JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 10/24/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint for Damages in Department 54

Tentative Ruling

Defendant Hal Meadows, M.D.’s (“Dr. Meadows”) motion to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiff John NDJ Doe and 13 other fictitiously-named Plaintiffs (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) is ruled upon as follows.

Background

This action arises from alleged sexual abuse inflicted upon minors by Defendant Bradley Earl Reger (“Reger”). Plaintiffs allege Mr. Reger’s abuse was facilitated by numerous entities and individuals who possessed knowledge of his misconduct, permitted him to access the minors who would become his victims, and engaged in a conspiracy to facilitate and conceal Mr. Reger’s misconduct, resulting in the sexual abuse of the plaintiffs.

The FAC includes 13 causes of action, only some of which name Dr. Meadows. The causes of action against Dr. Meadows are (1) negligence; (2) negligent supervision; (3) negligent failure to warn, train, or educate; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (5) sexual harassment under Civil Code section 51.9; (6) breach of fiduciary duty; and (7) constructive fraud.

The following allegation in the FAC summarizes the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims against Dr. Meadows:

“Upon information and belief at all relevant times, REGER, as a nurse practitioner, was practicing under the supervision of MEADOWS, a licensed physician; as required by the California Board of Registered Nursing. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times MEADOWS acted in the capacity as a mentor, employee and/or agent of REGER, and specifically is alleged to have come into possession of knowledge of REGER’s dangerous propensities with minors and in particular received complaints regarding REGER’s behavior with minors.

MEADOWS received information of REGER’s sexual inappropriate behavior with minor children prior to the date of his arrest and failed to undertake his mandated reporter obligations and report his abuses to law enforcement or child protective services. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, REGER was acting as agent, ostensible agent, or apparent agent of MEADOWS. At all times during REGER’s employment, agency, service, and/or affiliation with MEADOWS, Defendant MEADOWS held REGER out to be a trustworthy and legitimate nurse practitioner to treat and evaluate patients.

Defendant MEADOWS forced his patients to place their trust and confidence in REGER to in order to receive medical care that they sought to receive. Defendant MEADOWS concealed complaints about REGER’s sexual abuse of minor patients, and abnormal practices with minor patients, including unnecessary examinations

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 10/24/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint for Damages in Department 54

of their genitals, rectum, and anus, and abnormally long examinations that focused on unnecessary examinations of genitalia. Despite this knowledge, Defendant MEADOWS continued to place patients or otherwise recommend patients seek out REGER, thereby putting patients, including Plaintiffs, in direct contact with REGER. Despite the foregoing, the Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on this basis allege, that Defendant MEADOWS never once reported Reger to law enforcement, the California Department of Consumer Affairs, or to the Board of Registered Nursing of California.”

(FAC, ¶ 39.)

Dr. Meadows moves to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages. Dr. Meadows contends that the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims against him is professional negligence, and thus, Dr. Meadows argues, Plaintiff are required to obtain leave of court under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 to seek punitive damages against a healthcare provider. Since Plaintiffs have not done so, Dr. Meadows contends Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages should be stricken.[1]

Plaintiffs oppose on multiple grounds. The Court highlights two arguments advanced by Plaintiffs. The first argument, which is presented towards the end of Plaintiffs’ opposition, is that Dr. Meadows’ motion is improper under Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5(b) because Dr. Meadows did not previously challenge Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim when he demurred to Plaintiffs’ original Complaint, and thus Dr. Meadows waived his right to challenge the punitive damages claim. The second argument, which is the first substantive argument presented in the opposition, is that Plaintiffs’ claims are not for professional negligence and thus Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 does not apply.

Discussion

Legal Standard on Motion to Strike

A party may move to strike “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a).) Irrelevant matter includes allegations that are “not essential to the statement of a claim or defense” and allegations that are “neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 431.10(b).) A motion to strike may also be made to strike “any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ.

