Simmons, et al v. Loma Linda University Shared Services, et al

jury to proceed to Ms. Simmons’s individual meal-period claim. The jury ultimately returned a defense verdict. Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant on March 26, 2026, and Defendant served notice of entry of judgment on April 9, 2026. Simmons and Ortiz move for new trial. Although Simmons is included in the notice, the motion seeks a new trial on the certified rounding claim and derivative waiting-time subclass, relief directed to Ortiz, the Rounding Class, and the Derivative Waiting Time Subclass.

Separately, Plaintiffs move for partial JNOV, but that motion seeks relief only on Simmons’s individual meal-period claim and derivative waiting-time penalty claim. Defendant opposes. ANALYSIS Motion for New Trial A motion for a new trial asks the court to reexamine one or more issues of fact or law after a trial and decision. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 656, 657.) The grounds for a new trial are: (1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial; (2) Misconduct of the jury; (3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against; (4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at trial; (5) Excessive or inadequate damages; (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against the law; and (7) Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.

A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.)

The procedural steps prescribed by law for making and determining new trial motions are mandatory and must be strictly followed. (Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 118; Pacific Trends Lamp & Lighting Products, Inc. v. J. White, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1135.) A party intending to move for a new trial shall file and serve a notice of intent to move for a new trial, designating the ground upon moving, and whether the same will be made upon affidavits, the minutes of the court, or both. (Code Civ. Proc., § 659, subd. (a).) Said notice shall be filed and

served (i) after the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment, or (ii) within 15 days after the mailing of the notice of entry of judgment or 180 days after entry of the judgment, whichever is earlier. (Code Civ. Proc., § 659, subd. (a).) These jurisdictional times are not extended by Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, stipulation, or order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 659, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468.) The motion is not determined until an order ruling on the motion is entered in the permanent minutes of the court or signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 660, subd. (c).) Plaintiffs move for a new trial on the certified rounding claim and derivative waiting-time claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivisions (1), (6), and (7). The motion is based on three grounds: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding that Defendant’s timekeeping system did not capture the exact amount of time worked; (2) the verdict is against law; and (3) attorney misconduct during closing argument. For the reasons set forth below, the motion should be denied.

Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict On a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivision (6), the Court may weigh the evidence, but a new trial may not be granted unless, after weighing the evidence and reasonable inferences from the entire record, the Court is convinced the jury clearly should have reached a different verdict. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (6).) Thus, it is not enough that the evidence could support a different result; the question is whether the jury clearly should have reached that result.

The certified rounding claim was submitted to the jury under the Camp/Woodworth framework. The first special-verdict question asked whether Defendant’s timekeeping system captured the exact amount of time worked by Merrisa Ortiz and members of the Rounding Class during the class period. The jury answered “No,” which ended the rounding claim under the verdict form. Plaintiffs contend the jury’s finding is unsupported because the evidence showed Defendant’s electronic timekeeping system recorded employees’ actual punch-in and punch-out times to the minute and then rounded those punches to the nearest tenth of an hour for payroll purposes.

Plaintiffs argue that, under Camp/Woodworth, the capture of actual punch times necessarily means the employer captured the exact amount of time worked.

The issue presented with this motion is not whether Plaintiffs presented evidence that could support a plaintiff verdict. The issue is whether the evidence supports the jury’s actual finding and it does. Defendant presented evidence from which the jury could reasonably distinguish exact punch time from exact “time worked.” Specifically, Defendant presented testimony that employees would wait at the clock, badge reader, or computer until the next rounding period before clocking out, and that employees leaving their shift would stand around and wait for the time to “click over” so they would get their full hour clock-in. (TT 1/28/26, 84:7-19, 85:23-86:9, 126:3- 20.)

The jury also had Simmons’s testimony that it took about five minutes to complete the signins needed before taking calls and that she had to sign back into the computer, IVR, and API after lunch before she was ready to take calls. (TT 2/2/26, 25:11-24, 30:14-31:1.) The evidence permitted the jury to find that the system captured recorded punches but did not necessarily capture the exact amount of time actually worked. Plaintiffs argue this evidence should be treated as legally irrelevant under Camp/Woodworth because the rounding claim concerns the employer’s substitution of rounded punch time for actual punch time.

But Camp does not require that result on this record. Camp is under review and is persuasive, not binding. Further, the first special-verdict question used the phrase “time worked,” not “time punched” or “recorded punch time.” The jury was entitled to consider evidence on whether recorded punch time was identical to actual time worked. Although Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant’s evidence goes only to damages, offset, or manipulation of the rounding policy, the evidence still provides a basis to conclude the jury was not required to accept Plaintiffs’ view that exact punch time necessarily equaled exact time worked.

Nor does Woodworth compel a different result at this stage. Woodworth does support Plaintiffs’ legal theory, but the jury was presented with evidence directed to whether the timekeeping system captured exact work time as opposed to exact punch time. Given the wording of the verdict form and the evidence presented, the record supports a reasonable inference in Defendant’s favor. Accordingly, the record does not support a finding that the jury clearly should have answered the first special-verdict question “Yes.”

Error in law Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivision (7), separately permits a new trial for an error in law occurring at trial and excepted to by the moving party. In the case at hand, Plaintiffs’ error-in-law theory overlaps with their against-law theory because both turn on the same premise:

Defendant’s distinction between exact punch time and exact time worked was legally unavailable under Camp/Woodworth. Plaintiffs separately argue the verdict is against law because Defendant’s distinction between “time worked” and “time punched” is contrary to Camp/Woodworth. Plaintiffs argue that as a matter of law, an electronic system that captures exact punch times captures exact time worked for purposes of a rounding claim. If that premise is accepted, the verdict would be legally defective.

