AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al.

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 767206458123 in Department 18

Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2026 Patrick McKinney

The Motion for Summary Adjudication filed by PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. on 05/15/2026 is Granted.

Defendant PPG Industries, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Adjudication (“MSA”) of plaintiff Amir Azar’s punitive damages claim is GRANTED.

Plaintiff alleges that he developed malignant mesothelioma as a result of his exposures to dust from Defendant’s automotive paint primers, which Plaintiff alleges incorporated asbestoscontaminated talcum powder, when Plaintiff worked at auto body shops between March 2004 and October 2013.

LAW RE: PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIMS IN ASBESTOS TORTS ACTIONS

To be entitled to an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a).) The definition of “malice” includes “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (§ 3294(c).) “Despicable conduct” is conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. (See CACI 3946.)

A finding of malice does not require an actual intent to cause harm. “Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences.” (Pfiefer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.)

Further, a defendant’s “prolonged failure” to take adequate measures to protect people who worked with its products against a known hazard to their health and safety may justify a conclusion that the conduct was malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive. (Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 68, 86.) However, the Cal. Supreme Court has stated that by addition of the word “despicable” to Civ. Code § 3294(c), “the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, “malice” requires more than a “willful and conscious” disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

A clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to evidence presented by a plaintiff in opposition to a motion for summary adjudication of punitive damages claims. (Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118-1119.) However, the clear and convincing 25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 767206458123 in Department 18 evidentiary standard “does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to ‘prove’ a case for punitive damages at summary [adjudication].” (Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Sup.Ct. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158-1159.) “Summary adjudication ‘on the issue of punitive damages is proper’ only ‘when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or oppression.’ ” (Ibid.)

Further, a defendant moving for summary adjudication must still make an initial prima facie showing that no disputed issues of material fact exist such that defendant is entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law in order to shift the burden of production to plaintiff to present clear and convincing evidence of malice, oppression or fraud. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850.)

ANALYSIS OF MSA

There are a number of problems with the moving papers. First, although Dept. 18 received paper courtesy copies of some of Defendant’s moving papers, as required by Local Rule 3.30(c), it did not receive a paper courtesy copy of Defendant’s 346-page Index of Exhibits (“DIOE”). Because there is insufficient time before the 7/20/2026 trial date in this action to continue the hearing on the MSA to allow Defendant to provide a compliant paper courtesy copy of the DIOE, the Court in its considered discretion elects to consider only Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatory Responses and Plaintiff’s witnesses deposition testimony from the DIOE.

Defendant seeks to meet its initial burden of production pursuant to Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 106-107 by demonstrating Plaintiff’s “factually devoid” responses to Defendant’s sufficiently comprehensive written and deposition discovery. However, Defendant’s Special Interrogatories (“SROG”) are not sufficiently comprehensive in that they appear to seek only all facts and not identification of witnesses or documents in support of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. However, SROG No. 8, which requests that Plaintiff “IDENTIFY all facts” upon which Plaintiff bases his punitive damages, is as drafted ambiguous regarding what information Defendant is seeking.

The definitions provided for the term IDENTIFY in the set of SROG reference persons or documents, not facts. Thus, it is unclear whether the SROG seeks all facts and also identification of all witnesses and documents in support thereof or just a statement of all facts. Plaintiff’s Response provides only all facts, which is a reasonable response in light of the above-described ambiguity of SROG No.

8.

However, Plaintiff’s Response to SROG No. 8 is factually devoid. First, it references all seven (7) prior SROG Responses in the set and purports to incorporate them all by reference. This is a misuse of the Court’s limited resources that does not comply with CCP § 2030.210(a), and the Court will not consider any of the prior responses. The substantive response provided to SROG No. 8 is a boilerplate response devoid of any particularized facts, which repeatedly states that Defendant “knew or should have known” generalized facts, which is a negligence standard rather than a particularized statement of what Defendant actually knew at any specific time.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 767206458123 in Department 18 The factually devoid nature of Plaintiff’s Response to SROG No. 8 is made clear by the Opp. MPA, which asserts that many particularized facts are contained in Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Additional Material Facts (“PAMF”) with supporting evidence, yet none of the particularized facts contained in the Opp. MPA are stated in the Response to SROG No.

8.

Defendant presents evidence that neither Plaintiff nor his brother Ali Azar had personal knowledge to support a punitive damages claim at their depositions in this action. However, as stated above, Defendant has not properly requested that Plaintiff identify witnesses in its SROG. Nevertheless, asbestos torts plaintiffs who were end users or consumers of allegedly asbestoscontaining products with no other relationship to the product’s manufacturer rarely, if ever, have personal knowledge to support a punitive damages claim. Instead, these claims under the present circumstances are evidenced solely by documents produced and admissions made by the defendant in response to the plaintiff’s discovery efforts.

Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s Response to SROG No. 8 factually devoid, the Court finds that the burden has shifted to Plaintiff to present the evidence referenced in their Opp. MPA.

Plaintiff in Opposition points out that Defendant has not sought summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot be barred from presenting evidence at trial to support this cause of action, which if proven could support an award of punitive damages. However, the elements to prove a punitive damages claim are distinct from a cause of action for fraudulent concealment. (See Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Med. Grp., Inc. (2015) 238 Cal. App. 4th 124, 162 for elements of a fraudulent concealment claim.) Plaintiff cites to no authority regarding how a trial court should proceed in these circumstances Therefore, the Court elects to adjudicate the MSA of the punitive damages claim on the merits, subject to Plaintiff at trial attempting to prove its fraudulent conspiracy cause of action to a jury.

