KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al.

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

side-yard. (Complaint ¶ 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Developer submitted a “Tentative Subdivision map” to the City of Folsom which was approved by the City in a Planning Commission Staff Report. (Complaint ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that the Planning Commission Staff Report provides, in relevant part, that:

In order to mitigate the impacts of a small lot, the development plan includes a use/benefit easement. The Use/benefit easement is an important design feature which facilitates more “usable” yard space without altering the lot lines.

(Complaint, ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff contends that his alleged easement is described in Section 2.05(B) of the CC&Rs, which provides, in pertinent part, that there shall be side yard easements “which shall be appurtenant to certain lots as Dominant Tenements as set forth in grant deeds to be recorded by Declarant on lots which are subject to receive sideyard [sic] easements.” (Complaint, ¶ 16.) Section 2.05(B) of the CC&Rs also states the purpose of the easement is to allow “the owner of the Dominant Tenement to establish and maintain landscaping, an irrigation or watering system for such landscaping and fences thereon ” (Complaint, ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was ordered to remove a window on the wall of her house facing the alleged easement following a prior lawsuit, and that Defendant has since acted to block Plaintiff’s access to the alleged easement by installing a mesh fence along the property line. (Complaint ¶¶ 23, 24, 26.)

Defendant now moves the Court for:

an Order granting Summary Adjudication of the First Cause of Action in the Complaint to 'Quiet Title for Implied Easement' in favor of Defendant Teresa Naber on the basis that Plaintiff cannot prove any of the facts that would entitle him to a Judgment finding an Implied Easement against this Defendant. (Notice of Motion at 2:1-6.)

Plaintiff opposes. This matter is currently set for trial on January 5, 2026.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

II. Objections to Evidence

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED. Plaintiff has filed an “Objection to All Evidence Contained in Defendant’s Moving Papers ” (“Plaintiff’s Objection”). Plaintiff’s objections do not comply with California Rules of Court rule 3.1354 subdivision (b), which states that “[o]bjections to specific evidence must be referenced by the objection number” and requires that each objection “[i]dentify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located,” [s]tate the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to,” “[q]uote or set forth the objectionable statement or material,” and “[s]tate the grounds for each objection to that statement or material.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)(1)-(4).)

Here, Plaintiff’s Objection contends that “[i]n this case, Defendant has admitted that Plaintiff has an implied easement consisting of his fenced-in yard. Therefore, all of Defendant’s alleged evidence that contradicts her Admissions are in-admissible.” (Plaintiff’s Objection at 1:23-26.) Plaintiff’s Objection thus does not identify the name of any document in which Plaintiff contends any objectionable material is located nor does Plaintiff’s Objection state the exhibit, title page, and line number of any objectionable material.

Finally, Plaintiff fails to quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material. The Court is unable to assess Defendant’s objections, as it is not clear which specific declarations and exhibits the objection applies to. Simply stating that “all of Defendant’s alleged evidence that contradicts her Admissions are in-admissible” is insufficient. Failure to comply with the requirements of rule 3.1354 warrants overruling the objections. (Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1118.)

The Court need not rule on Defendant’s objections to evidence as they are not relevant to the disposition of the motion.

III.

Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met his or her initial burden of production. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) explains that a defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment/adjudication “[meets] that party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action” and only when “the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden” does the burden shift to the plaintiff or crosscomplainant “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” A party opposing summary judgment/adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving party has first met his/her initial burden. (Binder v.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.)

Only where the moving party makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment/adjudication. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is found in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b), which mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.

(Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion and the oppositions, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion for summary adjudication.

IV.

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court first addresses Plaintiff’s argument in opposition that this motion is rendered moot due to Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint. In this regard, the Court notes that the Court continued Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Verified First Amended Complaint so that it may be heard after this motion for summary adjudication. (See September 3, 2025, Order.) Accordingly, the Complaint remains as the operative pleading for the purpose of Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication and thus, any argument that this motion is rendered moot is rejected.

Turning to the substance of Defendant’s motion, the threshold question here is whether the moving papers are sufficient to satisfy Defendant’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p)(2) with respect to the ground advanced for summary adjudication. As indicated earlier, on summary adjudication, a moving party must meet her initial burden regardless of whether the opposing party disputes any issues of material fact. (See Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087 [moving party on summary judgment must meet his initial burden even if the motion is unopposed].)

Here, Defendant’s separate statement includes 20 asserted undisputed material facts (“UMF”)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

in support of her request for summary adjudication. As will be explained, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to meet her initial burden by failing to support at least one asserted UMF with sufficient evidence.

UMF 4 states:

The Plot Plan attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit 'D' for Lot No. 145 of the Cobble Hills Ridge Unit No. 2 City of Folsom is not a recorded document.