In the case at hand, the jury was instructed under the Camp/Woodworth framework and was asked whether Defendant’s system captured the exact amount of time worked. Importantly, Plaintiffs did not request a clarifying instruction defining “time worked” as the time between recorded clock-in and clock-out punches, and the special-verdict form likewise did not define the phrase that way. Defendant’s theory was that exact punch times did not necessarily equal exact work time. For the reasons discussed above, that theory had evidentiary support in the record and was not foreclosed as a matter of law by the authorities on which Plaintiffs rely.

The verdict therefore is not against law. Irregularity in the proceedings by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial Plaintiffs’ misconduct argument is based on Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivision (1). To obtain relief on this ground, Plaintiffs must show an irregularity in the proceedings or misconduct that materially affected their substantial rights and prevented a fair trial. As used in section 657, the term “irregularity in proceedings” refers to “an overt act of the trial court, jury, or adverse party, violative of the right to a fair and impartial trial, amounting to misconduct.” (Gray v.

Robinson (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 177, 182.) The challenged argument does not meet that standard. Defendant’s counsel argued that the jury should answer “No” to the first special-verdict question because employees sometimes waited near time clocks or badge readers for the next rounding interval. That argument was based on testimony admitted at trial and on the wording of the special verdict, which asked whether the system captured exact “time worked.” Plaintiffs also did not preserve the misconduct claim.

Since the alleged misconduct was a discrete legal/evidentiary argument, an objection and admonition could have addressed it. A claim of attorney misconduct generally is forfeited absent a timely objection and request for admonition, unless the misconduct was too serious to be cured. (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995)

35 Cal.App.4th 112, 129, disapproved on other grounds in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189.) Lastly, Plaintiffs’ allegation of misconduct depends on the premise that Defendant’s “time worked” theory was legally prohibited. Because that premise is not established, the closing argument does not amount to an irregularity in the proceedings or misconduct warranting a new trial. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) “The court, before the expiration of the power to rule on a motion for new trial ... shall render judgment in favor of the aggrieved party notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion for a directed verdict for the aggrieved party should have been granted had a previous motion been made.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 629, subd. (a).) A JNOV may be granted if the evidence appears, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, that there is no substantial evidence 1 to support the verdict, but should be denied if there is any substantial evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, in support of the verdict. (Burch v. CertainTeed Corp. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 341, 348.) Additionally, a JNOV may be granted to some issues or causes of action. (Dell’Oca v. Bank of New York Trust Co., N.A. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 531, 553.)

The Court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. (Hansen v. Sunnyside Products, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510.) However, it can consider inconsistent testimonies in determining if sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict. (Burch v. CertainTeed, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) The Court further can rely on erroneously submitted evidence in determining if substantial evidence was presented. (Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc. (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 593, 609-10.)

Yet all evidentiary conflicts and reasonable inferences are resolved to support the judgment. (Burch v. CertainTeed, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) Plaintiffs move for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Simmons’s individual meal-period claim and derivative waiting-time penalty claim. Plaintiffs argue the verdict cannot stand because Simmons’s time records showed 118 missed, short, or late meal periods, which triggered the rebuttable presumption recognized in Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58 (Donohue).

Plaintiffs contend Defendant failed to rebut the presumption because it did

1 Substantial evidence is that of a ponderable legal significance, reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Burch v. CertainTeed Corp. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 341, 348.)

not present evidence that Simmons was compensated for those meal periods or that she voluntarily chose to take noncompliant meal periods. The argument does not satisfy the JNOV standard. Donohue recognizes a rebuttable presumption where time records show noncompliant meal periods. (Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 76-77.) However, Donohue does not eliminate the substantial-evidence standard after a jury verdict. On JNOV, the question remains whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, contains substantial evidence to support the jury’s determination. (Burch v.

CertainTeed, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) In the case at hand, the jury expressly found that Defendant proved, for each of the 118 workdays, that it provided Simmons a reasonable opportunity to take uninterrupted 30-minute meal breaks on time, did not impede or discourage her from taking those breaks, relieved her of all duties, and relinquished control over her activities during the breaks. (Notice of Entry of Judgment, Ex. A, Judgment Upon Jury Verdict, pp. 4-5.) Those findings correspond to the employer’s obligation to provide, but not police, meal periods. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v.

Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1040.) Substantial evidence supports those findings. Defendant presented evidence that Access Center employees were trained on the meal-and-rest policies, that employees were told they were entitled to 30-minute meal periods and should have the opportunity to take meal periods before the fifth hour, and that employees were trained on how to request meal-period premium pay. (TT 2/4/26, 127:19-130:3.) Defendant also presented evidence that employees had flexibility in taking meal periods, that employees were not instructed to return early from lunch, and that employees could choose to take shorter meal periods. (TT 2/4/26, 130:16-132:18, 135:10-21.)

Defendant further relied on evidence that Simmons did not report that she was denied a compliant meal period or request premium pay. (TT 2/4/26, 134:1-21.) Defendant also relied on Simmons’s pay-period attestations and the jury’s ability to assess her contrary testimony regarding the buddy system and workplace pressures. (TT 2/2/26, 27:13-31:1, 73:21-74:24.) The jury could reasonably infer from Defendant’s evidence that Simmons was provided compliant meal periods and that any noncompliant entries reflected employee choice rather than employer noncompliance.

Finally, Defendant’s theory was not limited to Friday early-outs. The waiver and attestations were part of the broader evidentiary record from which the jury could draw reasonable inferences regarding Simmons’s knowledge and Defendant’s reporting process. The evidence need

not be conclusive to defeat JNOV. As a JNOV is not warranted on Simmons’s underlying mealperiod claim, there is no unpaid meal-period premium on which to base derivative waiting-time penalties. RULING 1. Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

2. Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is DENIED.

3. Movant to give Notice.