Defendant CSCDA Community Improvement Authority (“CSCDA”) demurs to all causes of action in Plaintiffs’ Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to allege compliance with the claims presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act (Government Code §900 et seq.).

Under the Government Claims Act, “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a [local] public entity ... until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board ....” (Gov't Code § 945.4; see also Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation (9th Cir. 2002) 277 F.3d 1128, 1136, fn. 6.) A “local public entity” is defined as “a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State ....” (Gov't Code § 900.4.)

Here, it is not clear from the face of the Complaint whether CSCDA is a public agency. CSCDA therefore asks this Court to take judicial notice of the following:

1. The CSCDA COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY is a Public Entity under California’s Government Code §811.2, §945.4 and §6500. See Declaration of Kevin J. Price, Paragraph 3, and Exhibit A, thereto.

2. Exhibit A to the accompanying declaration of Kevin J. Price is a true and correct copy of the JOINT EXERCISE OF POWERS AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE CSCDA COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY. (Declaration of Kevin J. Price filed concurrently herewith, ¶ 3; Exhibit A thereto)

(ROA 45, RJN.)

Paragraph 3 of the declaration of Kevin J. Price states: “I am informed and believe and based thereon state that the CSCDA COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY is a Public Entity under California’s

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, §945.4 and §6500.”

Kevin J. Price is counsel of record for Defendants in this case. (Price Decl., ¶ 1.) He lays no foundation for the statement that CSCDA is a public entity, and is only able to make that declaration on information and belief.

Further, he lays no foundation for authentication of Exhibit A. He states that Exhibit A “is a true and correct copy of the document entitled “JOINT EXERCISE OF POWERS AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE CSCDA COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY” which I believe to be a true and correct copy of the document forming the public entity “CSCDA COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY” on or about October 15, 2020.” (Price Decl. ¶ 4.)

In sum, Price has not sufficiently authenticated Exhibit A, nor has he laid any foundation for his conclusion that CSCDA is a public entity within the meaning of the Government Claims Act.

Whether CSCDA is a public entity is a disputed ultimate fact in this case. Thus, it cannot be said that the Complaint is deficient for failure to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act.

Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED. CSCDA shall file its answer within 20 days.

Defendants’ requests for judicial notice are DENIED. The materials requested to be judicially noticed are not the proper subject of judicial notice.

Plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice are DENIED as immaterial to the resolution of this demurrer.

The Case Management Conference is continued to August 13, 2026 at 1:30 p.m.

CSCDA to give notice. 103 Club Speed, LLC vs. K1 Speed, Inc., 22-01241507 Defendants Outlier K1S Equity Holdings, LLC and David Tedesco (collectively, “Outlier Defendants”) demur to the third and fifth causes of action of plaintiff Club Speed, LLC’s (“Clubspeed” or “Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (FAC).

Intentional Interference with Contract Outlier Defendants argue this cause of action fails to allege sufficient facts because there are no specific actions alleged against them, Plaintiff improperly attempts to lump all defendants together, and the allegations are made on information and belief without including any information that led Plaintiff to believe the allegations to be true. Outlier Defendants further argue that in a proposed second amended complaint attached to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, which was withdrawn before being heard, Plaintiff fails to allege that they made any of the alleged false or disparaging statements to K1 franchisees.

The Court will not consider any allegations made in Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint, as they are irrelevant to whether the FAC properly states a claim.

“ ‘The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.’ ” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.)

The FAC alleges that Clubspeed and defendant K1 Speed, Inc. (“K1”) entered into software license agreements and a referral agreement pursuant to which K1 agreed that Clubspeed would be the exclusive partner for K1 and its software used at 29 current locations as well as all new locations. Plaintiff alleges that K1 breached the agreements by developing its own software. Plaintiff alleges that it had valid contracts with K1 franchisees, defendants knew of the existence of those contracts, and defendants, with the intent to interfere, caused a disruption of those contracts by directing the franchisees to switch to new software. As a result, Plaintiff alleges it has suffered damages in an amount not less than $300,000. These allegations are sufficient to establish each element of a cause of action for intentional interference.

The FAC understandably does not allege any specific facts against the Outlier Defendants, as they were added as Doe defendants after the FAC was filed. However, as Doe defendants, the Outlier Defendants are alleged to be legally responsible for the events and damages alleged in the FAC. (FAC ¶ 10.) Outlier Defendants offer no authority showing that these allegations against them as Doe defendants are insufficient as a matter of law.

Further, while Outlier Defendants are correct that allegations made on information and belief must be accompanied by information that leads the plaintiff to believe that the allegations are true, the Court finds that the facts alleged in the FAC taken as a whole provide such information.

Trade Libel Outlier Defendants argue that this cause of action fails to allege any publication for purposes of a trade libel or alleged false statements.