SANDFORD vs DMV

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 04/13/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Tentative Ruling

DATE/TIME: April 13, 2026 11:00 a.m. DEP. NO.: 4 JUDGE: HON. JENNIFER K. CLERK: D. TRAN ROCKWELL

JAMES SANDFORD, Case No.: 25WM000152 Petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.

Nature of Proceedings: Demurrer – Second Amended Petition

The following shall constitute the Court’s tentative ruling on the above matter, set for hearing in Department 4, on Monday, April 13, 2026, at 11:00 a.m. The tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court, unless a party desiring to be heard so advises the Clerk of Department 4 no later than 4:00 p.m. on the Court day preceding the hearing, and further advises the Clerk that such party has notified the other side of its intention to appear.

The Court strongly encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. However, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing. Pursuant to Government Code Section 69959, Court Reporters are not permitted through the use of remote technology, and any Court Reporter designated for the hearing shall be physically present in the Courtroom.

The parties may join the Zoom session for the hearing by audio and/or video through the following link/telephone number:

https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept4 (833) 568-8864 ID: 160 7584 1179

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 04/13/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Parties requesting services of a Court Reporter will need to arrange for private Court Reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code § 68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a Court Reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by using the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore, available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf If a Court Reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list is not used, aStipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) must be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing.

Once the form is signed, it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 4. Pursuant to Government Code Section 69959, Court Reporters are not permitted through the use of remote technology, and any Court Reporter designated for the hearing shall be physically present in the Courtroom. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a Court Reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 4 at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away.

Once approved, the Clerk of Department 4 will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official Court Reporter will be provided.

Introduction

Respondent California Department of Motor Vehicle’s (Respondent or Department) demurrer to the Second Amended Petition filed by Petitioner James Sandford (Petitioner) is ruled upon as follows.

This is the second demurrer filed by Respondent in this matter. The Court previously sustained Respondent’s demurrer to Petitioner’s First Amended Petition on the grounds that his challenge to the suspension of his driver’s license constituted an improper collateral attack on his criminal convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol or other substances.

Factual Background

In the First Amended Petition, Petitioner appeared to allege that Respondent improperly

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 04/13/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

suspended his driver’s license. (1st Am. Pet. 1:17-20 [“Respondent continues to enforce a suspension based on Case No. 09M04660, despite certified evidence that the case was dismissed by the District Attorney, administratively destroyed by the Superior Court, and never required an 18-month DUI program”].) As discussed in the Court’s ruling on the demurrer to the First Amended Petition, the Court took judicial notice of Petitioner’s three 2009 criminal cases for driving under the influence. In March and April of 2009, Petitioner was arrested on three separate occasions for driving under the influence of alcohol or other substances and for driving without a valid driver’s license.

Three criminal cases were initiated against Petitioner in Sacramento County Superior Court: People v. Sandford, Case No. 09T01645; People v. Sandford, Case No. 09M04660; and People v. Sandford, Case No. 09F03182.

In Case Nos. 09T01645 and 09F03182, Petitioner was sentenced to, among other things, informal probation, a six-month license suspension, completion of a first offender program and completion of an “SB-38” program. The sentencing requirements for both Case No. 09T01645 and Case No. 09F03182 indicated they were to run concurrently to Case No. 09M04660. In 2010, Case No. 09F03182 was dismissed, apparently in connection with findings of police misconduct.

Petitioner now alleges, in the Second Amended Petition, that he seeks “to challenge [Respondent’s] administrative handling of his driving record and the suspension of his driving privileges.” (2nd Am. Pet. p. 1:18-20.) Petitioner alleges that he “has never received proper written notice of the suspension at issue,” and that “[w]ithout proper notice, Petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to challenge the suspension at the time it was imposed which is a fundamental administrative requirement.” (2nd Am. Pet. 2:1-5.) Petitioner also alleges that he “was never offered a hearing to contest the suspension.” (2nd Am. Pet. 2:8.)

