CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff Civil Rights Department’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for preliminary injunction is ruled upon as follows. Each of the parties’ requests for judicial notice are GRANTED. This is a Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) case. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on February 19, 205, alleges causes of action for denial of religious accommodations pursuant to Government Code section 12940(l) and failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination pursuant to Government Code section 12940(k).

The complaint alleges that real parties in interest, California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) patrol officers Jagdeep Sandhu and Gurjot Bhangal, practice Sikhism, and that as part of their religious belief and observance, they seek to maintain unshorn hair. The complaint alleges that this religious grooming practice conflicts with CHP’s requirement that all uniformed employees be clean-shaven. The complaint alleges that Sandhu and Bhangal requested as religious accommodations that CHP permit them to be bearded while on duty and in uniform.

The complaint alleges that CHP violated the FEHA when it categorically denied Sikh patrol officers Jagdeep Sandhu and Gurjot Bhangal’s religious accommodation requests to be permitted beards without legal justification. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff now moves the Court for an order preliminarily enjoining CHP from violating subdivision (l) of Government Code section 12940. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 526, subd. (a), 527, subds. (a)-(b); Rules of Court, rule 3.1150(a); see also Gov. Code, §§ 12920.5, 12965, subd. (d).)

Specifically, Plaintiff asks the Court to “refrain CHP from enforcing its policies requiring CHP Officers Jagdeep Sandhu and Gurjot Bhangal to be clean-shaven, which conflicts with their Sikh faith (i.e., allow Officers Sandhu and Bhangal to have beards during the pendency of this litigation and to refrain from subjecting Officers Sandhu and Bhangal to any discipline, threat of discipline, or other adverse action, such as requiring them to go on leave, for having beards).” (Notice, 2:8-12.) Plaintiff’s motion is made on the grounds that:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

• Plaintiff CRD is likely to succeed on the merits of its failure-to-accommodate religious discrimination claim under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (l)(1) because o As Sikhs, Officers Sandhu and Bhangal sincerely believe in maintaining unshorn facial hair, their religious grooming practice belief conflicts with CHP’s clean-shaven requirement, and, having denied their religious accommodation requests, CHP was and is aware of the conflict between Officers Sandhu and Bhangal’s beliefs and its employment requirement; o Having categorically denied Officers Sandhu and Bhangal’s religious accommodation requests, CHP has not demonstrated that it explored any available reasonable alternative means of accommodating Officers Sandhu and Bhangal’s religious beliefs and observance; and o CHP has not demonstrated that granting Officers Sandhu and Bhangal’s religious accommodation requests would cause it to incur an undue hardship, which is a fact-specific showing of significant difficulty or expense. • Because CRD is a public prosecutor charged with enforcing the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), which provides for injunctive relief, a public harm is presumed by CRD’s lawsuit against CHP and CRD’s likelihood of success on the merits of its failure- to-accommodate claim such that a preliminary injunction is warranted. • Even if CHP were to demonstrate grave harm were the injunction to issue, the ongoing mental and emotional injury experienced by Officers Sandhu and Bhangal, and the abridgement of their religious exercise, due to CHP’s failure to eliminate the conflict with their religious beliefs is greater such that the balance of harms mandates the issuance of a preliminary injunction. (Notice, 2:13 – 3:10.)

CHP opposes the motion. Legal Standard “As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim[s]. [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) “The purpose of such an order ‘is to preserve the status quo . . . . It ‘does not constitute a final adjudication of the controversy.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305.) “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

adjudication of the merits. (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554 [emphasis added]; see generally Code Civ. Proc. § 426, subd. (a)(2) [a preliminary injunction “may be granted . . . [w]hen it appears . . . that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce . . . great or irreparable injury . . . to a party to the action].) “‘[T]he extraordinary remedy of injunction’ cannot be invoked without showing the likelihood of irreparable harm. [Citation.]” (Intel Corp. v.

Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.) The threat of “irreparable harm” must be imminent. “An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents’ fears about something that may happen in the future.[..i]t must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.” (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.) The showing must be strong enough to 'support the exercise of the rather extraordinary power to restrain the defendant's actions prior to a trial on the merits.' (Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Ass'n v.

