MALONE VS TEMECULA VALLEY HOSPITAL, INC.

1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MALONE VS MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE CVME2511189 TEMECULA VALLEY ORDER HOSPITAL, INC. Tentative Ruling:

The court is empowered to issue whatever order “justice requires to protect any party...against unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (CCP §2031.060(b).) The motion for protective order must be accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve the matter outside court. (Id. 2031.060(a).) The order may specify that “a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed, or be disclosed only to specified persons or only in a specified way.” (Id. § 2031.060(b)(5).)

The moving party has the burden to establish good cause. (Fairmont Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) This requires a showing of factual specificity demonstrating that a protective order is necessary. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318.) Conclusory statements are insufficient. (Ibid.)

A trade secret “means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (Civil Code §3426.1.) The party asserting trade-secret objections has the burden to establish their existence. (Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1390.)

In its motion, Defendant focuses on protecting its “sensitive commercial information, including contractual terms, pricing arrangements, and operational structures that are not publicly available.” Plaintiffs argue the motion is untimely and that Defendant fails to show good cause.

Timeliness

As to timeliness, the statue requires that a party “promptly” seek a protective order.” (CCP §2031.060(a).) Here, the record reflects that Defendant first raised the protective order arguments in its initial written responses served on 1/20/26. The parties then engaged in various meet-and-confer efforts before filing this instant motion on 4/2/26. (Siegel Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) The Court does not bar the motion as untimely.

Good Cause

As to good cause, Defendant’s showing is deficient. In support, Defendant relies on the declaration of its counsel, David Goldstein, to assert that the Administrative Services Agreement, Business Associate Agreement, and related documents contain proprietary

business information. (Goldstein Decl., ¶ 3.) Specifically, it states the documents at dispute “contain confidential and proprietary commercial information, including terms governing [Defendant]’s proprietary business information, operational structures, and financial arrangements.” (Ibid.) It also states “[u]pon information and belief, [Defendant] has maintained the confidentiality of these materials in the ordinary course of business.” (Ibid.) This is insufficient. The declaration offers no specific facts to show disclosure would result in a particularized injury. Conclusory statements that the agreements are confidential or proprietary are insufficient to justify withholding production. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 318.)

In its reply, Defendant argues for the first time that the agreements themselves contain confidentiality clauses. This, however, is not a basis for finding good cause. Plaintiffs’ claims rely on an alter ego theory. As such, information relating to governance, control, operational policies, and business relationships between the parties are relevant to Plaintiffs’ liability theories.

Defendant has not shown good cause for the protective order it seeks. The declaration of counsel is insufficient to show a protectable interest or an injury.

The motion is denied.

If a timely request for oral argument is made by no later than 4:30 p.m. on June 10, 2026, oral argument will be heard on June 11, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. (not 8:30 a.m.).

2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME KOO VS HYUNDAI CVRI2404070 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES MOTOR AMERICA Tentative Ruling:

There is no dispute Plaintiff is designated as the prevailing party under the § 998 Offer Plaintiffs accepted on 11/5/25. (Dec.Azemoon ¶ 12, Ex. “H”, § 998 Offer, p. 364 of 417.) Under Civil Code §1794(d), “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under [the Song-Beverly Act], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Thus, the only question to be determined is the amount of the award to Plaintiff.

The matter of reasonableness of a party’s attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Co. (1989) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1062.) Fee motions should be based on detailed time records. (Crespin v. Shewry (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) The records should detail crucial information such as the types of issues involved, services performed, numbers of hours, billing rates, etc. (Martino v.