Stacee Cootes v. Vincent Spohn et al

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

“If a deponent fails to answer any question ..., the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (§ 2025.480, subd. (a); see also § 2025.460, subd. (e).) “A deponent who has objected to a question and refused to answer bears the burden of justifying such refusal on the motion to compel.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) § 8:814.)

Here, Defendants’ motion is accompanied by (1) a declaration detailing the attempted meet and confer efforts to avoid motion practice, met by Plaintiff’s counsel’s refusal, (2) a copy of relevant excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition transcript, and (3) a separate statement of 42 questions2 and responses in dispute with the factual and legal reasons for filing the motion to compel. Moreover, the motion is timely as it was made “no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition.” (§ 2025.480, subd. (b).) The Court adopts as reasonable Defendants’ interpretation of the term “completion of the record of the deposition” as being on March 12, 2026—the date upon which the transcript was available to the parties. (See also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) §§ 8:789, 8:793, 8:801.)

Defendants having met their procedural burden of filing a motion to compel and all supporting papers required, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to justify her refusal to answer.

Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden. In Opposition, Plaintiff (1) fails to file a responsive Separate Statement; (2) makes general, overarching arguments—with no reference to the record, specific questions, or area of testimony—asserting that defense counsel asked harassing, overbroad, and irrelevant questions, sought information protected by the attorney client or work product privilege, and asked questions that violated Plaintiff’s right to privacy; and (3) submits three pages of the deposition transcript, which in no way support Plaintiff’s contention that they “fully illustrate the harassing nature of the questioning” (see Declaration of Eric Bryan Seuthe (“Seuthe Decl.”), ¶ 16, Exhs. 4-5).

Furthermore, the Court has reviewed Defendants’ Separate Statement and finds the objections improper. First, neither Defendants’ Separate Statement nor the transcript excerpt show that Plaintiff’s counsel objected to the subject questions based on privacy. Plaintiff’s attempt to assert that objection for the first time in Opposition is too late and therefore improper. Second, Plaintiff’s counsel’s objections that sound in “harassing,” “overbroad,” “relevance,” “repetitive,” “argumentative,” “vague,” “ambiguous,” etc. are not a proper basis to instruct a deponent not to answer. “It is generally improper...for counsel to instruct a witness not to answer on grounds other than privilege, privacy, trade secrets or other matters statutorily or constitutionally exempt from discovery.” (Weil & Brown, Cal.

Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) § 8:734.2, p. 8E-123 citing Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1013-15.) Third, the Court’s review of the questions where Plaintiff was instructed not to respond based upon attorney/client communication confirms that the objection was misplaced. The questions simply call for a yes or no response and do not require Plaintiff to disclose the contents of any attorney-client privileged information.

2 The Separate Statement does not number the questions; however, the Support Memorandum contends that “[i]n total, Plaintiff was instructed and refused to answer no less than 42 questions....” (Support Memo, p. 3.)

Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully ... opposes a motion to compel an answer ..., unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (§ 2025.480, subd. (j).)

The Court finds neither that Plaintiff acted with substantial justification nor that other circumstances make imposition of sanctions unjust. The Court finds that the hourly rate charged by counsel is reasonable. (See Graft Decl. at ¶ 14.) The Court further finds that 17 hours is a reasonable number of billable hours for preparation of the motion and accompanying papers. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ request for sanctions as against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel is GRANTED. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are jointly and severally ordered to pay to Defendants, care of their attorney of record, within 10 calendar days of notice of entry of this order, sanctions in the amount of $4,110.

[2] DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUEST FRO PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE; AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,460

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED. Within 10 calendar days of notice of entry of this order, Plaintiff shall serve on Defendants a further document production with all remaining responsive documents to the Subject Discovery (defined below), and Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are jointly and severally ordered to pay to Defendants, care of their attorney of record, sanctions in the amount of $2,460. Defendants shall provide notice of entry of order.

The moving party fails to include, in the notice of this motion, the current version of the Tentative Ruling notice required by Local Rule 2.9, effective 1/1/26. The current version allows a party or counsel to request a hearing by calling the Court or emailing the Court, at JudicialReception2@napa.courts.ca.gov and providing specified information set out in Local Rule 2.9. The moving party is therefore directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the current Tentative Ruling notice explicitly required by Local Rule 2.9 to opposing party/ies forthwith.