Proc. § 436(b).) Like a demurrer, “[t]he grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437(b).) A motion to strike a defective portion of a cause of action should be used cautiously and sparingly. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683 [“We have no intention of creating a procedural ‘line item veto’ for the civil defendant”].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 10/24/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint for Damages in Department 54

Waiver

Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5(b) provides: “A party moving to strike a pleading that has been amended after a motion to strike an earlier version of the pleading was granted shall not move to strike any portion of the pleadings on grounds that could have been raised by a motion to strike as to the earlier version of the pleading.” Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief in their original Complaint included punitive damages. (See Complaint, p. 63:7-8.) On February 26, 2024, Dr. Meadows filed a demurrer to the original Complaint.

The demurrer attacked all causes of action brought against Dr. Meadows on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ claims were for professional negligence and were thus time barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5; that Plaintiffs’ failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action against Dr. Meadows; and that Plaintiffs’ Complaint was uncertain. On June 18, 2024, the Court overruled the demurrer on statute of limitations grounds and uncertainty grounds but sustained the demurrer with leave to amend for failure to state a cause of action.

Here, Plaintiffs are correct that Dr. Meadows did not specifically challenge the claim for punitive damages in the original Complaint. Instead, Dr. Meadows demurred to all causes of action against him, which, if successful, inherently defeats the punitive damages claim. The Court recognizes that Dr. Meadows certainly could have filed a motion to strike punitive damages in the original Complaint in conjunction with his demurrer. However, this does not mean he has forfeited his ability to file the present motion. The text of Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5(b) only refers to “a motion to strike an earlier version of the pleading,” not a demurrer. Given this language, and the lack of any applicable case authority interpreting the statute, the Court concludes that section 435.5(b) does not preclude Dr. Meadows from challenging Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims.

Punitive Damages Against Health Care Provider

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13(a) states:

“In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider, no claim for punitive damages shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court may allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive damages on a motion by the party seeking the amended pleading and on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code. The court shall not grant a motion allowing the filing of an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 10/24/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint for Damages in Department 54

damages if the motion for such an order is not filed within two years after the complaint or initial pleading is filed or not less than nine months before the date the matter is first set for trial, whichever is earlier.”

The term “professional negligence” is defined in other statutes, including Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5(2), the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, as “a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §§ 340.5(2), 667.7(e)(4), 1295(g)(2); Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146(c)(3); Civ. Code §§ 3333.1(c)(2), 3333.2(j)(4).) This definition is not repeated in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, but the Supreme Court has found, based on the presumption that the Legislature was familiar with the existing statutory definitions, “that the existing definition was intended to apply to section 425.13.” (Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 188 (Central Pathology).)

“By adoption of section 425.13, the Legislature intended to protect health care providers from unsubstantiated claims for punitive damages in actions against those providers in their capacity as practitioners.” (Williams v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) “An action for damages arises out of the professional negligence of a health care provider if the injury is directly related to the professional services provided by the health care provider. [Citation.] The test of whether a health care provider’s negligence constitutes professional negligence is whether the negligence occurred in rendering services for which the health care provider is licensed.” (Id. at pp. 324-325.)

“[W]henever an injured party seeks punitive damages for an injury that is directly related to the professional services provided by a health care provider acting in its capacity as such, then the action is one ‘arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider,’ and the party must comply with section 425.13.” (Central Pathology, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 191-192.) Merely “identifying a cause of action as an ‘intentional tort’ as opposed to ‘negligence’ does not itself remove the claim from the requirements of section 425.13(a).

The allegations that identify the nature and cause of a plaintiff’s injury must be examined to determine whether each is directly related to the manner in which professional services were provided.” (Id. at p. 192.) Where the duty alleged by the plaintiff to be imposed on the health care provider is “‘inextricably interwoven’” with the health care provider’s duties in relation to the rendering of services for which the provider is licensed, then section 425.13 applies. (Williams, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.)

