Jakeila Dotson v. Napa Valley Unified School District et al

The moving party failed to include, in the notice of this motion, the current version of the Tentative Ruling notice required by Local Rule 2.9, effective 1/1/26. The current version allows a party or counsel to request a hearing by calling the Court or emailing the Court, at JudicialReception2@napa.courts.ca.gov and providing specified information set out in Local Rule 2.9. The moving party is therefore directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the current Tentative Ruling notice explicitly required by Local Rule 2.9 to opposing party/ies forthwith. The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

A. PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Defendant Napa Valley Unified School District (“District”) demurs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10, subdivision (e),1 to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) of Plaintiff Jakeila Dotson as guardian ad litem for J.P. (“Plaintiff”).

B. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “facts constituting the cause of action.” (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) A demurrer is treated as “admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court must “construe the allegations of a complaint liberally in favor of the pleader.” (Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 438.) The Court must also accept as true facts that may be inferred from those expressly alleged. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1405.) Because “[a] demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading . . . the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove the [] allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-14.)

The Court may also consider as grounds for a demurrer any matter that is judicially noticeable under Evidence Code sections 451 or 452. (§ 430.30, subd. (a).)

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

C. DISCUSSION

The gravamen of the FAC is that, throughout the 2023-2024 school year, Plaintiff consistently suffered disproportionate amounts of discipline from co-defendant American Canyon Middle School (“ACMS”) faculty and administration based on his race, relative to nonblack students. (FAC, ¶¶ 11-12, 14.) Plaintiff alleges that, although his peers conducted themselves in the same way as Plaintiff, Plaintiff was always the only one singled out as the aggressor, culminating in: (1) 44 assertive discipline incidents, the majority of which alleged disrespect, disruption, or defiance/noncompliance, and (2) one specific incident between Plaintiff and a teacher Sheila Hassett on April 17, 2024. (FAC, ¶ 12, 14.)

The only allegations in the FAC specifically pertaining to the District are that, following Plaintiff’s filing, on May 3, 2024, of a formal complaint against the District claiming racial discrimination, the District conducted an investigation and issued a July 31, 2024 Notice of Determination. (FAC, ¶¶ 15-16, Exh. C.) The Notice of Determination determined that Plaintiff’s allegation of disproportionate punishment “was not sustained as to the April 17, 2024 incident,” but that “the investigation raised significant concerns about whether African American students in general, and [Plaintiff] in particular, has been subjected to racially discriminatory practices with respect to discipline.” (FAC, ¶ 16, Exh. C, p. 2.) The Notice of Determination further “sustained” Plaintiff’s allegation that “ACMS administration erroneously suspended Plaintiff for 5 days for sexual assault following the April 17, 2024 incident because of Plaintiff’s race and/or color,” noting that its immediate suspension of Plaintiff “based on the teacher’s April 17th accusation and information available within the first 30-60 minutes after the incident” was based “not simply on [the teacher’s] version of events, but also on ACMS administration’s negative beliefs about [Plaintiff].” (FAC, ¶ 23, Exh. C, pp. 5-6.) Plaintiff’s two other allegations were “not sustained.” (Id., Exh. C, pp. 4, 6.)

The FAC claims that the District has failed to: enforce anti-discrimination policies, investigate racial harassment in accordance with mandated procedures, properly supervise or discipline staff who engaged in discriminatory conduct, protect Plaintiff from racial discrimination and harassment, acknowledge or admit the racial discrimination and harassment, and create a safe environment free from discrimination and harassment. (FAC, ¶¶ 25, 28, 39, 53.) Moreover, Plaintiff claims that the District breached its duty to Plaintiff by unfairly disciplining Plaintiff without adequate investigation, acting with deliberate indifference despite having actual knowledge of the harassment, and failing to discover Teacher Hassett’s racist views and/or proclivities. (FAC, ¶¶ 29, 35, 47.)