The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

Defendants Vincent Spohn and Law Offices Of Vincent M. Spohn (collectively “Attorney Spohn”) and Bruce Ketron (collectively with Attorney Spohn, “Defendants”) move, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.320,3 for an order compelling Plaintiff Stacee Cootes (“Plaintiff”) to comply with Attorney Spohn’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 1, 8, 12, 13, 21, and 22 (“Subject Discovery”). (Notice of Motion; Separate 3 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

Statement.) Defendants also move for an order granting monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,460 against Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s counsel, Eric B. Seuthe of Law Offices of Eric Bryan Seuthe & Associates.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendants’ Support Memorandum and Proposed Order include a request to compel Plaintiff to provide further responses to the Subject Discovery. This request is not contained in the Notice of Motion, nor is it argued in the Separate Statement. It is unclear to the Court what further responses Defendants are looking for. Based on the foregoing, the Court disregards Defendants’ uncertain request for further responses and construes Defendants’ Motion only as it was noticed—for an order compelling Plaintiff to comply with her production obligations and for related sanctions.

If the responding party agrees to comply with a Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010 demand but then fails to do so, compliance may be compelled on appropriate motion. (§ 2031.320, subd. (a).) All that has to be shown is the responding party’s failure to comply as agreed. (Ibid.; see Standon Co., Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Kim) (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 903.)

In response to the Subject Discovery, Plaintiff stated that she (1) performed a reasonable and diligent search of all documents in her possession, custody, and control, (2) produces all which have not been produced by Vincent Spohn, and (3) believes that any other documents in existence are in the possession, custody, or control of Defendant. (Separate Statement, pp. 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13.)

Defendants show that the Subject Discovery requests obligated Plaintiff to produce text, phone, and email communications between her and third party witness, Laurie Carlson, who is a former employee of Attorney Spohn. (See generally Separate Statement.) Defendants further show that, at Plaintiff’s deposition, she admitted to having records of these communications and that, after the deposition, Plaintiff initially agreed she would produce them. (Declaration of Alex A. Graft (“Graft Decl.”), ¶ 6, Exh.

E, at pp.15:12-13, 172:8-9; ¶¶ 8, 9.) Defendants argue that, although Plaintiff subsequently produced further documents, the production appears incomplete because, most notably, no phone logs or text messages were produced. (Id., ¶¶ 11-12.) Defendants brought this to Plaintiff’s attention in an attempt to meet and confer prior to bringing the present motion, but Plaintiff never responded. (Id., ¶ 12, Exh. J.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s discovery responses do not assert any privilege or privacy objections which could conceivably allow for the withholding of responsive documents.

Thus, Defendants request that Plaintiff be ordered to produce all remaining responsive documents.

Plaintiff implicitly concedes the foregoing by failing to file a response or opposition.

It appears to the Court from Defendants’ showing that, while Plaintiff agreed to comply with the Subject Discovery requests, she failed to completely and fully do so. As such, the Motion is GRANTED.

“[T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel compliance with a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other

circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (§ 2031.320, subd. (b).) Moreover, “[t]he court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed.” (Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a).)

The Court finds neither that Plaintiff acted with substantial justification nor that other circumstances make imposition of sanctions unjust. The Court finds that the hourly rate charged by counsel is reasonable. (See Graft Decl. at ¶ 14.) The Court further finds that 10 hours is a reasonable number of billable hours for preparation of the motion. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ request for sanctions as against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel is GRANTED. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are jointly and severally ordered to pay to Defendants, care of their attorney of record, within 10 calendar days of notice of entry of this order, sanctions in the amount of $2,460.

Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation 25CV000695 District v. California Vacation Holdings Group, LLC et al

DEFENDANT BRIAN LEE SHUTTS’ MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE ACTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

Defendant Brian Lee Shutts, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a), and California Rules of Court, rule 3.350, for an order consolidating: Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District v. California Vacation Holdings Group, LLC, et al., Case No. 25CV000695 (Eminent Domain Action) with California Vacation Club v. Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, et al., Case No. 24CV001395 (Breach of Contract Action).

California Vacation Club’s objections to those of Mr. Shutts’ arguments raised for the first time through his Reply, and the evidence submitted in support thereof, is well taken. (See Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010 [“[t]he salutary rule is that points raised in a reply brief for the first time will not be considered unless good cause is shown for the failure to present them before”].) The instant ruling is made without regard to the evidence and arguments raised for the first time through the Reply.

“When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court . . . it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048, subs. (a).) The purpose of consolidation is to promote convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, especially regarding proof of issues common to both actions. (Wouldridge v. Burnes (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 82, 86.)

The Eminent Domain Action is brought by Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (NC Flood Control District) to obtain, through the power of eminent

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