HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al.

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 16D

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Cross-Defendant Lilliana Hamilton’s demurrer to self-represented Cross-Complainant Vinay Lata’s cross-complaint (“X-Comp”) is ruled upon as follows.

Cross-Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, subds. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Hamilton initiated this action by filing a complaint against Lata and Populus Financial Group, Inc. Hamilton alleges numerous FEHA related causes of action and Labor Code causes of action. Lata filed the X-Comp against Hamilton alleging causes of action for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), negligence, FEHA harassment/discrimination, and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 16D

abuse of process. Lata was the store manager at the store where Hamilton worked.

Hamilton demurs to all five causes of action in the X-Comp.

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (CCP § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d at 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318, William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 1616 fn.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.)

First Cause of Action (Defamation)

Hamilton’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 16D

Lata has alleged that Hamilton “made false statements accusing Cross-Complainant of harassment, discrimination, and hostility.” (X-Comp ¶ 42.) Lata also alleges that Hamilton published the defamatory statements “through her lawsuit”, in addition to publishing them in the workplace. (X-Comp. ¶ 43.)

Hamilton first argues that the cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege. The litigation privilege in Civil Code § 47(b) “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasijudicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) Courts must make “a careful distinction between a cause of action based squarely on a privileged communication, such as an action for defamation, and one based upon an underlying course of conduct evidenced by the communication.” (Park v.

Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1064 [quoting White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, 888].) The privilege is absolute and applies regardless of malice or intent to harm. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1063.) The privilege applies to all torts with the exception of malicious prosecution. This includes abuse of process. (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 1232, 1242.)

The Court finds that Hamilton has failed to show that this cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege. While the first cause of action does allege that Hamilton published defamatory statement “through her lawsuit”, it also alleges that statements were made in the workplace. (X-Comp. ¶ 43.) Thus, while the act of filing the complaint is undoubtedly protected by the litigation privilege in Civil Code § 47(b), the cause of action is also premised on conduct that is not connected to communications made in a judicial proceeding.

Thus, Hamilton’s arguments only address a part of the first cause of action. Indeed, “a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to a part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.) Thus, the demurrer to the first cause of action on the basis that it is barred by the litigation privilege is overruled.

Hamilton also argues that the allegations are deficient. “‘The elements of a defamation claim are (1) publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damages.’ [Citations.]” (John Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1300, 1312; Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1247.) “Publication means communication to some third person who understands the defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the person to whom reference is made.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 16D

Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) “‘The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.’ [Citations.]” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 888, citing Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1612, fn. 5.)

Here, Lata has alleged that Hamilton “made false statements accusing Cross-Complainant of harassment, discrimination, and hostility.” (X-Comp ¶ 42.) Lata does not allege that the statements were unprivileged and also does not specifically identify any statement made by Hamilton. On this basis alone, the demurrer is sustained.

Second Cause of Action (IIED)

Hamilton’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The Court first rejects Hamilton’s argument that the cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege. While Lata alleges that part of the offending conduct was “filing a malicious lawsuit”, Lata also alleges that the conduct forming the basis of the cause of action included “intimidation, verbal abuse, threats, discriminatory targeting ” (X-Comp ¶ 47.) Thus, while the act of filing the complaint is undoubtedly protected by the litigation privilege in Civil Code § 47(b), the cause of action is also premised on conduct that is not connected to communications made in a judicial proceeding.

Thus, Hamilton’s arguments only address a part of the second cause of action. Again, “a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to a part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.) Thus, the demurrer to the second cause of action on the basis that it are barred by the litigation privilege is overruled.

Hamilton next argues that the allegations are deficient “A cause of action for [IIED] exists where there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050- 1051.) Conduct is only 'extreme and outrageous' when it is 'so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.' (Davidson v.

City of Westminster,(1982) 32 Cal. 3d 197.) “Whether a defendant’s conduct can reasonably be found to be outrageous is a question of law that must initially be determined by the court; if reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct was, in fact, outrageous.” (Berkley v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 16D

Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534.)

In the body of the cause of action, Lata alleges that Hamilton’s “conduct—including intimidation, verbal abuse, threats, discriminatory targeting, and filing a malicious lawsuit—was extreme and outrageous.” (X-Comp. ¶ 47.) In the general allegations, Lata alleges that Hamilton raised her voice and was belittling when Lata asked her to perform certain job duties. (X-Comp ¶¶ 9, 11.) Lata also alleges that Hamilton inappropriately accessed the workplace safe without authorization. (X-Comp. ¶¶ 21-28) None of these allegations can be said to constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. To the extent that Lata alleges that Hamilton’s lawsuit constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct, the act of filing a lawsuit is protected by the litigation privilege and cannot form the basis of an IIED claim.

Lata also alleges that on July 29, 2025, Hamilton “became aggressive, verbally abusive, and used derogatory language, including calling Cross-Complainant a ‘bitch’ and also was screaming at the top of her voice.” (Id. ¶ 31.) While Lata also alleges that Hamilton “escalated the situation by threatening to come to Cross-Complainant’s apartment, causing fear and emotional distress,” there is no detail alleged. (Id. ¶ 32.) As alleged, at most these are “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” which do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 1050.)

