Mount VS 3M Company

“(b) The court may impose an issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses.

“(c) The court may impose an evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence.”

However, Plaintiffs’ moving papers contain no evidence that Defendant has engaged in any cognizable “misuse of the discovery process” in the present action. Instead, Plaintiffs’ motion in the present action is premised on the assertion that at some time prior to 2008, when Defendant first made an effort to conserve its corporate records regarding asbestos and asbestos torts claims, Defendant disposed of most of its corporate records regarding asbestos, even though Defendant had first been named as a defendant in an asbestos personal injury torts action in 1992.

Plaintiffs present no evidence whether any of Defendant’s relevant corporate records were destroyed prior or to or after 1992, instead, Plaintiffs present evidence only that Defendant has disposed of its records regarding the 1992 asbestos torts action and another asbestos torts action RG21100427: Mount VS 3M Company 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Sanctions Against American Honda Motor Company, Inc. For Spoliation of Evidence Requested in Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents Sets 1 And 2; filed by Germaine Helena Mount (Plaintiff) + CRS# A-21100427- 016 in Department 18 filed in 1995, in which Defendant was also named as a defendant.

Plaintiffs cite to no previous order or ruling issued by any court that imposed evidentiary or issue sanctions against AHMC for its asserted pre-2007 destruction of documents relevant to asbestos torts personal injury claims.

The fundamental lack of merit of the present motion is made clear by the moving Separate Statement. The moving Separate Statement lists Plaintiff’s CCP § 2031.010 et seq. Document Requests (“RFPD”) Nos. 7-9, 15, 17, 18, 21-27, 30, 31, and 64-66 and Defendant’s verified Second Amended Responses thereto. None of the Second Amended Responses contain a § 2031.210(a)(2) representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand or the information required by § 2031.230. Plaintiffs present no evidence that they successfully moved for further responses to the Second Amended Responses. Plaintiffs present no evidence that Defendant has failed to produce any responsive documents in its possession, custody or control at the time the relevant RFPD were served in this action.

Further, the premise of the motion – that Defendant will attempt to present evidence at trial regarding the issues identified at Notice of Motion pp. 2:24-3:26 – appears to be a red herring. The record shows that Defendant’s personal most qualified (“PMQ”) has no personal knowledge regarding what AHMC knew about the asbestos hazards of the asbestos-containing automobile and motorcycle parts it distributed at the time of distribution and that Defendant has no documents to support that claims made by the PMQ at deposition.

To the extent that Defendant has any witnesses with personal knowledge of facts tending to support these claims, Plaintiffs have had adequate time during the five years the present action has been pending to discover their identities and to take their depositions. Moreover, if Defendant attempts to introduce evidence at trial that was requested in discovery but not produced, Plaintiffs may move to exclude it at that time.

Further, Plaintiffs cite to no published appellate authority that is apposite to the present circumstances. Plaintiffs cite to Victor Valley Union High Sch. Dist. v. Superior Ct. (2023) 91 Cal. App. 5th 1121 Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215 and Galanek v. Wismar (1999) 68 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1423, 1427. None of these cases is factually apposite to the present circumstances, and Plaintiff’s claims about the Williams and Galanek decisions are inaccurate.

Williams did not involve a situation where destruction of records was negligent or inadvertent, rather than intentional. Williams involved an attorney malpractice action where the plaintiff requested defendant former attorney to return his case files pursuant to State Bar rules requiring former counsel to return case files. Counsel for defendant reviewed the 36 volumes of files and copied the correspondence therein but not the rest of the files before returning them to plaintiff former client. Plaintiff's counsel copied about eleven volumes worth of the files but not the rest. Plaintiff put the files in a storage space, which he then failed to pay the storage fees for and the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21100427: Mount VS 3M Company 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Sanctions Against American Honda Motor Company, Inc. For Spoliation of Evidence Requested in Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents Sets 1 And 2; filed by Germaine Helena Mount (Plaintiff) + CRS# A-21100427- 016 in Department 18 files were destroyed. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ claims in the moving MPA, the Court of Appeal did not disturb the trial court’s finding that under the circumstances the Williams plaintiff's destruction of the case files was intentional. (167 Cal.App.4th at 1224.)

Galanek involved an attorney malpractice action. Plaintiff in the underlying litigation alleged that she was seriously injured as a passenger in an automobile that was rear-ended and the vehicle’s seat defectively collapsed. Plaintiff alleged that defendant, her former counsel, was professionally negligent by failing to prevent the destruction of the vehicle, where preservation of the vehicle was necessary for the Galanek plaintiff to prevail in her products liability action. (68 Cal.App.4th at 1422, 1423.)

Because attorney malpractice is a form of professional negligence, the Galanek plaintiff was only required to show that the defendant attorney had been professionally negligent. The Court of Appeal described defendant attorney’s negligence “undeniable.” (Id. at 1425.) The Appellate Court found that because defendant’s “negligence in failing to preserve the car is what made it impossible for Galanek to prove causation, as a matter of public policy it is more appropriate to hold Wismar liable than to deny Galanek recovery, unless Wismar can prove his negligence did not damage Galanek.” (Id. at 1426.)

In sum, the facts of Galanek bear little relation to Defendant’s apparent destruction of possibly relevant documents at some unknown time prior to 2007 and possibly prior to 1992 when Plaintiffs assert AHMC was first named as a defendant in a California asbestos torts lawsuit.

None of the cases cited by Plaintiffs militate for a finding that AHMC should be subjected to evidentiary or issue sanctions in the present circumstances. If Plaintiffs can show at trial that AHMC destroyed relevant asbestos documents at a time when AHMC should reasonably have known they would be needed for reasonably anticipated future litigation, they may seek a jury instruction (CACI No. 204) regarding reasonable inferences the jury may make. However, Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion does not request such a jury instruction.

Wherefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.

The Court advises Plaintiffs’ counsel that “creative” discovery motions of the type addressed in this Tentative Ruling are a misuse of the Court’s limited judicial resources. Future motions of this type may result in the Court finding the “exceptional circumstances” necessary to appoint a discovery referee to be paid for by the parties pursuant to CCP § 639(a)(5).

The Court further advises Plaintiffs’ counsel that Local Rule 3.30(c) requires that paper courtesy copies be “identical” to the documents filed with the Court. This requirement necessarily means that paper courtesy copies provided to Dept. 18 must comply with all applicable rules of the CRC designed to expedite the Court’s review of voluminous evidentiary submissions, including without limitation CRC Rule 3.1110(f)(3) [hard exhibit tabs between all exhibits]. Because the Court has previously advised counsel of this requirement, counsel should anticipate that failure to comply with all applicable CRC Rules in paper courtesy copies of evidentiary submissions

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

RG21100427: Mount VS 3M Company 06/16/2026 Hearing on Motion for Sanctions Against American Honda Motor Company, Inc. For Spoliation of Evidence Requested in Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents Sets 1 And 2; filed by Germaine Helena Mount (Plaintiff) + CRS# A-21100427- 016 in Department 18 significantly more than 200 pages will result in hearings being continued so that complying courtesy copies may be submitted or where, as here, there is insufficient time before trial for a hearing continuance, evidentiary submissions being disallowed.

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