PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

*** The Court finds in its file no proof of service demonstrating moving defendant’s service of the Notice of Disclosure issued on 5/27/2026, despite being directed to serve all other parties with the Notice of Disclosure “forthwith.” Moving defendant is directed to serve the Notice of Disclosure on all other parties forthwith and to file proof of service within five (5) court days. ***

The notice of demurrer does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Defendant Grandcare, Inc. dba Mountain Manor Senior Residence’s (“Grandcare”) demurrer to the First Amended Complaint (“1AC”) is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel which of the causes of action challenged by this demurrer that will be addressed at the hearing. Counsel are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Factual Background

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Plaintiffs commenced this action on 2/28/2024, filing a complaint for “Medical Malpractice and Personal Injury.” On 12/31/2025, plaintiffs filed the operative 1AC which purports to allege against defendant Grandcare and defendant County of Sacramento causes of action for Elder Neglect/Abuse, Negligence/Negligence Per Se; Violation of Patient’s Bill of Rights; Unfair Business Practices; Fraud/Misrepresentation; and Medical Malpractice/Wrongful Death. According to plaintiffs, this case arises from “the custodial abuse and neglect of a highly vulnerable elder” by defendant Grandcare “which knowingly admitted and retained a cognitively impaired resident who had a documented history of combative behavior” and then “failed to implement basic safeguards,” resulting “in a physical altercation that caused immediate harm” while in Grandcare’s custody.

According to plaintiffs, the elder was subsequently arrested for the altercation and suffered an injury while held in county jail, contributing to his death several months later.

Defendant Grandcare now demurs to each of the 1AC’s six (6) causes of action on the ground they fail to plead sufficient facts. In brief, defendant contends that each cause of action fails as a matter of law because “[t]here are no allegations that Decedent was in any [sic] abused while a patient at Mountain Manor or suffered any injury at the facility;” “[n]o grounds are stated which would entitle Plaintiff to full restitution of any sums paid to Defendant for Decedent’s residency;” “[f]raud is not pleaded with the required specificity;” and “according to the allegations, Decedent’s death was caused by the acts or omissions of the County of Sacramento and/or the medical professionals who treated him for his spinal injuries incurred while in the exclusive custody and control of the County.” (Dem., p.4:17-28.)

Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that the 1AC contains sufficient allegations to satisfy the pleading standard with respect to each cause of action.

Legal Standards for Demurrer

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, raising issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. §§422.10, 589.) A demurrer may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) However, the face of the complaint includes facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) A demurrer can be utilized where a complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (Myers) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. Matters which may be judicially noticed may also be considered. The complaint is to be given a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Farmers v. Zerin (1997) 53 CaI.App.4th 445, 451.) Consideration of extrinsic evidence or facts asserted in the memorandum supporting or opposing the demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Still, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action. (See, e.g. Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031; Sui v. Price (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 933, 938.) The allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43–44.)

A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Finally, a demurrer may only be sustained where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Discussion

Elder Neglect/Abuse. Defendant Grandcare contends there are no allegations that (1) it “denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet” the decedent’s “basic needs” with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall him; and/or (2) the decedent suffered physical harm, pain or mental suffering while under the care of defendant Grandcare. (Dem., p.7:5-9.) Instead, this cause of action alleges that the decedent assaulted another patient, was arrested, and suffered an injury while held in jail. (Id., at p.7:9-11.) Additionally, defendant Grandcare asserts that there are no allegations that (1) it abused the decedent while he was at the care facility; or (2) any of its officers, directors or managing agents was involved in the abuse, authorized or ratified the abuse, or even hired the person who committed the abuse. (Id., at p.7:11-

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

14.) As will now be shown, none of these contentions has merit and thus, the demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

The 1AC currently alleges the following:

38. The decedent was “dependent upon the Defendants for his care, comfort, and safety because he could not provide it himself due to physical infirmities, metal [sic] conditions, and advanced age.” 39. “Defendants agreed to and were obligated to provide ‘care or services’ to [the decedent] [and] entered into a caretaking/custodial relationship with [him] and assumed responsibility for his health and safety and for attending to his basic needs because he was incapable of managing his basic needs without assistance.”

