MARITI vs LSK PLASTIC SURGERY, INC., et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

25CV012275: MARITI vs LSK PLASTIC SURGERY, INC., et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena for Production of Records in Department 16D

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

****NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE.*****

Plaintiff in pro per’s notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Plaintiff is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise of Local Rule 1.06, the Court’s tentative ruling procedure, and the manner to request a hearing. If Plaintiff is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Plaintiff shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely, in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff in pro per Elena T. Mariti’s motion to quash subpoenas for production of records and for protective order is ruled on as follows.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s motion is procedurally improper. Plaintiff seeks to quash eleven individual subpoenas issued by two defendants through a single motion. “When simultaneously filing multiple discovery-related motions in the same case with the same hearing date, each motion shall be filed as a separate document and a separate filing fee paid for each. Parties may not combine motions pertaining to different types of discovery within the same document. Failure to comply with any part of this rule regarding discovery motions may, in the discretion of the Court, be grounds for the motions being dropped without consideration.” (Super.

Ct. Sac. County Local Rules, rule 2.31(E) [emphasis added].) As applied here, even if the subpoenas at issue had been identical as to the documents sought, Plaintiff should have filed at least two separate motions, one for each defendant given that subpoenas issued by entirety separately represented parties are “different types of discovery” as referenced in rule 2.31(E). In this instance, however, the Court in its discretion considers the motion (as opposed to dropping them) because both defendants filed an opposition and because each of the subpoenas seeks essentially the same information

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV012275: MARITI vs LSK PLASTIC SURGERY, INC., et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena for Production of Records in Department 16D

and can be ruled on in the same manner.

In this medical-malpractice case, Plaintiff asserts claims arising out of allegedly negligent surgery and follow-up care. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Liza S. Kim, M.D., and Michael Wong, M.D., along with four other named defendants, together acted negligently causing Plaintiff acute and ongoing physical and mental harm. (Compl., ¶¶ 12, 47, 48.)

Defendant Kim issued four subpoenas to non-party Stanford Healthcare and three subpoenas to co-Defendant Mercy General Hospital.[1] Defendant Wong issued three subpoenas to non-party Stanford Healthcare and one subpoena to co-Defendant LSK Plastic Surgery, Inc. While they include some variation, as relevant to this motion, all the subpoenas seek medical records broadly, demanding “any and all” records of appointments, treatments, charts, notes, reports, radiology/scans, costs and billing, etc., related to Plaintiff without limit as to subject matter or time period. (Mariti Amended Decl., Exhs. A & B.)

Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoenas, or in the alternative limit them, on the basis that the subpoenas are overly broad and violate Plaintiff’s right to privacy. (Not. of Mot., at p. 2:18–22.) Plaintiff also asks the Court to issue a protective order granting Plaintiff a “first look” at all records and to award Plaintiff expenses and sanctions. (Id. at p. 2:11–17.)

Defendants Kim and Wong separately oppose the motion, and both cite the broad right to discovery based on relevance. (Kim Opp., at p. 5:28–6:22; Wong Opp., at p. 6:17– 7:4.)[2] Defendant Kim acknowledges that privacy rights must be balanced against discovery but argues that the scope of the issues is broad in this case and the records are the only reliable source of information. (Kim Opp., at p. 10:8–11:22.) Defendant Kim also requests monetary sanctions for what she contends are Plaintiff’s obstructive and baseless tactics. (Id. at p. 12:10–24.)

Likewise, Defendant Wong recognizes the caselaw discussing privacy interests but argues he has a compelling interest in the subpoenaed records. (Wong Opp., at p. 7:13–8:19.)[3] Defendant Wong also requests monetary sanctions. (Id. at p. 12:11–27.)

Legal Standard

'[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) 'In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant's right to discovery is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV012275: MARITI vs LSK PLASTIC SURGERY, INC., et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena for Production of Records in Department 16D

broad ... [and] statutes governing discovery 'must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.' [Citation.]' (Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541; see also Greyhound Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 378 ['disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it'].) Nevertheless, while civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. (Bd. of Registered Nursing v. Super. Ct. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 [citing Calcor Space Facility v. Super. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223].) It cannot be based on pure speculation. (Digital Music News LLC v. Super. Ct. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 227.)

