Helen Albano, et al. v. County of Monterey, et al.

exemption from the mandatory COVID-19 vaccination order. [Defense Fact 1.] With leave of Court, Natividad filed its Amended Answer and included Section 855.4 immunity as its 33rd Affirmative Defense. [Answer, filed 10/17/25, at 8:20-22.]

Based on its comprehensive review of relevant factors, including an examination of medical literature and studies, Natividad implemented a vaccine mandate requiring all employees to be vaccinated. [Defense Fact 9.] The decision to enforce the vaccine requirement and to prohibit non-vaccinated employees from working at Natividad aimed to, and did, promote public health by preventing disease and limiting its spread within the community. [Defense Fact 10.] Employees who received exemptions were placed on leave, and Natividad sought alternative employment within the County for those individuals. [Defense Fact 12.]

Natividad’s decisions to enforce the vaccine mandate, place exempt employees on leave, and restrict their ability to work in the hospital were made to support public health by preventing COVID-19 and controlling its transmission within the community. [Defense Fact 14.] In placing Plaintiffs on leave, Natividad acted with due care to safeguard its patients, staff, and the Monterey community from COVID- 19. [Defense Fact 15.]

Legal Standard.

Summary judgment or adjudication is warranted where there are no triable issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subds. (c), (f); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.]

Courts follow a three-step process when reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication: (1) identify the issues outlined by the pleadings; (2) evaluate whether the moving party has disproved the opponent’s claims; and (3) assess if the opposition has shown there is a triable factual issue. [Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.]

A motion for summary adjudication proceeds “in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).] The initial burden always rests on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that no material factual issues are in dispute. [Choochagi v. Barracuda Networks, Inc. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 444, 453.] When a defendant files for summary judgment or adjudication, they satisfy their initial burden if they prove that at least one element of the cause of action cannot be established or that a complete defense exists. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).] Failure to meet this burden results in denial of the motion, ending the inquiry. [Id.]

To meet the burden of proving that a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, the needed evidence. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 854.] Merely pointing out the lack of evidence is not enough. [Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.] This supporting evidence may include affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters subject to judicial notice. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 855.]

Even if the moving defendant meets its burden, the opposing plaintiff can still defeat a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion by presenting evidence that raises a triable

issue of fact. [Aguilar, 25 Cal. 4th at 849-850.] The plaintiff cannot rely solely on allegations or denials in its pleadings; instead, it must present specific facts indicating the existence of a triable issue of material fact concerning the cause of action. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Choochagi, 60 Cal.App.5th at 453.] If the plaintiff fails to do so, summary judgment or summary adjudication should be granted. [See Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.]

The court must liberally construe the evidence presented by the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication, resolving all doubts and making all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 844-845.] When reviewing such a motion, the court must consider what inferences a factfinder could reasonably draw that favor the opposing party. [Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.] The main role of the court is to identify issues, not to decide them; only clear and indisputable inferences can lead to a legal resolution. [Ibid.] If evidence conflicts, factual disputes must be resolved during trial. [Ibid.] Furthermore, the trial court cannot weigh evidence as a factfinder would to determine credibility, nor can it grant summary judgment based on credibility assessments. [Id. at 840.]

Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”).

Natividad’s first request to judicially notice the documents marked as Exhibits A (Supreme Court’s Order Regarding Depublication of Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist., No. S292190) and B (Order Granting Summary Judgment in Broadstreet v. Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System, Monterey County Superior Court, Case No. 24CV004109) is GRANTED. [Evid Code § 452, subd. (d).]

Plaintiffs’ request to judicially notice the documents marked as Exhibits 1 (California Department of Public Health Order), 3 (Law Revision Commission memorandum), 4 (Law Revision Commission recommendation), 6 (Legislative history of Assembly Bill 1194), and 7 (Legislative history of Assembly Bill 1194) is GRANTED. [Evid. Code § 452, subd. (c).] Plaintiffs’ remaining requests are DENIED. The document marked as Exhibit 2 (a demurrer ruling in an unrelated case) is irrelevant. [See Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 (“[a]lthough a court may judicially notice a variety of matters, only relevant material may be noticed.”) (original italics; internal citation omitted).] The exhibit marked as Exhibit 5 (California Government Tort Liability) is not official legislative history.