41. “Defendants owed a duty to [the decedent] to ensure that he received basic custodial and necessary care, and a safe environment that was free from physical abuse and neglect.” 42. “Defendants breached the duties owed to [the decedent] and neglected him while he resided at Defendants’ facility by failing to properly assess, supervise, and safely manage him despite his known cognitive and behavioral impairments. Defendants failed to ensure that [the decedent] received the supervision, monitoring, and behavioral management necessary to protect him and others from foreseeable harm. [The decedent] was a 75-year-old man suffering from dementia, including Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia, and associated cognitive impairments affecting judgment and impulse control, rendering him dependent upon Defendants for appropriate supervision and care. ” 43.

The decedent’s “admitting history and physical notes that he was admitted to an acute care hospital on February 12, 2023, for being combative with other residents at a care facility. Thus, Defendants knew of [the decedent’s] combative behavior but chose to admit him to their facility anyway despite the fact that Defendants’ facility was not equipped or able to care for residents with aggressive behaviors. ” 44. The decedent “continued with his aggressive behaviors after he was admitted to Defendants’ facility with at least three episodes of agitation between March 3, 2023, and March 4, 2023.

Defendants did not notify [the decedent’s] physician or the facility’s medical director about [these] agitated behaviors so no interventions were or could have been put into place to prevent [such] behaviors. 45. “ [T]he day before the subject assault and battery, [the decedent] was observed yelling at staff, roaming the halls, and being

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

verbally abusive to staff, residents and visitors to Defendants’ facility. .” 46. “In the morning hours of March 7, 2023, [the decedent], who remained completely unsupervised, walked to his roommate’s bedside and repeatedly struck [his roommate] and caus[ed] injuries to [the roommate] This battery was caused by Defendants’ negligence [sic], including their failure to adequately assess, care plan, staff, supervise, and monitor [the decedent] and the resident population under their care. As a further result of Defendants’ actions, [the decedent] was arrested following the March 7, 2023, battery.

While in the Sacramento County Jail, [the decedent] fell out of a bunk bed on or about March 24, 2023, resulting in spinal fractures. [The decedent] required emergency spinal surgery and subsequently suffered severe complications As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, [the decedent] suffered severe injuries and damages, including but not limited to spinal fractures requiring surgical repair, post-surgical infections, additional invasive procedures, physical pain and suffering, emotional distress, and medical complications. 47. “As a result, Defendants and all of them, ‘neglected’ [the decedent] when Defendants failed to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise (Welfare and Institutions Code §15610.57(a)(1)[)]; and failed to protect [the decedent] from health and safety hazards (Welfare and Institutions Code §15610.57(b)(3)[)].

Moreover, Defendants abused [the decedent] within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code §15610.07 by subjecting him to neglect and reckless custodial failures that resulted in physical harm, pain, and mental suffering. Defendants’ acts and omissions, including their failure to properly assess, supervise, care plan, and manage [the decedent] despite his known cognitive and behavioral impairments, placed him in a dangerous and unsupervised environment, foreseeably resulting in severe physical injury, emotional distress, and psychological harm to [the decedent].

Said injuries caused and or contributed to his death on April 30, 2025.” 48. More specifically, because [the decedent] was a resident of Defendants’ facility and was entirely in their custody, Defendants, and each of them, had duties under state laws, designed for the protection and benefit of elders and dependent adults like [the decedent], to provide him with twenty-four-hour care and supervision, nourishment, and a safe, comfortable, healthful environment. ” 49. During the period of [the decedent’s] residence at Defendants’ facility, Defendants acted negligently and recklessly and with conscious disregard with respect to [the decedent], as detailed above.

In particular,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Defendants, and each of them, neglected to exercise reasonable care in caring for [the decedent] and acted with conscious disregard of his rights, health, and safety, and caused severe injuries, when they: (1) neglected to adequately staff their building with sufficient staffing of quality caregivers to provide adequate care, services and supervision for pure profit reasons; and (2) willfully and repeatedly neglected to provide basic, custodial care, including adequate supervision among other failures.” 50.

Defendants’ conduct, as herein alleged, was and is a part of a general business practice of the Defendants. The business practice exists in part because Defendants made a conscious, calculated choice to reduce staff to save money on personnel costs, thus understaffing the facility based upon the residents’ acuity levels in effort to maximize profit directly and indirectly, despite knowing that they had legal obligations under regulations to staff the facility to meet the residents’ needs/acuity levels and safety.

Defendants knew that the only way to provide a safe environment was with adequate numbers of trained, competent caregiver personnel, but Defendants instead took shortcuts at the cost and risk of their residents’ health and well-being. Defendants knew that adverse consequences would flow from their understaffing, mistreatment, and neglect of their elderly and vulnerable residents. Thus, Defendants made a conscious motivated decision to promote their financial condition at the expense of their legal obligations of care to their elderly residents, including [the decedent].