Where medical records are sought, the right to discovery must be balanced with a person’s right to privacy. The right to privacy provided for in the California Constitution, article 1, section 1, may be invoked by a litigant as justification for refusal to answer questions or respond to requests for information that unreasonably intrude on that right. A plaintiff asserting a privacy claim has the burden of establishing each element, specifically: 1. A legally protected privacy interest; 2. A reasonable expectation of privacy; and 3.

A serious invasion of the privacy interest. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35–37.) If a privacy right is established, the party seeking information may then raise legitimate countervailing interests that disclosure would serve, and the court must then balance the competing considerations. (Williams v. Super. Ct., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 553)

Discussion

Applying the Hill framework, Plaintiff has established a privacy interest. There is no doubt that a person has a legally protected privacy interest in their medical records.[4] (County of L.A. v. Super. Ct. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 641.) “These are matters of great sensitivity going to the core of the concerns for the privacy of information about an individual.” (Id. at pp. 641–642.)

Next, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their medical records. (County of L.A. v. Super. Ct., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 643.) State and federal law provide specific protections against the misuse or release of medical information. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 56, et seq.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3; 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 & 164 [HIPAA Privacy Rules].)

Finally, on their face as issued, Defendants’ subpoenas threaten a serious intrusion on privacy based on their nature, scope, and impact. The subpoenas seek “any and all” of Plaintiff’s medical records without any limitation by subject matter or time period. The nature of the information is highly sensitive; the demand is entirely boundless in scope; and as a result, the potential embarrassment and distress is real, even if the records are

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV012275: MARITI vs LSK PLASTIC SURGERY, INC., et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena for Production of Records in Department 16D

not publicly disclosed. (County of L.A., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 647.)

Not every invasion of privacy requires the party seeking discovery of private information to establish a compelling need. Rather, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams v. Super. Ct., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557.) The invasion here is obvious given the broad and entirely unlimited scope of the subpoenas.

At the same time, it is true that a plaintiff waives their privacy interests to some extent by filing a lawsuit and putting relevant claims at issue. (Britt v. Super. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 862–863 [discussing waiver of evidentiary privileges in the context of medical privacy]; Palay v. Super. Ct. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 919, 933–934 [disapproved by Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 557, fn. 8, but only to the extent the case assumed without conducting the Hill analysis that a compelling need is automatically required].)

The scope of waiver is narrowly construed to include only those conditions and injuries the litigant has necessarily put in issue by bringing the lawsuit. (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 863–864.) “[W]aiver extends only to information relating to the medical conditions in question, and does not automatically open all of a plaintiff’s past medical history to scrutiny.” (Id. at p. 849 [emphasis in original].) As applied here, there is no question that Plaintiff, by her own allegations, has effectively waived to an extent her privacy interests to some of her medical records.

Despite the scope of Plaintiff’s waiver of privacy by her allegations, Defendants by their subpoenas seek discovery of medical and billing records pertaining to any and all of plaintiff’s past medical history. However, Plaintiff did not waive privacy as to her entire medical record by filing this lawsuit. Nor have Defendants established otherwise. Plaintiff alleges pre-existing conditions (Compl., ¶¶ 15, 101) and injuries to various bodily systems and psychological trauma (Compl., ¶ 48). Plaintiff’s allegations of bodily harm are extensive, but they are also detailed and specific.

There is no evidence that every aspect of Plaintiff’s past medical history is implicated by her allegations. Further, while not dispositive of the motion, it appears that at least one third party has indicated that their production of records can be filtered “to match an agreed scope to comply with minimum necessary standards and privacy laws.” (Mariti Amended Decl., 2:23–24.)

The caselaw cited by Defendants supports Plaintiff’s position. In both Morales and Vinson, the court held that the plaintiffs had not put their entire medical or mental history into issue and thus the subpoenas threatened to violate plaintiffs’ privacy rights. (Vinson v. Super. Ct. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842–844; Morales v. Super. Ct. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 283, 288, 292.) Plaintiff does not argue that she need not provide any medical records. Plaintiff argues that some areas of her medical history are not at issue. The Court agrees. The subpoenas are overly broad as issued and must be quashed.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV012275: MARITI vs LSK PLASTIC SURGERY, INC., et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena for Production of Records in Department 16D

Even without the bright-line rule of Britt, the Court would find on balance that the subpoenas violate Plaintiff’s right of privacy without adequate justification. Defendants have a legitimate right to discover information needed to prepare their defense. (County of L.A. v. Super. Ct., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 653.) But Plaintiff’s interest is substantial and the threatened invasion is obvious. Defendants were required to demonstrate a compelling need for the substantial breadth of what they requested.

