Mount VS 3M Company

RG21100427: Mount VS 3M Company 06/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. INC. (Defendant) CRS# 078600978928 in Department 18

Tentative Ruling - 06/29/2026 Patrick McKinney

The Motion for Summary Adjudication filed by American Honda Motor Co., Inc. on 09/23/2025 is Granted in Part.

This tentative ruling addresses defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Defendant” or “AHMC”) respective Motions for Summary Adjudication (“MSAs”) as to each of Plaintiffs’ decedents, Gerald Mount (“Mr. Mount”) and Helena Germaine Mount (“Mrs. Mount”).

Defendant’s respective MSAs are GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ Fraud-Based Causes of Action but are DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims.

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Mount worked at a salvage yard from 1978 to 1999 where he was exposed to asbestos-containing automotive friction products attributable to Defendant. They also allege that from approximately 1979 to 2010 Mr. Mount was exposed to asbestos-containing motorcycle friction products when he rebuilt Honda motorcycles or scooters. Plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Mount developed cancer as a result of asbestos exposures caused by Mr. Mount taking asbestos fibers on his person home with him.

ANALYSIS OF MSA

1. MSA of Plaintiffs’ Fraud-Based Claims

Plaintiffs’ Operative Complaint alleges four fraud-based theories of liability against defendant: (1) intentional misrepresentation; (2) fraudulent concealment; (3) conspiracy to commit intentional misrepresentation; and (4) conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment.

“The elements of a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with the intent to induce another's reliance on the misrepresentation, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166.) “[A] cause of action for misrepresentation requires an affirmative statement, not an implied assertion.” (RSB Vineyards, LLC v. Orsi (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1092.)

"The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact." (Hambrick v.

Healthcare Partners Med. Grp., Inc. (2015) 238 Cal. App. 4th 124, 162.) When there is no fiduciary relationship between the parties, RG21100427: Mount VS 3M Company 06/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. INC. (Defendant) CRS# 078600978928 in Department 18 “a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1187.)

The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are: (1) formation and operation of the conspiracy; and (2) damage resulting to plaintiff; (3) resulting from a wrongful act done in furtherance of the common design. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1062.)

Defendant attempts to meet its initial burden of production pursuant to Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 106-107 (plaintiff’s “factually devoid” responses to defendant’s sufficiently comprehensive written and deposition discovery).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Responses to Defendant’s Special Interrogatories (“SROG”) Nos. 25, 28, 31, and 34, seeking all facts regarding each of Plaintiff’s fraud-based theories, are factually devoid. The Responses incorporate by reference Plaintiffs’ Response to SROG No. 1, seeking all facts supporting the contention that Defendant exposed decedents to respirable asbestos, a 27-page single-spaced Response. However, the 27 single-spaced pages contain no specific facts to support any of the elements of Plaintiff’s fraud-based theories. Instead, the Response contains only general allegations and claims regarding what Defendant “knew or should have known,” a negligence based standard, rather than specific statements regarding what Defendant knew at any specific time regarding the asbestos hazards of its asbestos-containing automotive and motorcycle parts.

Similarly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs in Opposition fail to effectively dispute any of the moving Undisputed Material Facts (“DUMF”). The Court does not consider additional material facts (“PAMF”) until the burden of production has shifted to Plaintiffs. Moreover, citation to as many as one hundred and eighty-seven (187) PAMF in response to one DUMF is an improper misuse of the Court’s limited resources. The Court instead elects to find that Defendant has met its initial burden of production and that the burden to produce evidence to create triable issues of material fact regarding each element of Plaintiffs’ four fraud-based theories shift to Plaintiffs.

The Court observes Plaintiffs’ 187 PAMF are unduly repetitive (compare, e.g., PAMF Nos. 11 and 15 with Nos. 17 and 18; compare No. 105 to No. 107; and compare No. 155 with No. 158) and contain purported material facts either not supported by the cited evidence or constituting improper legal argument (see e.g., PAMF No. 30, PAMF 42, stating that warnings “did not comply with OSHA warning,” and PAMF No. 78 – defendant cannot have known in 1981 about an EPA guidance issued in 1986). Other PAMF are not reasonably material to disposition of the present MSAs. (See e.g., PAMF Nos. 142-149 and a majority of Nos. 150-186.)

The Court advises Plaintiffs’ counsel that if they attempt to misuse the Court’s limited judicial resources with an over-long Separate Statement of excessive volume in the future, the Court will likely elect to consider only the first ninety PAMF or disallow the Separate Statement in its entirety. (See Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 875, stating in relevant part: “The point of the separate statement is to be a concise list of the material

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21100427: Mount VS 3M Company 06/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. INC. (Defendant) CRS# 078600978928 in Department 18 facts and the evidence that supports them.”)

None of Plaintiffs’ 187 PAMF create triable issues of material fact that Defendant ever made an affirmative misrepresentation upon which anyone relied to either Mr. or Mrs. Mount’s detriment.

Similarly, Plaintiffs’ 187 PAMF do not create triable issues of material fact that Defendant had a duty to disclose allegedly concealed facts to Plaintiffs’ decedents. The PAMF state only that Mr. Mount purchased genuine Honda replacement parts from a Honda dealership, but Plaintiffs do not identify any specific Honda dealerships or present any evidence that the dealerships were directly owned by Defendant.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ 187 PAMF contain no evidence to support a finding that Defendant engaged in a conspiracy with anyone to conceal the alleged asbestos hazards of Honda asbestoscontaining automotive and motorcycle parts.

Wherefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s MSAs of all of Plaintiffs’ fraud-based causes of action.

2. MSA of Punitive Damages Claim

To be entitled to an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a).) The definition of “malice” includes “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (§ 3294(c).) “Despicable conduct” is conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. (See CACI 3946.)

A finding of malice does not require an actual intent to cause harm. “Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences.” (Pfiefer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.)

Further, a defendant’s “prolonged failure” to take adequate measures to protect people who worked with its products against a known hazard to their health and safety may justify a conclusion that the conduct was malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive. (Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 68, 86.) However, the Cal. Supreme Court has stated that by addition of the word “despicable” to Civ. Code § 3294(c), “the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, “malice” requires more than a “willful and conscious” disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21100427: Mount VS 3M Company 06/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. INC. (Defendant) CRS# 078600978928 in Department 18 A clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to evidence presented by a plaintiff in opposition to a motion for summary adjudication of punitive damages claims. (Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118-1119.) However, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard “does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to ‘prove’ a case for punitive damages at summary [adjudication].” (Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Sup.Ct. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158-1159.) “Summary adjudication ‘on the issue of punitive damages is proper’ only ‘when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or oppression.’ ” (Ibid.)

Further, a defendant moving for summary adjudication must still make an initial prima facie showing that no disputed issues of material fact exist such that defendant is entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law in order to shift the burden of production to plaintiff to present clear and convincing evidence of malice, oppression or fraud. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850.)

Defendant again attempts to meet its initial burden of production pursuant to Andrews, supra.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Response to SROG No. 40, seeking all facts regarding the punitive damages claim, is factually devoid for the reasons set forth above. Also, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not effectively dispute any of Defendant’s DUMF regarding the punitive damages claim. Therefore, the burden to produce evidence creating triable issues of material fact regarding Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim under a clear and convincing evidentiary standard shifts to Plaintiffs.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ evidence in Opposition is sufficient to create triable issues of material fact regarding Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim under a clear and convincing evidentiary standard. (PAMF Nos. 10, 31, 32, 35, 38, 41, 43, 45, 46, 73-77, 87, 88, 94-96, 98- 106, 115, 117, 123, 124, 176, 187.)

Although AHMC has taken the position that at all times through the present it believed in good faith that its chrysotile asbestos containing automobile and motorcycle parts did not create an asbestos hazard because they were bound in non-asbestos materials and that it relied on information about asbestos hazards provided by another Honda entity, Honda R & D, Plaintiffs present evidence that by 1979 or 1980 AHMC knew that governmental agencies such as OSHA, the EPA and Cal-OSHA believed that there was a reasonably significant possibility that dust from asbestos-containing automotive and motorcycle parts created either by friction (brake and clutch facings) or by removal of old parts (gaskets), that care needed to be used in avoiding inhalation of these dusts and that warnings should be provided to end users.

Plaintiff presents evidence that in 1979 it first provided a warning about handling dust from brake friction parts in a service manual for the Honda Prelude but did not provide this warning in owner’s manuals and did not publish services manuals for other Honda automobiles incorporating asbestos-containing parts until as many as four or five years later when new model generations were introduced. No motorcycle service manuals contained asbestos warnings until 1981. Some motorcycles

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21100427: Mount VS 3M Company 06/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. INC. (Defendant) CRS# 078600978928 in Department 18 containing asbestos parts never contained warnings in their service manuals, and no owner’s manuals contained an asbestos warning. Further, in a September 1980 American Honda Service News letter intended for Honda service technicians, AMHC represented in relevant part:

“Most brake shoes and disk pads contain asbestos and produce harmful asbestos dust that collects on brake mechanisms.

“Above all, treat brake dust as if it’s very dangerous stuff. It may cause or contribute to a variety of serious physical problems or diseases.” (See Bendon Dec. Exh. W; PAMF Nos. 94-95.)

A reasonable jury could therefore disbelieve AHMC’s claim that it did not reasonably know that asbestos dust from its asbestos-containing automotive and motorcycle parts might be significant potential health risks such that it was not required to provide end-users with asbestos warnings at any time between September 1980 and the end of 1993, when AHMC and its parent no longer sold asbestos containing vehicles or parts.

Finally, none of the Honda OEM automotive or motorcycle asbestos-containing replacement parts sold to consumers contained asbestos warnings as part of their packaging.

Plaintiffs’ Request for CCP § 437c(h) continuance is DENIED. This case has been pending since 5/20/2021 and has an 8/3/2026 trial date. Yet, despite Plaintiffs claims of Defendant failing to comply with its discovery obligations, no motions to compel against Defendant were heard in this action until 3/24/2026. Although the Court has offered to continue the hearing on the present motion to a date in July 2026 to allow for completion of Defendant’s PMQ deposition, Plaintiffs requested that the Court hear the pending dispositive motions on 6/25/2025.

Wherefore, the Court DENIES AHMC’s MSA of Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim.

The Court reminds Plaintiffs’ counsel that pursuant to Local Rule 3.30(c), paper courtesy copies of evidentiary submissions must include hard exhibit tabs pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1110(f)(3). For evidentiary submissions more than 200 pages, the Court requires strict compliance with all Rules of Court designed to expedite the Court’s review of voluminous evidentiary submissions.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

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