SILVA vs UCS LIMO LLC, DBA UCS LIMO SERVICE, DBA SF COACH LIMO, DBA UCS WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION, et al.

24CV076161: SILVA vs UCS LIMO LLC, DBA UCS LIMO SERVICE, DBA SF COACH LIMO, DBA UCS WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION, et al. 08/17/2026 Hearing on Demurrer To Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint; filed by UCS LIMO LLC, DBA UCS LIMO SERVICE, DBA SF COACH LIMO, DBA UCS WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION (Defendant) + CRS# 967520640601 in Department 21

Tentative Ruling - 08/17/2026 S. Raj Chatterjee

Demurrer of UCS Limo to Second Amended Complaint (SAC) is SUSTAINED IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND OVERRULED IN PART.

On 1/22/26, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint (SAC). The SAC added new parties: (1) UCS Limo Inc., a California corporation allegedly converted from UCS Limo LLC on June 4, 2025; (2) UCS Global, a California corporation that allegedly shares TCP permit 31930 with UCS Limo; (3) Rayna Thuane Silva Portes, CEO of UCS Global, daughter-in-law of Defendant Valciley Caetano and wife of Defendants Lorran V. Caetano; and (4) Ilanna Caetano, Secretary of UCS Global, daughter of Defendant Valciley Caetano and sister of Defendant Lorran V. Caetano. (SAC para 5-8.) The SAC added new claims of alter ego, joint employer, and single enterprise. (SAC para 12-15)

All Defendants demur to the SAC, although most of grounds are applicable only to the newly added individual defendants - Rayna Portes and Ilanna Caetano.

Alter ego or joint enterprise liability. Defendants argue that the SAC lacks “allegations specifying the nature and extent of any of the Individual Defendants’ purported “participation” in the corporate affairs of UCS Limo or UCS Global, beyond alleging, on information and belief, that they had an “ownership interest” in one of the entities, acted on its behalf, and was an “owner, officer, or managing agent.” (Moving 9:15-18.) Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 235 states: “Rutherford alleged that Caswell dominated and controlled PDR; that a unity of interest and ownership existed between Caswell and PDR; that PDR was a mere shell and conduit for Caswell's affairs; that PDR was inadequately capitalized; that PDR failed to abide by the formalities of corporate existence; that Caswell used PDR assets as her own; and that recognizing the separate existence of PDR would promote injustice.

Rutherford was required to allege only “ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.” Moreover, the “less particularity [of pleading] is required where the defendant may be assumed to possess knowledge of the facts at least equal, if not superior, to that possessed by the plaintiff,” which certainly is the case here. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's ruling that Rutherford sufficiently pled an alter ego theory of liability.” The SAC at paras 13-18 alleges “ultimate facts” equivalent to those in Rutherford.

The SAC therefore adequately alleges alter ego or joint enterprise liability.

Defendants Rayna, Ilanna, or UCS Global as joint employers. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that might support claims against the new individual defendants for joint employer liability. Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64, held that to be a “joint 24CV076161: SILVA vs UCS LIMO LLC, DBA UCS LIMO SERVICE, DBA SF COACH LIMO, DBA UCS WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION, et al. 08/17/2026 Hearing on Demurrer To Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint; filed by UCS LIMO LLC, DBA UCS LIMO SERVICE, DBA SF COACH LIMO, DBA UCS WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION (Defendant) + CRS# 967520640601 in Department 21 employer” under California wage-and-hour law, an entity must (a) exercise control over wages, hours, or working conditions; (b) suffer or permit to work; or (c) engage the worker in a common law employment relationship.

Any one of the three is sufficient. (Id. at pp. 64-71.) Plaintiff argues that the allegations related to alter ego at SAC at para 12-17 also support the joint employer claims. (Oppo at 12.) Defendant argues that the joint employer allegations are conclusory referencing the alter-ego allegations that the Court has found are adequate for that purpose. Neither Defendant nor Plaintiff address the distinction between the alter-ego theory and the joint employer theory. Plaintiff asserts he was employed by the defendant entity.

The employer-employee relationship generally does not extend to supervisors, officers, directors, or owners of an entity. “Persons are not normally bound by an agreement entered into by a corporation in which they have an interest or are employees.” (Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating Notes Program, LLC (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 840, 860.) The plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to show joint employer and rely on legal and factual conclusions. SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to allege facts that would support an employer-employee relationship between plaintiff and the new individual defendants.

Labor Code Section 558.1. Defendants argue that “The SAC is devoid of any allegations of Rayna or Illana’s personal involvement in any of the alleged Labor Code violations.” (Moving at 15:22-23) Under Labor Code 558.1, a person can be liable for certain Labor Code provisions or Wage Orders if they are owners, directors, officers, or managing agents of the employer and “acting on behalf” of that employer. Espinoza v. Hepta Run, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 44, 59, states: [I]n order to “cause” a violation of the Labor Code, an individual must have engaged in some affirmative action beyond his or her status as an owner, officer or director of the corporation.

