FORWARD, INC. vs THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants State of California, et al.’s demurrer to the complaint of plaintiff Forward, Inc. is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel of the specific grounds for this demurrer and/or causes of action that will be addressed at the hearing. Counsel are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

23CV012125: FORWARD, INC. vs THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al. 07/24/2024 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

The notice of hearing does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Factual Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on 11/21/2023, filing a complaint which purports to assert a cause of action under the Hazardous Substances Account Act (“HSAA”) as well as claims for Equitable Indemnity, Equitable Contribution, Unjust Enrichment and Declaratory Relief. The complaint generally alleges this is an action “to recover response costs and for damages, indemnity, equitable contribution and declaratory relief relating to groundwater contamination caused by the State of California and its departments” at several correctional facilities located in Stockton, California and adjacent to plaintiff’s own landfill. (Compl., ¶1.)

Plaintiff alleges it has been ordered to install “a groundwater extraction and treatment system” at these facilities because of a determination by the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board (“Regional Board”) that plaintiff’s landfill has caused volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) to contaminate groundwater underlying the facilities. (Id.) According to plaintiff, this determination is embodied in a 2017 Cleanup and Abatement Order (“2017 CAO”) issued by the Regional Board to plaintiff but “the main concentrations of VOCs at the State Facilities are not due to groundwater contamination caused by [plaintiff’s] Landfill.” (Id. (underline added for emphasis).)

Plaintiff maintains “the main concentrations of VOCs are present at the State Facilities due to releases caused by the Defendants, and it is the removal of this Defendantcaused contamination that will be the primary if not exclusive result of the Regional Board’s requirement for Plaintiff to implement a groundwater extraction and treatment system described in the 2017 CAO.” (Id.) Contending that “but for” the contamination caused by defendants, plaintiff would likely not have been required to install a groundwater extraction and treatment system and therefore, plaintiff now seeks to recover from defendants the costs for extracting and treating groundwater and in meeting any other requirements of the Regional Board to remove or remediate VOCs at defendants’ facilities. (Id.)

Defendants now demur to the entire complaint and each cause of action therein on various grounds discussed below. Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standards for Demurrer

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A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, raising issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. (Code of Civil Procedure §422.10 and §589.) A demurrer may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) However, the face of the complaint includes facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) A demurrer can be utilized where a complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (Myers) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. Matters which may be judicially noticed may also be considered. The complaint is to be given a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Farmers v. Zerin (1997) 53 CaI.App.4th 445, 451.) Consideration of extrinsic evidence or facts asserted in the memorandum supporting or opposing the demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Finally, a demurrer may only be sustained where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of (1) two Cleanup and Abatement Orders issued by the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board; (2) the 2019 Right of Entry Permit & Monitoring Well Agreement; and (4) plaintiff’s 2023 Government Claim and the subsequent denial of same is GRANTED for the limited purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the

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existence of documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the June 2023 “Remedial Investigation Update and Revised Feasibility Study Addendum” prepared by Arcadis U.S. Inc. on behalf of plaintiff (Def. RJN, Ex. 4) is DENIED since this Court does not find this document to be a proper subject for judicial notice, nor is there or can there be a proper foundation established for admissibility of this document in the context of a demurrer. Nor is a document subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452(h) simply because the document can also be found “by resort to the State Water Resources Control Board’s website,” as defendants suggest. Further, Even if it were subject to judicial notice, judicial notice would pursuant to the authorities cited above be limited to its existence and would not extend to the truth of the statements contained therein.

Discussion

A. Government Claims Act. Defendants first demur to the entire complaint and all causes of action therein on the grounds that plaintiff “failed to comply with the Government Claims Act” (“GCA”) insofar as the complaint does not allege “facts demonstrating timely presentation of [plaintiff’s] claim” pursuant to the GCA but rather merely includes in Paragraph 22 a “legal conclusion” that plaintiff “has complied with the claims filing requirement” of the GCA. According to defendants, the failure to allege both the date plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and the date the government claim was submitted renders the complaint subject to a general demurrer, relying primarily on Willis v.

