JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

As to Dr. Meadows, the only allegations lodged against him are the following:

“Defendant HAL MEADOWS, M.D., an individual (hereinafter “MEADOWS”) at all times mentioned herein was and is an adult male individual, who Plaintiffs are informed and believes [sic], and on that basis alleges [sic], currently resides in the County of Lassen, in the State of California. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times MEADOWS acted in the capacity as a mentor, employee and/or agent of REGER, and specifically is alleged to have come into possession of knowledge of REGER’s dangerous propensities with minors and in particular received complaints regarding REGER’s behavior with minors. MEADOWS received information of REGER’s sexual inappropriate behavior with minor

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint for Damages in Department 54

children prior to the date of his arrest and failed to undertake his mandated reporter obligations and report his abuses to law enforcement or child protective services.” (Complaint at ¶ 39.)

“With the actual and constructive knowledge of the REGER ENTITIES, RELIGIOUS ENTITIES, Defendants JOSEPH STURGEON, an individual; JOANNE STURGEON, an individual; Dr. HAL MEADOWS, an individual; STEVE SCOTT, an individual; RICHARD COOK, an individual; SHARON COOK, an individual; PIETRO DESANTIS, an individual; (‘INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS’ and collectively with REGER, REGER ENTITIES and RELIGIOUS ENTITIES, ‘Defendants’) permitted REGER to entice, groom and induce the travel of minors through his affiliations with the RELIGIOUS ENTITIES for the purposes of sexually assaulting them under the guise of ‘required’ medical treatment.” (Complaint at ¶ 7.)

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) The sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint for Damages in Department 54

facts pled state a valid cause of action, not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

First Cause of Action for Civil Sex Trafficking

Plaintiffs have elected not to oppose the demurrer to the first cause of action for civil sex trafficking, stating that they withdraw it without prejudice. (Opposition at 2:5-6.) Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Statute of Limitations

As to the second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action, Dr. Meadows argues the causes of action sound in professional negligence and are, therefore, time-barred pursuant to three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. Dr. Meadows reasons that the most liberal reading of the Complaint is that the alleged failure to report took place in 2016 at the absolute latest. (Complaint ¶ 83.) Thus, Plaintiffs would have had to file their Complaint in 2019, but they did not file this action until November 20, 2023.

Plaintiffs oppose on the ground the causes of action are governed by the more specific statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, governing civil actions based upon the sexual abuse of a minor.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the cause of action is not subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 governing professional negligence actions, but rather the more specific statute of limitations set forth in section 340.1 governing civil actions based upon sexual abuse of a minor. The statute applies to an 'action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse.' (Code Civ.

Proc. § 340.1(a)(2).) As seen from the authority cited by Dr. Meadows himself, “a more recent and more specific statute controls over an earlier and more general one.” (David M. v. Beverly Hospital (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1279 [applying statute of limitations and tolling provisions in § 340.5 for tort claims against health care providers over more general provisions in §§ 338 and 352].)

Here, both section 340.1 and section 340.5 could govern the action given the authorities holding that a failure to report abuse discovered in the course of rendering professional services sounds in professional negligence. (David M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at 1278 [citing Penal Code § 11166(a)].) However, Section 340.1, is more specific in that it

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint for Damages in Department 54

covers a specific type of action, one based on sexual abuse of a minor. Section 340.5 was originally enacted in 1970 and deals with professional negligence claims against healthcare providers. By contrast, section 340.1 was enacted in 1986, and amended a number of times, most recently in 2023 when the section was rewritten. General principles of statutory construction compel the conclusion that Section 340.1, not 340.5, applies to the causes of action. Given the fact that Section 340.1 was enacted subsequent to Section 340.5, governs a more specific situation, and does not exclude health care providers from its scope, the Court concludes that Section 340.1 applies to Plaintiffs’ claims against Dr. Meadows.

At the time Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in 2023, section 340.1 provided, “(a) In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age or majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological illness or injury occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later.” The Court notes that, effective January 1, 2024, the statute now provides “(a) There is no time limit for the commencement of any of the following actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.”

At the time the Complaint was filed, Plaintiffs were approximately between the ages of 24 and 37 years old, within the previous and applicable time limit under section 340.1(a). Accordingly, Dr. Meadows’ demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Failure to State Facts

Dr. Meadows then demurs on the ground the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ allegations against him sound in professional negligence, but the Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the same. In support, Dr. Meadows argues the Complaint does not allege when he failed to report Mr. Reger’s sexual misconduct, what he allegedly knew of Mr. Reger’s sexual misconduct, or how he came to learn of Mr. Reger’s sexual misconduct. According to Dr. Meadows, “the Complaint merely alleges that at some unidentified point in history Dr. Meadows failed to report his knowledge of Mr. Reger’s sexual misconduct, the scope of which is also not alleged and unable to be determined from the face of the Complaint.” (Demurrer at 8:18-20.)

