SANDFORD vs DMV

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 01/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Tentative Ruling

DATE/TIME: January 12, 2026 11:00 a.m. DEP. NO.: 4 JUDGE: HON. JENNIFER K. CLERK: D. TRAN ROCKWELL

JAMES SANDFORD, Case No.: 25WM000152 Petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.

Nature of Proceedings: Demurrer

The following shall constitute the Court’s tentative ruling on the above matter, set for hearing in Department 4, on Monday, January 12, 2026, at 11:00 a.m.

The Court strongly encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. However, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing. Pursuant to Government Code Section 69959, Court Reporters are not permitted through the use of remote technology, and any Court Reporter designated for the hearing shall be physically present in the Courtroom.

The parties may join the Zoom session for the hearing by audio and/or video through the following link/telephone number:

https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept4 (833) 568-8864 ID: 160 7584 1179

Parties requesting services of a Court Reporter will need to arrange for private Court Reporter

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 01/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code § 68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a Court Reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by using the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore, available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf If a Court Reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list is not used, aStipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) must be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing.

Once the form is signed, it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 4. Pursuant to Government Code Section 69959, Court Reporters are not permitted through the use of remote technology, and any Court Reporter designated for the hearing shall be physically present in the Courtroom. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a Court Reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 4 at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away.

Once approved, the Clerk of Department 4 will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official Court Reporter will be provided.

Respondent California Department of Motor Vehicle’s (Respondent or Department) demurrer to the First Amended Petition filed by Petitioner James Sandford (Petitioner) is ruled upon as follows.

Respondent’s request for judicial notice of records and files of the Sacramento County Superior Court (Resp. RJN Exhs. A-E) is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) The Court takes notice only of the “existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached [but does] not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files.” (In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274, 314, quoting Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.)

Factual Background

In the First Amended Petition, Petitioner appears to allege that Respondent has improperly suspended his driver’s license. (1st Am. Pet. 1:17-20 [“Respondent continues to enforce a suspension based on Case No. 09M04660, despite certified evidence that the case was dismissed

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 01/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

by the District Attorney, administratively destroyed by the Superior Court, and never required an 18-month DUI program”].)

Petitioner alleges that on June 4, 2009, he was sentenced in Case No. 09M04660. (1st Am. Pet. 2:8.) Petitioner alleges “the sentence included a six-month DUI program, not an 18-month SB- 38 program.” (Id. at 2:8-10.) Petitioner further alleges that on December 2, 2024, he received notice from this Court that “Case No. 09M04660 had been administratively destroyed pursuant to Government Code §§ 68152 and 68153.” (Id. at 2:11-13.)

Petitioner also alleges that on August 30, 2010, he received a letter from the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office stating that a different criminal case, No. 09F03182, which Petitioner alleges was “underlying [Case No.] 09M04660,” “was identified for dismissal” due to misconduct by the arresting officer. (1st Am. Pet. 2:5-7.)

Petitioner appears to allege that because the abstract associated with his conviction in Case No. 09M04660 was destroyed by the Court, it can no longer form the basis for his license suspension. (1st Am. Pet. 3:5-8 [“[Vehicle Code] §1808(b) requires retention of DUI abstracts for 10 years. The abstract for 09M04660, if it ever existed, expired in 2019 No abstract has been produced. DMV’s enforcement is unsupported”].)

Petitioner seeks, among other things, a writ of mandate “compelling the DMV to cease reliance on Case No. 09M04660.” Petitioner also requests that the Court “order the DMV to restore Petitioner’s driving privileges” and “[d]eclare Respondent’s suspension unlawful and unsupported by verified records.” (1st Am. Pet. 3:19-22.)

Respondent requests judicial notice of additional factual information, which the Court has granted. In March and April of 2009, Petitioner was arrested on three separate occasions for driving under the influence of alcohol or other substances and for driving without a valid driver’s license. (Resp. RJN Exhs. A, B, C.) Three criminal cases were initiated against Petitioner in Sacramento County Superior Court: People v. Sandford, Case No. 09T01645; People v. Sandford, Case No. 09M04660; and People v. Sandford, Case No. 09F03182. (Ibid.)