51. As a proximate result of Defendants’ neglect and abuse, and their failure to provide basic custodial care that was part of their fundamental and core services, [the decedent] suffered severe injuries and damages, including but not limited to spinal fractures sustained after his arrest and incarceration, requiring emergency surgical intervention, subsequent infections at the surgical site, additional corrective surgeries, significant physical pain and suffering, and substantial emotional and mental distress.

While defendant Grandcare first contends there are no allegations (1) it “denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet” the decedent’s “basic needs” with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall him and (2) the decedent suffered physical harm, pain or mental suffering while under the care of defendant Grandcare (see, Dem., p.7:5-9), Paragraphs 38-39 specifically allege that the decedent was “dependent upon the Defendants,” including defendant Grandcare, “for his care, comfort, and safety because he could not provide it himself due to physical infirmities, metal [sic] conditions, and advanced age” and that “Defendants,” including defendant

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Grandcare, “agreed to and were obligated to provide ‘care or services’ to [the decedent] [and] entered into a caretaking/custodial relationship with [him] and assumed responsibility for his health and safety and for attending to his basic needs because he was incapable of managing his basic needs without assistance.” Paragraph 41 further asserts that “Defendants,” including Grandcare, owed a duty to [the decedent] to ensure that he received basic custodial and necessary care, and a safe environment that was free from physical abuse and neglect,” and Paragraphs 42- 45 specifically allege that “Defendants,” including Grandcare, knew or should have known of the decedent’s cognitive and behavioral impairments” and that the decedent had in fact engaged in aggressive behaviors on several occasions during his residency at the subject care facility.

Nevertheless, it is alleged in Paragraphs 42-43 that Defendants including Grandcare failed to properly assess, supervise, and safely manage the decedent despite his known and/or documented cognitive and behavioral impairments so as to protect him and others from foreseeable harm, even after the “aggressive behaviors” exhibited on several occasions at the subject care facility prior to the subject incident on 3/7/2023 as alleged in Paragraphs 44-45. Moreover, Paragraphs 46-49 and 51 add that on the date of the subject incident, the decedent “remained completely unsupervised” and due to Grandcare’s failure to adequately assess and monitor both the decedent and the other residents, the decedent was not prevented from battering his roommate, causing injury to both the roommate and the decedent himself even before the latter was taken into custody and suffered subsequent injuries when falling from his bed on 3/24/2023.

The foregoing allegations, which must be accepted as true for purposes of this demurrer regardless of plaintiffs’ ability to prove them (see, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d at 591; Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at 696-697), are at a minimum sufficient in this Court’s view to establish not only that (1) defendant Grandcare “denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet” the decedent’s “basic needs” with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall him and (2) the decedent suffered physical harm, pain or mental suffering while under the care of defendant Grandcare.

As such, defendant’s suggestion that this cause of action merely alleges that the decedent assaulted another patient, was arrested, and suffered an injury while held in jail (see, Dem, p.7:9-11) is an unsupported, overly-simplistic characterization which ignores a number of specific allegations in this first cause of action.

Because the 1AC adequately pleads a valid cause of action for “neglect” under the Elder Abuse Act, the Court need not determine here whether valid cause of action for “abuse” under the Act is also pled. Still, it is worth adding that the allegations found in Paragraphs 47-50 are, when construed together with the preceding paragraphs, likely sufficient to plead the elements necessary for “abuse” as defined in the Elder Abuse Act.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Negligence/Negligence Per Se. Defendant Grandcare demurs to the second cause of action on a single, narrow ground: The 1AC “fails to allege any facts with respect to any injury which the Decedent suffered while he was in the custody and care of Grandcare” but rather, “[i]t was only after Decedent was in the custody of the County of Sacramento that [he] suffered physical injury, when he fell out of his bed in his cell, and he subsequently died several weeks after the surgery for the injuries he suffered in this fall.” (Dem., p.8:9-16.)

In short, according to defendant, “any physical and mental injuries which Decedent suffered, and his subsequent death, were caused solely by the acts and omissions of the County of Sacramento and/or the medical professionals who treated him for the injuries suffered while in the care and custody of the County of Sacramento, not Grandcare” and the allegation “Defendant somehow caused Decedent to be arrested months prior to his death is too remote and tenuous to support a finding of actual and proximate cause as a matter of law.” (Id., at p.8:16-23.)