Petitioner then reiterates his previous allegations that the destruction of the abstract of judgment for Petitioner’s criminal conviction in Case No. 09M04660 after the expiration of the ten-year retention period prevents the Department from carrying out the suspension ordered the by criminal Court in that case. (2nd Am. Pet. 2:13-3:2.)

Petitioner also alleges, as he did in the First Amended Petition, that the 2010 dismissal of Case No. 09F03182 required the Department to “update[] its records to reflect the corrected information.” (2nd Am. Pet. 3:4-6.)

Finally, Petitioner alleges that the Department “misinterpreted the minute orders from June 4, 2009,” in that it “treated concurrent sentencing as a basis to impose a second-offender program requirement, even though the administrative record does not support such an interpretation.” (2nd Am. Pet. 3:10-13.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 04/13/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Petitioner seeks among other things, “a writ of mandate compelling the Department to correct its administrative records,” and an order to “[r]estore Petitioner’s driving privileges based on administrative compliance.” (2nd Am. Pet. 5:3-12.)

Standard of Review

In a mandamus proceeding, the respondent may challenge the sufficiency of a petition for writ of mandate by filing a demurrer. (May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1323.) A petition for writ of mandate is subject to a demurrer on the same grounds as a civil complaint. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1109; Rodriguez v. Municipal Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 521, 526.) “A demurrer tests only the sufficiency of the pleading.” (Cedar Fair, LP. v. County of Santa Clara (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1159.)

The court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725), “ but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “[T]he... plaintiff’s ability to prove [the pleading's] allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court....” (Cedar Fair, L.P. v.

County of Santa Clara, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159, quotations, citations omitted.) In considering a demurrer, the court must determine whether the pleading, standing alone, states a cause of action under any possible legal theory. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title. Guar Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.) The court should overrule a demurrer if the facts alleged in a complaint or petition are sufficient to state a cause of action. (Ibid.)

Discussion

First and Second Causes of Action - Right to Notice and Administrative Hearing In the First and Second Causes of Action, Petitioner alleges “Failure to Provide Notice” and “Failure to Provide Hearing.” Respondent demurs to these causes of action on the grounds that Petitioner was not entitled to notice or and administrative hearing prior to the suspension of his driver’s license following his criminal convictions. As Respondent notes, Petitioner cites no authority in support of his allegations that notice and a hearing were required.

Under Vehicle Code section 13352, the Department “shall immediately suspend or revoke” a person’s driving privileges “upon receipt of an abstract of the record of a court” showing a conviction for driving under the influence. (Veh. Code, § 13352, subd. (a).) Thus, the Department was not required to afford Petitioner notice or the opportunity for a hearing because the suspension of Petitioner’s license following the 2009 convictions was mandatory: “Under [Vehicle Code] section 14101, subdivision (a), a driver is not entitled to a hearing if the DMV’s action ‘is made mandatory by this code.’” (Draeger v.

Reed (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1524,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 04/13/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

quoting Veh. Code, § 14101, subd. (a).) In opposition, Petitioner argues that the Department “took new administrative action in 2022,” and appears to contend that he was entitled to notice and a hearing in connection with the unspecified 2022 administrative action. (Opp. 2:12.) As Respondent observes on reply, however, the Second Amended Petition is devoid of any allegations regarding a 2022 action by the Department. As pleaded, the Second Amended Petition fails to state a cause of action for writ relief based on a failure to provide notice and/or a hearing.

The demurrer to these causes of action is therefore sustained. The Court will grant leave to amend as to these causes of action only, as Petitioner has identified a potential basis to validly amend the pleading based on purported events in 2022. Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action – Reliance on Missing or Expired Abstracts, Failure to Update Records, Misapplication of Concurrent Sentencing, Failure to Perform Mandatory Duties. All of these causes of action are, at their core, challenges to the sentencing orders issued in Petitioner’s criminal cases.

Petitioner’s primary contention in this action appears to be that he should not be required to complete the DUI program for repeat offenders. As he states in his declaration in support of the opposition, “I drafted the SAP to focus solely on the DMV’s 2022 administrative actions, including its failure to provide me with notice, its reliance on outdated or missing records, its failure to update its records after the 2010 corrected minute order, and its imposition of a second-offender program requirement without any administrative hearing. (Declaration of James Sanford, ¶ 5.)