Civil Conspiracy

Plaintiffs contend they have sufficiently alleged a civil conspiracy between Dr. Meadows and Mr. Reger pursuant to the allegations in paragraph 39, which state Dr. Meadows came “into possession of knowledge of REGER’s dangerous propensities with minors

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint for Damages in Department 54

and in particular received complaints regarding REGER’s behavior with minors” “and failed to undertake his mandated reporter obligations and report his abuses to law enforcement or child protective services.” (Complaint at ¶ 39.)

The elements of civil conspiracy are '(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.' (AREIII Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022.) CACI No. 3600 sets forth the two essential elements for a civil conspiracy: (1) that [Dr. Meadows] was aware that [Mr. Reger] planned to [sexually abuse, sexually harass, and/or molest minors]; and (2) [Dr. Meadows] agreed with [Mr. Reger] and intended that [his sexual abuse, sexual harassment and/or molestation] be committed. (2 CACI 3600.)

The Court finds the Complaint fails to state a claim for civil conspiracy against Dr. Meadows. Although the Complaint alleges Dr. Meadows received complaints about Mr. Reger’s misconduct and did not comply with his mandated reporter obligations, the allegations are conclusory and there are no factual allegations that Dr. Meadows was aware Mr. Reger planned to continue his misconduct or that Dr. Meadows agreed with Mr. Reger and intended for Mr. Reger’s sexual abuse to be committed. The demurrer to the second cause of action for civil conspiracy is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Negligence-Based Causes of Action

As to the negligence-based claims (third cause of action for negligence, fourth cause of action for negligent supervision, and sixth cause of action for negligent failure to train, warn, or educate), Dr. Meadows contends “plaintiffs have not established Dr. Meadows owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs, or that the duty was otherwise breached.” (Demurrer at 9:6-8.)

Plaintiffs contend they have sufficiently alleged Dr. Meadows had “special duties to protect Plaintiffs when they were entrusted to Meadows’ care” and a that Dr. Meadows breached that duty by failing to comply with his mandated reporter obligations. (Complaint ¶¶ 39, 120.)

The Court disagrees. The paragraph that Plaintiffs rely upon as alleging a duty, paragraph 120, does not set forth any specific allegations that Plaintiffs were ever entrusted to Dr. Meadows’ care. That paragraph only generally alleges that “Defendants” had special duties to protect the minor Plaintiffs. It is unclear how the minors were ever entrusted to Dr. Meadows’ care when the only allegations specific to Dr. Meadows are that he was a mentor, employee, and/or agent of Mr. Reger. Accordingly, the demurrer to the third, fourth, and sixth causes of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint for Damages in Department 54

IIED

The established elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are that a plaintiff must identify facts demonstrating that “(1) the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, severe emotional distress to the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff actually suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the emotional distress.” (Ross v. Creel Printing & Publ'g Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 736, 744-45.) The conduct at issue “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” (Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883.)

Dr. Meadows asserts “Plaintiffs have not alleged facts which would indicate Dr. Meadows acted with intent when he allegedly failed to report Mr. Reger.” (Demurrer at 9:9-10.)

Plaintiffs maintain they have sufficiently alleged Dr. Meadows acted with intent or reckless disregard because they have alleged Dr. Meadows failed to report Mr. Reger after receiving complaints about his misconduct. (Complaint ¶ 39.)

Despite Plaintiffs’ claims, the Complaint lacks allegations establishing Dr. Meadows intended to cause, or acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing, Plaintiffs severe emotional distress. As it currently stands, the allegations are only that Dr. Meadows somehow became aware of Mr. Reger’s misconduct and then did not comply with his mandated reporter allegations. These conclusory allegations are not sufficient. The demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Sexual Harassment (Civil Code section 51.9)

Civil Code section 51.9 provides liability for sexual harassment when (1) there is a business, service, or professional relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, (2) the defendant has made sexual advances or engaged in other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature or of a hostile nature based on gender, that were unwelcome and pervasive or severe, and (3) the plaintiff has suffered or will suffer economic loss or disadvantage or personal injury as a result of the conduct. (Civil Code § 51.9(a).) Civil Code section 51.9(a)(1)(E) explicitly defines a “business, service or professional relationship” to include one between the plaintiff and a “[p]hysician” or “[a] relationship that is substantially similar.” (Civil Code § 51.9(a)(1).)

According to Dr. Meadows, “[t]he scant facts alleging Dr. Meadows’ failure to report Mr.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint for Damages in Department 54

Reger cannot arise to the level of sexual harassment.” (Demurrer at 9:10-11.)

Plaintiffs contend they have alleged “[t]here existed a ‘business, service or professional relationship’ between Plaintiffs and Meadows, satisfying the first element. Complaint, ¶¶ 39, 48-50. Plaintiffs have pleaded that Reger made sexual advances that were based upon Plaintiffs’ gender that were unwelcome, pervasive, and severe, satisfying the second element. Complaint, ¶¶ 208-209.” (Opposition at 15:10-14.) Plaintiffs then contend they have alleged Defendants, such as Dr. Meadows, ratified Mr.