State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471.) “If the threshold requirement of irreparable injury is established, then [the court] must examine two interrelated factors to determine whether . . . a preliminary injunction should be [issued]: ‘(1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or non-issuance of the injunction.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at 306 [emphasis added].)

The greater the showing on one factor, the lesser the showing must be on the other. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) However, a preliminary injunction may not be granted, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless it is reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits. (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442.) The party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of showing all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (O'Connell v.

Super. Ct. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.) Courts will deny a preliminary injunction unless there is a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will be successful in his or her assertion of rights. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.) A preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury. Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with the characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. (Winter v.

NRDC, Inc., (2008) 555 U.S. 7, 22.) Harm is presumed when a governmental entity seeks a preliminary injunction upon a statute that authorizes injunctive relief, which the defendant may rebut. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 71-72.) Ultimately, a court “must exercise its discretion in favor of the party most likely to be injured.” (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205, internal citation omitted.) “The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause.” (IT

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at 73.) Prohibitory v. Mandatory Injunction “An injunction is prohibitory if it requires a person to refrain from a particular act and mandatory if it compels performance of an affirmative act that changes the position of the parties.” (Davenport v. Blue Cross of California (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 435, 448.) “The substance of the injunction, not the form, determines whether it is mandatory or prohibitory.” (Id. at 446-447.) Plaintiff characterizes its request for an order that CHP refrain from enforcing its grooming policy against the officers as a direct prohibitory injunction. (See Jaynes v.

Weickman (1921) 51 Cal.App. 696, 699; Prop. Order, ¶ 1(a)(i)- (ii).) CHP argues that Plaintiff has failed to meet the high burden of establishing entitlement to a mandatory injunction, so its application for a preliminary injunction must be denied. However, although CHP discusses the legal burden required for obtaining a mandatory injuction, CHP does not explain its rationale for why it characterizes Plaintiff’s request for CHP to refrain from implementing its grooming policy on Officers Sandhu and Bhangal is “mandatory” instead of prohibitory.

The Court concludes that the request by Plaintiff for an order that CHP refrain from enforcing its grooming policy against Officers Sandhu and Bhangal is prohibitory in nature as it calls on the CHP to refrain from taking action against Officers Sandhu and Bhangal for growing beards. Irreparable Harm In enforcing FEHA, CRD “represents the interests of the state and effectuates the declared public policy of the state to protect and safeguard the rights and opportunities of all persons from unlawful discrimination.” (Gov.

Code, § 12930, subd. (o).) “[W]here a legislative body has specifically provided injunctive relief for a violation of a statute or ordinance, a showing by a governmental entity that it is likely to prevail on the merits should give rise to a presumption of public harm.” (IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 71; Water Replenishment Dist. of Southern California v. City of Cerritos (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1463-1464 [reversing denial of preliminary injunction because the statutory scheme under which the government sued “authorize[d][] the trial court to grant an injunction” such that “a rebuttable presumption ar[ose][] that the potential harm to the public outweigh[ed][] the potential harm to the [defendant]”].)

Only if a defendant sued by the government presents evidence of “grave or irreparable harm” does a court “examine the relative actual harms to the parties.” (IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 72.) In its opposition, CHP argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to a presumption of harm. CHP argues that CRD has not cited to any statute in which the legislature has specifically provided injunctive relief for the CRD in this circumstance. CHP also argues that Plaintiff ignores the fact that both Plaintiff and Defendant CHP are governmental entities. (Opposition, 30:14 – 31:13.)

On reply, Plaintiff argues, “First, FEHA specifically authorizes courts to grant injunctive relief in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

civil actions. (See Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (d).) Second, the presumption applies even if the injunction adjusts the status quo between the parties. (See People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266, 284-285.) Third, the presumption applies even when the government seeks to enjoin the government. (See Water Replenishment Dist. of Southern California v. City of Cerritos (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1453-1454.) The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of harm pursuant to IT Corp.

