Motion to transfer venue; Motion to disqualify counsel
Plaintiff’s Opposition asserts, without offering any actual testimony or other evidence to support the claim, that he actually paid $600 in late fees. But even without any admissible evidence from Plaintiff to refute Defendants’ claims as to the amount collected, Defendants have failed to meet their burden for the Third Cause of Action. Defendants have thus failed to meet their burden here, as to the Defendants collectively.
However, Defendants have shown that there does not appear to be a “reasonable probability” that Plaintiff will prevail in this action as to Defendant Phillip Ravenna or Defendant De Anza Corporation. Merely asserting in response that De Anza signed a sublease for Waterfront Resort Properties LP, or that Ravenna worked as the property manager for Terra Vista Management Inc., does not suffice. Nor does the evidence cited in ROA 348, at ¶ 31, suffice to show any basis for the claims as to those defendants. The Motion is therefore GRANTED IN PART, as to Defendant Phillip Ravenna or Defendant De Anza Corporation. However, the Motion has failed to demonstrate that $100,000 is justified as the security sum for those two defendants. The Court instead finds that the security sum shall be set at $50,000.
Motion 2 is DENIED. Plaintiff has failed to show either that reconsideration under C.C.P. § 1008 is warranted here, or that the previously determined sanctions award should not remain.
Counsel for Defendants to give notice of these rulings. 10 Gonzalez v. O/C Aten Technology, Inc. 11 Rojas v. Before the Court is a motion to transfer venue and a motion to Alamirad disqualify counsel filed by defendant Farzan Alamirad (Defendant) Dental Corp against plaintiff Elizabeth Rojas (Plaintiff). For the reasons set forth below, both motions are DENIED.
Motion to Transfer Venue:
Even if filed in a “proper” county, on appropriate motion, the court has discretionary power to transfer the case to any other county “[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 397, subd. (c); Rycz v. Sup. Ct. (McGarry) (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 836.)
Defendant has failed to identify any witnesses who reside in Los Angeles County and only makes generalized assertions that unnamed “percipient witnesses” reside in Los Angeles County. Defendant’s main concern appears to be his own inconvenience in having to litigate in Orange County. (Alamirad Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) However, it is only the convenience of the nonparty witnesses that is important. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the parties’ conveniences are not considered – even if they are to testify. (Wrin v. Ohlandt (1931) 213 Cal.158, 160; Simonian v. Simonian (1950)
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97 Cal.App.2d 68, 69 [the conveniences of a party are limited to cases where a party is extremely ill or feeble so that travel to a distant county would endanger the party’s health].) Defendant has failed to show the convenience of nonparty witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the venue change. The motion to transfer venue is therefore DENIED.
Motion to Disqualify:
Civil judges have the power to order disqualification of counsel when necessary for the furtherance of justice. (Willian H. Raley Co. v. Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1042, 1048; People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145.) In exercising that power, the court must weigh “the combined effect of a party’s right to counsel of choice, an attorney’s interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified counsel and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding against the fundamental principle that the fair resolution of disputes within our adversary system requires vigorous representation of parties by independent counsel unencumbered by conflicts of interest.” (Willian H.
Raley Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at 1048; SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 1145-46 [“The paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar”].)
As such, motions to disqualify counsel are not granted on a regular basis and will not be granted when only a hypothetical conflict exists. (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 302.) “A conflict arises when the circumstances of a particular case present a substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interest or by the lawyer’s duties to another current client, a former client, or a third person. (In re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835, 844 [citing Rest. 3d Law Governing Lawyers, § 121].)
If competent evidence does not establish a conflict, the attorney will not be disqualified. (Ibid.) Here, Defendant contends he disclosed confidential business and employee-related documents to Arian Eghbali, believed to be a family member of opposing counsel, for the purpose of obtaining “professional assistance" and that the disclosed documents are directly related to the subject matter of this litigation.
“Mere exposure to the confidences of an adversary does not, standing alone, warrant disqualification . . . Such a rule would nullify a party's right to representation by chosen counsel any time inadvertence or devious design put an adversary's confidences in an attorney's mailbox.” (In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 589.)
“The drastic remedy of disqualification of counsel is appropriate only where the attorney improperly or inadvertently received information protected by the opposing party's attorney-client privilege, the information is material to the proceeding, and its use would
prejudice the opposing party in the proceeding.” (Sundholm v. Hollywood Foreign Press Assn. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1330, 1334.)
Defendant failed to present any evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel received any confidential information (let alone attorney-client privileged information) that would prejudice Defendant in this litigation. Defendant fails to explain in what capacity Arian Eghbali provided “professional assistance” but notably does not contend it was legal assistance or representation. Defendant also does not explain how employee payroll information and internal operational information could be used adversely against him in this litigation. Moreover, Defendant relies entirely on speculation. There is no evidence Plaintiff’s counsel even received any confidential information. Defendant has not shown grounds for disqualification. The motion to disqualify is therefore DENIED.
Counsel for Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling. 12 Karakalos v. Before the Court at present are the Demurrer and Motion to Strike Colonial filed on 3/23/26 by Defendants Colonial Family Funeral Care dba Family Funeral Chapman Funeral Homes and Mary J. Harmon, (“Defendants”), as to Care etc. et al. the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed on 2/17/26 by Plaintiff Mary Karakalos (“Plaintiff”).
The Demurrer: The Demurrer is directed to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action (each a “COA”) in the SAC. The Demurrer as to COA 4 is OVERRULED; the Demurrer as to COAs 5- 8 is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
COA 4 now attempts to assert a claim for “Interference With Right to Possession and Control of Human Remains,” which alleges intentional conduct and is thus distinct from the claims in COAs 1 and 2. The Demurrer as to COA 4 is therefore OVERRULED. However, the additional COAs asserted as COAs 5-8, which were added without leave to do so, appear to effectively duplicate COA 4. None of those COAs state a cognizable claim distinct from COA 4. The Motion is therefore GRANTED as to COAs 5-8, without further leave to amend.
The Motion to Strike: In light of the ruling on the Demurrer, the Motion to Strike as to COAs 5-8 is MOOT.
The Motion is otherwise DENIED. The allegations presented, in promising to provide but then intentionally failing to actually provide the remains at issue to Plaintiff in a timely manner, are sufficient to support the request for punitive damages in ¶ 42 and ¶ 51, for pleading purposes.
Defendants are to file their Answer to the SAC within 10 days
Case Management Conference is CONTINUED to October 30, 2026, at 9:30 a.m.
Plaintiff to give notice of these rulings.