City of Carlsbad (2020 (Rev. Denied)) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1119 (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.9:2-5) but defendants also add that those facts now alleged, along with those found in the June 2023 “Remedial Investigation Update and Revised Feasibility Study Addendum” prepared by Arcadis U.S. Inc. (“Arcadis Report”), demonstrate plaintiff did not timely submit its government claim so as to completely bar this action.

The demurrer based on the GCA shall be overruled. While the Willis decision does indeed state on Page 1119 that “the timely filing of a written government claim is an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail on his or her cause of action [citation]” and that “a complaint failing to allege facts demonstrating timely presentation of a claim is subject to a general demurrer for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,” this Court is unable to find in Willis any language which actually mandates plaintiff to plead in this case not only the date its cause of action accrued (something which would appear to constitute a “legal conclusion”) and/or the date on which the government claim was submitted.

Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by defendants’ suggestion that the allegations in Paragraph 22 about plaintiff’s compliance with the GCA are impermissibly conclusory given that Paragraph

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22 must be read in conjunction with the preceding paragraphs which detail those facts and circumstances relevant to the causes of action asserted in the complaint.

Additionally, to the extent defendants maintain that the facts now alleged in the complaint and those in the June 2023 Arcadis Report (for which judicial notice has been requested) demonstrate plaintiff’s government claim was not timely submitted so as to bar the entire complaint, the Court finds defendants’ argument to be unavailing because (1) the request for judicial notice of the June 2023 Arcadis Report has been denied since this document is not a proper subject for judicial notice and (2) even if it were, judicial notice of the Arcadis Report would be limited to its existence and would not extend to the truth of any statements contained therein. As such, its contents cannot be properly used here to affirmatively show that plaintiff’s 2023 government claim was untimely as a matter of law.

Moreover, it appears that defendants’ assertion about plaintiff’s government claim not being timely submitted and the entire complaint being barred is expressly premised on the “discovery rule” and plaintiff’s alleged discovery of a “separate and localized source of contamination at the State Facilities on June 3, 2014.” (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.9:8- 14.) However, in the Otay Land Co. decision (which defendants themselves cited), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explicitly held that the plaintiffs’ claims for contribution and indemnity under the HSAA did not accrue until they actually paid the remedial action costs.

In doing so, the Court of Appeal rejected application of the discovery rule and instead relied on the traditional, common law rule that a cause of action does not accrue until “last element” of the cause of action can be shown. (Otay Land Co., LLC v. U.E. Limited, L.P. (2017 (Rev. Denied)) 15 Cal.App.5th 806, 850-851.) In particular, the Fourth District stated in pertinent part:

The HSAA does not contain a statute of limitations for contribution or indemnity actions under section 25363(e). “Traditionally at common law, a cause of action accrues when [it] is complete with all of its elements This is the ‘last element’ accrual rule[.] [¶] [T]he courts and the Legislature have over time developed a handful of equitable exceptions to and modifications of the usual rules governing limitations periods. The most important of these doctrines, the discovery rule, where applicable, postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. [Citation.] When a statute is silent as to when a claim accrues, this silence “triggers a presumption in favor of permitting settled common law accrual rules to apply.” [Citation.]

Here, the court determined the three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (b), for “action[s] for trespass upon or injury to real property” applied to Plaintiffs’ HSAA claim. The court then found

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the statutory period “commenced when [Plaintiffs] knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to the claim, which is no later than October 15, 1998,” [when the plaintiff] purchased the Property.

Plaintiffs contend their claim did not accrue until they paid remedial action costs. We agree. Because the HSAA is silent as to when a contribution or indemnity action accrues, common law accrual rules apply. [Citation.] As discussed ante, the HSAA permits “[a]ny person who has incurred removal or remedial action costs in accordance with this chapter or the federal act [to] seek contribution or indemnity from any person who is liable pursuant to this chapter.” (Former §25363(e).) Plaintiffs could not establish all elements of their HSAA claim, and that claim could not accrue, at least until they incurred removal or remedial action costs. (Otay Land Co., at 850-851.)

For all these reasons, this Court shall overrule defendants’ demurrer based on plaintiff’s failure to comply with the GCA.