As such, the Court need only balance the harms if CHP can establish “grave harm” were the injunction to issue. (See IT Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 72.) A party suffers no grave or irreparable harm by being prohibited from violating the law. (People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266, 306; citing People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 866, 882.) CHP argues, “Necessarily then, the inverse holds true: a party can establish grave or irreparable harm by establishing that they would be forced to violate the law if preliminary relief is granted.

Here, if the preliminary injunction were issued, the CHP would be forced to risk violating Cal-OSHA if they were to allow Officers Sandhu and Bhangal to have beards that prevent them from being able to use the necessary personal protective equipment they need to safely perform their jobs. In this regard, the CRD is seeking to enjoin the CHP, a public agency, from performing its duties to protect and serve the citizens of California by permitting its officers to violate state law.” (Opposition, 28:26 – 29:7.)

The Court finds this argument by CHP unconvincing. CHP has not presented evidence to support its argument that an order enjoining CHP from enforcing it clean-shaven policy against Officers Sandhu and Bhangal would necessarily cause CHP to violate Cal-OSHA. Furthermore, even setting aside the presumption, unlawful discrimination and the right to be can cause the type of harm that warrants the issuance of a preliminary injunction. (Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1067; United States v.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (E.D. Cal. 2024) 737 F.Supp.3d 977 (“CDCR”) [granting preliminary injunctive relief to correctional officers denied religious beard accommodations based on the respirator-related rationale]; Elrod v. Burns (1976) 427 US 347, 373 [holding that the infringement on First Amendment freedoms, “for even minimal periods of time,” constitutes irreparable injury]; Singh v. Berger (D.C. Cir. 2022) 56 F.4th 88, 110) [stating that “[e]ach day that the Marine Corps refuses to let the[] [Sikh plaintiffs] take the oath of enlistment unless they surrender their faith inflicts an irreversible and irreparable harm . . . . [because] [t]hey are forced daily to choose between their religion and the performance of the supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation”].)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has met its burden of a showing the type of harm which supports the exercise of the Court's equitable power in the form of injunctive relief. Balancing of the Harms Here, Plaintiff argues: Just as the Singh plaintiffs were “forced daily to choose between their

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

religion and the performance of [law enforcement duties],” so too are Sandhu and Bhangal forced by CHP to choose their work as law enforcement officers over the full expression of their religious beliefs. (See Singh, supra, 56 F.4th at p. 110; Sandhu Decl., ¶¶ 2-4, 7, 10; Bhangal Decl., ¶¶ 5-8, 11.) Sandhu and Bhangal both report the very same types of “emotional, psychological, and spiritual harms” as the CDCR correctional officers who were also denied religious beard accommodations because of purported safety reasons stemming from OSHA requirements. (See CDCR, supra, 737 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1000 [stating that “the irreparable harm is evident” for the CDCR correctional officers denied beard accommodations], 1001 [concluding that “it is clear that Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable injury as a result of Defendant’s failure to comply with the requirements of Title VII”]; Sandhu Decl., ¶¶ 11-13; Bhangal Decl., ¶¶ 19-21.)

The injuries Sandhu and Bhangal are experiencing are irreparable. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a); Elrod, supra, 427 US at p. 373; Singh, supra, 56 F.4th at p. 110; CDCR, supra, 737 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1000- 1001.) Any injury claimed by CHP will not be “emotional, psychological, . . . [or] spiritual” in nature and, as such, cannot be accorded similar weight. (See CDCR, supra, 737 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1000, 1001 [noting CDCR’s “circular statements” of supposed harm to “balance weakly against the harm to the Charging Parties’ constitutional rights, especially given Plaintiff’s apparent likelihood of success”].) (Plaintiff’s Memorandum, 18:15 - 19:3.)

CHP argues that Plaintiff’s reliance on CDCR is misplaced and is distinguishable as follows: CDCR asserted that all correctional officers must be able at all times to don tight-fitting respirators to respond to use of force incidents involving chemical agents and therefore required all correctional officers to be clean-shaven. (CDCR, supra, 737 F.Supp.3d at p. 983.) The court rejected CDCR’s assertion that all officers must be designated to comply with the tight-fitting respirator requirement because it found that respirators are not utilized when chemical agents were used in response to inmate disturbance, controlled use of force situations are planned so supervisors could designate who responds, and prison riots are rare so response is at least somewhat planned. (Id. at p. 991-994.)