The demurrer based on the lack of causation to support the second cause of action is OVERRULED. The 1AC alleges in pertinent part:

59. In particular, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Defendants, and each of them, acted with conscious disregard for [the decedent’s] rights, health, safety, and violated the state and federal regulations, including Health and Safety Code §1599.1, 22 C.C.R. §§72001 et seq., and 42 C.F.R. §§483.1 et seq. all of which caused injury and emotional distress to [the decedent] when they: [¶] failed to accurately monitor and record Plaintiff’s [sic] condition and report changes to his doctor and family; [¶] failed to establish and implement a resident care plan for [the decedent] based on his needs and safety requirements; [¶] failed to accord [the decedent] dignity and respect, and not subject him to abuse or neglect; [¶] failed to maintain nursing and other staffing at levels necessary to meet the needs of [the decedent]; failed to ensure that the facility has sufficient nursing staff to assure resident safety and to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident; [¶] failed to follow proper skilled nursing care standards to maximize the health, safety, and well- being of [the decedent] 60.

As a proximate result of Defendants’ actions, failures, and deficiencies, and their failure to provide basic custodial care that was part of their fundamental and core services, [the decedent] suffered severe injuries and damages, including but not limited to spinal fractures sustained after his arrest and incarceration, requiring emergency surgical intervention, subsequent infections at the surgical site, additional

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

corrective surgeries, significant physical pain and suffering, and substantial emotional and mental distress. (Underline added for emphasis.)

As explained above, these allegations about the causation of injuries to the decedent must be accepted as true for purposes of this demurrer regardless of plaintiffs’ ability to prove them (see, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d at 591; Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at 696-697) and because the 1AC expressly alleges that the decedent suffered a variety of injuries including but not limited to emotional and mental distress as a proximate result of defendant Grandcare’s acts and/or omissions while having care and custody of the decedent, the demurrer based on a claimed lack of causation cannot be sustained.

Moreover, defendant Grandcare’s suggestion that the physical and/or mental injuries which the decedent may have suffered while detained in the county jail “were caused solely by the acts and omissions of” third parties are “too remote and tenuous to support a finding of actual and proximate cause” (see, Dem., p.8:19-21) presents a factual question which cannot be resolved on demurrer. (See, e.g., Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1556.)

Violation of Patient’s Bill of Rights. In response to this third cause of action, defendant Grandcare insists plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts that Grandcare violated any of the rights enumerated in the Resident's Bill of Rights (i.e., failing to provide proper medical care, failing to keep the decedent informed of his care plan, violating his right to privacy, etc.) or even suffered any injury while at the subject care facility. (Dem., p.10:17-20.) As before, defendant Grandcare essentially claims that the decedent suffered no physical injury while in its care and custody and the only physical injury occurred more than one month into his detention at the county jail. (Id., at p.10:20-23.)

The 1AC’s third cause of action alleges in pertinent part:

67. Defendants owed a duty to [the decedent] to ensure that his patient rights were not violated. [Cite.] [The decedent’s] patient rights are established in the Patient Bill of Rights [and] include, but are not limited to: [¶] be fully informed of his total health status; [¶] be free from neglect and mental and physical abuse; [¶] be treated with consideration, respect and full recognition of dignity; and [¶] reside in a facility that employs an adequate number of qualified personnel 68. Defendants violated the above-referenced rights when Defendants failed to provide appropriate services to prevent serious health and safety hazards to [the decedent] and failed to provide adequate care to meet his needs. In particular, and without limiting the generality of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

foregoing, Defendants violated [the decedent’s] rights when it: [¶] failed to fully inform him of his total health status; [¶] subjected him to neglect and mental and physical abuse; [¶] did not treat him with consideration, respect and full recognition of dignity; and [¶] did not provide an adequate number of qualified personnel 69. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, [the decedent] sustained injuries and painful physical and emotional suffering.

70. As an actual and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants, Plaintiffs incurred significant general and special damages.

