Moore VS A.H.Voss Company

RG21112710: Moore VS A.H.Voss Company 07/24/2026 Pre-Trial Conference in Department 23

Tentative Ruling - 07/24/2026 Ruben Sundeen

The court issues the following tentative ruling on the parties' Motions in Limine

Plaintiffs' MIL No. 1

Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 1 is granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein.

Plaintiffs’ motion presents a cornucopia of issues in a single motion. In effect, Plaintiffs have filed several motions in limine under the title of one.

As an initial matter, the Court observes that motions in limine are intended to allow a trial court “to rule on a specific objection to particular evidence.” (Kelly v. New West Fed. Sav. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 671.) “[U]ntil the evidence is actually offered, and the court is aware of its relevance in context, its probative value, and its potential for prejudice, matters related to the state of the evidence at the time an objection is made, the court cannot intelligently rule on admissibility.” (People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 975, fn. 3.) Since it may be difficult to predict testimony or foresee what evidence is actually offered (and its relevance), an objection at the time the evidence is offered will more appropriately allow the court to consider the issue. (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189–190.)

First, Plaintiffs seek to limit questions to prospective jurors about cancer, while also recognizing that some questioning is appropriate, and also without stating what the proposed limit should be. To the extent that the motion seeks to preclude Defendant from preconditioning the jury, such a prohibition applies to both parties and can be determined on a case-by-case basis. Simply put, the motion seeks a ruling on some unspecified inquiry before any such inquiry has been made— and the court cannot rule on conjecture regarding some future, context-void possibility. Therefore, this request-portion of the motion is denied.

Then Plaintiffs seek an unspecified limitation on questions regarding potential prejudice against a corporate defendant, arguing that such questions suggest corporate conduct will be in evidence. The purpose of voir dire, as this court understands it, is to explore potential preexisting bias or prejudice for or against either party. The court can take judicial notice that everyone has had both positive and negative experiences interacting with a corporate representative, so such questions about specific experiences are prohibited. In all other respects, the motion is denied as to this sub-issue.

Next Plaintiffs’ motion seeks to exclude personal views of defense counsel. The court agrees that the personal views of all counsel regarding the facts of this case are irrelevant and improper, and therefore such statements are prohibited. RG21112710: Moore VS A.H.Voss Company 07/24/2026 Pre-Trial Conference in Department 23 Continuing, the motion seeks to exclude reference to other plaintiffs represented by Plaintiffs’ counsel in other cases. The court agrees; however, it is not limited to one side. Thus, all counsel shall refrain from referencing other clients they represent, or that opposing counsel represent and have represented.

Going farther down the rabbit hole, motion seeks to exclude references to other lawsuits. The court agrees; however, (again) it is not limited to one side. Thus, all counsel shall refrain from referencing any other lawsuits.

Plaintiffs’ then seek to exclude parties, witnesses and counsel from commenting, implying, or otherwise referencing to the jury that there is ambient exposure to asbestos. Whether or not there was or now is potential exposure to ambient asbestos is a question of fact for the jury, and this court cannot remove such findings from the province of the jury. A party may reference facts they reasonably believe will be admitted into evidence. Evidence of present/current ambient or background asbestos (i.e., since the May 2021 passing of Steve A. Moore) is irrelevant and is excluded.

Plaintiffs next seek to exclude reference to the government’s (historical) use of asbestos. To the extent that Plaintiffs or Steven A. Moore was aware of government use of asbestos, such awareness appears relevant. However, the general proposition that the government has used asbestos is of limited probative value and is excluded per Evidence Code section 352.

Plaintiffs’ motion also seeks to exclude reference to asbestos being a product of the divine, specifically “God” or “Mother Nature.” Some context of the mineralogical origin of asbestos is appropriate. References to the “God” or “Mother Nature” are not, and therefore are proscribed.

And finally, the motion seeks to exclude reference to serpentine as California’s state rock. The court agrees that reference to any California symbol (state rock, state animal, state flower, or state bird) is irrelevant and excluded.

The court cannot overlook that the argument of how other “trial judges in Alameda routinely” rule. (Pl. MIL No. 1, at p. 3:8.) Plaintiffs are advised that such arguments are wholly unpersuasive. First, this court is cognizant of the different philosophies and perspectives of other judicial officers of this bench; and second, this court must exercise its own independent judgment based upon the information presented to it by the parties.

In closing, Plaintiffs’ motion in liminie is grossly unwieldy because it presents a shotgun of issues, rather than singular distinct issues for this court’s consideration. The court considered denying the motion on that basis alone; however, to move the case forward the court decided to rule on the motion as presented.

Each party to inform their witnesses of this ruling.

Plaintiffs' MIL No. 2

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21112710: Moore VS A.H.Voss Company 07/24/2026 Pre-Trial Conference in Department 23

Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 2 is granted in part and denied in part.