On June 4, 2009, Petitioner appeared for sentencing in all three cases. (Resp. RJN Exh. A, June 4, 2009 Minute Order - Proceedings; Exh. C, June 4, 2009 Minute Order - Proceedings.) In Case Nos. 09T01645 and 09F03182, the Minute Orders state that Petitioner was sentenced to, among other things, informal probation, a six-month license suspension, completion of a first offender program and completion of an “SB-38” program. (Ibid.) The sentencing requirements for both Case No. 09T01645 and Case No. 09F03182 indicated they were to run concurrently to Case No. 09M04660. (Ibid. [concurrent sentence indicated as “c/c 09M04660”].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 01/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Standard of Review

In a mandamus proceeding, the respondent may challenge the sufficiency of a petition for writ of mandate by filing a demurrer. (May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1323.) A petition for writ of mandate is subject to a demurrer on the same grounds as a civil complaint. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1109; Rodriguez v. Municipal Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 521, 526.) “A demurrer tests only the sufficiency of the pleading.” (Cedar Fair, LP. v. County of Santa Clara (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1159.)

The court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725), “ but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “[T]he... plaintiff’s ability to prove [the pleading's] allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court....” (Cedar Fair, L.P. v.

County of Santa Clara, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159, quotations, citations omitted.) In considering a demurrer, the court must determine whether the pleading, standing alone, states a cause of action under any possible legal theory. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title. Guar Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.) The court should overrule a demurrer if the facts alleged in a complaint or petition are sufficient to state a cause of action. (Ibid.)

Discussion

Beneficial Interest Respondent first demurs on the grounds that Petitioner cannot allege an entitlement to writ relief because he has not completed a DUI program as required by the sentencing orders in his criminal cases. Respondent argues that Petitioner “has two DUI convictions, and he was required by the terms of his plea in one of those matters to enroll and complete a DUI program.” (Opening Mem. 11:17-18.) Respondent further contends that “[w]ithout proof of completion from a DUI program provider, the DMV has no duty to act by lifting the DUI license suspension.” (Id. at 12:26-27.)

Respondent correctly notes that, contrary to Petitioner’s allegations, the destruction of the Court’s records for Case No. 09M04660 does not affect any underlying conviction in that case. Nor does the destruction of those records disturb the convictions and sentencing requirements in Petitioner’s two other criminal cases. However, to the degree Respondent demurs on the grounds that Petitioner has not completed the DUI program in compliance with the Court’s sentencing order, that argument requires the Court to make a factual determination that is outside the scope of review on demurrer.

Nothing in the pleadings or matters subject to judicial notice would enable the Court to determine as a matter of law Petitioner’s compliance with prior sentencing orders. As this argument requires a factual determination that relates to the merits of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 01/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

the Petition, the demurrer on this ground is overruled. Improper Collateral Attack Respondent next demurs on the ground that Petitioner is not permitted to collaterally attack his conviction in Case No. 09M04660 through the instant Petition. Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot challenge the suspension of his license on the grounds that his underlying criminal conviction was invalid without first obtaining a separate determination of the conviction’s invalidity. (Opening Mem. 13:5-26.) It is well settled that petitioners seeking to reinstate their driving privileges based on allegedly invalid criminal convictions must separately challenge those convictions.

In Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335, the trial court granted a writ of mandate setting aside the Department’s suspension of the petitioner’s driving privilege on the ground that petitioner’s prior conviction for drunk driving was invalid because he had not been represented by counsel. (Id. at p. 338.) The Supreme Court reversed, holding that without a prior adjudication of the conviction’s invalidity, the Department had no obligation to reinstate petitioner’s driving privilege: The department, having received abstracts of judgments showing two convictions of petitioner for drunk driving within a seven-year period, was required to suspend his driving privilege. [Citation] It is no part of the department's duty to pass on the validity of those judgments. **** The present proceeding is simply a petition to review the department's administrative act in performing a mandatory function, and it is not a proceeding in which additional sanctions may be imposed against petitioner by reason of his 1966 conviction.

