Petitioner Dorotea Vidovic’s Petition for Relief 945.4; 946.6
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2:00 PM LINE: 6 26-CIV-01306 DOROTEA VIDOVIC VS. SEQUOIA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT
DOROTEA VIDOVIC PRO SE SEQUOIA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT MIKA J. FRISK
PETITIONER DOROTEA VIDOVIC’S PETITION FOR RELIEF 945.4; 946.6
TENTATIVE RULING:
For the reasons stated below, Petitioner Dorotea Vidovic’s Petition for Relief from Claim Presentation Requirement is GRANTED pursuant to Government Code section 946.6.
Petitioner’s late-filed Supplemental Declaration/Corrected Supplemental Declaration has not been considered.
ACCRUAL DATE OF PETITIONER’S CLAIMS
Respondent asserts that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear this Petition because Petitioner did not present a request for leave to present a late claim within one year of accrual of the claim. Petitioner argues that the accrual date is reasonably disputed and that the 2015 denial of a promotion does not control the accrual date because her claim involves harm to her employment and compensation that continued beyond that date.
In support of this position, Petitioner relies on the continuous accrual doctrine, which was applied in Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 805. There, the court addressed whether a FEHA cause of action for discriminatory disability retirement benefits accrued only at the time of the initial grant of retirement benefits—which occurred well outside the one-year window—or whether each subsequent monthly payment constituted a new, independently actionable wrong. The court held that “an unlawful event occurred each time plaintiff received a discriminatory payment, such that a new limitations period applies to each allegedly discriminatory check.” (Id. at p. 813.)
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the language of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (a), which makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee “in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” reasoning that discrimination in compensation logically occurs when the employer pays the allegedly discriminatory amount, not only when the underlying policy is adopted or the initial decision is made. (
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This doctrine applies to Petitioner’s claim at least to the extent it encompasses pay inequities that fall within the one-year statutory window prescribed by Government Code section 911.4, subdivision (b). The Court therefore has jurisdiction to consider the Petition and need not now reach whether, to the extent Petitioner seeks to recover for discriminatory conduct or pay reductions that occurred before the one-year window, her claim meets the more rigorous requirements of the continuing violation doctrine under Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798. That doctrine would require proof that the alleged discriminatory compensation
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acts were similar in kind, recurred frequently, and had not yet become permanent in the sense that informal resolution was foreclosed.
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
Under California’s Government Claims Act, a claimant who has missed the deadline to present a timely claim to a public entity may petition the superior court for relief from the claim presentation requirement. The governing statute is Government Code section 946.6. The court must grant the petition if the petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a late-claim application was timely filed with the public entity under section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied under section 911.6; and (2) at least one enumerated statutory ground for relief is satisfied, including that the failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Gov.
Code, § 946.6; Lincoln Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1079, 1089.) “Excusable neglect is ‘that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.’” (Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476.)
“Government Code section 946.6 is a remedial statute intended to provide relief from technical rules which otherwise provide a trap for the unwary. The remedial policy underlying the statute is that wherever possible cases should be heard on their merits. Thus, a denial of such relief by the trial court is examined more rigorously than where relief is granted and any doubts which may exist should be resolved in favor of the application. [Citations.]” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1778.)
Petitioner has established that a late-claim application was timely filed and deemed denied. (Pet., at p. 2:24- 28; Exhs. B, C.)
Petitioner asserts that her failure to present the claim was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect based on her “reasonable reliance on ongoing administrative processes and the evolving and continuing nature of Respondent’s conduct and resulting harm.” (Pet., at p. 3:4-8; Exh. D.) Petitioner’s Exhibit D is her November 24, 2025 email entitled “Recipients Response to District Letter Regarding Application for Leave to Present Late Claim,” which states, in relevant part:
My claim concerns the District’s failure to promote me timely, the limitation of retroactive compensation to one year instead of three, and resulting ongoing pay inequities, all of which continued to affect me through recent pay periods. Under California’s continuing violation and continuing accrual doctrines, as well as the “each paycheck” rule applied to pay inequity claims, the harm did not accrue in 2019; it continued into the present, including within the one-year period preceding the filing of my claim and the late claim application.
Additionally, the timeline was materially affected by ongoing administrative proceedings, including matters before the California Civil Rights Department (CRD), the California Department of Education (CDE), and the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). These simultaneous and overlapping processes reasonably impacted the timing of the Government Claim filing and constitute excusable neglect under Government Code section 911.6.
(Id.)
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Respondent’s position is that Petitioner has not demonstrated diligence in pursuing her claims. Petitioner argues that she reasonably believed the administrative process she pursued through the California Civil Rights Department regarding the same underlying employment issues, which concluded on August 8, 2025, with a Right-to-Sue notice, should conclude before she initiated litigation. (Reply, at p. 2:10-12; Exh. E.) Petitioner’s pursuit of an administrative remedy during the claims-filing period demonstrates that she was taking action aimed at resolving the issues raised in her claim and constitutes sufficient diligence to support relief from the claim presentation requirement.
Respondent further argues that Petitioner has not demonstrated facts showing that she acted reasonably under the circumstances in failing to timely file a government claim. The central question is whether Petitioner’s failure to timely file a claim, in the context of her understanding that the other administrative processes she was pursuing should be concluded before filing a claim, satisfies the standard of conduct expected of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. This is not an instance of pure ignorance of the claim requirement, nor is it an instance in which Petitioner failed to take any action during the presentation period.
Rather, Petitioner mistakenly believed that separate administrative remedies pertaining to the same underlying issues affected the claim presentation period. Construing the remedial statute liberally, and resolving doubts in favor of resolution on the merits, Petitioner has established excusable neglect entitling her to relief. (See Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 1767.)
Respondent has not demonstrated that it will be prejudiced by the granting of Petitioner’s requested relief such that the delay has materially impaired its ability to defend itself against the claim.
The Petition is accordingly GRANTED.
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, Petitioner shall prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.