UNSPECIFIED

Defendant's business was located. Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. states, "In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant. When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service." (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439-1440.)

Tentatively, the Court plans to GRANT, Defendant Yinming Liu's motion to vacate the default and default judgment entered against Yinming Liu. The Court notes that this order does not apply to the other Defendants, as no other Defendants moved to vacate default/judgment.

/ / / The Court's tentative is to GRANT the motion to amend the judgment. The Court notes that motions to amend judgments pursuant to CCP Sec. 187 are to be granted with "great liberality." (Relentless Air Racing, LLC v. Airborne Turbine Ltd. Partnership (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 811, 815.)

The Court is inclined to overrule the defendant's evidentiary objections. The Court is applying the relevant tests and, if it is not reversible error, some amount of common sense. R Motor appears to have been funded and controlled through IC Manage, Inc., run by R Motor's principals, Drako and Sikand. IC appears to have been R Motor's sole funder. It appears three million dollars were transferred from IC to R Motor over the course of 33 transfers. It appears R Motors had little independent existence in terms of its own reserves or its own place of business, personnel, etc.

And, yes, the Court is deeply troubled by the fact that R Motor appears to have filed for voluntary dissolution * six days after the judgment * in this case. Perhaps there's a perfectly good explanation for that. The Court has not seen it yet.

To amend the judgment in a situation such as this, with an alleged alter ego, the creditor must establish three things: (1) that the alter ego shares such a unity of interest and ownership with the judgment debtor that their separate personalities no longer exist; (2) that an inequitable result will follow if the debtor's acts are treated as its own alone; and (3) that the added party controlled the underlying litigation and was thereby virtually represented in it. (Relentless, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 815-816.)