The standard of relevance does not adequately protect Plaintiff’s privacy interests. “Mere speculation as to the possibility that some portion of the records might be relevant to some substantive issue does not suffice.” (Davis v. Super. Ct. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017; Williams v. Super. Ct., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 556.) “In those situations where it is argued that a party waives protection by filing a lawsuit, the court must construe the concept of waiver narrowly and a compelling interest is demonstrated only where the material sought is directly relevant to the litigation.” (Tylo v. Super. Ct. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387 [emphasis added].)

It cannot be said that Defendants have a compelling interest in the entirety of the medical records requested in the subject subpoenas. Defendant Wong provides a summary showing of direct relevance entitling defendants to some records. (Wong Opp., at pp. 4–5.) But the actual subpoenas are not narrowly tailored to address any specific medical condition at issue in this action. Rather, Defendants requested all of Plaintiff’s medical records without limitation by subject matter or scope of time.

Disposition

The subpoenas as currently phrased are overbroad. While more narrowly tailored subpoenas may be appropriate, the Court will not undertake the task of defining what is appropriate as such is the task of counsel as informed by the meet-and-confer efforts with Plaintiff. As a result, the motion to quash is GRANTED, without prejudice to Defendants issuing appropriate and more narrowly tailored subpoenas.

Because the Court has granted Plaintiff’s motion to quash, the Court need not consider Plaintiff’s request for production under protective order or procedures.[5] However, the Court notes that both parties submitted evidence that Plaintiff and at least Defendant Kim’s counsel had made some progress on an agreed scope of discovery and general protective order. (Mariti Amended Decl., Exhs. C & D; Dickens Decl., Exhs. G–I, L–N, Y.) While not required by the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court strongly encourages the parties to continue to meet and confer regarding the appropriate scope of discovery and document-handling or protective procedures in advance of Defendants’ reissuance of subpoenas so as to avoid any future dispute and/or motions over these issues. The

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV012275: MARITI vs LSK PLASTIC SURGERY, INC., et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena for Production of Records in Department 16D

Court also notes that, since January 1, 2026, parties must attempt to meet and confer in person or by telephone or videoconference where there is a meet-and-confer requirement that must be met prior to filing a motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040, as amended by Stats. 2025, Ch. 200.)

Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is denied. The Court finds that the opposition was substantially justified and that the requirements of the subpoenas, though overly broad, were not oppressive. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2.) Defendants’ requests for sanctions are denied.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Defendant Kim voluntarily withdrew the three subpoenas issued to co-Defendant

Mercy General Hospital. (Dickens Decl., ¶ 4.a., Exh. F.) These subpoenas are no longer at issue. [2] Co-Defendant Dignity Health dba Mercy General Hospital filed a joinder to Defendant

Kim’s opposition. Dignity Health argues that the medical records are essential to preparing their defense. [3] Defendant Wong’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the Complaint is granted

for the purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (Johnson & Johnson v. Super. Ct. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not the truth of the statements contained therein].)) [4] In Reply, Plaintiff clarifies that the subpoenaed healthcare providers do not maintain

her psychiatric records. (Reply, at p. 5:10–20.) [5] It is not clear whether Plaintiff requests a protective order or “first look” procedure only

for the subpoenas at issue or generally for discovery throughout the litigation. (Not. of Mot., at p. 2:11–13.) If Plaintiff seeks a general protective order, that remedy is outside the scope of the instant motion to quash. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1; Super. Ct. Sac. County Local Rules, rule 2.31(E).) Plaintiff’s request for additional remedies in “Plaintiff’s Request for Continuance ” filed on December 12, 2025, is also outside the scope of this motion. (Minute Order, December 22, 2025.) Similarly, the additional remedies Plaintiff requests in her Reply filed on December 31, 2025, are not properly before the Court on this motion. It is improper to expand the scope of requested relief in a reply brief.