In Opposition, Plaintiff presents the following evidence. By the second half of 1972, Defendant knew that talc could be contaminated with asbestos, specifically tremolite. (PAMF No. 2.) During the 1970s and possibly into the early 1980s Defendant obtained talc from R.T. Vanderbilt, whose talc was known to contain tremolite. (PAMF No. 3.) By December 1972, Defendant knew that many of its paint and paint product formulations incorporated talc that contained tremolite, which Defendant at that time understood to be asbestos. (PAMF No. 4.) Defendant was aware that it had to protect its own workers who worked with this talc, presumably in its raw form (see infra), such that a well-maintained ventilation system was essential to prevent exposures that exceeded peak limits. (PAMF No.

5. See also PAMF Nos. 6- 12.)

Defendant never did any testing to see if manipulation of its talc-incorporating paint products could release asbestos fibers during sanding. (PAMF No. 13.)

In 1974, testing at one of Defendant’s plants showed tremolite-containing talc levels “in excess

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 767206458123 in Department 18 of 10 fiber/cc ceiling level.” (PAMF No. 14.) In 1978, Defendant retained an independent testing laboratory to test what was presumably Vanderbilt talc still used by Defendant and received results showing that the talc was 10% tremolite and 3% to 5% anthophyllite. (PAMF No. 16.) There is no evidence in the record that Defendant used Vanderbilt talc after the 1980s or during the March 2004 to October 2013 when Plaintiff was exposed to Defendant’s paint products.

The evidence cited by Plaintiff from Defendant’s person most qualified (“PMQ”) deposition indicates that at some time Vanderbilt attempted to persuade its customers and OSHA that the tremolite in its talcs was not in an asbestiform habit, and Plaintiff presents evidence suggesting that in or around 1992 OSHA decided not to regulate “common amphibole cleavage fragments” in the same manner as asbestos. (See evidence in support of PAMF Nos. 17-19.) It is unclear how evidence of OSHA’s decision not to regulate some forms of tremolitic talc could constitute evidence of Defendant’s malice, oppression or fraud.

The PMQ deposition testimony also contains evidence that Defendant lost money when it discontinued use of Vanderbilt talc, presumably at some time during the 1980s. The only evidence in the record of Defendant’s talc suppliers during the relevant March 2004 to October 2013 exposure period is Luzenac and that there were at least two others, a Canadian supplier and a U.S. supplier, who Defendant’s PMQ was unable to name at his deposition. (Rosenthal Dec. Exh. 1 at p. 29:13-21, 30:3-14.)

Plaintiff presents evidence that Defendant’s PMQ testified that Defendant relied upon representations from its talc suppliers in MSDS sheets during the relevant period that, as required by Defendant’s specifications, the talc was free of asbestos contamination. (See evidence in support of PAMF No. 20.) PAMF Nos. 21-22 indicate that someone employed by Defendant was likely aware of the CTFA J4-1 testing method used by Defendant’s talc suppliers and the 0.5% detection limit of that method. However, Plaintiff presents no evidence tending to show that Defendant during the relevant period was aware of the alleged need to conduct transmission electron microscopy on talc samples.

Defendant did not conduct any regular testing of talc samples during the relevant period. (PAMF No. 23; the Court notes that PAMF Nos. 22 and 23 contain improper legal argument that does belong in a Separate Statement. The Court has not considered those legal arguments.)

Plaintiff also presents evidence Defendant does not recall seeing and did not produce in discovery any certificates of analysis from its talc suppliers regarding the contents of supplied talcs; Defendant never looked for an alternative to talc in its paint products; Defendant did not employ or retain a geologist to opine on or investigate the talc mines where Defendant’s suppliers obtained their talc; and Defendant did not educate distributors, presumably of Defendant’s finished paint products, about the possibility that talc could be contaminated with asbestos. (PAMF Nos. 24-27.)

Plaintiff presents no evidence regarding what, if anything, Defendant understood about the possible asbestos exposures to persons using Defendant’s liquid talc-containing paint products if the products were sanded after drying, except that Defendant conducted no testing to find out. Plaintiff also presents no evidence regarding the amounts of talc

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV155599: AZAR vs 3M COMPANY, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 767206458123 in Department 18 that any of Defendant’s talc-containing paint products incorporated as a percentage of the paint products as a whole or otherwise.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Opposition evidence is insufficient to create triable issues of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim under a clear and convincing evidentiary standard. The fact that one previous talc supplier (Vanderbilt) had supplied talc that contained high levels of tremolite and other types of asbestos twenty years prior to Plaintiff’s exposure period is not evidence that Defendant understood during the relevant period that all talc from whatever source could be subject to trace amounts of asbestos-contamination, an alleged fact for which there is no evidence in the record.

Although Defendant’s reliance on its later talc suppliers’ express representations that the talcs they supplied were free from asbestos may have been negligent or even grossly negligent, it does not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence of Defendant’s malice, oppression or fraud toward Plaintiff or persons similarly situated to Plaintiff.

Wherefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s MSA of Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim.

The Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ Opposition Objections Nos. 1-2.

The Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s Opposition Objection No.

3. Defendant’s Standard Interrogatory Responses are unverified, and even if they were verified would only be admissible in evidence against Defendant (CCP § 2030.410.)

The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s Reply Objections

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