To the extent Plaintiffs seek to exclude any reference to the other defendants named in the complaint, the motion is granted. This, however, does not prohibit Defendants from proving other sources of exposure by parties who may have been named defendants.

To the extent Plaintiffs seek a blanket exclusion of representations made in this proceeding, the motion is denied. Inconsistent statements are admissible for impeachment, and principals judicial estoppel also may apply. (See, e.g., Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171.)

The court defers ruling on whether any pre-trial filing can be submitted to the jury. However, the court is strongly disinclined to do so since it appears that an instruction or stipulation (e.g., “that Plaintiffs stated X” in their complaint”) could address the issue.

Each party to inform their witnesses of this ruling.

Plaintiffs' MIL No. 3

Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 3 is denied without prejudice.

Simply put, “substantial factor” is the causation standard in California. (CACI, No. 430.) The “but for” standard is not.

In effect, Plaintiffs’ motion assumes that a jury would be so persuaded by the argument of Defendant’s attorneys that they would disregard this court’s instruction. The court does not agree with this premise.

Jury instructions are often intentionally vague so that the fact-finder’s common sense and experience can apply the standard to the specific context presented. Thus, there often is some space where counsel can argue how they believe the jury should apply the standard.

If it appears that counsel is asking for an application of the substantial factor standard that exceeds reason, the court can rule at that time. However, it would be improper to prospectively prevent counsel from arguing a reasonable application of the law to the facts.

For these reasons, the motion is denied.

Defendant's MIL No. 1

Defendant’s motion in limine is denied.

Defendant does not challenge Dr. Zhang’s qualifications to testify as an expert. Defendant

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21112710: Moore VS A.H.Voss Company 07/24/2026 Pre-Trial Conference in Department 23 challenges the factual basis for Dr. Zhang’s opinions.

However, the expert’s factual basis for their opinion is squarely a jury question. (See CACI No. 219 (“In deciding whether to believe an expert’s testimony, you should consider b. the facts the expert relied on.”)

Defendant’s motion argues that Dr. Zhang’s opinion was not reliable. However, it also confirms that Dr. Zhang reviewed at least one stained slide and some medical records. Whether that is sufficient to form a reliable opinion is a jury question.

So as to avoid violating the limitation on expert testimony, both parties are reminded that their experts may not relay “as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686.)

Each party to inform their expert witness(es) regarding the constraints on hearsay testimony as set forth in People v. Sanchez.

Defendant’s alternative request for a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 is denied without prejudice.

Defendant's MIL No. 2

Defendant’s motion in limine No. 2 is granted.

Defendants seek to exclude as irrelevant purchase orders from 1987 and 1988 related to job sites described as Cement Hill and Dover Park. Defendants seek to exclude on the basis of lack of foundation, hearsay, and relevance.

In opposition, Plaintiffs note they have since deposed the custodian of records in May 2026, to establish a foundation. The court finds that, if foundation is established, the records appear to qualify and are admissible as a business record.

However, Plaintiffs also admit that “certain documents, other witnesses, and Ms. Moore’s own testimony” is that Steve A. Moore worked at the subject job sites in 1986. (Opp. at p.2:10-11 and Amended Opp. at p.3:5 (footnote excluded in both).) Absent evidence that Steve A. Moore worked at these jobsites in 1987 and 1988, these records are irrelevant and/or their probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or wasting the court's time. (Evid. Code 352.)

Defendant's MIL No. 3

Defendant’s motion in limine is denied.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21112710: Moore VS A.H.Voss Company 07/24/2026 Pre-Trial Conference in Department 23 As a preliminary matter, the court notes that opposition largely is an attempt to prove cause of death. That is not the court’s role of a motion in limine: to make a finding regarding a disputed fact re cause of death. The question is a rather simple one: Is there a basis in the law for excluding or admitting a death certificate?

As an initial matter, the contents of a death certificate—in this case a statement as to the cause of death—is hearsay: an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter. Defendant claims that cause of death finding is double hearsay. While there is nothing in the Certificate of Death which indicates that the opinion on cause of death was other than Dr. Stanley’s (the certifying physician), there is evidence that this opinion is based upon statements provided by others since no autopsy was performed and there is no evidence that Dr. Stanley was Mr. Moore’s treating physician.

Plaintiff provides a thorough briefing on the evidence they plan to present as to cause of death. However, the issue is not whether the death certificate opinion is consistent with that other evidence, but whether the “double hearsay” contained in the death certificate is admissible— which might even consist of triple hearsay if based upon information provided to Robin Moore, who provided it to Dr. Stanley, who placed it into the official record.

Had Dr. Stanley performed an autopsy or been Mr. Moore’s treating physician, the death certificate would be admissible under as an official government record exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence Code section 1281 allows for one level of hearsay contained in an official government records; however, it does not mean that an unspecified and unlimited chain of hearsay is admissible just because it ends up in an official record.

