Demurrer
arbitration is granted.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS motion to compel arbitration filed by Lyft, inc. The Court STAYS this litigation of Plaintiff’s cause of action against Lyft, Inc. (only), pending the results of arbitration. The Court SETS a post-arbitration status conference for February 10, 2027, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 514 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. The Court ORDERS the Plaintiff and Defendant Lyft to file a report regarding the status of the arbitration by no later than February 3, 2027. The trial date remains as scheduled with regard to Plaintiff’s cause of action against Hassel. Moving Party is ORDERED to give notice.
Hospital
Demurrer filed by Defendant Barlow Respiratory Hospital Tentative Ruling The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.
Background
On December 29, 2025, Liza Sigua Henson, individually and as successor in interest to Larry Matundan (“Plaintiff”) filed the complaint in this action. On February 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”), naming as defendants Barlow Respiratory Hospital (“Defendant”), Billy Doe, and Does 1 through 50 and asserting causes of action for: (1) medical negligence; (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) unlawful retaliation in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5; (4) reckless neglect of an elder person in violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Protection Act; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. On April 8, 2026, Defendant filed this demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC. Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 5, and Defendant filed a reply on May 11. No trial date has been set.
Legal Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 provides: “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:?
(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible. .. .” A general demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e), tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388
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We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; accord Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104.) All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the pleading. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)
Even “improbable’ facts alleged in the pleading must be accepted as true. (Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 104-105.) Courts must “liberally construe the pleading’ and “give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in context.” (Id. at p. 105.) A complaint must contain a “statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1); see also C.A. v. William S. Hart High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [“the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action”].)
Ordinarily, a complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) Ultimate facts are those upon which “the right to recover depends’ and are “essential’ to the cause of action. (Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 643 fn. 2; see also 1 Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 6:124.) A plaintiff is required to plead only “the essential facts of [its] case’ that are sufficient “to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the] cause of action.” (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 550.)
Mere boilerplate or pleading of legal conclusions is not sufficient. (Id. at p. 551 fn. 5.) But a plaintiff need not allege “each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of plaintiff’s proof’ at trial. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 872.) A demurrer for uncertainty under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), is “disfavored’ and will be sustained “only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695; accord Mahan v.
Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3.) A complaint need not be “a model of clarity’ and must only contain sufficient allegations to put the defendants on notice of the claims against them. (A.J. Fistes Corp., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 695.) As the Court of Appeal has observed, “where a complaint is in some respects uncertain,” ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; see also 1 Weil & Brown, supra, ¶¶ 7:85-7:86.)
A demurrer can be sustained only when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.) Leave to amend should be granted when “there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Centinela Freeman, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1010; Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; Shaeffer v. Califia Farms (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145.)
Meet and Confer
Before filing its demurrer, “the demurring party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41, subd. (a).) The requirement is met. (Duenas Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.)
Discussion
Defendant demurs to the Fifth Cause of Action in the FAC, for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). The elements of a cause of action for IIED are: (1) that the defendant engaged in “extreme and outrageous conduct’ with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress”; (2) that the plaintiff suffered “severe or extreme emotional distress”; and (3) that the plaintiff's injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant's outrageous conduct. (Hughes v.
Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051; see also Christensen v. Super. Ct. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 905-906; Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 487, 506; Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009; CACI No. 1600.) Conduct is “outrageous’ if it “exceed[s] all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051.)?[M]ere insults’ and “other trivialities’ are not sufficient. (Ibid.; see also, e.g., Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1007.)
The conduct must be directed at the plaintiff or, alternatively, defendant must act with reckless disregard of plaintiff and the probability that the conduct will cause severe emotional distress to plaintiff. (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 905-906; So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671.) Conduct may be considered outrageous, depending on all of the circumstances, if a defendant? (1) abuses a relation or position which gives [the defendant] power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” (Molko v.
Holy Spirit Ass’n (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1122; CACI No. 1602.) Outrageous behavior can also occur when a defendant knows of a dangerous condition, fails to warn about the danger, and the plaintiff suffers physical harm as a result. (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 152.)
Plaintiff alleges (among other things) that decedent Larry Matudan was admitted into Defendant’s facility for respiratory failure and was reliant on Defendant for his care; Mr. Matudan also suffered from paraplegia and urinary incontinence, requiring Mr. Matudan to use a catheter. (FAC, ¶¶ 10-11.) On December 21, 2024, Billy Doe, an employee of Defendant, used a mechanical lift to lift Mr. Matudan to adjust his bed; during this process, Billy Doe discovered the catheter was being pulled by the process, he pulled sharply on the tube, causing it to be dislodged completely, which led to bleeding and pain. (FAC, ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s use of the mechanical lift violated title 22 of the California Code of Regulations, section 70706.2. (FAC, ¶ 16.) Subsequently, a complaint was made to the California Department of Public Health regarding the care provided to Mr. Matundan. (FAC, ¶ 25.) In retaliation, Plaintiff alleges, Defendant transferred Mr. Matundan to another facility on March 17, 2025, with only four hours’ notice. (FAC, ¶¶ 26, 28.) Defendant did not provide the receiving facility with essential information relative to the diagnosis and care of Mr.
Matundan. (FAC, ¶ 27.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s retaliatory conduct was outrageous and caused Mr. Matundan to suffer severe emotional distress. (FAC, ¶¶ 63-65.) Mr. Matundan died on June 6, 2025. (FAC, ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts in the FAC regarding the allegedly severe emotional distress suffered by Mr. Matundan. As to this element of the cause of action, all that is alleged in the FAC is a bare legal conclusion. There is no allegation of, for example, depression, anxiety, or physical or mental symptoms or manifestations of severe emotional distress. (Cf. Hailey v. California Physicians? Service (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 452 [cited by Plaintiff].) Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.
Conclusion
The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer of Defendant Barlow Respiratory Hospital to the Fifth Cause of Action in the FAC. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Liza Sigua Henson, individually and as successor in interest to Larry Matundan, LEAVE to file an amended complaint to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this ruling by no later than June 2, 2026. Moving party is ordered to give notice. Home -->)" -->