As the Court discussed in its ruling on the prior demurrer, however, the destruction of the Court’s records for Case No. 09M04660 pursuant to its retention policy has no effect on the underlying conviction in that case and does not affect the sentencing requirements with which Petitioner must comply. Petitioner’s allegation that the “Department cannot enforce a suspension based on documents it is no longer authorized to retain or produce” is incorrect. (2nd Am. Pet. 3:4-6.) The Court also previously addressed Petitioner’s allegation that the “Department failed to update its records after the 2010 dismissal and corrected abstracts in Case No. 09F03182.” (2nd Am.

Pet. 4:8-11.) As the Court explained: With the dismissal of Case No. 09F03182, which had required completion of the first offender six-month DUI program, Petitioner may be alleging that he is no longer a second DUI offender, and the requirement to complete the SB-38 eighteen-month program should no longer apply. Even assuming these facts are true, however, the decisions in Thomas and Larsen,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 04/13/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

discussed above, foreclose Petitioner’s claims for a writ of mandate against Respondent. The requirement to complete the SB-38 DUI program was imposed in the sentencing order for Case No. 09T01645, which indicated sentencing was to run concurrently with Case No. 09M04660. (Resp. RJN Exh. A [Minute Order – Proceedings, June 4, 2009].) Nothing in the pleadings or the materials subject to judicial notice indicates that either Case No. 09T01645 or 09M04660 were dismissed or otherwise affected by the September 17, 2010 dismissal of Case No. 09F03182.

Therefore, the abstracts for the two former cases continued to require the suspension of Petitioner’s driving privileges. (Thomas v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 338 [“The department, having received abstracts of judgments showing two convictions of petitioner for drunk driving was required to suspend his driving privilege”].) In the absence of a separate determination setting aside the convictions and/or sentencing orders in Case Nos. 09T01645 or 09M04660, “[i]t is no part of the department’s duty to pass on the validity of those judgments.” (Ibid.)

Neither this Court nor the Department may alter the convictions or sentencing requirements imposed in the criminal actions. To the degree Petitioner believes these convictions or requirements are improper in light of the dismissal of the felony case, his remedy was to challenge them in an appropriate proceeding. (See id. at pp. 338-339 [petitioner “could have sought to have the rendering court set aside the conviction at any time”].) (Tentative Ruling, Jan. 8, 2026, adopted Jan. 9, 2026, p. 6.)

This analysis applies with the same force to the Second Amended Petition. The Department does not determine what requirements are imposed by a sentencing order – the sentencing criminal court does. The Department is not authorized to alter the requirements of a sentencing order absent further direction from the Court. The dismissal of Case No. 09F03182 therefore does not permit the Department to excuse Petitioner from any sentencing requirements in the other two cases. Petitioner had to seek relief from those requirements from the sentencing court, which he apparently has not done.

For the same reasons, Petitioner’s claim that “[t]he Department misinterpreted the sentencing documents and applied the wrong program requirement” fails as well. Excusing Petitioner from the repeat offender DUI program requirements would require the Department to apply a different requirement than the second offender eighteen-month program imposed in Case Nos. 09T01645 and 09M04660. The Department is not authorized to “interpret” an abstract in the manner Petitioner requests. (Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335, 338 [Department required to suspend driving privilege based on abstracts of judgments].)

The Court having previously sustained the Department’s demurrer on these grounds, and Petitioner having failed to validly amend the pleading, the demurrer to Causes of Action Three through Six is sustained without leave to amend.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 04/13/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Disposition The demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action is sustained with leave to amend. The demurrer to the remaining causes of action is sustained without leave to amend. Where leave was granted, Petitioner may file a Third Amended Petition within 30 days after the effective date of this Minute Order. The responsive pleading shall be due 30 days after the filing of any Third Amended Petition. The Minute Order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rule of Court, rule 3.1312, or other notice is required.