Knox, Sean vs. Visalia Unified School District

12. The entire altercation was captured via video surveillance. As depicted therein, PLAINTIFF effectively displaced the subject student's balance, bringing her to the ground to prevent further harm to herself or others, and quickly secured her to ensure she could not continue to engage in violent behavior. PLAINTIFF ensured he was not applying pressure to the subject student's torso, maintaining her ability to breathe. PLAINTIFF's actions were deliberate and focused on minimizing harm. His primary goal was to ensure the subject student's safety while addressing the immediate threat she posed in the chaotic situation.

13. Statements made by PLAINTIFF, "you can move" and "you can breathe," are not captured in the video, yet in fact were made, as confirmed by PLAINTIFF's verbal interaction with the student. Despite the subject student's assertions that she could not move or breathe, PLAINTIFF calmly reassured her, indicating an active awareness of her physical condition and emotional state, while continuing to assess whether she posed a further risk to the school environment.

14. PLAINTIFF's conduct was part of a broader effort to maintain order during a violent school brawl. Aware of the larger threat posed by the ongoing brawl, PLAINTIFF requested additional assistance from staff, demonstrating the urgency of the situation." (FAC P.P.12-14.)

Further that "Notwithstanding, DEFENDANT VUSD's subsequent October 21, 2024 decision to terminate PLAINTIFF was based on a racially prejudicial rush to judgment, and a both flawed and incompetently conducted investigation. By way of example, PLAINTIFF's repeated requests for training related to physical intervention, verbal de-escalation, conflict resolution, and crisis management prior to this incident were well documented. In fact, PLAINTIFF was the only campus supervisor that did not receive this training. When confronted with these facts during the course of the investigation, administrators Luis Jaramillo, Paul Preheim and Frank Escobar admitted that PLAINTIFF's requests had gone ignored. However, instead of being supportive of his efforts to maintain a safe environment, PLAINTIFF faced immediate, severe disciplinary action, culminating in his termination." (FAC P.16.)

Additionally, that "During the investigation and disciplinary process, PLAINTIFF informed DEFENDANTS that he had previously requested training in physical intervention and de escalation and had not received such training. Despite this, DEFENDANTS failed to meaningfully consider those facts in evaluating the incident" and "PLAINTIFF's claims are further corroborated by the disparate treatment he was subjected to in comparison to his non-African American, similarly situated colleagues. Specifically, campus supervisors Manuel Vasquez and Patrick Buyayo were involved in similar incidents in which they intervened in student altercations, but faced minimal or no disciplinary action." (FAC P.17, 18.)

Specifically, as to the IIED cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that "DOES 1 through 50 were supervisory employees, administrators, investigators, and decision-makers employed by DEFENDANT VUSD, including individuals involved in reviewing the September 16, 2024 incident, evaluating PLAINTIFF's prior training requests, conducting the ensuing investigation, recommending discipline, and approving PLAINTIFF's termination." (FAC P.39.)

Further that "...the acts and omissions of said DOE DEFENDANTS were committed within the course and scope of their employment with DEFENDANT VUSD. Pursuant to Government Code section 815.2, DEFENDANT VUSD is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by the wrongful acts and omissions of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment." (FAC P.40.)

Additionally, that: "41. Following the September 16, 2024 student altercation, DOE DEFENDANTS engaged in a course of conduct that was extreme and outrageous, including, but not limited to, ignoring or deliberately disregarding PLAINTIFF's repeated and documented pre-incident requests for training in physical intervention, verbal de-escalation, conflict resolution, and crisis management, despite later acknowledging during the investigation that such requests had gone ignored and that PLAINTIFF had not been provided the same training afforded to other campus supervisors.