B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. Defendants also object to the entire complaint and each cause of action therein on the grounds that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies available under Water Code §13320 and §13330. According to the moving papers, plaintiff’s current suit amounts to a challenge to the Regional Board’s 2008 and 2017 determinations that plaintiff is liable for groundwater contamination at the facilities in Stockton and thus, plaintiff should have timely petitioned the State’s Water Board to review the Regional Board’s 2008 and 2017 decisions before filing the present litigation, thereby failing to exhaust administration remedies. On this basis, defendants insist this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the claims advanced in plaintiff’s complaint.

The demurrer based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies will be overruled as well. First, the underlying premise on which this demurrer is based cannot withstand scrutiny. While defendants suggest the “essence” of the present suit is a “challenge” to the Regional Board’s 2008 and 2017 determinations that plaintiff is liable for groundwater contamination at the Stockton facilities, this is not borne out by the language of the 2008 and 2017 CAOs and the express allegations of the complaint. The 2008 CAO spans over 20 pages but the salient portion states the following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT, pursuant to CWC sections 13267 and 13304, Forward Inc. and its agents, successors, and assigns, shall investigate the discharges of waste to groundwater, clean up the waste, and abate the effects of the waste, forthwith, resulting from the Austin Road Landfill (now Forward Landfill), in conformity with State Board Resolution No. 92-49 Policies and

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Procedures for Investigation and Cleanup and Abatement of Discharges Under Water Code Section 13304, California Code of Regulations, Title 27, section 20380 et seq., and the Central Valley Water Board’s Water Quality Control Plan for the Sacramento River and San Joaquin River Basins (in particular the Policies and Plans listed within the Control Action Considerations portion of Chapter IV). Compliance with this requirement shall include, but not be limited to, completing the tasks listed below. (2008 CAO, pp.8-9 (underline added for emphasis).)

Similarly, the 2017 CAO states in pertinent part:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT, [the 2008 CAO] is rescinded except for enforcement purposes, and that pursuant to CWC sections 13267 and 13304, Forward Inc. and Republic Services, Inc., its agents, successors, and assigns, shall investigate the discharges of waste to groundwater, clean up the waste, and abate the effects of the waste, forthwith, resulting from the operations at the Forward Landfill. The Discharger shall continue to comply with WDRs Orders R5-2003-0080 and R5-2014-0006. (2017 CAO, p.8 (underline added for emphasis).)

In short, both the 2008 and 2017 CAOs by their own terms merely require plaintiff (and others) to “investigate the discharges of waste to groundwater, clean up the waste, and abate the effects of the waste.” The present litigation does not challenge the substance of either CAO or the obligations associated therewith but rather merely seeks to obtain reimbursement of those portion of the investigation, clean up and abatement costs attributable to any waste or contamination which is shown to be the result of defendants’ own action or inaction. (Compl., ¶1.)

Accordingly, defendants’ characterization of the current suit as a challenge to or an attempt to modify the Regional Board’s 2008 and/or 2017 CAOs must be rejected and given the clear dichotomy between the earlier CAOs and the claims asserted in this action, this Court cannot agree that the administrative remedies specified in Water Code §13320 [review of regional board findings by state board] and §13330 [petition for writ of mandate by superior court] have any application to the case at bar. This is especially true when California case law otherwise indicates that the HSAA was enacted in order to allow a party to obtain contribution and/or indemnity for costs incurred as a result of a water board’s cleanup orders and also that the HSAA may be utilized even without any prior government action requiring remediation efforts. (See, e.g., Otay Land Co., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th 806, 822-826; Orange County Water District v.

Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017 (Rev. Denied)) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 297-304.)

It is worth adding here that even if otherwise inclined to agree with defendants’ argument about plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court finds that

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the complaint currently also includes allegations which may support an exception to the general rule requiring exhaustion before filing suit. (See, e.g., Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control District v. California Public Employment Relations Board (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080-1081 [doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to exceptions].) In particular, Paragraphs 15-16 of the complaint generally assert that defendants’ own conduct during the period from 2017 through 2022 effectively prevented plaintiff from discovering the contamination at defendants’ Stockton facilities inasmuch as defendants essentially denied meaningful access to these facilities until 2022.

