Barboza, Jesus vs. General Motors LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company

Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Barboza, Jesus vs. General Motors LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company Case No.: VCU319184 Date: June 4, 2026 Time: 8:30 A.M. Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias Motion: Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees Tentative Ruling: To award a total of $9,568.04 consisting of $6,930 in fees and $2,638.04 in costs.

Facts In this matter, Plaintiff alleges the purchase of a 2022 GMC Sierra which developed substantial engine and electrical defects. The parties resolved this matter for $71,000 without return of the Subject Vehicle. The cash price of the Subject Vehicle was $64,964.55. On March 19, 2026, a conditional notice of settlement was filed.

On April 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for recovery of attorneys' fees and costs seeking a total of $23,728.04 consisting of $17,575.00 in fees plus a 1.20 multiplier and $2,638.04 in litigation costs. In opposition, Defendant argues the rates are too high for Tulare County, that no multiplier is properly awarded here, has challenged specific entries or groups of entries and seeks to tax or strike some of the costs sought by Plaintiff, as detailed below.

Authority and Analysis Lodestar Calculation "A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the 'careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case." (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)

"The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work." (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

"Under that [lodestar]method, the court 'tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.' (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)" (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5 th at 285.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover 32.5 hours at rates ranging from $600 to $550 per hour.

Reasonable Local Rate "The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the 'reasonable hourly rate,' i.e., the rate 'prevailing in the community for similar work.' (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)" (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5 th at 285.)

"The general rule is '[t]he relevant "community" is that where the court is located.' (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)" (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5 th at 285.)

"The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work." (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

"The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court." (Id.) Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

There is no evidence provided that the rates of $600 to $550 for counsel are the prevailing rates in Tulare County, where this Court resides. This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $350.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended Plaintiff's counsel's records indicate 32.5 hours incurred on this matter. Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.)

"Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid. Code, Sec. 702, subd. (a) ['the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter'].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice." (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.)

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney's submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397--verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, "then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount." (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104]; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court "has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether"].)

Here, Defendant specifically challenges the following entries:

Client Intake--March 4, 2025: Here, Defendant challenges the 1.3 hours incurred as to intake costs, all of which were incurred prior to the filing of the complaint. The Court agrees that pre-litigation case evaluation and intake are ordinary costs of doing business and are not recoverable under Civil Code section 1794(d), providing for fees "in connection with the commencement and prosecution" of the action. As such, the Court will deduct 1.3 hours as to Attorney Whelan (-1.3 hours as to Whelan.)

Templated Complaint--March 12, 2025: Here, Defendant challenges the review and drafting of a complaint Defendant notes is a template used in other cases against Defendant and other manufacturers. The Court will reduce the entry by.5 hours (-0.5 as to Whelan.)

Time Preparing for and Attending CMC Hearing--July 16, 2025: Here GM challenges the 1.5 hours entered as to preparation for and attendance at the CMC hearing. The Court does not find this entry unreasonable and will not reduce the hours here.

Review of GM's Initial Disclosures--August 6, 2025: Here, GM seeks to strike the 1.6 hours of the 2.1 entered as to review of initial disclosures, arguing that GM's disclosures are mandated by law and do not differ from case to case. However, a review of Code of Civil Procedure section 871.6(h), as to GM's disclosures, indicates that unique, vehicle specific information is required to be disclosed. The Court will not reduce this entry.

Drafting Initial Disclosures and Deposition Notice of GM's PMQ--August 6, 2025, August 26, 2025: Defendant challenges the 1.2 hours billed as to drafting these documents, noting the disclosures appear generic and the deposition notice is templated. The Court agrees and will reduce the entries by a total of.7 hours (-.7 as to Whelan.)

Duplicative Review of GM's Document Production--October 22, 2025: Here, Defendant notes an additional 1.6 hours to review and analyze document production and deposition exhibits, including selection of exhibits. Further, a different attorney appears to have conducted the deposition. The Court agrees and will reduce this entry by 1.6 hours (-1.6 as to Valitskaya.)

Time Billed Attending Deposition of GM's PMK--October 24, 2025: Here GM states the actual deposition took one hour, but the billing entry reflects 2.2 hours. The Court does not find a reduction warranted on this basis.

Administrative, Clerical Tasks, and Templated and Boilerplate Form Pleadings Billed at Attorney Rates--April 14, July 1, 8, 14, 16, 18 & 29, September 25, 26, October 8, 21, December 4, 2025: Here, GM argues 1.7 hours of the work billed appears to be "ministerial, non-legal activities that should be handled by support staff or absorbed as overhead" including "reviewing conformed copies of the complaint, [c]onfirm jury fees have been accepted by the court," proof of service, "[r]eview trial countdown," and "provide instructions to paralegal re documents." The Court agrees and will reduce Attorney Valitskaya by 1 hour and Attorney Whelan by.7 hours as requested. (-1 as to Valitskaya; -.7 as to Whelan.)

Time Spent on Client Communications and Document Review (throughout): Here, GM indicates 2.3 total hours billed as to client communication and document review, arguing these entries are redundant and seeking a reduction of 1.3 hours. The Court, however, without exact dates, cannot compare whether these entries are duplicative. Therefore, the Court will not make a deduction here.