As a result, Hamilton’s demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained.

Third Cause of Action (Negligence)

Hamilton’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are ‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 [emphasis in original].) “The first element, duty, ‘may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.’ ” (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128.)

Lata alleges that Hamilton “owed a duty to act reasonably and professionally in the workplace” and that Hamilton “breached that duty through her conduct.” (X-Comp ¶¶ 51-52.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 16D

The Court agrees with Hamilton that Lata has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that Hamilton “owed a duty to act reasonably and professionally in the workplace.” Nor has Lata identified any authority in her opposition which would recognize the existence of a such a duty. On this basis alone the demurrer is sustained.

The Court need not and does not address Hamilton’s alternative argument that the cause of action is barred by the exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation.

Fourth Cause of Action (FEHA harassment/discrimination)

Hamilton’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Lata simply alleges that Hamilton “targeted [Lata] because of her race and national origin” and “created a hostile and abusive environment.” (X-Comp ¶¶ 55, 56.)

The elements of a FEHA harassment cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on the plaintiff’s protected status; and (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with his or her work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. (Thompson v. City of Monrovia (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 860, 876.) A supervisor that engaged in the harassing conduct may be personally liable. (Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(3).)

The plaintiff must show the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the terms and conditions of his or her employment. The conduct complained of “cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial; rather the plaintiff must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a generalized nature.” (Hope v. California Youth Auth. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 577, 588.)

An employee bringing a FEHA action may not sue an employer directly but must first file an administrative complaint. (Gov't Code § 12960; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88.) “Under the FEHA, the employee must exhaust the administrative remedy provided by the statute by filing a complaint with the [Department] and must obtain from the Department a notice of right to sue in order to be entitled to file a civil action in court based on violations of the FEHA. The timely filing of an administrative complaint is a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action for damages under the FEHA.” (Medix Ambulance Serv. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 109, 116.) “It is the plaintiff’s burden to plead and prove the timely filing of the DFEH complaint.” (Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1402.) In the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 16D

FEHA context, the failure to exhaust an administrative remedy is a jurisdictional defect. (Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613.)].) With respect to FEHA claims, the Legislature amended Government Code § 12960 in 2021 to provide that an administrative complaint must be filed within three years of the unlawful employment practice. (Gov. Code § 12960(e)(5).)

Here, Lata has not alleged that she filed an administrative complaint and obtained a notice of right to sue. In opposition, Lata argues that she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because she has alleged a common law cause of action for harassment, not a FEHA cause of action for harassment. However, Lata titled the cause of action as one for “FEHA/Common Law” harassment. Moreover, Lata cites no authority recognizing a common law cause of action for harassment premised on a protected characteristic. “Because the cause of action for sexual harassment is a creature of statute, plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion requirements.” (Medix Ambulance Serv. v.

Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal. App. 4th 109, 118.) Harassment on the basis of race or national origin is also a “creature of statute” and Lata was required to exhaust administrative remedies. On this basis alone, the demurrer is sustained.

Apart from the failure to allege exhaustion, Lata does not identify her race or national origin and does not allege any facts showing that Hamilton harassed Lata on the basis of her race or national origin. On this additional basis the demurrer is sustained.

Fifth Cause of Action (Abuse of Process)

Hamilton’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Lata alleges that Hamilton “misused the legal system by filing a lawsuit based on knowingly false allegations.” (X-Comp. ¶ 59.) She alleges that Hamilton’s purpose “was to intimidate, retaliate against, and further harm” Lata. (Id. ¶ 60.)

The Court agrees with Hamilton that this cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege as pled. It is entirely premised on Hamilton’s act of filing the complaint in this action. As noted above, and contrary to Lata’s argument, the litigation privilege applies to the tort of abuse of process. (Action Apartment Assn., Inc., supra, 41 Cal. 4th at 1242.) Further, Hamilton’s motive in filing the complaint is not relevant as the privilege applies regardless of malice or intent to harm. (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 1063.) The demurrer is sustained on this basis alone.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV025253: HAMILTON vs POPULUS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other Demurrer in Department 16D

The Court need not reach Hamilton’s other arguments as the cause of action is entirely premised on conduct protected by the litigation privilege.

In sum, Hamilton’s demurrer is sustained as to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action for the reasons stated above.

The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. “If the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to the demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) Leave to amend is granted as this is Hamilton’s first challenge to the cross-complaint on which the Court has ruled and Lata requested leave.

The Court did not consider Lata’s declaration filed in connection with her opposition. Extrinsic evidence is not permitted on a demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp., supra, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 881.)

Where leave was granted, Lata may file and serve an amended cross-complaint no later than July 30, 2026. Hamilton shall file and serve a response within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the amended complaint is served by mail as modified by the CCP 430.41 extension if necessary.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.