Accordingly, no basis exists for permitting a collateral attack on the 1966 judgment of conviction in this mandate proceeding against the department; and, there having been no previous adjudication that petitioner's 1966 conviction was invalid, the superior court improperly granted the writ. (Id. at p. 338; see also Larsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 12 Cal.4th 278 [extending holding in Thomas to out-of-state DUI convictions].) In opposition, Petitioner appears to concede that the conviction in Case No. 09M04660 has not been set aside, but argues that the case records were destroyed pursuant to Government Code section 68152. (Opp. 2:22-24.)

Petitioner contends “DMV cannot rely on destroyed records to continue suspension.” (Ibid.) Petitioner is incorrect. As noted above, the destruction of criminal case records pursuant to the statutory retention policy does not mean that Petitioner’s conviction is set aside or that the sentencing requirements no longer apply. Further, Petitioner appears to accept that he must complete a DUI program in order to reinstate

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 01/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

his driving privileges, but argues that he “should only be required to complete a six-month program, not SB-38.” (Opp. 3:1-2.)[1] Although the argument is unclear, Petitioner appears to contend that Case No. 09F03182 was dismissed, apparently in connection with findings of police misconduct. (1st Am. Pet. 2:5-7, 4:4-8, Exh. A.) Petitioner attaches to the Petition a letter from the Sacramento County District Attorney, dated August 30, 2010, stating that Case No. 09F03182 was identified as a case in which the arresting officer’s “description of the events in his written reports is significantly different from the actual events as revealed in the camer[a] footage.” (1st Am.

Pet. Exh. A.) The letter stated that Case No. 09F03182 would be dismissed, and that a hearing would be held on September 17, 2010 in Department 9 of the Sacramento Superior Court. (Ibid.) Minutes from the September 17, 2010, hearing for Case No. 09F03182 indicate that the District Attorney’s motion to dismiss was granted, the previously entered plea was withdrawn, the previously entered sentence was vacated and “Diversion Terminated,” previously paid court fines and fees were ordered refunded, and “Corrected DMV and DOJ abstracts to issue.” (1st Am Pet.

Exh. B, p. 2; Resp. RJN Exh. C.) With the dismissal of Case No. 09F03182, which had required completion of the first offender six-month DUI program, Petitioner may be alleging that he is no longer a second DUI offender, and the requirement to complete the SB-38 eighteen-month program should no longer apply. Even assuming these facts are true, however, the decisions in Thomas and Larsen, discussed above, foreclose Petitioner’s claims for a writ of mandate against Respondent. The requirement to complete the SB-38 DUI program was imposed in the sentencing order for Case No. 09T01645, which indicated sentencing was to run concurrently with Case No. 09M04660. (Resp.

RJN Exh. A [Minute Order – Proceedings, June 4, 2009].) Nothing in the pleadings or the materials subject to judicial notice indicates that either Case No. 09T01645 or 09M04660 were dismissed or otherwise affected by the September 17, 2010 dismissal of Case No. 09F03182. Therefore, the abstracts for the two former cases continued to require the suspension of Petitioner’s driving privileges. (Thomas v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 338 [“The department, having received abstracts of judgments showing two convictions of petitioner for drunk driving was required to suspend his driving privilege”].)

In the absence of a separate determination setting aside the convictions and/or sentencing orders in Case Nos. 09T01645 or 09M04660, “[i]t is no part of the department’s duty to pass on the validity of those judgments.” (Ibid.) Neither this Court nor the Department may alter the convictions or sentencing requirements imposed in the criminal actions. To the degree Petitioner believes these convictions or requirements are improper in light of the dismissal of the felony case, his remedy was to challenge them in an appropriate proceeding. (See id. at pp. 338-339 [petitioner “could have sought to have the rendering court set aside the conviction at any time”].)

Therefore, as in Thomas, there having been no determination that Petitioner’s prior convictions and the resulting sentencing orders are improper or invalid, there is no basis for a writ of mandate to issue against the Department. (Thomas v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra, 3 Cal.3d at

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 01/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

p. 338.) The demurrer is sustained on this ground. Statute of Limitations/Laches The Department also demurs on the ground that the Petition is untimely, based upon both the applicable statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches. The Department contends that Vehicle Code section 14401, subdivision (a), requires any action for judicial review of the Department’s order suspending a person’s driving privileges to be filed within 90 days after notice of the order is provided. (Veh. Code, § 14401, subd. (a).)