These allegations are on their face sufficient to plead a claim for violation of the patient rights established by California law, especially when such allegations are deemed true within the context of this demurrer and without regard to plaintiffs’ ability to prove any or all of them At a minimum, insofar as the Court has determined that plaintiffs have adequately pled their first cause of action for elder neglect/abuse, plaintiffs have likewise pled a valid claim for violation of the decedent’s right to be free from “neglect and mental and physical abuse.” Additionally, for the reasons already explained in connection with both the first and second causes of action, defendant’s suggestions that (1) the decedent suffered no cognizable harm or injury while residing at the subject care facility, (2) the decedent’s only harm or injury occurred after being detained at the county jail and/or (3) the harm or injuries occurring after the subject battery incident on 3/7/2023 is plainly inconsistent with the express allegations included within the 1AC and whether or not such subsequent harm or injury is “too remote and tenuous” to be properly attributed to defendant Grandcare is factual question which may not be resolved on demurrer. (See, e.g., Berryman v.

Merit Prop. Mgmt, Inc., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at 1556.) Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the third cause of action is OVERRULED as well.

Unfair Business Practices. According to the moving papers, this fourth cause of action not only fails to allege with the requisite degree of particularity any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice of defendant Grandcare which caused the decedent to lose money or property but also fails to state a basis for restitution of the sums paid to defendant Grandcare for the full period of his residency there. (Dem., p.10:24-p.11:10.) The Court finds that neither of these two contentions has merit and thus, the demurrer to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

The Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) found in Business & Professions Code §17200 et seq. generally prohibits one from engaging in any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. (See, e.g., Yeh v. Barrington Pacific LLC (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1303, 1324; Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) The elements of a cause of action under the UCL are that (1) the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

defendant engaged in unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and (2) the plaintiff is entitled to restitution and/or injunctive relief. (See, e.g., Bus & Prof. Code §§17200, 17203, 17204.) In order to give substance to this statutory prohibition, an action based on the UCL “borrows” violations of other laws and treats such violations, when committed pursuant to business activity, as unlawful business practices. (Id.; see also, Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1590.)

Inasmuch as this Court has already rejected defendant Grandcare’s challenges to the preceding causes of action for Elder Neglect/Abuse and Violation of Patient’s Bill of Rights, this fourth cause of action under Business & Professions Code §17200 may permissibly be premised on one or both of these preceding causes of action. (See, e.g., Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 868 [elder abuse/neglect claim held sufficient predicate for UCL claim].) Additionally, because defendant Grandcare’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action for Fraud/Misrepresentation has also been overruled infra, the fifth cause of action may operate as a valid basis for the fourth cause of action for violation of the UCL.

Accordingly, defendant’s demurrer to this UCL cause of action on the ground that it fails to allege with the requisite degree of particularity any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice necessarily falls short.

The moving papers’ remaining argument that the 1AC “fails to state a basis for restitution of the sums paid to defendant Grandcare for the full period of [the decedent’s] residency there” (Dem., p.11:8-10) fares no better. First, Business & Professions Code §17203 specifically authorizes the Court to make such orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” Thus, provided that this UCL is ultimately proven at trial, restitution of all sums derived by the underlying business act or practice is statutorily authorized.

Second, it is well established in California that where a contract or other benefit is procured by fraud, restitution may be awarded to the plaintiff (see, e.g., Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370; McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387- 388) and not only does the 1AC include a cause of action for fraud but defendant Grandcare’s demurrer to that fraud cause of action has been overruled infra. Consequently, the Court finds that the 1AC sufficiently establishes a potentially valid basis for restitution of the sums paid to defendant Grandcare for the decedent’s residency at the subject care facility.

Fraud/Misrepresentation. Defendant Grandcare demurs to the fifth cause of action arguing that it “utterly fails to meet the heightened pleading requirements for a cause of action in fraud” insofar as it (1) “does not specifically allege how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the any allegedly false representations were made; how the representations were false; and the persons who made the representations as well as

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation;” and (2) fails to specify whether the decedent’s wife is asserting this cause of action in her individual capacity or in her capacity as a representative of the decedent. (Dem., p.11:26-p.12:3.)

The demurrer to this fraud cause of action on the ground it is not alleged with the required heightened degree of factual particularity (i.e., the ‘who, what, when, and how’ of the alleged misrepresentation(s)) is OVERRULED. While this cause of action does specifically allege that defendant Grandcare made, both before and after the decedent’s admission the subject care facility, one or more “false representations with intent to deceive and/or induce reliance by Plaintiffs which resulted in a justifiable reliance by Plaintiffs [and] ultimately resulted in damages to Plaintiffs” (1AC, ¶83; see also, ¶¶84- 87), the 1AC further asserts that defendant Grandcare “failed to disclose important facts[which] were unknown and inaccessible to [the decedent] and his family, that would have impacted [his] and his family’s decision of whether to have him admitted to Defendants’ [sic] nursing home and whether to remain at the facility” (1AC, ¶88) despite having a duty to disclose such facts (Id., at ¶¶89-90) which were material to the decision to move into and remain at the subject care facility (Id., at ¶¶89-94) and which induced detrimental reliance (Id., at ¶¶91, 93-95).