However, that does not necessarily mean the individual must have had involvement in the day-to-day operations of the company, nor is it required the individual authored the challenged employment policies or specifically approved their implementation. But to be held personally liable he or she must have had some oversight of the company’s operations or some influence on corporate policy that resulted in Labor Code violations.”

Both Espinoza v. Hepta Run, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 44, 57-60, and Espinoza v. Hepta Run, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 44, 59, were decided at summary judgment and neither addressed the pleading requirement. Russo v. Federal Medical Services, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2024) 744 F.Supp.3d 914, 920-921, is a federal trial court opinion, but it was decided on the pleadings. In Russo, the federal court distinguished between (1) defendants Mr. Slattery and Ms. Woulfe, where there were allegations that they “had the authority to hire and fire employees, set work schedules and conditions, determine compensation rates and methods, and maintain employment records” and (2) defendant Mr.

Tate, where the only allegation was that he was CEO and owner. For individual defendants Rayna Thuane Silva Portes and Ilanna Caetano, the SAC at para 7-8 alleges: “Upon information and belief, Portes [and I. Caetano] has been involved in the management and operations of the Corporate Defendants, including decisions affecting the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV076161: SILVA vs UCS LIMO LLC, DBA UCS LIMO SERVICE, DBA SF COACH LIMO, DBA UCS WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION, et al. 08/17/2026 Hearing on Demurrer To Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint; filed by UCS LIMO LLC, DBA UCS LIMO SERVICE, DBA SF COACH LIMO, DBA UCS WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION (Defendant) + CRS# 967520640601 in Department 21 wages, hours, and working conditions of employees.” The allegations are conclusory. The plaintiffs need to allege sufficient facts to establish liability under § 558.1 SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to allege sufficient facts.

Timeliness of claims. The defendants argue that the new claims for alter ego, joint employer, and single enterprise do relate back to the filing of the original complaint because they are based on a new set of allegations. (Moving at 15-16.) “The authority of a court to amend a judgment to add a nonparty alter ego as a judgment debtor has long been recognized.” (Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1106.)

The defendants argue that SAC did not properly substitute the new defendants for a fictitious Doe defendant. (Moving at 16:3-10.) The SAC makes the appropriate procedural allegations. The SAC at para 9 alleges: “Defendants UCS Global, UCS Limo Inc., Rayna Thuane Silva Portes, and Ilanna Caetano are substituted for DOE Defendants 1 through 4 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 474. Plaintiffs were ignorant of the facts establishing the liability of these Defendants at the time of filing the original Complaint on May 17, 2024, and did not discover such facts until after the commencement of this action.” This is an adequate allegation.

The defendants argue “Silva’s claims for statutory penalties, including PAGA penalties, against Rayna, Ilanna, and UCS Global, are time-barred” based on the date of the original PAGA notice on May 9, 2024. (Moving at 16:11-13.) The SAC adequately alleges that not all PAGA claims are time barred. (SAC para 127.) Plaintiff served an amended LWDA notice on January 15, 2026, identifying USC Limo Inc., USC Global, Rayna Portes, and Illana Caetano. (Molteni Decl., para 2, Ex. A).

Standing. Defendants assert that Plaintiff Silva stopped working for Defendants by February 2024 (SAC para 1) and assert that defendants Rayna or Illana did not become directors or officers until May 2024. Procedurally, on a demurrer the Court is limited to the complaint and the SAC does not allege when Rayna or Illana become directors or officers. Defendants ask the Cort to take judicial notice that “As of May 24, 2024, Rayna Thuane Silva Portes became [UCS Global’s] Director and Chief Executive Officer, Ilanna Caetano its secretary, and Lorran Caetano its Chief Financial Officer. (Def RJN Exh. H.) The Court can take judicial notice of the existence of the Secretary of State filing but not the truth of the matters stated in the filing. The standing argument is not persuasive because it relies on matter outside the complaint

Uncertainty. The SAC’s reference to “Defendants” does not make the complaint uncertain.

Plaintiff may file a Third Amended Complaint consistent with this order, which must be filed within 30 days. (CRC 3.1320(g).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV076161: SILVA vs UCS LIMO LLC, DBA UCS LIMO SERVICE, DBA SF COACH LIMO, DBA UCS WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION, et al. 08/17/2026 Hearing on Demurrer To Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint; filed by UCS LIMO LLC, DBA UCS LIMO SERVICE, DBA SF COACH LIMO, DBA UCS WORLDWIDE TRANSPORTATION (Defendant) + CRS# 967520640601 in Department 21