Such facts, if proven, could potentially operate as an exception to the exhaustion requirement cited by defendants or to preclude defendants from relying on arguing there was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

For the reasons explained above, the demurrer based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is overruled.

C. Express Waiver. Defendants demur to the entire complaint and all causes of action therein on the grounds that plaintiff is “contractually barred from recovery due to an express waiver” since the 2021 Right of Entry Permit & Monitoring Well Agreement (“ROE”) executed by plaintiff and the State of California (Def. RJN, Ex. 3) “clearly and unambiguously waived the claims [plaintiff] has alleged against the Defendants.” (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.11:9-10.) More specifically, defendants contend that the June 2023 Arcadis Report reveals plaintiff knew “[a]s early as 2014” there was a “separate and localized source of [contamination] identified at the State Facilities” but as plaintiff, when negotiating access to defendants’ facilities pursuant to the Regional Board’s CAOs, agreed not only to bear all costs for the work to be performed but also to waive “all claims for loss or damage caused by, arising out of, or in any way connected with [plaintiff’s] exercise of this [ROE].” (Id., at p.11:10-19).

However, plaintiff alleges in its complaint that as a result of its “activities on the State Facilities under the ROE,” it discovered “a separate and localized source of VOC contamination at State Facilities” and now seeks to recover some of the remediation and removal costs incurred as a result of defendants’ conduct even though plaintiff expressly waived all claims for loss or damage caused by, arising out of, or in any way connected with plaintiff’s activities pursuant to the ROE.” (Id., at p.11:20-p.12:17).

This demurrer too shall be overruled. First, the demurrer is explicitly premised on the June 2023 Arcadis Report for which judicial notice has been requested and which defendants maintain establish plaintiff’s knowledge “[a]s early as 2014” of a “separate and localized source of [contamination] identified at the State Facilities” (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.11:10-12) but as already explained, defendants’ request for judicial notice of the June 2023 Arcadis Report has been denied since this document is not a proper subject for judicial notice and (2) even if it were, judicial notice of the Arcadis Report would be limited to its existence and would not extend to the truth of any statements contained

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therein. As such, its contents cannot be properly used here to affirmatively show that plaintiff had actual knowledge of any claims for loss or damage arising out of or related to plaintiff’s activities pursuant to the 2021 ROE which claims could have therefore been ‘expressly waived’ by virtue of this ROE. For this reason alone, the demurrer based on express waiver misses the mark.

Second, even a cursory reading of the ROE’s actual waiver language persuades the Court that this language cannot be fairly construed as constituting a bar to the present suit. The “Waiver and Indemnification” provision at issue is found on Pages 10-11 of the 2021 ROE and it states in its entirety:

Permittee [i.e., plaintiff] waives all claims against State, its officers, agents, employees, lessees, and sub-lessees, for loss or damage caused by, arising out of, or in any way connected with Permittee’s exercise of this Agreement, and Permittee agrees to protect, save harmless, indemnify, and defend State, its officers, agents, employees, lessees, and sub-lessees, from any and all loss, damage, or liability, including, without limitation, all legal fees, expert witness, or consultants fees and expenses suffered or incurred by the State, its officers, agents, employees, lessees, and sub-lessees that is caused by, arises out of, or is any way connected with Permittee’s exercise of the rights granted by this Agreement, except those claims for damages proximately caused by the sole negligence of State.

The above-cited language is by its own terms limited to loss or damage “caused by, arising out of, or in any way connected with Permittee’s exercise of this Agreement” or “Permittee’s exercise of the rights granted by this Agreement” and as such, simply cannot be properly read to constitute a waiver of the indemnity, contribution, unjust enrichment or declaratory relief causes of action currently alleged in the complaint. This is particularly true when Civil Code §1542 provides that a “general release does not extend to claims that the releasing party does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release and that, if known by him or her, would have materially affected his or her settlement with the released party.” For this reason as well, the demurrer based on express waiver must be overruled.