1. The Complaint Fails to Allege Facts Sufficient to State the First Cause of Action

The District argues that the First Cause of Action for Harassment in Education Institution under Education Code section 220 fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that the alleged harassment was “severe and pervasive” or that the District acted with “deliberate indifference” to the known harassment. The District further argues that the First Cause of Action fails to allege that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies as required under Education Code section 262.3.

a. While the FAC Alleges Facts Sufficient to Meet the First Element of the First Cause of Action (Severe, Pervasive and Offensive Harassment), the FAC Fails to Allege Facts Sufficient to Meet the Third Element (Deliberate Indifference)

To prevail on a claim under Education Code section 220 for discrimination and harassment, “a plaintiff must show: (1) he or she suffered ‘severe, pervasive and offensive’ harassment, that effectively deprived plaintiff of the right of equal access to educational benefits and opportunities; (2) the school district had ‘actual knowledge’ of that harassment; and (3) the school district acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ in the face of such knowledge.” (Donovan v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567, 579.)

Although the factual allegations of the 44 discipline incidents, other than the April 17, 2024 incident, are not abundant, the Court finds that the FAC alleges facts sufficient to establish, for pleading purposes, that he suffered severe, pervasive and offensive harassment by ACMS employees.

Thus, the Demurrer on the ground that the First Cause of Action fails to allege facts to establish severe, pervasive and offensive harassment is OVERRULED.

However, the Court does not find that the FAC sufficiently alleges that the District acted with deliberate indifference. As noted, the only facts alleged specifically as to the District are that, after Plaintiff filed a formal complaint on May 3, 2024 (following the April 17, 2024 incident), the District conducted an investigation and issued a July 31, 2024 Notice of Determination. Although the FAC alleges, in conclusory fashion, that “Defendants acted with deliberate indifference [with knowledge of the harassment],” there are no factual allegations against the District sufficiently supporting that conclusory assertion to inform the District of the claim against which it needs to defend. (FAC, ¶ 35.) In particular, it is unclear whether the First Cause of Action stems from the District’s July 31, 2024 report and investigation, or whether the District’s alleged deliberate indifference is with respect to the previous acts of harassment/discrimination, or both. If the former, the FAC fails to allege any facts to suggest that the District’s conduct in response to Plaintiff’s formal complaint was deliberately indifferent. (See also 12/17/2025 Minute Order on Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP Motion, p. 4 [finding that “the FAC does not attack or challenge that investigation or the Notice of Determination resulting therefrom.”].) If the latter, the FAC does not allege sufficient facts to support an assertion that, or how, the District knew of any other incidents of harassment.

Plaintiff’s Opposition offers little help to clarify the issue, by vaguely stating: “Plaintiff does not seek to overturn the District’s administrative determination or set it aside. Rather, Plaintiff asserts independent statutory claims based on Defendant’s discriminatory conduct and failure to respond appropriately.” (Opposition, p. 9.) On the one hand, it appears that Plaintiff is clarifying the FAC is not taking issue with the July 31, 2024 Notice of Determination or related investigation/conduct; but, on the other hand, Plaintiff’s claim that the District failed “to respond appropriately”—if not in reference to that July 31, 2024 investigation/report—is vague and ambiguous as to the conduct to which the District allegedly failed to appropriately respond.

Thus, the Demurrer on the ground that the First Cause of Action fails to allege facts to establish the District’s deliberate indifference is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND in accordance with the above discussion.

b. The FAC Fails to Allege Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under Education Code Section 262.3

Under Education Code section 262.3, subdivision (d), “a person who alleges that he or she is victim of discrimination may not seek civil remedies pursuant to this section until at least 60 days have elapsed from the filing of an appeal to the State Department of Education.” In other words, there is “a 60-day ‘cooling off period’ before civil remedies may be pursued by private enforcement.” (Donovan, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 593.)

The District argues that Plaintiff does not allege he filed an appeal to the California Department of Education (“DOE”) as required under Education Code section 262.3, subdivision (d) and, separately, does not allege that he complied with the California Code of Regulations, Title 5, section 4632, which requires filing a written appeal to the DOE within 30 days of receipt of the UCP Investigation Report. (Support Memo, pp. 4-5.) Furthermore, the District argues that Plaintiff’s challenge of the UCP Investigation Report can only be challenged through a petition for writ of mandate. (Id., at p. 5, citing Taswell v. Regents of Univ. of California (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 343, 352.) The District does not address its claim, or Plaintiff’s response, regarding the petition for writ of mandate or 5 CCR § 4632 in its Reply, and therefore, the Court construes those points abandoned.

