GARCIAMEZA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

25CV005229: GARCIAMEZA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff Mistica Garciameza’s motion for attorneys’ fee is ruled upon as follows.

In this Song-Beverly Lemon Consumer Warranty action, related to Plaintiff’s 2024 GMC Sierra Denali the parties reached a settlement whereby Defendant General Motors, LLC agreed to pay Plaintiff $138,500. The parties agreed that Plaintiff was the prevailing party and that Plaintiff’s attorney fees, costs and expenses pursuant to Civil Code § 1794(d) were to be determined by noticed motion.

Plaintiff seeks $21,466.67 which represents: (1) $15,882.50 in fees (2) a 0.3 multiplier enhancement in the amount of $4,764.75; and (3) $819.42 in costs.

Civil Code § 1794(d) provides that a prevailing buyer is entitled to recover “costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” The Act is a “strongly pro-consumer” law, whose remedies are in addition to those available to consumers under other laws, particularly the Unfair Competition Law. (Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 990) It “is manifestly a remedial measure, intended for the protection of the consumer; it should be given a construction calculated to bring its benefits into action.” (Id.)

In keeping with the remedial purposes of the law, the Act mandates that prevailing buyers recover costs and attorney fees “based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794(d).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV005229: GARCIAMEZA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

The parties have already agreed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

The $15,882.50 in claimed fees represents 39.5 hours of work by two attorneys and one paralegal worked with billing rates ranging from $525/hr to $250/hr. (Acosta Decl. ¶ 27; Exh. A.) Attorney Acosta has attached the billing records showing the various hours spent by the attorneys and the asks performed by each. These tasks involved drafting the complaint, preparing and reviewing initial disclosure, preparing for and attending mediation, and reviewing Defendant’s CCP § 998 offer and negotiating a settlement. (Id.) Defendant opposes the motion on the basis that Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates should be reduced, that the lodestar should be reduced, and that no multiplier is warranted.

As discussed below, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates must be reduced and that the requested hours must also be reduced. Further, no multiplier will be awarded.

The general standards and authorities guiding the Court’s consideration of this motion are well-established, and will receive summary recitation here. The “fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the 'lodestar,' i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “It is not necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an award of attorney’s fees under the lodestar method. Declarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked, and the tasks performed are sufficient.” (Conception v.

Amscam (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324.) The appropriate hourly rate used to arrive at the lodestar is measured by “the prevailing billing rates of comparable private attorneys as the 'touchstone' for determination of that value” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 621, 643; see Ketchum v. Moses (2002) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) California “appellate courts have unanimously concluded the lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees is appropriate” in awarding attorney fees under the Song-Beverly Act. (Reynolds v.

Ford Motor Co. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1111.) “A trial court assessing attorney fees using the lodestar adjustment method ‘begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the “careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.”’ [Citations.]” (Reynolds, supra, at p. 1112; see also, id. at p. 1113 [“[T]he trial court is . . . tasked under section 1794 . . . with calculating attorney fees based on actual hours expended that were reasonably incurred for the particular litigation.”]; accord Mikhaeilpoor v.

BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ‘ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.’ [Citation.]”].) “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV005229: GARCIAMEZA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34.)

The reasonable market value of the attorney's services is the measure of the reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094.) The lodestar rate should reflect rates charged in the 'community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.' (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) The trial court 'possesses personal expertise in the value of the legal services rendered in the case before it.' (Russell v. Foglio (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 653, 661.) The “trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” (Ketchum, supra, at p. 1132; accord PLCM Group, (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.)

The Court then determines whether the lodestar should be enhanced or decreased by a “multiplier,” based on factors such as “'(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]' [Citation.]” (Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1216.) “'There is no hard-and-fast rule limiting the factors that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to increase or decrease a lodestar calculation.' [Citation.] There are numerous such factors, and their evaluation is entrusted to a trial court's sound discretion; any one of those factors may be responsible for enhancing or reducing the lodestar.” (Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 924, 947.)

“Reasonable hourly compensation is based on ‘prevailing hourly rates’ in the community, thereby ‘anchoring the calculation’ to an objective standard. [Citation.]” (Reynolds at p. 1112.) However, “[i]n making its calculation of a reasonable hourly rate, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (Morris at p. 41 [citations omitted].)

Hourly Rates

Plaintiff requests the following hourly rates for its counsel and paralegal:

• Christopher Urner: $525/hour

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV005229: GARCIAMEZA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

• Jorge Acosta: $450/hour • Mary Zazueta (paralegal): $250/hour

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are unreasonably high and not reflective of the prevailing rates in the community which as noted above, is the appropriate rate. (Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at 783.) To that end, Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration discussing the reasonableness of rates focuses on findings made in other trial courts, mainly in Southern California. (Acosta Decl. ¶¶ 19- 20.) However, that is not the relevant community. Attorney Acosta also relies up the Laffey Matrix rates and a survey of consumer attorney fees. This matter was litigated in Sacramento, and therefore Sacramento is the appropriate market to determine the hourly rate. This case is a Lemon Law action, with no distinguishing characteristics that would support rates higher than market rates.