For these reasons, Defendant’s motion in limine is granted.

Defendant's MIL No. 4

Defendant’s motion in limine is denied without prejudice.

Defendants seek to exclude evidence of Mr. Moore’s alleged pain, suffering, and disfigurement as irrelevant since he is not entitled to recover on these damages.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that there is no recovery for alleged pain, suffering, and disfigurement. Instead, they oppose the motion alleging it is vague and fails to reference any specific evidence. Plaintiffs also point out that some of these damages overlap into damages associated with the wrongful death and loss of consortium claims.

The court disagrees that the scope of the motion is so vague as to preclude the court ruling on the motion. However, the court agrees that there necessarily is some overlap on the damages available in the wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. Moreover, the court can instruct the jury as to the limited use of such evidence.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21112710: Moore VS A.H.Voss Company 07/24/2026 Pre-Trial Conference in Department 23 Therefore, the court denies Defendant’s motion in limine without prejudice.

Should Plaintiffs argue for unavailable damages, or dwell unreasonably on any particular category of evidence, the court can rule on the objection at trial.

Defendant's MIL No. 5 – Joinder with CNH Industrial MIL No. 3

Defendant joins a motion in limine brought by a former defendant seeking to exclude the testimony of Erin Spaulding, CVA, CM&A, as an expert in the field of cannabis generally, and on the value of cannabis-related business ventures, including farms. Defendants seek to exclude testimony on the value of Steve A. Moore’s prospective farm.

Defendant points out that the cannabis farm was partially planned, but never operated. Mr. Moore had cleared four acres of vineyards, but had not actually planted any cannabis, and he had not executed any contracts with distributors or hired any employees. Moreover, Ms. Spaulding testified that the cannabis farm business plan was informal and that other business operations were needed to support cash flow and capital needs of a start up business.

Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Moore’s experience running a piping and plumbing company, and his prior experience from his family’s vineyard and winery provides sufficient reliability of the success of this new business enterprise. Plaintiffs also point out that Mr. Moore’s property was zoned for agricultural use, and he obtained permits. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Moore also hoped to construct a facility for year-round cultivation.

However, Plaintiffs do not dispute that facts supporting Defendant’s motion: that the farm never operated, that no cannabis was planted, that there were no contracts with distributors, and that the business plan was informal. Moreover, the permit was provisional, valid only for 12 months, could be denied renewal at the State’s sole discretion, and could be revoked at the State’s sole if the licensee actively and diligently failed to pursue an annual license, including satisfaction of CEQA compliance and securing a final Lake or Streambed Alteration Agreement. Significantly, Defendants point out there is no evidence that Mr. Moore could meet the CEQA and annual license requirements.

The court finds that the testimony of Ms. Spaulding more closely resembles the testimony excluded in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747. Expert testimony inherently involves some level of inference. However, the court’s role as a gatekeeper demands that the factual basis and methodology is not based on too many assumptions as to be unduly speculative. (Id. 753.) The court finds that the less developed a new business operation, the more formality in its set up and more certainty in productivity and sales is required.

The court finds that the lack of a formal business and capitalization plan, the lack of any employees or retained consultants, the lack of experience in a new enterprise, the lack of a distribution network, and the lack of actual planting, coupled with the impact of soil, orientation

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21112710: Moore VS A.H.Voss Company 07/24/2026 Pre-Trial Conference in Department 23 to the sun, and weather on outdoor farming operations and potential CEQA issues all make the testimony of Ms. Spaulding grossly speculative. Stated differently, Mr. Moore had not and would have had to successfully navigate and accomplish all these things to approach Spaulding’s conclusion—all of which the Spaulding testimony assumes. (Compare Id. 756, Sargon’s damages relied on only three assumed premises.)

Spaulding’s testimony is not dissimilar from finding that a person who dies after purchasing a big rig truck with hopes to make it big in the trucking industry, but without any prior experience in the trucking industry, would have in fact made it big—and thereby reasonably should be entitled to damages as if they had made it big.

Plaintiffs present an idea for a cannabis farm that was still in its developmental stage, and seek damages based upon a string of assumptions that must all align in perfect unison to support Spaulding’s testimony. As noted, it is not uncommon for some level of inference (i.e., speculation) in the testimony of an expert. However, this court finds there are at least six levels of assumed facts necessary to reach Spaulding’s testimony.

Lost “prospective profits are recoverable where the evidence makes reasonably certain their occurrence and extent.” (Id. 773-774 (quoting Grupe v. Glick (1945) 26 Cal.2d 680,693.) Where expert testimony is based upon six levels of speculation (i.e., speculation, upon speculation, upon speculation, upon speculation, upon speculation, and upon speculation), then the expert’s testimony can only be described as unduly speculative.

Therefore, Defendant’s motion is granted.