Under their negligence cause of action, Plaintiffs allege:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 10/24/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint for Damages in Department 54

“Defendants and each of them had special duties to protect minor Plaintiffs and the other minors within the INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, including Dr. Hal Meadows. Defendant Dr. Hal Meadows, as a supervising physician to REGER, had a duty to protect minor patients, including Plaintiffs, was required to, and failed to, provide adequate supervision of REGER, and failed to be properly vigilant in seeing that supervision was sufficient at to ensure the safety of Plaintiffs and other patients. Defendants, including MEADOWS, each had special duties to protect the Plaintiffs and other patients, when such individuals were entrusted to Defendants’ care.

The Plaintiffs’ medical care, welfare, and physical custody, was entrusted to Defendants, including MEADOWS. Defendants, including MEADOWS, voluntarily accepted the entrusted care of Plaintiffs. As such, Defendants, including MEADOWS, owed the Plaintiffs a special duty of care that medical professionals owe to protect them from harm. The duty to protect and warn arose from the special, trusting confidential, and fiduciary relationship between Defendants, including MEADOWS, and Plaintiffs.”

(FAC, ¶ 121.)

Similarly, Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision cause of action against Meadows is based on “Plaintiffs’’ special relationships with Defendants, including MEADOWS, .” (FAC, ¶ 137.) Plaintiffs’ IIED claim alleges that Dr. Meadows engaged in outrageous and extreme conduct by, among other things, “allowing or otherwise permitting REGER to examine minors alone,” and by “allowing REGER to remain in his position[]” as a nurse practitioner under Dr. Meadows. (FAC, ¶ 187c & g.) Plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claim arises from Plaintiffs’ time as patients “under the care of INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, such as MEADOWS, .” (FAC, ¶ 211.)

Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on Dr. Meadows role as a mandatory reporter as well as his position “as a licensed physician” with supervisory authority over Reger, as well as Dr. Meadows role as a physician for some of the Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ 225.) Plaintiffs’ constructive fraud claim similarly highlights Dr. Meadows’ status as a licensed physician. (FAC, ¶ 232.)

Given Plaintiffs’ repeated references to Dr. Meadows’ role as a physician and the duties that derive therefrom, the Court finds that Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 applies to Plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims against Dr. Meadows are based on his failure to adequately supervise Reger or otherwise prevent Reger from seeing minor patients whom he would allegedly sexually assault, and that he failed to report Reger to authorities as required by his duties as a mandatory reporter.

Claims based on failure to properly supervise an employee who sexually assaults a patient are subject to section 425.13. (United Western Medical Centers v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 500, 504.) Regarding Dr. Meadows’ status as a mandatory reporter, while the FAC does not expressly identify the source of Dr. Meadows’ mandatory reporter status, the Court observes that licensed physicians are mandatory reporters.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 10/24/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint for Damages in Department 54

(See Pen. Code § 11165.7(a)(21).) Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims directly relate to the manner in which Dr. Meadows complied with his duties as a health care provider, which means they directly relate to Dr. Meadows’ rendering of professional services. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ claims are inextricably interwoven with Dr. Meadows’ duties in rendering professional services, since they involve his supervisory and mandated reporter duties as a physician.

Disposition

For the reasons discussed above, Dr. Meadows’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages against him is GRANTED.

Leave to amend is DENIED. However, the Court’s ruling granting Dr. Meadows’ motion is without prejudice to Plaintiffs properly moving to amend to allege punitive damages under the procedures provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13. [1] The Court notes that Dr. Meadows’ notice of motion also refers to Plaintiffs’ prayer for treble damages and

attorney’s fees. (See Notice of Motion, p. 1:27-2:3; see also Meadows’ MPA, p. 2:25-28.) However, no argument is presented in the moving papers in support of striking these portions of Plaintiffs’ FAC. Thus, to the extent Dr. Meadows moves to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for treble damages and prayer for attorney’s fees, the motion is DENIED.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 10/24/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint for Damages in Department 54

gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.