Juan Andrade-Ortega vs APEX CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC., a California corporation et al

In support of his opposition, Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the following items: (1) The Respondent’s notice of appeal, dated February 19, 2026: Exhibit A; and (2) Plaintiff’s declaration in support of his opposition to the motion to compel arbitration filed on October 17, 2025: Exhibit B.

Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), permits judicial notice of records of any court of this state or any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452, subd. (d).) Exhibits A-B are court records, therefore they are proper items of judicial notice. Thus, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the documents but does not take notice of the truth of any disputed contents. (Oh v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. of America (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 71, 79-81 (Oh).) Thus, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

III. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff submits evidentiary objections to the declarations of Eric Stilwell (“Stilwell”), Vicente Castro (“Castro”), and Halli Spaulding (“Spaulding”), which are submitted in support of Defendants’ motion.

Objections 1-6 are OVERRULED.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section 1008 represents the Legislature’s attempt to regulate what the Supreme Court has referred to as ‘repetitive motions.’ [Citation.]” (Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 868, 885, disapproved on other grounds in Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830.) Motions for reconsideration are regulated by section 1008, subdivision (a), which requires that any such motion be: (1) filed within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order of which reconsideration is sought, (2) supported by new or additional facts, circumstances or law, and (3) accompanied by an affidavit detailing the circumstances of the first motion and the respects in which the new motion differs from it. (Ibid.)

V. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues this Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter because Defendants appealed the Order. Code of Civil Procedure section 916, provides, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 916, subd. (a).)

While the Court’s docket shows that Defendants commenced an appeal on February 19, 2026, the docket also shows that a notice of completion from the Sixth District Court of Appeal was filed on May 14, 2026. Thus, it does not appear there is an appeal pending and the Court has jurisdiction over this matter.

B. New and Different Facts

Defendants argue that reconsideration is proper because the Court did not receive the new translation and was unable to consider grounds for denial under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.1. (Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“MPA”), p. 3:20-22.) They further argue that Defendants’ authorized agents created new and dispositive facts which were not taken into account in the original order because the declaration was not yet available at that time and the Court did not have the chance to consider the motion to compel arbitration on its merits. (MPA, pp. 4:24-5:2.)

In the Order, the Court (Hon. Adams) denied the motion and reasoned:

Here, the Spanish-language agreement is purportedly the operative document, and the only document that contains a signature. Defendants have not produced a certification that any English-language document is a translation of the Spanish-language agreement. While Castro and Stilwell indicate that the copies

are true and correct, neither of them state that they are qualified interpreters, and Defendants present no actual translation of the agreement that comports with rule 3.1110(g). Rather, Defendants present two documents, one in a foreign language that was purportedly signed by Plaintiff and another they claim is an English version of the same document. But the Rules of Court are clear that a non-English document must be accompanied by a certified translation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(g).) Furthermore, upon reviewing both exhibits, the Court found noticeable differences between the two documents, including that the Spanish-language document contains a paragraph of bolded text at the end of it and there are a different number of headings throughout. Accordingly, the Court must disregard this evidence.

Without a true and correct translation of the operative agreement Defendants claim apply here, the Court is unable to determine that an agreement to arbitrate exists and if so, what terms Plaintiff has allegedly agreed to. Accordingly, the Court must find that Defendants have not met their burden to show the existence of an enforceable agreement, and the motion must be denied. (Order, pp. 5:16-6:9 [emphasis original].)

Now Defendants seek to introduce the certified English translation packet which includes the purported arbitration agreement and is translated and certified by Diana Maria Maldonado (“Maldonado”). (See Spaulding Decl., Exh. C.) However, the language of rule 3.1110(g) is clear that “an English translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter” is required for exhibit written in a foreign language. (See Cal. Rule of Ct. 3.1110(g).) Therefore, Defendants’ contention that the Court improperly applied rule 3.1110(g) is not sufficient to support the instant motion. (See Gilbert v.

AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500 [“since in almost all instances, the losing party will believe that the trial court’s ‘different’ interpretation of the law or facts was erroneous,” the assertion that the court misapplied facts or law when ruling on a prior motion is insufficient to support a motion for reconsideration.].)

Defendants contend that they interpreted the rule differently (i.e., only a translation of the non-English agreement certified under oath by a qualified interpreter was necessary) and thus, they now present new and different facts. (MPA, p. 6:3-8.) This is not persuasive because Defendants relied on the Stilwell and Castro declarations in support of the motion to compel arbitration and as the Court noted in the Order, they did not make any representations about being a qualified interpreter. Defendants have not and do not make assertions that Stilwell or Castro are qualified interpreters. Thus, Defendants did not satisfy their own purported interpretation. As such, it does not appear there was any efforts taken to satisfy Rule 3.1110(g).

Moreover, the Court noted several differences between the copies submitted. In fact, the certified translation by Maldonado contains an entire bold paragraph, which was not contained in the translation relied on by Defendants. Thus, in the absence of certified translation or any attestation under oath by a qualified interpreter, the Court was unable to analyze what exactly was agreed to under the arbitration agreement. The fact that Defendants became aware of this issue after the tentative ruling was posted and subsequently sought to fix it, does not constitute “new or different” facts for purposes of reconsideration because Defendants admit to knowing about the procedural requirement for foreign language documents and as explained above, they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure

to produce the necessary translation at an earlier time.4 (See Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457 [“the party seeking reconsideration must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time.”]; see also New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213 [the burden under section 1008 is “comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could no, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.”].)

Next, Defendants argue the Court should reconsider its ruling because of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 (“Section 1281.2”), which provides,

On a petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that (a) the right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petition; or (b) grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.... (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2 [emphasis added].)

Defendants’ reliance on Section 1281.2 is unavailing because it requires a determination by the Court that an agreement to arbitrate existed. In the Order, the Court explicitly stated that, “the Court is unable to determine that an agreement to arbitrate exists and if so, what terms Plaintiff has allegedly agreed to. Accordingly, the Court must find that Defendants have not met their burden to show the existence of an enforceable agreement, and the motion must be denied. (Order, p. 6:6-9 [emphasis added].)

Here, the Court did not determine that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, which was Defendants’ burden. (See Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165-166; see also Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, 829.) Consequently, Section 1281.2 is not applicable here because the required determination was not made by the Court.

While the Court has inherent power to reconsider its own orders at any time on it own motion (see Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107), for reasons stated above, it does not see a basis to do so here.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants have not set forth new and different facts or a change in the law to support their motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

4 In the reply, Defendants assert that they were unaware of the rule. However, as this was asserted for the first time in the reply, the Court declines to consider it. (See Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764 [points raised for the first time in reply brief will not ordinarily be considered, because this would deprive respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument]; L.A. Taxi Cooperative, Inc. v. The Independent Taxi Owners Assn. of Los Angeles (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 918, 926, fn. 7 [contention forfeited where raised for the first time in reply brief without a showing of good cause].) Similarly, the Court will not consider other arguments and evidence offered for the first time in the reply. (Ibid.)

VI. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

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