Natividad’s second request to judicially notice the demurrer papers (Exhibit A) and the resulting order (Exhibit B) from an unrelated case filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court is DENIED as irrelevant. [Mangini, 7 Cal.4th at 1063.]

Evidentiary Objections.

The Court rules on each party’s evidentiary objections as follows:

PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS No(s). Cite Ruling 1 Bouyea Decl. at ¶ 3 OVERRULED. Declarant has the requisite foundation, and Plaintiff did not dispute this fact. 2, 4 Bouyea Decl. at ¶¶ 13, 19 SUSTAINED for lack of foundation. 3 Bouyea Decl. at ¶ 15 SUSTAINED because it is a legal conclusion as to “reasonableness” accommodation. 5 Dr. Reingold Decl. at ¶ 10 OVERRULED. 6-17 Dr. Harris Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 8, 10-11, OVERRULED. 13-15, and 18-21 18 Dr. Harris Decl. at ¶ 23 SUSTAINED because it is a legal conclusion as to “undue harm.” 19 Dr. Harris Decl. at ¶ 24 OVERRULED. 20 Dr. Harris Decl. at ¶ 25 SUSTAINED because it is a legal conclusion as to “undue hardship.”

NATIVIDAD’S OBJECTIONS No(s). Cite Ruling 1 Exh. 2 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and SUSTAINED as irrelevant. Compendium of Evidence (“CE”) 2 Exh. 3 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and CE OVERRULED. 3 Exh. 5 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and CE SUSTAINED because it is a legal conclusion as to “reasonableness” accommodation. 4-5 Exhs. 6-7 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and CE OVERRULED. 6 Exh. 6 to Plaintiffs’ CE Provisionally OVERRULED on condition that Plaintiffs file an amended declaration attaching a copy of the certified transcript of Dr. Charles Harris’s deposition.

Discussion.

Natividad argues that summary judgment should be granted because it has Section 855.4 immunity from FEHA liability and cites to the holding in Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 822 as support. [Motion at 4:16-5:4.] Plaintiffs strongly disagree and offer various arguments, including that “Section 855.4 does not provide blanket immunity for all actions taken during a public health response” and that Allos is not determinative. [Opp. at 6:3- 7:7.] Ultimately, as discussed below, Natividad makes the stronger arguments, and therefore, its motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Generally, the Government Claims Act (the “Act”) “affords a public employee personal immunity from suit when the act or omission for which recovery is sought resulted from the exercise of the discretion vested in him.” [Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 976 (citing Gov. Code § 820.2; internal quotes omitted).] “This ‘discretionary act’ immunity extends to ‘basic’ governmental policy decisions entrusted to broad official judgment.” [Ibid.] The Act’s “purpose is assuring judicial abstention in areas in which the responsibility for basic policy

decisions has been committed to coordinate branches of government, because any wider judicial review would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.” [Allos, 112 Cal.App.5th at 833 (internal quotes, brackets, and ellipses omitted).]

Section 855.4 is part of the Act. Subdivision (a) of Section 855.4 provides that “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury resulting from the decision to perform or not to perform any act to promote the public health of the community by preventing disease or controlling the communication of disease within the community if the decision whether the act was or was not to be performed was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in the public entity or the public employee, whether or not such discretion be abused.”

Further, subdivision (b) states that a public entity or its employee is not liable for any injury “caused by an act or omission in carrying out with due care” such a decision. “Neither the statutory language nor case law interpreting it suggests a defendant must qualify for immunity under both section 855.4 subdivision (a) and section 855.4 subdivision (b) in order to be immune.” [Greenwood v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 851, 865.]

It is undisputed that Natividad is a public entity and therefore falls within the class of entities Section 855.4 aims to protect. [Defense Fact 4.] Consequently, by seeking summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of Section 855.4 immunity, Natividad must demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact because any injury resulting from its failure to accommodate Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs was due to a discretionary decision made to promote public health during the COVID-19 pandemic. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 850; Gov. Code § 855.4.]