To support this UMF, Defendant cites to Exhibit D of the Complaint and to Exhibit B of the Declaration of Brian Thionnet. However, these exhibits do not pertain to Lot No. 145. Indeed, Exhibit D of the Complaint concerns Lot No. 144. (Complaint, Exhibit D.) Similarly, Exhibit B of the Declaration of Mr. Thionnet also concerns Lot No. 144. (Thionnet Decl., Exhibit B.) Indeed, Mr. Thionnet declares that he has “ examined the document marked hereto as Exhibit ‘B’ which is a pre-construction ‘plot plan’ for Lot #144 (Kshirsagar).” (Thionnet Decl., ¶12.) In other words, none of the evidence cited by Defendant supports any assertions in relation to Lot 145 as all of the evidence cited in support of this UMF concerns only Lot 144. It is Defendant’s burden to set forth admissible evidence in support of every asserted UMF.

Further, to the extent Defendant may argue that the facts as stated in UMF 4 are not truly material to her motion, inclusion of the facts concedes materiality. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.) In Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506, the First District Court of Appeal addressed this point directly. The court noted that the moving party “enumerated purportedly undisputed material facts in its separate statement, some of which [opposing party] disputed.” (Id. at 521.)

The moving party convinced the trial court that despite their inclusion in the moving party's separate statement, those facts were not actually material and succeeded on summary judgment. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed, concluding that summary judgment was improper “[b]ecause a dispute as to any one of these facts means there was a dispute as to a concededly material fact.” (Id. at 522 [emphasis added].)

Putting aside Defendant’s failure to support at least one asserted UMF with evidence (which requires denial of the entire motion), there are additional grounds for finding that Defendant has failed to meet her initial burden with respect to the ground advanced for summary adjudication.

As previously discussed, Defendant seeks summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s first cause of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

action for quiet title by implied easement on the grounds that “Plaintiff cannot prove any of the facts that would entitle him to a Judgment finding an Implied Easement against this Defendant.” (Notice of Motion at 2:1-6.)

Defendant’s moving memorandum of points and authorities argues that the “undisputed material facts confirm that there was no intent to create a beneficial use easement in favor of [Plaintiff’s] property by burdening [Defendant’s] property.” (Moving MPA at 6:11-17.) In opposition Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that Defendant’s motion is “frivolous” because it fails to negate the essential elements of a cause of action for an implied easement. (Opposition at 3:20-21.) On reply, Defendant explains that her position on this motion is that the undisputed material facts put forth by Defendant shows that the implied easement claimed in the Complaint is not necessary to the use and benefit of Plaintiff’s property. (Reply at 3:22-25.)

In short, Defendant’s precise argument on this motion is unclear. Defendant’s moving memorandum of points and authorities seem to suggest that summary adjudication should be granted because there was no intent to create the claimed implied easement; however, on reply Defendant clarifies that her argument is that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the claimed implied easement is necessary to the use and benefit of Plaintiff’s property. Defendant’s Notice of Motion does not shed any light as to Plaintiff’s argument as it only generally asserts that Plaintiff cannot prove any facts which would entitle him to a judgment on his first cause of action.

With that said, the Court finds that, for the reasons stated below, Defendant has failed to present sufficient UMFs to demonstrate that “Plaintiff cannot prove any of the facts that would entitle him to a Judgment finding an Implied Easement against this Defendant” either because there was no intent to create the claimed implied easement or because the claimed implied easement is not necessary to the use and benefit of Plaintiff’s property.

Parties to the sale of real property may grant or reserve easements, either expressly (in a written instrument) or impliedly (based on evidence of the parties’ intent) as part of the transaction of the sale. (Romero v. Shih (2024) 15 Cal.5th 680, 687.)

To find an easement by implication, there must be clear evidence that it was intended by the parties. (Ibid.) “The purpose of the doctrine of implied easements is to give effect to the actual intent of the parties as shown by all the facts and circumstances.” (Fistoe v. Drapeau (1950) 35 Cal.2d 5, 8.) Thus, an easement will not be implied contrary to the intent expressed by the parties in their agreement. (Muzzi v. Bel Air Mart (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 456, 467 [where lease

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

explicitly limited tenant to nonexclusive use of common area there could be no implied easement granting more].)

The doctrine of implied easements is codified in Civil Code section 1104. “Though recognized in statutory law, the doctrine of implied easements is at least equally a product of the common law as elaborated in judicial decisions.” (Romero v. Shih, supra, 15 Cal.5th 680, 693.)

“[A]n easement will be implied when, at the time of conveyance of property, the following conditions exist: 1) the owner of property conveys or transfers a portion of that property to another; 2) the owner's prior existing use of the property was of a nature that the parties must have intended or believed that the use would continue; meaning that the existing use must either have been known to the grantor and the grantee, or have been so obviously and apparently permanent that the parties should have known of the use; and 3) the easement is reasonably necessary to the use and benefit of the quasi dominant tenement.” (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420 [internal quotation omitted].)

