SCALE LEADERSHIP ACADEMY VS PALO VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

It also argues that the fact that Petitioner is a virtual program does not change the geographical restrictions. It further argues that to the extent Ed. Code § 47605 and 5 C.C.R. § 11966.4 require written findings on a non-compliant renewal petition, Respondent complied when it provided written notice of the defects in the Renewal Petition. Respondent also contends that there can be no automatic renewal of a defective renewal petition under 5 C.C.R. § 11966.4(c) because this would exceed the authority of Ed.

Code § 47605. Finally, it argues that the declaratory relief cause of action is derivative, so it also fails.

In opposition, Petitioner argues that Respondent is wrong about its interpretation of the law and whether the Renewal Petition was defective is a question of fact that cannot be determined on a demurrer. It further argues that the Renewal Petition states that Petitioner’s school will be located and operate within Respondent’s boundaries, so even if Respondent’s interpretation is correct, a hearing was required. It also argues that the board had the authority to enact 5 C.C.R. § 11966.4; that section does not conflict with Ed. Code § 47605; and it effectuates the purposes of the Charter Schools Act. Finally, Petitioner argues that the declaratory relief cause of action is also sufficiently pled, and if the court finds that its claims are not sufficient, it should be granted leave to amend.

In reply, Respondent argues that because Petitioner states in the Renewal Petition that it may open a new resource center within the District, it was actually either a petition for a new charter or a proposed revision to the charter, to which different provisions apply and automatic renewal is not applicable. Respondent otherwise reiterates its arguments from the demurrer.

Analysis

I. Meet and Confer Requirement

Respondent satisfied its obligation to meet and confer pursuant to C.C.P. § 430.41(a). (See, Decl. of Michael J. Davis at ¶¶ 2-5.)

II. Request for Judicial Notice

Respondent asks that the Court take judicial notice of various documents related to its boundaries and profile; Petitioner’s address; and CNUSD’s boundaries. It also asks the Court to take judicial notice of Assembly Bills 1505 and 1507. These documents are subject to judicial notice pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(b) and (h), and Petitioner raises no objections to the request for judicial notice. Accordingly, the request should be granted and judicial notice taken as to the existence of the documents, but not the truth of the matter. (Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 658.)

III. Evidence and Argument Raised for the First Time in the Reply Should Not Be Considered

In its reply, Respondent argues for the first time that automatic renewal does not apply to the Renewal Petition because it was not a petition for renewal, but instead either a petition for a new charter or a proposed revision to the charter since Petitioner states in the Renewal Petition that it may open a new resource center within the District. (Reply, pp. 7:18-9:10.) “The general rule of motion practice, which applies here, is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.” (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537; San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v.

Wells Fargo Bank (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316; American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453 [“Points raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument.”].) The inclusion of new evidence or arguments in the reply should only be allowed in the exceptional case, and if permitted, the other party should be given the opportunity to respond. (Plenger v.

Alza Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 349, 362, fn. 8; Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252; San Diego Watercrafts, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at 316.)

Here, Defendant provides no explanation for why this argument could not have been introduced with its motion. Thus, there is no evidence this is an “exceptional case” in which the new evidence/argument should be considered. Accordingly, the Court should not consider the new argument raised for the first time with Respondent’s reply.

IV. Standard

A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (C.C.P. § 430.10(e).) In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d

120, 125.) The court assumes the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and of any material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 672.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) Facts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint will also be accepted as true and, if contrary allegations appear in the complaint, will be given precedence. (Del E.

Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 606.) If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

V. On the Merits

A. 1st Cause of Action for Writ of Mandate

A traditional writ of mandate under C.C.P. § 1085 lies “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled.” (C.C.P. § 1085(a).) This code section allows judicial review of ministerial duties and quasi-legislative and legislative acts. (County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 643, 653.) “The two requirements for mandamus thus are (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to performance of that duty.” (Keyes v.

Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 657; see also, Water Audit California v. Merced Irrigation District (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1180.) “A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.” (Rodriguez v. Solis (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 495, 501- 502; see also, County of Los Angeles, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at 643 [“[a] ministerial duty is one which is required by statute”].)