However, defendant Grandcare’s moving papers advance no discernible argument about why these allegations of fraudulent concealment are deficient or otherwise inadequate to plead a valid claim for recovery on a fraudulent concealment theory which is separate and distinct from a theory of affirmative misrepresentation. (See, e.g., Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1130 [claim based on fraudulent concealment requires showing that (1) the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant had a duty to disclose the fact, (3) the defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud, (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as s/he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained damage].)

By failing to specifically address these allegations of fraudulent concealment (or of constructive fraud (see, 1AC, ¶¶91-92)) in the moving papers, defendant Grandcare has effectively prevented the Court from sustaining this demurrer to the fraud cause of action because under current California law, a demurrer may be sustained only if it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 119.)

Moreover, although it is generally true that fraud must be pleaded with a heightened factual particularity, this rule carries less weight in cases of nondisclosure. After all, how does a plaintiff describe “how” and “by what means” something did not happen, or “when” it never happened, or “where” it never happened? (See, e.g., Alfaro v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) Moreover, “[e]ven under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party than of the party pleading.” (Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 658.) In short, a plaintiff asserting a concealment theory will “not be able to specify the time, place, and specific content of an omission as precisely as would a plaintiff in a false representation claim” and thus, such a claim “can succeed without the same level of specificity required by a normal fraud claim.” (See, e.g., Falk v.

GMC (N.D. Cal. 2007) 496 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1098-1099.) Thus, the heightened specificity rule is relaxed in actions premised on concealment or nondisclosure, as they are inherently different from those based on affirmative misrepresentations. (See, e.g., Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199-1200.)

Given that this fraud cause of action is not limited to a claim of affirmative misrepresentations but rather also includes a claim based on concealment of material facts (as well as constructive fraud), a relaxed pleading standard is appropriate here. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 214; Turner, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 658 [“If, in truth, Milstein concealed from plaintiff the fact that the property was to be sold, he knows it and he knows the time and place of concealment, if there was a time and place.

It would seem that concealment is negative and that it would occur without any time or place. Milstein knows the facts.”].) Thus, defendant Grandcare’s contention that the fraud cause of action fails to adequately allege the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misrepresentation(s) at issue largely misses the mark and does not support an order sustaining the demurrer to the entirety of this cause of action.

Defendant Grandcare also challenges this fraud cause of action on the ground that it fails to specify whether the decedent’s wife is asserting this cause of action in her individual capacity or in her capacity as a representative of the decedent. (Dem., p.12:2- 3.) Aside from the fact that the express allegations indicate this cause of action is asserted on behalf of both the decedent and his surviving spouse, the moving papers fail to provide any meaningful argument or any applicable legal authority bearing on the sufficiency of this cause of action or the disposition of the demurrer on this narrow ground.

As such, it is deemed waived. (See, e.g., Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1008 [“failure to offer reasoned analysis of the issue constitutes a waiver”]; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [when party fails to support assertion with reasoned argument and citations to authority, point is treated as waived].) Consequently, defendant’s demurrer on this additional ground is also OVERRULED.

Medical Malpractice/Wrongful Death. According to the moving papers, no act or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV003667: PRATT vs MOUNTAIN MANOR SKILLED NURSING & ASSISTED LIVING, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

omission on the part of defendant Grandcare caused the decedent’s death but rather, his death was caused by the County of Sacramento’s failure to ensure his safety while held in custody and/or the negligence of the medical professionals who treated the decedent after being injured falling from the bed in his cell. (Dem., p.12:9-13.) In short, because defendant Grandcare did not cause or contribute to the decedent’s death, this final cause of action is subject to demurrer. (Id., at p.12:13-14.)

The basis for defendant’s demurrer to this cause of action is essentially identical to that of the second cause of action for Negligence/Negligence Per Se and it shall be OVERRULED for the same reasons cited above.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendant Grandcare’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ 1AC is OVERRULED in its entirety.

If not already done, defendant Grandcare shall file and serve an answer to the 1AC no later than 6/23/2026.

Demurring defendant to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)