Maribel Aceveda Jacinto v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., et al.

“A corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 395.5.)

“The moving party must overcome the presumption that the plaintiff has selected the proper venue.” (Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 836.) Defendant has failed to rebut the presumption of proper venue in Los Angeles County.

Venue is proper in this county pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 395, subd. (b), which states that,? in an action arising from an offer or provision of goods, services, loans or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family or household use, . . . he superior court in the county where the buyer or lessee in fact signed the contract, where the buyer or lessee resided at the time the contract was entered into, or where the buyer or lessee resides at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 395, subd. (b).)

Defendant here acknowledges that Plaintiff purchased the vehicle at issue, and obtained the warranty sued upon, in Claremont, in Los Angeles County. (Hurvitz Decl. Exh. A.) Los Angeles County was the county where Plaintiff signed the contract, and thus where venue is proper under section 395, subd. (b). [1] Venue is also proper under Code of Civil Procedure § 395.5, as under the same facts, Los Angeles County is the county “where the contract is made’ and where “the obligation or liability arises.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 395.5..)

Additionally, Defendant is a corporation, and as such may not seek transfer of venue to any county save that which hosts its principal place of business. (See Easton v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 243, 246?47 [“Schneider’s status is that of a foreign corporation only. As such, it may be sued in any county in the state.”]; Karson Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 7, 8?9 [“A corporate defendant challenging venue may obtain an order changing venue only to the county of its principal place of business.”]; General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 966, 970 [holding that transfer to Los Angeles County was proper after defendant corporation had shown that its principal place of business was located there].) Defendant does not identify its home county in this state.

Accordingly, the motion to transfer venue is DENIED. Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 732 MARIBEL ACEVEDO JACINTO, Plaintiffs, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A, LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No.:

Hearing Date: May 17, 2026 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.”s Motion to Transfer Venue to Riverside County Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.”s Motion to Transfer Venue to Riverside County is DENIED. Plaintiff to provide notice. Dated: May 17, 2026 __________________________________________ Hon. Richard S. Kemalyan Judge of the Superior Court

Defendant cites Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, for the proposition that section 395.5, and not 395, subd. (b), applies in Song Beverly cases. (Motion at p. 5.) But this case does not stand for the proposition that section 395, subd. (b), does not apply; it only states that venue under that provision is not “mandatory in Song-Beverly Act cases,” and venue may likewise be proper under section 395.5. (Tidrick, supra, 112 Cal.App.5 th at p. 1156.) Thus both section 395, subd. (b), and section 395.5 may furnish a basis for venue in a Song Beverly case.

Case Number: 25STCV28429 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Dept: 732 Cameron Torabi, et al. v. John Tabares Construction, et al. Monday, May 18, 2026