In the present case, Petitioner alleges and argues that Respondent was required under Ed. Code § 47605(b) to conduct a hearing and make written findings on its Renewal Petition, and its failure to do so means the Renewal Petition is deemed approved pursuant to 5 C.C.R. § 11966.4(c). In its demurrer, Respondent argues that the Renewal Petition was defective, and it has no duty to conduct a hearing on a defective petition, so Petitioner’s claim fails. It also argues that 5 C.C.R. § 11966.4 does not provide for automatic renewal of deficient renewal petitions, and its letter to Petitioner setting forth the defects in the Renewal Petition was sufficient to comply with any requirement for written findings.

Ed. Code § 47605(a)(1) states: “Except as set forth in paragraph (2), a petition for the establishment of a charter school within a school district may be circulated by one or more persons seeking to establish the charter school. A petition for the establishment of a charter school shall identify a single charter school that will operate within the geographic boundaries of that school district. A charter school may propose

to operate at multiple sites within the school district if each location is identified in the charter school petition. The petition may be submitted to the governing board of the school district for review after” it is signed by the parents or legal guardians of half the number of estimated pupils or have the number of teachers estimated to be employed by the school. (Ed. Code § 47605(a)(1)(A)-(B).)

Ed. Code § 47607(b) states that “Renewals and material revisions of charters are governed by the standards and criteria described in Section 47605, and shall include, but not be limited to, a reasonably comprehensive description of any new requirement of charter schools enacted into law after the charter was originally granted or last renewed.” 5 C.C.R. § 11966.4(A)(2)(a) states that signature requirement in Ed. Code § 47605(a) does not apply to petitions for renewal.

Ed. Code § 47605(b) states: “No later than 60 days after receiving a petition, in accordance with subdivision (a), the governing board of the school district shall hold a public hearing on the provisions of the charter, at which time the governing board of the school district shall consider the level of support for the petition by teachers employed by the school district, other employees of the school district, and parents...”

While one of the main disputes between the parties is whether the governing board of a school district is required to conduct a hearing on a petition that does not meet the requirements of Ed. Code § 47605(a), the Court need only reach this issue if it first determines, as a matter of law, that the Renewal Petition submitted by Petitioner did not, in fact, meet the requirements of Ed. Code § 47605.

Respondent argues that the Renewal Petition was non-compliant because Petitioner’s only operating site was in Corona, California, outside the boundaries of Respondent. (Demurrer, pp. 8:8-11, 10:11-15, 11:15-16, 12:4-6, 13:23-14:5.) It presents evidence, through its request for judicial notice, that Petitioner uses the address 1880 Compton Ave., Corona, California. (RFJN, Exs. 3-5.) However, this is insufficient to show Petitioner operates a charter school out of that location. Further, Plaintiff alleges in the Petition that it does not operate a school site or resource center outside Respondent’s boundaries. (Petition at ¶ 13.)

In addition, in the Renewal Petition, attached as exhibit B to the Petition, Petitioner states “SLA shall locate and operate within District boundaries as follows: Palo Verde Resource Center...” (Petition, Ex. A, p. 209.) Thus, accepting the allegations of the Petition as true, Petitioner has sufficiently pled that it submitted a valid Renewal Petition, and no hearing on that Renewal Petition was conducted. (Petition at ¶¶ 12, 13, 15.) The issue of whether the Renewal Petition actually complied with the Code requirements is a question of fact that cannot be determined on a demurrer. (See, Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 672.)

Therefore, for pleading purposes, Petitioner has sufficiently stated a cause of action for a writ of mandate.

B. 2nd Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief

Pursuant to C.C.P. §1060, any person under a written instrument who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an

action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights or duties. (Marina Development Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 435, 443.) To demonstrate entitlement to declaratory relief, a plaintiff must show that the action presents “two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.” (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546.)

Respondent’s sole objection to this cause of action is that the writ of mandate cause of action fails and this cause of action is derivative, so it fails as well. (Demurrer, p. 21:7-11.) As discussed above, the writ of mandate cause of action is sufficiently pled. Thus, the declaratory relief cause of action is sufficient, and the demurrer is overruled.

Ruling:

Grant the request for judicial notice. Overrule the demurrer.