In contrast, situations in which CHP officers must respond to natural or manmade emergencies are not planned. (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 8.) These situations most often occur when an officer is proactively patrolling and comes across an emergency. (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 20.) Supervisors do not designate who will respond. (Ibid.) If they come across an emergency while they are alone, they must respond and render aid if possible.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

(Ibid.) This cannot be compared to a prison riot situation in which there are a plethora of other correctional officers available to respond. If one or two correctional officers cannot respond, the supervisor could send in other available officers. Further, because CDCR conceded that some correctional officer positions don’t respond to situations in which a tight-fitting respirator is necessary, the court rejected the argument that all correctional officers must be interchangeable. (CDCR, supra, 737 F.

Supp.3d at p. 991.) That is not the case here. There are no alternative positions at the CHP in which the CHP can guarantee an officer will never be exposed to harmful airborne contaminants. (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 33.) Additionally, the CRD asserts that “the CDCR court’s rejection of the employer’s arguments is even more compelling here, given that CHP officers work in open-air environments.” (Motion, p. 13, fn. 6.) This argument shows the CRD’s fundamental misunderstanding regarding CHP officers and risk of exposure to harmful airborne contaminates.

While it is true that correctional officers at CDCR work in closed environments and CHP officers work in open environments, this argument ignores that the chemicals correctional officers are exposed to are considered irritants in contrast to the toxins CHP officers can be exposed to, which can cause severe injury or death. (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 35.) In a closed environment, the concentration of chemicals in the air will often be higher than in an open-air environment but there is no way to compare chemicals used by correctional officers to incapacitate inmates to potentially fatal airborne contaminants that CHP officers come across. (Ibid.)

The CRD’s attempt to diminish the risk of exposure to CHP officers is disingenuous at best. For this reason alone, the court’s holding in CDCR has little weight to the present situation. (Opposition, 19:20 – 20:24.) The Court concludes that while there are differences between the facts in CDCR and this case, the CDCR’s rationale is instructive here. Both cases involve California law enforcement, religious beard requests, and accommodation denials based on safety and Regulation 5144. The Court finds that here, just as in CDCR, “circular statements” of organizational harm unsupported by “concrete information” “balance weakly” against employees’ harms (see Id. at p. 1001), and CHP’s bare assertion that it “stands to suffer far greater injury” (Opposition, 30:7) is insufficient to outweigh CRD’s evidence of actual harm, including emotional distress suffered by Officers Sandhu and Bhangal.

The Court concludes that the comparative harm for Plaintiff is greater than the potential harm argued by CHP. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

Plaintiff alleges CHP failed to accommodate Officers Sandhu and Bhangal’s religious beliefs. An employer is required to “reasonably accommodate . . . [a person’s] religious belief or observance”3 (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (l)(1)) unless the employer demonstrates that doing so would cause its business conduct “undue hardship.” (Ibid.; Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11062.) “Undue hardship” means “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.” (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (u).) An employer also must “demonstrate[] that it has explored any available reasonable alternative means of accommodating the [person’s] religious belief or observance.” (Gov.

Code, § 12940, subd. (l)(1).) “[E]xcusing the person from those duties that conflict with the person’s religious belief or observance or permitting those duties to be performed at another time or by another person” are possible reasonable religious accommodations. (Ibid.) FEHA’s protection against discrimination based on religion encompasses “all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice, including religious dress and grooming practices.” (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (q).) “‘Religious grooming practice’ shall be construed broadly to include all forms of head, facial, and body hair that are part of an individual observing a religious creed.” (Ibid.)

Courts use a two-part burden shifting framework for religious accommodation claims. For the prima facie case, a plaintiff must establish 1) a sincerely held religious belief; 2) the employer’s awareness of that belief; and 3) that the belief conflicted with an employment requirement. (California Fair Employment & Housing Com. v. Gemini Aluminum Corp. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.) Once met, the burden shifts to the employer to “establish [that] it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate or [that] no accommodation was possible without producing undue hardship.” (Soldinger v.

Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 345, 370.) Plaintiff argues that they are likely to succeed on their failure to accommodate claim because they can establish its prima facie case, CHP did not explore available alternative accommodations, and CHP is not likely to prevail on its undue hardship defense as its categorical denial of Officers Sandhu and Bhangal’s accommodation requests erroneously relied upon the essential functions concept and a Cal/OSHA regulation, and was not based on a fact-specific undue hardship analysis.

Plaintiff can establish its prima facie case and shift the burden to CHP. As Sikhs, it is undisputed that Officers Sandhu and Bhangal sincerely believe in maintaining unshorn facial hair. (Sandhu Decl., ¶¶ 3-4; Bhangal Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.) It is also undisputed that CHP is aware of Officers Sandhu and Bhangal’s beliefs, at least dating to their accommodation requests. (It is also undisputed that Officers Sandhu and Bhangal’s beliefs conflict with CHP’s grooming policy (Sandhu Decl., ¶ 7; Bhangal Decl., ¶ 8).

With the burden shifted, CHP must demonstrate that “it has explored any available means of accommodating the religious belief or observance, including the possibilities of excusing the person from those duties that conflict with the person’s religious belief or observance or permitting those duties to be performed at another time or by another person.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (l)(1).) CHP must show that it “at least initiat[ed][] an attempt to reach an accommodation.” (Gemini, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017, emphasis in original; cf.

Groff v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

DeJoy (2023) 600 U.S. 447, 473 [holding that it is not enough for an employer to “assess” and reject an accommodation and that instead the employer must “[c]onsider[] . . . other options”].) Plaintiff’s argue that CHP fails to meet its burden, explaining: CHP did not “explore[] any available means of accommodating” Sandhu and Bhangal. (See Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (l)(1).) CHP admits as much for Sandhu. (See Ex. F, 137:5-9 [“[Q:] [D]id CHP explore any alternative means of accommodating Officer Sandhu? [A:] No, sir.”].)

CHP did not research alternative respirators, including loose-fitting respirators that do not implicate Regulation 5144’s clean-shaven requirement. (Ex. F, 73:1-9, 74:6-11.) CHP did not explore the possibility of assigning Sandhu to positions or posts that would not require wearing a gas mask. (Ex. F, 85:5- 86:23.) And CHP did not explore excusing Sandhu from job duties potentially requiring use of a tight-fitting respirator or assigning Sandhu’s emergency response duties to others. (Ex. F, 79:9-14, 83:6-84:21.)

Likewise, for Bhangal, there is no evidence that CHP explored all available means of accommodating his religious practice. (See Ex. M, Exs. 3, 5 [no facts or documents supporting CHP having explored all available accommodations].) Other than to deny their requests, CHP did not contact Sandhu or Bhangal to discuss potential accommodations. (See Sandhu Decl., ¶¶ 16, 19; Bhangal Decl., ¶¶ 14, 17.) (Plaintiff’s Memorandum, 11:6-18.) Plaintiff further argues that CHP’s generic rationale for denying Officers Sandhu and Bhangal’s accommodation requests – “departmental policy regarding uniform and grooming standards, along with other officer safety concerns” (Ex.

C, CHP 003; Ex. M, Ex. 3), which CHP reaffirmed in Plaintiff’s investigations – does not satisfy the fact-specific showing of “significant difficulty or expense” that FEHA requires to sustain the denial of a religious accommodation, consideration of essential job functions are not relevant to religious accommodation claims, which turn only on undue hardship, and CHP’s invocation of Cal/OSHA’s Regulation 5144 does not substitute for a fact-specific undue hardship analysis. In opposition, CHP argues that it did consider accommodations, but determined they were not reasonable, stating: In analyzing whether the CHP could accommodate an officer with a beard, multiple accommodations were considered but were ultimately found to be unreasonable. (Alvarez Decl., ¶¶ 20- 27.)