Vehicle Code section 14401 provides: (a) Any action brought in a court of competent jurisdiction to review any order of the department refusing, canceling, placing on probation, suspending, or revoking the privilege of a person to operate a motor vehicle shall be commenced within 90 days from the date the order is noticed. (b) Upon final completion of all administrative appeals, the person whose driving privilege was refused, canceled, placed on probation, suspended, or revoked shall be given written notice by the department of his or her right to a review by a court pursuant to subdivision (a). (Veh.

Code, § 14401.) The Department does not point to anything in the Petition establishing the date Petitioner’s suspension order “was noticed.” The Department contends that “the date of accrual would have been near his June 4, 2009 sentencing hearing, as this would have been the approximate time the DMV issued notice of his license suspension.” (Opening Mem., 15:1-2.) However, the Petition does not establish the date Petitioner received notice of the suspension and the Department does not request judicial notice of any document purporting to show that such notice was issued. “[F]or a demurrer based on the statute of limitations to be sustained, the untimeliness of the lawsuit must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint and matters judicially noticed.” (Coalition for Clean Air v.

City of Visalia (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 408, 420.) Here, the Department has not established when the notice of suspension was issued for purposes of Vehicle Code section 14401, or indeed, that a notice was issued at all. “[W]hen the relevant facts are not clear such that the cause of action might be, but is not necessarily, time-barred, the demurrer will be overruled.” (Ibid.) For similar reasons the demurrer based on the doctrine of laches is overruled. The Department argues that by waiting over fifteen years after his criminal sentencing to challenge his license suspension, Petitioner unreasonably delayed bringing the instant action.

The Department further argues it has been prejudiced by the delay, citing the destruction of Court records and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 01/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4

Department records as examples of evidence lost as a result of the lengthy passage of time. As with the statute of limitations, however, “for a demurrer to be sustained based on the doctrine of laches, ‘both the delay and the injury must be disclosed in the complaint.’” (Kao v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1334, quoting Sangiolo v. Sangiolo (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 511, 514.) As noted above, the date Petitioner’s claim accrued is not established by the pleadings or matters subject to judicial notice, making the true length of any delay impossible to determine.

Further, while the record before the Court shows that some court files have been destroyed pursuant to the applicable retention policy, the Department has not established, for purposes of demurrer, that its own records have been lost or destroyed, or any other forms of prejudice as a result of the purported delay. Finally, the Court cannot accept, on demurrer, the Department’s argument that Petitioner has “acquiesced” to the 18-month DUI program. The Department cites records from separate civil lawsuits Petitioner has initiated against Terra Nova Counselling and the Department, which the Department argues show that “Petitioner’s actions indicated that he had every intention to comply and follow through with the requirement to complete the 18-month DUI program.” (Opening Mem. 17:11-14.)

The arguments regarding Petitioner’s purported acquiescence are based on facts well outside the scope of the pleadings in this action and would require the Court to accept the truth of statements contained in judicially noticed documents, which is impermissible on demurrer. (See Opening Mem. 17:16-19 [“Petitioner alleged that, on January 31, 2024, he logged into a Zoom meeting that had been previously scheduled and was ‘ready to participate’”].) Accordingly, the demurrer on the grounds that the Petition is barred by the statute of limitation and/or laches is overruled.

Disposition

The demurrer is sustained on the grounds that the Petition is an improper collateral attack on Petitioner’s criminal convictions. The demurrer is otherwise overruled. As this is Respondent’s first challenge to the operative Petition in this action, leave to amend is granted. Petitioner may file a Second Amended Petition within 30 days after the effective date of this Minute Order. The responsive pleading shall be due 30 days after the filing of any Second Amended Petition. The Minute Order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rule of Court, rule 3.1312, or other notice is required.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000152: SANDFORD vs DMV 01/12/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 4 [1] The parties appear to agree that “SB-38” refers to a statutory program for persons convicted of

two or more DUI offenses, under which current sentencing laws for second-offenders require completion of an 18-month DUI program. (Opening Mem. 11:26-28, citing Veh. Code, §§ 13352, 23540, 23542.)