Based on the Court’s experience and its familiarity with Lemon Law cases, it finds that the requested rates are somewhat high for this community. The Court therefore finds the following rates are reasonable:

• Christopher Urner: $475/hour • Jorge Acosta: $400/hour • Mary Zazueta (paralegal): $200/hour

Hours

Plaintiffs seek the following hours:

• Christopher Urner: 7.3 hours • Jorge Acosta: 20 hours • Mary Zazueta (paralegal): 12.2 hours

“A trial court may not rubberstamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) A trial court ruling on a fees motion is not required to specifically set forth “each charge they find to be reasonable or unreasonable, necessary, or unnecessary A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case.” (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 250.) A fee award should “ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent,” including those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.) However, “‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 1000 [citations omitted])

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV005229: GARCIAMEZA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

The Song-Beverly Act “‘requires the trial court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. These circumstances may include, but are not limited to, factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved. If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.

A prevailing buyer has the burden of “showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’”’” (Etcheson v. FCA US LLC (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 831, 840 [citations omitted].)

In a Lemon Law case that proceeded to trial, the Court of Appeal determined that a trial court’s reduction of a fee award to 28% of the requested amount was appropriate given the “relative simplicity of the plaintiff’s lawsuit and the inefficiency of her counsel’s litigation activities.” (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 255.) The Court of Appeal found as follows: “Additionally, the record demonstrates the highly inefficient manner in which plaintiff litigated her case. Plaintiff's trial counsel claims ‘extensive experience with claims brought under the Song-Beverly [Act].’ Payam Shahian, the senior attorney among plaintiff's trial counsel, supervises the other attorneys in his firm, but does not ‘materially’ get involved ‘unless they involve complex legal issues, reach significant stages of litigation, or require [his] assistance.’ (Italics added.)

Shahian did not bill time to this case, confirming the case did not involve complex legal issues. Yet, despite counsel's experience litigating ‘hundreds of automotive defect cases involving California's consumer protection statutes, including Song-Beverly,’ an astonishing array of 10 different attorneys litigated this case, with multiple attorneys staffed at different times. Further, counsel's billing entries demonstrate a lack of efficiency in litigating the case and a lack of clarity in tasks performed.

This evidence supports the trial court's finding that plaintiff's counsel failed to act efficiently.” (Id. at 255-256 [emphasis in original].)

Defendant contends that there was duplicative and excessive billing. Defendant’s counsel indicates the billing entries which it contends represents time that should not be compensated. (Rodriguez Decl. Exh. B.) The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s billing entries in their entirety and as in Mikhaelipoor, the Court here also finds that Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing entries reflect a “lack of efficiency.” As previously stated, “it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.) The

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV005229: GARCIAMEZA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

Court notes that many of the billing entries are vague and contain notations such as “review and analyze”, and more. In addition, many of the entries by the different individual appear to indicate a level of duplication. The record demonstrates a level of inefficiency and duplicity of efforts. “An attorney fee award should include compensation for all hours reasonably spent[, which] means padding in the form of inefficient . . . efforts is not subject to compensation.” (Rey v. Madera Unified Sch.

Dist., (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1243-1244 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). 'To the extent a trial court is concerned that a particular award is excessive, it has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether.' (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal. 4th at 1138.) The Court will not conduct a linebyline analysis of the billing records in this ruling but simply notes that the 39.5 hours are excessive.

Based on the Court’s review of the records and its own familiarity with this case and cases of this nature, the Court finds that the following hours are reasonable.

• Christopher Urner: 5 hours at $475/hour ($2,375) • Jorge Acosta: 15 hours at $400/hour ($6,000) • Mary Zazueta: 8 hours at $200/hour ($1,600)

The total hours amount to 28 hours reduced from the 39.5 requested by Plaintiff for an award of fees in the amount of $9,975.

The Court will not award a multiplier of 0.3 as requested by Plaintiff. Indeed, to obtain a multiplier, Plaintiff must show that the totality of the following factors favors a multiplier: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (2) the skill displayed in presenting them; (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Graham v. Daimler Chrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579.) Plaintiff’s counsel argues that they obtained an “excellent recovery” and that the risks imposed by this case were substantial because counsel took the case on a contingency.

Plaintiff does not discuss the novelty and difficulty of any issue in this case or the extent to which this case precluded other employment. The Court finds no basis in the record to justify any multiplier. As already discussed above this is a garden variety lemon law case, with no unusual facts, no novel legal issues, which is not complex, and did not require exceptional skill so as to warrant application of a multiplier.

Additionally, the Court will allow Plaintiff an additional $1,600 (4 hours at $400/hour) for Plaintiff’s counsel’s time reviewing the opposition and drafting the reply. This brings the fee award to $11,575.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV005229: GARCIAMEZA vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

Finally, the Court will award Plaintiff $819.42 in costs which Defendant did not object to.

In sum, Plaintiff is awarded $12,394.42 in fees and costs ($11,575 fees + $819.42 costs).

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to notify Defendant’s counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing, via Zoom or by telephone, in the event Defendant’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Plaintiff shall prepare an order for the Court’s signature pursuant to CRC 3.1312.