42. PLAINTIFF is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that DOE DEFENDANTS further engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct by conducting and ratifying a one-sided, predetermined, and fundamentally unfair investigation of the September 16, 2024 incident, including mischaracterizing PLAINTIFF's conduct during the incident, disregarding the surrounding circumstances of the ongoing school brawl, failing to fairly consider that PLAINTIFF was acting in an effort to protect student and staff safety, and using the incident as a pretext to impose severe discipline and terminate PLAINTIFF's employment.

43. PLAINTIFF is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that DOE DEFENDANTS treated similarly situated non-African American employees, including campus supervisors Manuel Vasquez and Patrick Buyayo, more favorably in connection with comparable student-discipline incidents, while subjecting PLAINTIFF to harsher scrutiny, a rushed disciplinary process, and termination. DOE DEFENDANTS knew of these disparities, yet approved and ratified the unequal treatment.

44. The above-described conduct was undertaken by DOE DEFENDANTS intentionally, or with reckless disregard of the probability of causing PLAINTIFF severe emotional distress. DOE DEFENDANTS knew, or reasonably should have known, that depriving PLAINTIFF of his livelihood through a knowingly unfair and discriminatory process, while ignoring Defendant's own failure to provide requested training, would cause PLAINTIFF profound humiliation, anguish, and emotional harm.

45. The conduct of DOE DEFENDANTS exceeded all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Said DOE DEFENDANTS abused their supervisory and administrative authority by failing to provide requested training, and thereafter relying on the consequences of that lack of training in imposing severe discipline against PLAINTIFF." (FAC P.P.42-45.)

Defendant VUSD demurrers to the second cause of action for IIED for failure to state facts sufficient to allege a cause of action. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the conduct described above is sufficient as to the elements of IIED in context of the discrimination claim.

Demurrer The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint "states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based." (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4 th 209, 220. To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if "the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action." (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4 th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4 th 634, 638.) It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer. (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But "doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

IIED against Public Entities Lawson v. Superior Court (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1389 suggests that IIED claims are viable against public entities on the basis of vicarious liability: "Accordingly, as long as the Complaint adequately pleads the elements of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress against [State employee defendants], it also adequately pleads the vicarious liability of the State for those causes of action."

"The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." (Miller v. Fortune Commercial Corporation (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 214, 228-29.)

"Whether a defendant's conduct can reasonably be found to be outrageous is a question of law that must initially be determined by the court; if reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct was, in fact, outrageous." (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534.)

The court in Light v. Dept. of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 97-101 concluded that claims for IIED arising from employment may be asserted in a civil suit where the actionable conduct also forms the basis for a FEHA violation. There, such sufficient allegations included that the allegations that a defendant supervisor "...ostracized Light in the workplace, encouraged Light to lie to investigators, pursued Light at home and in the office to determine whether Light did so, and verbally and physically attacked Light after Light disobeyed. The trier of fact could conclude this conduct was extreme and outrageous (especially in light of Seals's supervisory position), taken for purposes of retaliation prohibited by FEHA, and intended to cause Light emotional distress." (Id. at 102.)

Here, the amended allegations in support of the IIED claim fail under the standard set forth in Light. Plaintiff alleges an unfair investigation biased on the basis of Plaintiff's race and a lack of training and ignoring of Plaintiff's training requests. This does not arise to ostracizing Plaintiff in the workplace, encouraging Plaintiff to lie, pursuing Plaintiff at home, and physically attacking Plaintiff. Rather, these claims sound in discrimination, pled in the first cause of action by Plaintiff. The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer to the second cause of action.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4 th 1219, 1226.) Here, neither the amended complaint nor the opposition reveal a basis for permitting amendment here. Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the second cause of action without leave to amend. Defendant is ordered to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Visalia-County Civic Center Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2 Examiner notes for probate matters calendared June 15, 2026 and June 17, 2026, that allow for posting: Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc. Case Number | Case Name | Type | Status | Comments | VPR050740 | In the Matter of Flores, Rachel | Confirm Sale Real Property | Appearance Required | Appearance required pursuant to CRC, rule 7.452 |