Time for Fee Motion--April 7, 2026 & Anticipated: Here, GM challenges the 2.8 hours incurred as to drafting this motion and the additional 7 anticipated hours. The Court will not award anticipated hours, but will not reduce the 2.8 hours incurred drafting this motion. Therefore, the Court will permit a total of 19.8 hours.

Multiplier As to the 0.20 enhancement sought by Plaintiff, such an award is based on the following factors: The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; The skill displayed in presenting them; The extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorney; and The contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The Court finds Plaintiff's justification for the multiplier is conclusory and does not set forth an adequate basis to award an enhancement. The Court does not find that the work cited demonstrates such extraordinary skill to justify an enhancement to the award sought. This case settled before trial, and the Court finds that this appears to be a standard Song-Beverly case, with no additional novelty or difficulty of issues evidenced from the supporting papers filed by Plaintiff.

As to the third factor, the Court does not find that Plaintiff's counsel was precluded from accepting other work.

As to the fourth factor, The Court further agree that the "contingent risk" here was minimal given the mandated fee-shifting of attorneys' fees and costs. (Ketchum v. Jones (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-42 [Where attorney fees are mandatory, the "contingent" risk of "establishing eligibility for the award" is not actually contingent and does not warrant an enhancement.].) The Court will not award an enhancement in this case.

Costs As to the $2,638.04 sought in costs, the Court notes an exhibit to the declaration of counsel as to an unfiled memorandum of costs. First, Defendant challenges the jury fees of $150. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5 provides in relevant part as follows: "(a) The following items are allowable as costs under Section 1032: (1) Filing, motion, and jury fees." Therefore, the Court will not strike this cost.

Next, Defendant challenges the deposition costs stated in the amount of $1,590.10. Defendant argues notes Plaintiff has not provided an invoice or other documentation which itemizes this cost and therefore it cannot determine if these are permitted deposition costs. California Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1033.5(a)(3) expressly states that costs are allowable for: "taking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions, including an original and one copy of those taken by the claimant and one copy of depositions taken by the party against whom costs are allowed." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5(a)(3)) (emphasis added.)

"A prevailing party is entitled to the reasonable cost of taking depositions unless it appears that the taking of the depositions was unnecessary." (Ceranski v. Muensch (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 751, 755). "Travel expenses to attend depositions" are also recoverable. (Code. Civ. Proc. Sec.Sec. 1033.5(a)(3)(A)-(B).) "Determination of whether a cost is reasonable is within the trial court's discretion." (Thon v. Thompson (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1548.)

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.) Here, the Court finds the $1,590.10 a reasonable cost as to the taking, recording and transcribing of the deposition of GM's PMQ. Therefore, the Court will not tax this category.

Finally, Defendant challenges the cost sought in the "Other" category consisting of $266.67 in "mediation costs." Again, Defendant notes Plaintiff has not provided an invoice or other documentation which itemizes this cost. However, the Court notes "...the verified Memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred" and the burden rests with the party seeking to tax costs to show they were improper, unreasonable or unnecessary. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-856.) The Court does not find these costs improper, unreasonable or unnecessary in this matter and will deny the motion to tax or strike these costs. Therefore, the Court will award $2,638.04 in costs as requested.

Conclusion

Therefore, the Court awards a total of $9,568.04 consisting of $6,930 in fees and $2,638.04 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Rideout, Jazzmin vs. First Pitch Entertainment, LLC et al Case No.: VCU329435 Date: May 14, 2026 Time: 8:30 A.M. Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias Motion: Plaintiff's Motion to Lift Stay of Proceedings Pending Appeal Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, exclusive of all matters wherein the statutory stay under CCP 916 applies.

Plaintiff Jazzmin Rideout moves to lift the stay of this matter, which was ordered incident to Rideout's appeal of this court's order denying her prior motion to enjoin defendant First Pitch Entertainment, LLC, from further contact with putative class members, and for set aside of prior settlements with putative class members (and for sanctions).

Both parties cite Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a), which states, in pertinent part and subject to exceptions not relevant here, "the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the ... order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby..., but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the ... order."

Rideout's motion, ultimately, calls for a narrow determination: That there is no stay in this case broader or different in scope than that arising automatically under section 916. Insofar as that narrow determination is called for, it is appropriate to make it here.

Both parties observe that the only sound legal basis for a stay in this case incident to Rideout's appeal is the automatic stay arising under 916. Accordingly, the court finds Rideout's motion should be granted so that the court's prior stay order is not interpreted to create continuing uncertainty as to the scope of matters stayed by the perfecting of Rideout's appeal.

The court does not purport, here, to decide what matters may or may not properly proceed incident to the automatic stay in effect under section 916; it merely confirms that section 916 defines the entirety of any stay now in effect incident to Rideout's appeal.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Arreola Rodriguez, Jorge vs. Ford Motor Company, a Delaware Corporation et al Case No.: VCU329584 Date: June 4, 2026 Time: 8:30 A.M. Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias Motion: Motion for Sanctions Tentative Ruling: To find the motion to compel the disclosures moot by the April 28, 2026 disclosures by Defendant; to deny the motion as to the request for sanctions.

Facts On December 23, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Act.