The CHP determined that emergency response duties cannot be transferred to another officer because officers must be able to independently respond to any emergency they encounter and cannot rely on other officers to respond. (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 21.) Permanently excusing an officer from the requirement to be able to don a tight-fitting air purifying respirator at all

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

times would mean excusing an officer from an essential function of the job of a CHP officer because they would be unable to respond to natural or manmade emergencies and civil disturbances. (Ibid.) For the same reasons, the job of a CHP officer cannot be reclassified in a way that would allow an officer to have a beard because every officer in the state must be able to immediately don a tight-fitting air purifying respirator. (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 22.) The CHP also determined that transferring an officer to a different office was not a reasonable accommodation because every officer in the state must be immediately available to don a tight-fitting air purifying respirator, no matter where they are assigned. (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 23.)

Prior to Officers Sandhu’s and Bhangal’s requests, the CHP considered whether an officer could grow a beard on a temporary or trial basis and shave if an emergency arose. (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 25.) However, the CHP determined that an officer with a beard cannot respond to emergencies and thus cannot perform the essential functions of a CHP officer. (Ibid.) Further, the CHP determined that an officer must be immediately able to deploy to an emergency so there is no time to shave. (Alvarez Decl., ¶ 26.)

The CHP also considered whether officers could wear loose-fitting respirators but determined that loose-fitting respirators do not adequately protect an officer from exposure to airborne contaminants and present officer safety concerns. (Morris Decl., ¶ 18.) (Opposition, 10:24 – 11:17.) On reply, Plaintiff emphasizes that an employer must present “facts demonstrating . . . [that it] initiated any steps to accommodate” the employees. (Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 345, 373, emphasis added.)

Plaintiff argues that CHP’s opposition is “devoid of demonstrable facts showing it to have adequately explored accommodating Officers Sandhu and Bhangal.” (Reply, 4:1-2.) Plaintiff further argues that Officers Sandhu and Bhangal can use loose-fitting respiratory devices (“PAPRs”) to comply with Regulation 5144 and perform emergency duties. Plaintiff agrees that CHP would violate Regulation 5144 were it to allow them to have beards and use tight-fitting respirators, but argues that Regulation 5144 does not give CHP an absolute right, shielded from FEHA’s accommodation requirements, to only offer them tight-fitting respirators.

Because officers can have beards and comply with Regulation 5144 (i.e., be safe from respiratory hazards), Plaintiff argues that CHP’s undue hardship arguments based upon respiratory safety fail. Plaintiff also argues that CHP failed to demonstrate how, prior to the accommodation requests at issue, it determined that its tight-fitting respirator would be the only respirator provided to its employees. Plaintiff argues that because Officers Sandhu and Bhangal can have beards and lawfully use a loose-fitting PAPR in their work, there is no significant, demonstrated respiratory safety-based undue hardship to CHP.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that it will prevail. Plaintiff’s evidence establishes a reasonable probability that CHP failed to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV003835: CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT vs CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 09/29/2025 Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Department 54

accommodate Officers Sandhu and Bhangal, particularly by failing to meet its burden to affirmatively “demonstrate[]” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (l)(1)) that it cannot accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs absent “significant difficulty or expense.” (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (u), emphasis added.) While CHP’s evidence in opposition may create disputed issues as to whether suggested alternatives are reasonable or would cause undue hardship, it does not sufficiently establish that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed such that a preliminary injunction should be denied.

Indeed, in balancing the two interrelated factors of degree of harm and likelihood of success, the greater the showing on one factor, the lesser the showing must be on the other. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) Here, the degree of harm faced by Officers Sandhu and Bhangal is significantly greater than the degree of harm faced by Defendant and, therefore, the likelihood of success showing may be less. CHP’s vagueness argument also fails. The test is whether the injunction is “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” (Uber, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 316, citation omitted.)

Here, the proposed injunction clearly restrains CHP from requiring Officers Sandhu and Bhangal to be clean-shaven. (See Prop. Order at p. 2:10-11.)

Conclusion

On the evidence before it, the Court concludes the evidence tips in favor of an order prohibiting CHP from enforcing its grooming policy against Officers Sandhu and Bhangal pending disposition of Plaintiff’s legal claims. The Court, therefore, GRANTS the requested preliminary injunction. Plaintiff shall prepare a formal order for the Court's signature pursuant to C.R.C. 3.1312.