BROWNE, et al. vs SHATTUCK HEALTH CARE, INC., et al.

Although Plaintiffs purport to dispute SSF Nos. 30, 32, and 34, the evidence they cite in support of their purported dispute does not suggest that either Hycare or McGregor personally undertook to attend to the basic needs of Plaintiffs’ decedent. Plaintiffs cite no statute or case law suggesting that an individual who acts as the admissions director for a care facility is personally liable for elder abuse where, as here, there is no evidence that the individual personally assumed any role in the subsequent care of the elder. 23CV025386: BROWNE, et al. vs SHATTUCK HEALTH CARE, INC., et al. 08/05/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by HYCARE, INC. (Defendant) + CRS# 237418179135 in Department 19

Likewise, as to nursing supervisor Wenshi Ni, even accepting as true the evidence suggesting that she was a Hycare employee, Plaintiffs’ evidence does not demonstrate that she personally undertook to provide for the basic needs of Plaintiffs’ decedent. (See AF Nos. 58-67 and 70-74.) The Court could not locate any information in the evidence cited by Plaintiffs in support of AF No. 68 indicating that Hycare or McGregor had care and custody of Plaintiffs’ decedent on May 8, 2022.

As indicated above, the undisputed facts establish that Hycare provided administrative and support services to SHC, but not resident care functions. (See SSF Nos. 30-34.) To the extent Plaintiffs seek to hold Hycare vicariously liable for elder abuse based on the acts of Hycare officers and employees McGregor and Wenshi Ni, this claim fails in the absence of evidence that McGregor and Wenshi Ni were personally liable for elder abuse.

As to the Second Cause of Action for Negligence and the Fourth Cause of Action for Wrongful Death, the motion is DENIED. There is a triable issue of material fact as to whether McGregor’s decision to accept Plaintiffs’ decedent for admission into the SHC facility was negligent. (See AF Nos. 4, 6, 19-22, 31, and 51-57, and the evidence cited in support.) If the trier of fact finds McGregor was negligent in deciding to admit Plaintiffs’ decedent to the SHC facility, it may find that Hycare is vicariously liable for the actions of its Executive Vice President McGregor.

The Court observes that Defendants’ argument as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Wrongful Death relies on the same arguments and evidence as the Second Cause of Action for Negligence. Therefore, Defendants’ motion as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Wrongful Death is denied for the same reason as the Second Cause of Action.

The Court also observes that the two cases Defendants cited on pages 16-17 of its opening brief involving regional centers have no apparent relevance to this motion.

As to the Fifth Cause of Action for Premises Liability (which is asserted against Piedmont Properties LLC only), the motion is GRANTED as unopposed. (See opposition brief at page 27.)

As to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages, the motion is GRANTED. To prevail on a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that Hycare and/or McGregor were guilty of malice, fraud, or oppression. (See Civil Code § 3294(a).) Malice is conduct that is intended to cause injury or conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others. (See Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).) To show conscious disregard, Plaintiffs must prove that McGregor was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. (See Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.)

Plaintiffs’ evidence, if credited, may support a claim that McGregor’s decision to admit Plaintiffs’ decedent to SHC’s facility was negligent. However, Plaintiffs submit no evidence

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV025386: BROWNE, et al. vs SHATTUCK HEALTH CARE, INC., et al. 08/05/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by HYCARE, INC. (Defendant) + CRS# 237418179135 in Department 19 demonstrating that MacGregor was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of that decision and deliberately failed to avoid them. (See AF Nos. 4, 6, 19-22, 31, and 51-57, and the evidence cited in support.) Plaintiffs are admonished for mischaracterizing the evidence cited in support of AF Nos. 53-55, none of which can reasonably be interpreted as showing that McGregor knew Plaintiffs’ decedent was “substantially certain” to suffer injury.

As to nursing supervisor Wenshi Ni, Plaintiffs’ evidence suggests that she was concerned that Plaintiffs’ decedent needed one on one support at all times, and she didn’t have sufficient staff to provide that support. (See AF Nos. 60-61, 64-67, and 70-73.) But again, Plaintiffs fail to submit evidence supporting the conclusion that Ni knew of the probable dangerous consequences of decedent’s admission to the facility and deliberately failed to avoid them. More specifically, Plaintiffs fail to present evidence that Ni had any ability to override or reverse the decision to admit Plaintiffs’ decedent to the facility or to provide one on one staffing at all times. The Court also observes that AF No. 65 mischaracterizes Ni’s testimony; she did not say that she knew Plaintiffs’ decedent was “substantially certain” to suffer injury without continuous one-on-one monitoring.

In the absence of evidence that McGregor and/or Ni acted with malice giving rise to a claim for punitive damages, Hycare is not liable for punitive damages on the theory that Hycare ratified their actions.

As to Plaintiffs’ claim for treble damages pursuant to Civil Code § 3345, the motion is DENIED. Whether a defendant is liable for treble damages is not an issue for which summary adjudication is available. (See Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(f)(1), stating summary adjudication can be used to address one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, issues of duty, or a claim for damages as specified in Civil Code § 3294, i.e., a claim for punitive damages only.) However, this issue appears to be moot, in light of the Court’s ruling on the motion for summary adjudication as to the First Cause of Action for Elder and Dependent Adult Abuse and Neglect.

The motion for summary judgment by Hycare Inc. and Terrance McGregor is DENIED for the reasons set forth above.

Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objection to their own Complaint is OVERRULED as moot. A Complaint is not evidence; however, it does constitute a judicial admission by Plaintiffs.

The Court did not consider the Declaration of Steven Fugaro, dated July 10 and filed July 14, as untimely. Any opposition evidence should have been filed with the opposition, not after the reply was filed.

The Court did not review or consider Defendants’ Reply Separate Statement. (See Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(b)(4).)

The Court rules as follows on Defendants’ Objections to Evidence:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV025386: BROWNE, et al. vs SHATTUCK HEALTH CARE, INC., et al. 08/05/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by HYCARE, INC. (Defendant) + CRS# 237418179135 in Department 19

Objections Nos. 1-2 and 4 are SUSTAINED as lacking foundation.

Objection No. 3 is OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. Defendants contend that Gray mischaracterizes McGregor’s deposition testimony, but they don’t explain how it was mischaracterized.

Objection No. 5 is OVERRULED on the grounds asserted.

Objection Nos. 6-8 are SUSTAINED as speculative and lacking foundation. Gray lacks foundation to testify as to what McGregor understands.

Objections No. 9-10 are SUSTAINED as inadmissible hearsay. The email quoted in Objection No. 10 may be admissible against to Shattuck Healthcare Inc. dba Elmwood Nursing and Rehab Center pursuant to Evidence Code § 1220, but not against the Defendants who filed this motion for summary judgment.

Defendant Piedmont Properties LLC is DISMISSED from this case, with prejudice.