preempted.

EXHAUSTION OF CBA’S GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES. Plaintiff was not required to exhaust the grievance procedures in the CBA before asserting his claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy based on immigration status discrimination. Collins v. Lobdell (9th Cir. 1999) 188 F.3d 1124, 1127, states: “The rule for determining whether a plaintiff is required to exhaust remedies provided for in a collective bargaining agreement before bringing the claim in federal court is well established. If the claim is based on rights arising from the collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiff is required to exhaust remedies created by the agreement.

However, if the claim arises from statutory rights, the plaintiff is not required to exhaust agreement remedies[.]” The claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy based on immigration status discrimination does not arise from the CBA and Plaintiff is not required to exhaust the CBA grievance procedure.

CONCLUSION

On or before 7/10/26 Plaintiff must file any First Amended Complaint limited to the claims that are not preempted.

PLEASE NOTE: This tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if uncontested by 04:00pm the day before your hearing. If you wish to contest the tentative ruling, then both notify opposing counsel directly and the court at the eCourt portal found on the court’s website: www.alameda.courts.ca.gov.

If you have contested the tentative ruling or your tentative ruling reads, “parties to appear,” please use the following link to access your hearing at the appropriate date and time: https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/department21. If no party has contested the tentative ruling, then no appearance is necessary.