BROWNE, et al. vs SHATTUCK HEALTH CARE, INC., et al.

Likewise, as to nursing supervisor Wenshi Ni, Plaintiffs’ evidence, if credited, suggests that she was concerned that it would be “best” if Plaintiffs’ decedent had one on one support at all times, and she didn’t have sufficient staff to provide that support. (See AF Nos. 58-59, 62-65, and 68- 71; see particularly Ni’s deposition at page 58.) But again, Plaintiffs fail to submit evidence supporting the conclusion that Ni knew Plaintiffs’ decedent was substantially certain to be injured if admitted or acted with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury.

The Court also observes that AF No. 63 mischaracterizes Ni’s testimony; she did not say that she knew Plaintiffs’ decedent was “substantially certain” to suffer injury without continuous one-onone monitoring. 23CV025386: BROWNE, et al. vs SHATTUCK HEALTH CARE, INC., et al. 08/05/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication filed by SHATTUCK HEALTH CARE, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 700162119875 in Department 19 Plaintiffs’ evidence reflects that rather than providing decedent with one on one support, Wenshi Ni had nursing assistants check on decedent every 10-15 minutes and asked decedent’s roommate to report immediately if decedent got out of bed. (AF No. 70.)

This level of support for decedent proved to be inadequate, but it was not a denial or withholding of caretaking services. Elder abuse by neglect requires a showing of the denial or withholding of caretaking services, not negligence in providing those services. (See, e.g., Covenant Care Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 783.)

As to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages, the motion is GRANTED. To prevail on a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that SHC was guilty of malice, fraud, or oppression. (See Civil Code § 3294(a).) Malice is conduct that is intended to cause injury or conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others. (See Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).) To show conscious disregard, Plaintiffs must prove that SHC was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of its conduct and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. (See Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.)

As discussed supra, Plaintiffs’ evidence, if credited, may support a claim that McGregor’s decision to admit Plaintiffs’ decedent to SHC’s facility was negligent. However, Plaintiffs submit no evidence demonstrating that MacGregor was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of that decision and deliberately failed to avoid them. (See AF Nos. 1, 3-6, 18-24, 46-55.) As noted above, Plaintiffs are admonished for mischaracterizing the evidence cited in support of AF Nos. 51-53, none of which can reasonably be interpreted as showing that McGregor knew Plaintiffs’ decedent was “substantially certain” to suffer injury.

Likewise, as to nursing supervisor Wenshi Ni, Plaintiffs’ evidence, if credited, suggests that she was concerned that it would be “best” if Plaintiffs’ decedent had one on one support at all times, and she didn’t have sufficient staff to provide that support. (See AF Nos. 58-59, 62-65, and 68- 71; see particularly Ni’s deposition at page 58.) But Plaintiffs fail to submit evidence supporting the conclusion that Ni knew of the probable dangerous consequences of decedent’s admission to the facility and deliberately failed to avoid them (or, for that matter, that Ni had any ability to override or reverse the decision to admit Plaintiffs’ decedent to the facility or to provide one on one staffing at all times.)

As noted above, AF No. 65 mischaracterizes Ni’s testimony; she did not say that she knew Plaintiffs’ decedent was “substantially certain” to suffer injury without continuous one-on-one monitoring.

In the absence of evidence that McGregor and/or Ni acted with malice giving rise to a claim for punitive damages, Hycare is not liable for punitive damages on the theory that SHC authorized or ratified their actions.

As to Plaintiffs’ claim for treble damages pursuant to Civil Code § 3345, the motion is DENIED. Whether a defendant is liable for treble damages is not an issue for which summary adjudication is available. (See Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(f)(1), stating summary adjudication can be

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV025386: BROWNE, et al. vs SHATTUCK HEALTH CARE, INC., et al. 08/05/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication filed by SHATTUCK HEALTH CARE, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 700162119875 in Department 19 used to address one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, issues of duty, or a claim for damages as specified in Civil Code § 3294, i.e., a claim for punitive damages only.) However, this issue appears to be moot, in light of the Court’s ruling on the motion for summary adjudication as to the First Cause of Action for Elder and Dependent Adult Abuse and Neglect.

Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objection to their own Complaint is OVERRULED as moot. A Complaint is not evidence, but it does constitute a judicial admission by Plaintiffs.

The Court did not consider the Declaration of Steven Fugaro, dated July 10 and filed July 14, as untimely. Any opposition evidence should have been filed with the opposition, not after the reply was filed.

The Court did not review or consider SHC’s Reply Separate Statement. (See Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(b)(4).)

The Court rules as follows on SHC’s Objections to Evidence:

Objections Nos. 1-2 and 4 are SUSTAINED as lacking foundation.

Objection No. 3 is OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. SHC contends that Gray mischaracterizes McGregor’s deposition testimony but doesn’t explain how it was mischaracterized.

Objection No. 5 is OVERRULED on the grounds asserted.

Objection Nos. 6-8 are SUSTAINED as speculative and lacking foundation. Gray lacks foundation to testify as to what McGregor understands.

Objection No. 9 is SUSTAINED as inadmissible hearsay.

Objection No. 10 is OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. (Evidence Code § 1220.)