D. HSAA Claim Time-Barred. Defendants contend the first cause of action under the HSAA is barred by the three-year statute of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure §338(b) since the limitations period began no later than 2014, at which time plaintiff not only had incurred some response/remediation costs but also knew or should have known of a separate and localized source of contamination on the properties where the defendants’ facilities are located. (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.13:16-p.14:7.) This demurrer too is in pertinent part premised on the 2023 Arcadis Report for which judicial notice is requested and which defendants insist establishes plaintiff’s actual or constructive

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discovery in 2014 of their correctional facilities being a separate and distinct source of contamination.

The demurrer to the HSAA claim based on the statute of limitations is overruled because, as pointed out above, the Court has denied defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Arcadis Report and even if judicial notice were granted, it would be limited to its existence and would not extend to the truth of any statements contained therein. Thus, the contents of the 2023 Arcadis Report are not a competent basis for showing plaintiff’s alleged discovery of the separate and distinct source of contamination on defendants’ property back in 2014 and without it, this Court is unable to conclude that the first cause of action under the HSAA is time-barred as a matter of law.

E. Insufficient Facts for Unjust Enrichment Claim. Defendants here argue that the fourth cause of action for unjust enrichment fails because the complaint does not plead facts which demonstrate defendants received some benefit “through mistake, fraud, coercion, or request” but instead, the complaint admits (and the 2008 and 2017 CAOs confirm) that plaintiff’s remediation/removal efforts were actually done at the direction of the Regional Board.

The general demurrer to the unjust enrichment claim shall be overruled. First, defendants’ assertion that plaintiff must show that it conferred a benefit upon defendants through some “mistake, fraud, coercion, or request” is explicitly premised on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc. (2015) 783 F.3d 753 but this opinion is not binding on this Court. The same is true for the authority on which the Ninth Circuit relied: The California Jurisprudence (3d) treatise. Second, according to several decisions which are binding on this Court, the elements of an unjust enrichment claim are actually limited to (1) receipt of a benefit and (2) unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another. (See, e.g., Elder v.

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 841, 857; Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1593.) Accordingly, this Court rejects defendants’ suggestion that plaintiff must show the benefit was conferred as a result of some “mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.” Therefore, coupled with this Court’s view that the complaint adequately asserts plaintiff has to date performed at its own cost substantial efforts to investigate, remove and/or remediate contamination which is alleged to have been caused by defendants’ own action or inaction, the unjust enrichment claim is sufficiently pled to withstand this demurrer.

F. Declaratory Relief Claim “Wholly Derivative” of Other Claims. Defendants’ final challenge is limited to the fifth cause of action for declaratory relief and is brought on the ground this cause of action is effectively superfluous inasmuch as it is “wholly derivative” of the preceding causes of action. In short, defendants argue that this declaratory relief claim should not be permitted to proceed if it seeks resolution of an

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issue which can be resolved pursuant to the preceding causes of action.

The demurrer on this final ground will also be overruled. The Court finds that the primary thrust of the first four causes of action is to obtain reimbursement of various costs, fees and other expenses which plaintiff has already incurred as a result of the contamination which is now alleged to have been caused by defendants’ own action or inaction, while the declaratory relief cause of action seeks in part a judicial determination that defendants are not only liable for future costs to investigate, remove and/or remediate such contamination but also obligated to defend, indemnify and hold plaintiff harmless from past and future costs, fees and other expenses.

As such, defendants’ characterization of the declaratory relief claim as being “wholly derivative” of the preceding claims does not withstand scrutiny and is therefore rejected. Moreover, although it may be argued that there is some degree of overlap between the remedies sought in the declaratory relief claim and the preceding claims, this does not justify the sustaining of the demurrer on the narrow grounds advanced by defendants since California law is clear that a demurrer may be sustained only where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 119.)

Because this Court finds the complaint currently pleads a legally viable claim for declaratory relief separate and apart from the preceding causes of action, defendants’ demurrer is hereby overruled.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendants’ demurrer to the complaint is OVERRULED in its entirety.

If not already done, each defendant shall file and serve its answer to the complaint no later than 8/5/2024.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)