HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al.

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-servicestranscripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Cross-Defendant Lilliana Hamilton’s motion to strike to self-represented Cross-Complainant Vinay Lata’s cross-complaint (“X-Comp”) is ruled upon as follows.

Cross-Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, subds. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Hamilton initiated this action by filing a complaint against Lata and Populus Financial Group, Inc. Hamilton alleges numerous FEHA related causes of action and Labor Code causes of action. Lata filed the X-Comp against Hamilton alleging causes of action for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), negligence, FEHA harassment/discrimination, and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

abuse of process. Lata was the store manager at the store where Hamilton worked.

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc, § 436.) A motion to strike is limited to the face of the challenged pleading or any matter of which the Court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 437(a).) The use of the motion to strike should be cautious and sparing. It should not be a procedural 'line item veto'. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 1683.)

Entire X-Comp

Hamilton’s motion to strike the entire cross-complaint on the grounds that it is a sham pleading is denied.

Hamilton argues that the entire cross-complaint “is a sham pleading that attempts to punish Cross-Defendant for bringing a lawsuit.” Hamilton then discusses the litigation privilege as she did in her demurrer. However, as seen in the Court’s ruling on the demurrer, it concluded that Hamilton had not shown that the first and second causes of action were entirely barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code § 47(b). Thus, the motion to strike the entire cross-complaint must be denied.

In any event, Hamilton’s argument in support of striking the entire cross-complaint is essentially a challenge to the merits of the causes of action alleged therein. However, CCP § 436(a) “does not authorize attacks on entire causes of action, let alone entire pleadings.” (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal. App. 4th 509, 528.) CCP § 436(b) also does not permit a meritsbased attack on causes of action or entire pleadings. “While this language might be broadly construed to reach any deficiency in a pleading, including substantive ones, that is not its purpose or effect.

Rather it authorizes the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed. This provision is commonly invoked to challenge pleadings filed in violation of a deadline, court order, or requirement of prior leave of court.” (Id. [emphasis in original].) Hamilton’s argument is not one that is properly raised on a motion to strike pursuant to CCP § 436.

First, Second, and Fifth Causes of Action (in their entirety)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

Hamilton’s motion to strike the entirety of the first, second and fifth causes of action on the basis that they are barred by the litigation privilege is denied. As just discussed above, motions to strike entire causes of action are improper. “Where a whole cause of action is the proper subject of a pleading challenge, the court should sustain a demurrer to the cause of action rather than grant a motion to strike.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1281.)

Paragraph Numbers 37-40

Hamilton moves to strike these paragraphs on the basis that they “improperly implicate communications privileged by the litigation privilege.” (Mot. 4:23-24.) While these paragraphs may refer to the complaint filed by Hamilton in this action, they also refer to Hamilton’s alleged conduct preceding the lawsuit. Yet, Hamilton moves to strike the entirety of the paragraphs. “[M]atter that is essential to a cause of action should not be struck and it is error to do so.” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281.) The allegations could provide background and context to Lata’s claims. In reality, Hamilton appears to be doing nothing more than improperly seeking to use a motion to strike as a procedural “line item veto”. (PH II, Inc., supra, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1683.) This is improper. The motion to strike directed to ¶¶ 37-40 is denied.

Prayer for Punitive Damages

Lastly, Hamilton moves to strike Lata’s prayer for punitive damages. The motion is granted in this regard.

In order to plead an entitlement to punitive damages a plaintiff must allege that the defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civil Code §3294(a).) “Malice” under Civil Code §3294(c)(1) means conduct intended to injure the plaintiff or despicable conduct by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of others. Malice “based on a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, requires proof that the defendant’s conduct is ‘despicable’ and ‘willful.’” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211.) “‘[D]espicable’ connotes conduct that is ‘ so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.’” (Id. [citations omitted].)

Despicable conduct includes “that which is in blatant violation of law or policy.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter, & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1050.) Indeed, “[e]ven ‘nonintentional torts’ may form the basis for punitive damages when the conduct constitutes conscious disregard of the rights or safety of other. [citation omitted] ‘Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of malicious acts

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly probable harm will result.’ [citation omitted].” (Skf Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 907.)

The Court agrees that as currently pled, the cross-complaint fails to allege facts showing that Hamilton engaged in any oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. First, as seen from the Court’s ruling on the demurrer, the Court sustained Hamilton’s demurrer to all five causes of action in the cross-complaint. Thus, there is no current cause of action which would support a request for punitive damages.

The motion to strike is therefore granted as to the prayer for punitive damages and denied in all other respects.

Where the motion was granted, it is granted with leave to amend. “If the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to the demurrer [or motion to strike], leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) Leave to amend is granted as this is Hamilton’s first challenge to the cross-complaint on which the Court has ruled and Lata requested leave.

The Court did not consider Lata’s declaration filed in connection with her opposition. Extrinsic evidence is not permitted on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp., supra, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 881.)

Where leave was granted, Lata may file and serve an amended cross-complaint no later than July 30, 2026. Hamilton shall file and serve a response within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the amended complaint is served by mail as modified by the CCP 430.41 extension if necessary.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.