With respect to Education Code section 262.3, Plaintiff argues that the statute, on its face, does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a civil complaint. Indeed, subdivision (c) states “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to require an exhaustion of the administrative complaint process before civil law remedies may be pursued.” (Ed. Code, § 262.3, subd. (c).)

Federal district courts that have analyzed the entire framework and Legislative history of Education Code sections 262.3 and 262.4 have determined that a claimant must at least pursue administrative remedies to the point of having filed an appeal with the DOE and waiting 60 days before filing a civil lawsuit. (See Reply, p. 2, citing Annamaria M. v. Napa Valley Unified School Dist. (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2006, No. C 03-0101 VRW) 2006 WL 1525733, at *11; R.N. v. Travis Unified Sch. Dist. (E.D. Cal. Decl. 8, 2020, No. 20-cv-00562-KJM-JDP, 2020 WL 7227561, at *11-12 [finding that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under section 220 where they alleged that they filed a complaint with the local educational agency but did not allege they filed an appeal to the California Department of Education].)

This is consistent with the general doctrine of administrative exhaustion under California law that “where an adequate administrative remedy is provided by statute, resort to that forum is a ‘jurisdictional’ prerequisite to judicial consideration of the claim.” (McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 275, 285 [“If an appeal can be taken to a higher administrative body ... that appeal must be pursued and the issues must be presented to the final decisionmaker before they can be presented in court.”].)

Moreover, Donovan, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 567, would appear to support the federal authorities’ holding. Donovan explained that sections 262.3 and 262.4 “provide for enforcement of” Education Code section 220. (Id., at 590-91.) “Although it authorized a private right of action for a section 220 violation ... the Legislature also sought to accomplish the policy objectives underlying the antidiscrimination in education law through administrative enforcement, to avoid throwing [public] schools into immediate litigation and to give schools an opportunity to resolve informally as many cases as possible.” (Id. at 607-08 (citation omitted); see also Enciso v. City of Los Altos, No. H037770, 2015 WL 1952275, at *14-15 (Cal. Ct. App. (6th Dist.) April 30, 2015) [recognizing Ed. Code § 262.3, subd. (d) as requiring exhaustion of administrative appeal]; but see B.Q. v. Mesa Union School Dist., No. B303351, 2020 WL 7052293, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. (2d Dist.) Dec. 2, 2020) [“This administrative appeal process [under 262.3] is not mandatory. Those who elect to forego this process are not precluded from filing a PDE [Ed. Code, § 200] action. [¶] For those who use this administrative appeal process, there is a provision that delays seeking civil damages. [¶] [T]he goal [with this legislation] was to provide an optional administrative procedure for those who wanted to use it and to declare that this process was not a requirement for filing litigation.”].)

Based on the foregoing, the Demurrer to the First Cause of Action on the ground that the FAC fails to allege exhaustion of an appeal under Education Code section 262.3 is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND should Plaintiff be able to allege exhaustion of his administrative remedies.

2. The FAC Does Not Preclude the Possibility That the District Failed to Carry Out a Ministerial Duty, Which Failure is Not Subject to Immunity Under Section 820.2

The District argues that the First Cause of Action for Harassment in Education Institution, Second Cause of Action for Negligence, and Third Cause of Action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision or Retention fail because the District is immune under Section 820.2 because each alleged violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights was a discretionary act by public employees.

Section 820.2 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” The immunity for the employee under section 820.2 then operates to shield the public entity itself (here, the District) through Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b), which states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.”

Courts have framed the key distinction between immune and non-immune conduct under Section 820.2 as one between high-level policy planning (immune) and operational implementation of a policy (not immune) decisions. (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 981; Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 685 [“[T]here is no basis for immunizing lower level decisions that merely implement a basic policy already formulated.”].) Even when a basic policy decision is itself immune, “subsequent operational actions in the implementation of that

basic decision still must face case-by-case adjudication on the question of negligence.” (Barner, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 687.)

The District argues that “[t]he FAC challenges decisions regarding how the District investigated complaints, responded to alleged misconduct, and determined appropriate disciplinary or remedial measures,” which it contends are necessarily discretionary decisions requiring the evaluation of facts and the exercise of judgment. (See Reply, p. 8; see also Support Memo, pp. 9-10.) As a result, the District contends, the District is immune from the causes of action which are based upon such discretionary conduct.