Reger’s conduct because they knew Mr. Reger was engaging in sexual abuse of minors and failed to investigate and an employer can be liable for an employee’s act under a theory of ratification. Even accepting all of the foregoing as true, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Dr. Meadows was Mr. Reger’s employer. At most, Dr. Meadows is alleged to have been Mr. Reger’s mentor, employee, and/or agent. (Complaint ¶ 39.) Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for sexual harassment against Dr.

Meadows and the demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Dr. Meadows argues “plaintiffs have not alleged any facts which would indicate Dr. Meadows owed any of the plaintiffs a fiduciary duty.” (Demurrer at 9:11-12.)

The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty include: 1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; 2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and 3) damage proximately caused by the breach. (Gutierrez v. Girardi (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 925, 932.)

According to Plaintiffs, “[Dr.] Meadows, as a licensed physician and employer of [Mr.] Reger, was a fiduciary since Plaintiffs were in a substantially vulnerable position. As patients/minor children, Plaintiffs bestowed trust and confidence in [Dr.] Meadows to take appropriate steps to prevent the lewd and lascivious conduct perpetrated by Reger against the Plaintiffs. Complaint, ¶ 226. Plaintiffs plead that defendants, including [Dr.] Meadows knew that [Mr.] Reger was perpetrating sexual abuse of Plaintiffs and did nothing to investigate, supervise, or monitor [Mr.] Reger but instead ratified [Mr.] Reger’s conduct by continual retention of Reger. Complaint, ¶¶ 211, 214-215. Further, Plaintiffs allege that [Dr.] Meadows failed to report and disclose the abuse perpetrated by Reger. Complaint, ¶ 226.” (Opposition at 11:17-24.)

Nowhere is it alleged that Dr. Meadows was Mr. Reger’s employer or Plaintiffs’ healthcare provider. In fact, it remains unclear what Dr. Meadows relationship was to Mr. Reger, the other co-defendants, and Plaintiffs. The Court cannot decipher from the minimal allegations lodged against him whether he was Mr. Reger’s treating physician,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint for Damages in Department 54

Plaintiffs’ treating physician, or a physician serving in some other relevant capacity. The demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Constructive Fraud

Dr. Meadows contends that Plaintiffs have failed to plead their cause of action for constructive fraud with the requisite particularity “as plaintiffs allege no facts whatsoever that Dr. Meadows attempted to conceal Mr. Reger’s sexual misconduct when he allegedly failed to report him.” (Demurrer at 9:12-15.)

Plaintiffs contend they have alleged Dr. Meadows was in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiffs, which Dr. Meadows breached by failing to properly supervise Mr. Reger, and that Dr. Meadows misrepresented, concealed or failed to disclose information relating to Mr. Reger’s misconduct. (Complaint ¶¶ 223-226, 246-250.)

The elements of constructive fraud require the plaintiff to establish '(1) a fiduciary relationship, (2) nondisclosure, (3) intent to deceive, and (4) reliance or resulting injury.' (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1249-1250; but see Cal. Civ. Code § 1573 [actual fraudulent intent not required].) 'A breach of a fiduciary duty usually constitutes constructive fraud.' (Knox v. Dean (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 417, 434.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a fiduciary relationship between Dr. Meadows and themselves and, in turn, failed to sufficiently allege this cause of action. The demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Uncertainty

Lastly, Dr. Meadows demurs on the ground the Complaint is uncertain because it alleges multiple instances of misconduct against multiple defendants. However, the allegations simply refer to “defendants” and fail to specify which misconduct is attributed to which defendant.

The demurrer for uncertainty is OVERRULED. The allegations are not so uncertain that Dr. Meadows cannot frame a response. Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are only granted where the complaint is so muddled that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. The favored approach is to clarify theories in the complaint through discovery. (See Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; 1 Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2014), sec. 7:85, p. 7(l)-39.)

Conclusion

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint for Damages in Department 54

Dr. Meadows’ demurrer as to the first cause of action for civil sex trafficking is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Dr. Meadows’ demurrer to the second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action on the ground they are time-barred pursuant to section 340.5 is OVERRULED.

Dr. Meadows’ demurrer to the second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action on the ground each fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Dr. Meadows’ demurrer based on uncertainty is OVERRULED.

Plaintiffs may file and serve a First Amended Complaint (“1AC”) no later than July 2, 2024. Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiffs are directed to present the clerk a copy of this ruling at the time of filing the 1AC.

Defendants may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of the 1AC, 35 days if served by mail.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or other notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure 367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV012006: JOHN NDJ DOE, et al. vs CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/18/2024 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint for Damages in Department 54

APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.