Natividad contends that Allos is controlling and confirms that Section 855.4 immunizes it from Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action under FEHA. [Motion at 8-10, 13.] In that case, the plaintiff was a school district employee who filed claims after the district refused to let her work only from home following the COVID-19 stay-at-home order. [Allos, 112 Cal.App.5th at 826- 827, 829-830.] She wanted to work remotely full-time because of several health problems that made her more vulnerable to COVID-19. [Id. at 827-829.]

The plaintiff claimed she could not get vaccinated due to a “prior serious reaction/allergy” to the vaccine, which she stated was a disability the school district had to accommodate. [Id. at 828, 831.] Plaintiff argued that the district’s various accommodations were inadequate. [Id. at 829.] The trial court granted, and the appellate court affirmed, summary judgment in favor of the district because the plaintiff’s “claims were barred by section 855.4.” [Id. at 831-832, 834-836.] In doing so, the court in Allos reasoned that Section 855.4 bars the plaintiff’s claims because they are rooted in the school district’s decisions about remote work and returning to the office. [Ibid.]

Additionally, the appellate court found that the plaintiff did not clearly establish she had a disability, which weakened her FEHA disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims. [Id. at 837.]

The Court agrees with Natividad that Allos “confirms that [Section 855.4] immunity applies here.” [Motion at 9.] Like Allos, Plaintiffs seek to hold Natividad responsible for harm caused by its decision to require them to be vaccinated. However, Natividad made this decision “[b]ased upon a thorough evaluation of all relevant factors, including review of the relevant medical literature and medical studies...” [Defense Fact 9.] Natividad’s reason for enforcing its

vaccine mandate, placing Plaintiffs on leave, and restricting their ability to work in the hospital was to “promote the public health of the community by preventing disease and controlling the communication of disease within the community.” [Defense Fact 14; see also Defense Fact 10.] In other words, conduct contrary to Natividad’s vaccine mandate would have been less protective of the public. Therefore, Natividad’s decision not to accommodate Plaintiffs because of its vaccine mandate arises from its efforts to protect public health. Consequently, Section 855.4 applies to Plaintiffs’ FEHA claim.

Plaintiffs’ arguments fail to persuade the Court to rule otherwise.

First, Plaintiffs argue that there was no qualifying discretionary decision. Because Dr. Harris testified that Natividad acted according to the Board of Supervisors’ direction, Plaintiffs conclude that any discretionary decisions were made by others, including public health officials at the state and local levels, whose mandates Natividad was reportedly following. [Opp. at 11:7-9.] This argument overlooks that Dr. Harris attested that the Board of Supervisors’ “directive was consistent with the decision that [he and] upper management made that unvaccinated workers were not going to be allowed to work at” Natividad. [Defense Fact 9 (citing Dr.

Harris Decl. at ¶¶ 12-13).] Dr. Harris also explained how Natividad’s vaccine mandate was established. [Ibid.] Therefore, Natividad’s decision was independent of the California Department of Public Health’s mandate requiring health care workers to be vaccinated, while also allowing for medical and religious exemptions.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that paragraph 24 of Dr. Harris’s declaration confirms that the challenged conduct was based on operational and staffing concerns, not on the type of diseasecontrol measures contemplated by Section 855.4. [Opp. at 13:21-23.] Not so. Dr. Harris stated in paragraph 24 that “[t]o the extent unvaccinated employees infected hospital staff causing that staff to miss workdays, that also strained [Natividad’s] ability to provide care and services to the patient population as this situation reduced available care resources.”

Thus, Dr. Harris made it clear that the focus was on the community’s public health – the patients – rather than “operational and staffing concerns.” Plaintiffs’ reliance on Sava v. Fuller (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 281 is misplaced because it did not involve Section 855.4. [Id. at 292 (“Respondents contend they are also immune under section 855.4. That section is inapplicable.”).]

Third, Plaintiffs are mistaken in believing that Section 855.4 only applies when the plaintiff’s injury results from exposure to a communicable disease in a physical environment. [Opp. at 17-19.] Such an interpretation contradicts the plain language of Section 855.4, which states that neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an “injury” caused by a public health decision. [Gov. Code § 855.4, subd. (a).] The term “injury” is defined as “death, injury to a person, reputation, character, feelings or estate, of such nature that it would be actionable if inflicted by a private person.” [Gov. Code § 810.8.] Nothing in the statute supports Plaintiffs’ argument.

Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that Allos is distinguishable and point out that their “claims arise from subsequent employment decisions governed by FEHA, not from any qualifying decision under section 855.4, subsections (a) or (b).” [Opp. at 6 (bold in original).] The Court is not persuaded that Section 855.4 immunity does not apply to FEHA-related claims, including

Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action. California law generally recognizes that “a statutory governmental immunity overrides a statute imposing liability,” and that “absent a clear indication of legislative intent that statutory immunity is withheld or withdrawn, a specific statutory immunity applies to shield a public employee from liability imposed by a particular statute.” [Bitner v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059 (internal quotes and ellipsis omitted).] A public entity, such as Natividad, is subject to any immunity provided by statute. [Gov.

Code § 815, subd. (b).] Natividad’s cited authorities in its motion demonstrate that FEHA’s mandatory duty to accommodate religious beliefs does not override statutory immunity for discretionary acts. [Motion at 13-14; Esparza v. County of Los Angeles (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 452, 462 (FEHA did not abrogate Government Code section 818.2 immunity conferred by section 818.2); Bitner, 87 Cal.App.5th at 1063 (“[E]ven if we were to accept that FEHA creates a mandatory duty within the meaning of [Government Code] section 815.6, section 815 provides that the immunity provision of section 844.6 takes precedence over any liability imposed by section 815.6, and plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary is without merit.”).]

Thus, like other statutory immunities, and as recognized in Allos, 112 Cal.App.5th at 835, FEHA liability does not supersede Section 855.4 immunity. The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ argument that no immunity applies when FEHA is the more specific statute was rejected in Bitner, 87 Cal.App.5th at 1060-1062, because the distinction between “general” and “specific” is based on subject matter. FEHA is an extensive statutory scheme designed to support a broad public policy of protecting against employment discrimination; thus, the later enactment of FEHA was not decisive.

Fifth, the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ argument that Natividad “propose[s] an interpretation of [Section] 855.4 that does violence to the very purpose of the immunity provision which must be taken into account.” [Opp at 21-22.] The Court disagrees, and the statute’s legislative history does not support Plaintiffs’ limited view of the statute. As noted by the 1963 Law Revision Commission recommendation:

4. Public health officials and public entities should not be liable for determining whether to impose quarantines or otherwise take action to prevent or control the spread of disease, where they have been given the legal power to determine whether or not such action should be taken. Where the law gives a public employee discretion to determine a course of conduct, liability should not be based upon the exercise of that discretion in a particular manner; for this would permit the trier of fact to substitute its judgment as to how the discretion should have been exercised for the judgment of the person to whom such discretion was lawfully committed...

5. Public entities and public employees should not be liable for failure to make arrests or otherwise to enforce any law. They should not be liable for failing to inspect persons or property adequately to determine compliance with health and safety regulations, Nor should they be liable for negligent or wrongful issuance or revocation of licenses and permits. The government has undertaken these activities to insure public health and safety. To provide the utmost public protection, governmental entities should not be dissuaded from engaging in such

activitles by the fear that liability may be imposed if an employee performs his duties inadequately.

[Exh. 4 to Plaintiffs’ RJN at 830-831 (¶¶ 4, 5).]

Accordingly, Natividad’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED because it has met its burden of showing that Section 855.4 immunity overrides the FEHA liability alleged in the Second Cause of Action. Plaintiffs have not provided any material facts raising triable factual issues to the contrary.

Conclusion.

Natividad’s motion is GRANTED, and Natividad is entitled to summary judgment of Plaintiffs’ claim against it. As detailed above, the parties’ evidentiary objections are SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART, and their request for judicial notice is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Natividad shall prepare the Proposed Order consistent with this Tentative Ruling.

NOTE RE TENTATIVE RULING

This tentative ruling becomes the court’s order, and no hearing shall be held unless one of the parties contests it by following Rule 3.1308 of the California Rules of Court and Monterey County Local Rule 7.9. Those parties wishing to present an oral argument must notify all other parties and the Court no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing; otherwise, NO ORAL ARGUMENT WILL BE PERMITTED, AND THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL BECOME THE ORDER OF THE COURT AND THE HEARING VACATED. You must notify the court by email or by calling the Calendar Department at 831-647-5800, extension 3040, before 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing.

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