In Opposition, Plaintiff first argues that the challenged conduct is not immune policy formulation decisions, but rather non-immune operational conduct pertaining to the carrying out of established duties, including the “failure to properly investigate, failure to protect against known discrimination, and failure to supervise and discipline staff.” (Opposition, p. 12.) Plaintiff further argues that whether or not the conduct is discretionary cannot be determined upon the pleadings, but instead requires a fact-intensive inquiry as to whether the challenged conduct is policy-level or operational. (Ibid.)

To the extent the FAC is based on the District’s failure to discipline staff for the alleged harassment and/or discrimination of Plaintiff, it appears the District would be immune from such conduct. (See Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1437 [“We have no doubt that this analysis leads inevitably to the conclusion in the case at bench that the decision of [the public entity’s directors] to institute disciplinary proceedings against [an employee of the public entity] was a policy decision involving the exercise of discretion entitling them to immunity under Government Code section 820.2. The decision whether or not to initiate discipline proceedings and what discipline to impose is placed initially on the department head and the decision is entirely within his discretion. The decision involves the exercise of analysis and judgment as to what is just and proper under the circumstances and is not purely a ministerial act.”]; see also Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 988 [noting that discretionary acts include the rendering of personnel decisions entrusted to public officials’ independent judgment.”]; Eldridge v. Sierra View Local Hospital Dist. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 311, 325-26.)

However, the District cites no authority which compels a finding that the District is immune from liability under Section 820.2 for any alleged failure to investigate or respond to Plaintiff’s claims of harassment and/or discrimination, enforce anti-discrimination policies, or supervise staff. The allegations in the FAC do not preclude, and instead allow for a reasonable inference, that the District’s alleged failures in those regards could be based on the District’s failure to follow policies that were already in place—a ministerial (non-immune) act. (See, e.g., E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1284-85 [holding district not immune under Section 820.2 for failing to protect student from bullying by other students at middle school where student presented evidence that district and school had safety policies, which established procedures and guidelines for district and school employees to follow when witnessing, or receiving reports of, bullying, and that school employees did not follow many of those procedures and guidelines once student and her parents reported bullying, and district cited

no authority holding that employees’ decisions regarding how to respond to reports of bullying qualified as quasi-legislative policy-making].)

Given that the FAC does not negate, on its face, the possibility that the District failed to undertake a ministerial duty (as to which failure the immunity of Section 820.2 would not apply), the Demurrer to the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action on the ground that the District is immune is OVERRULED.

3. The Fourth Cause of Action is not Entirely Duplicative of the Second Cause of Action and, Regardless, a Demurrer Does Not Lie on Grounds That a Cause of Action is Duplicative

The District argues that the Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress fails because it is not a separate cause of action but rather duplicative of the Second Cause of Action for Negligence.

Plaintiff in Opposition argues that Fourth Cause of Action alleges facts to support a negligence cause of action and, if it is more properly characterized as a general negligence claim, he can relabel it as a negligence claim. Unfortunately, Plaintiff’s argument does not address Defendant’s contention that this cause of action is duplicative of the Second Cause of Action and, by omission, might be construed as a concession that the two causes of action are duplicative.

That said, the Court does not find the Fourth Cause of Action entirely duplicative or redundant of the Second Cause of Action, as the Second Cause of Action is based on a duty and failure to take steps to prevent discrimination whereas the Fourth Cause of Action is based on a duty and failure to affirmatively create a safe classroom environment. (FAC, ¶¶ 38-39, 52-53.) Moreover, a demurrer is not properly sustained on the sole ground that a cause of action is duplicative of another cause of action asserted in the complaint. (See R.L. v. Merced City School Dist. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 89 [“Redundancy, however, is not enumerated as one of the statutory grounds on which a demurrer may be sustained. ... This is the sort of defect that, if it justifies any judicial intervention at all, is ordinarily dealt with most economically at trial, or on a dispositive motion.”]; Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858 [same]; but see Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290 [demurrer may be sustained as to duplicative causes of action]; Rodrigues v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 501 [same].)

As the only ground upon which the District demurs to the Fourth Cause of Action is duplicity, the demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is OVERRULED.

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