As previously mentioned, Defendant offers UMFs 1-20 in support of her motion. These UMFs assert, inter alia, that Defendant owns real property located at 100 Cobble Ridge Drive and that Plaintiff owns real property located at 102 Cobble Ridge Drive. (UMFs 1, 2.) The “Subdivision map” for Cobble Hills Ridge Phase IIA records no side yard easements that pertain to any of the parcels in the Cobble Hills Ridge Phase IIA subdivision. (UMF 5.)

The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Cobble Hills Ridge II — Phase II states:

There shall be created by Declarant and its successors and assigns, together with the right to grant and transfer same, sideyard [sic] easements which shall be appurtenant to certain lots as 'Dominant Tenements' as set forth in grant deeds to be reported [sic] by Declarant on lots which are subject to receive sideyard [sic] easements.

(UMF 6.)

The Declarant of the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions was Lakemont Folsom LLC. (UMF

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

7.) Defendant’s “property does not contain a recorded easement for a sideyard [sic] ” (UMF 8.) Plaintiff attached the City of Folsom Planning Commission Staff Report for the Cobble Hills Ridge II Subdivision, which states that the side yards are to have a minimum setback of 5 feet. (UMFs 13, 14.) The distance between the residential structure on Lots 144 (102 Cobble Ridge) and 145 (100 Cobble Ridge) is 14.8 feet. (UMF 17.) The distance between Plaintiff’s structure on his property to his property line is 6.7 feet. (UMF 18.) The distance between Defendant’s structure on her property to her property line is 8.1 feet. (UMF 19.) Finally, the distance of the residential structure on 102 Cobble Ridge Drive (Lot 144) exceeds the minimum distance of 5 feet for a side yard as set forth in the City of Folsom Planning Commission Report. (UMF 20.)

To the extent that Defendant argues that she is entitled to summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action because there was no intent to create a beneficial use easement in favor of Plaintiff’s property, the Court finds that Defendant has also failed to present sufficient UMFs to support such a finding. Here, while Defendant’s UMFs demonstrate that the CC&Rs indicate that the Developer intended to create express side yard easements appurtenant to certain lots (UMFs 6, 7) and that Defendant’s property does not contain a recorded easement for a side yard (UMF 8), Defendant presents no evidence that the Developer did not intend for Plaintiff’s property to receive a beneficial use easement over Defendant’s property.

It is entirely conceivable that the Developer did in fact intend to record an easement benefiting Plaintiff’s property but that, as the result of some error, the Developer failed to actually do so. Indeed, there is no evidence that the Developer actually did record any express easements for side yards on any of the properties in the subdivision, and that these recorded easements were the extent of the Developer’s intention. The fact that Plaintiff’s property has the minimum required setback for his side yard does not alter this analysis.

The Court simply cannot find, on the UMFs presented by Defendant that there was no intent to create a beneficial use easement in favor of Plaintiff’s property.

To the extent Defendant intended to argue that she is entitled to summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the claimed implied easement is reasonably necessary to the use and benefit of the quasi-dominant tenement (i.e. Plaintiff’s property) at the time of conveyance, the aforementioned UMFs also fail to support such a finding.

While it is true that an easement can be implied only when it is reasonably necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the quasi-dominant tenement (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420), the law does not require that that the easement must be absolutely necessary. (Owsley v. Hamner (1951) 36 Cal.2d 710, 718.) Rather, the law only requires that the easement be “reasonably necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the property ” (Ibid.) Here, Defendant essentially argues that because Plaintiff’s side yard exceeds the minimum setback of 5 feet, the alleged implied easement is not absolutely necessary for the beneficial

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enjoyment of Plaintiff’s property. (UMF 14, 18.) However, such argument and supporting evidence fail to address whether or not the alleged implied easement is necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of Plaintiff’s property. Stated differently, simply demonstrating that Plaintiff’s side yard has the requisite minimum setback for the subdivision is not sufficient to support a finding that Plaintiff does not need the easement to reasonably enjoy his property. Thus, the UMFs provided by Defendant does not demonstrate that the alleged implied easement is not reasonably necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of Plaintiff’s property (the quasi-dominant tenement).

In sum, Defendant has not met her initial burden to demonstrate that she entitled to summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s first cause of action for quiet title of implied easement. Accordingly, the burden never shifted to Defendant to create a triable issue of material fact.

The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication.

V. Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(j) in the amount of $15,750.00 is denied. That section provides:

If the court determines at any time that an affidavit was presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall order the party who presented the affidavit to pay the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses the filing of the affidavit caused the other party to incur. Sanctions shall not be imposed pursuant to this subdivision except on notice contained in a party’s papers or on the court’s own noticed motion, and after an opportunity to be heard.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 473c, subd. (j).)

The Court does not find that the affidavits in support of the motion were presented in bad faith.

Discussion

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s request for summary adjudication is DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV001802: KSHIRSAGAR vs NABER, et al. 10/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 54

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.