NAVID MOEINI, AN INDIVIDUAL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA

The Complaint was filed on February 26, 2026, alleging several claims against Defendant for violation of the Song-Beverly Act, including failure to repurchase or replace after a reasonable number of repair attempts (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (d)); failure to commence repairs within a reasonable time or complete repairs within 30 days (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (b)); failure to provide service literature and replacement parts (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (a)(3)); breach of express written warranty (Civ. Code, § 1791.2); and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (Civ. Code, §§ 1791.1).

On April 22, 2026, Defendant filed the instant motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 26, 2026. Defendant filed a reply memorandum on June 1, 2026.

III.

Discussion

A. Legal Framework: Motions to Compel Arbitration

“A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.)

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)

B. Application

1. Existence of An Arbitration Agreement

“[I]n ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute. [citations] General principles of California contract law guide the court in making this determination.” (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541; Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122, 1128 [quoting Mendez].)”

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“The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement[.]” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) “A party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement. A signed agreement is not necessary, however, and a party's acceptance may be implied in fact[.]” (Id.)

“Although the party seeking arbitration bears the ultimate burden of proof as to the existence of an arbitration agreement, the burden of producing evidence on the issue may shift pursuant to a three-step process recognized by California courts.” (Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, 830.) “The first step requires the party seeking arbitration to carry the initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy. [citations] If that initial burden is met, the second step requires the party opposing arbitration to carry the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. [citation] If the opposing party meets the burden of producing sufficient evidence, the third step requires the party seeking arbitration to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties formed a valid contract to arbitrate their dispute.” (Ibid. [citations omitted].)

“The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent's signature.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543–544; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “Alternatively, the moving party can meet its burden by setting forth the agreement's provisions in the motion.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v.

Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 [quoting Condee]; see also People v. Skiles (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1178, 1187 [“The means of authenticating a writing are not limited to those specified in the Evidence Code.” (citing Evid. Code, § 1410)].] and ibid. [“For example, a writing can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence and by its contents.”].)

Here, Defendant has set forth the agreement’s provision in its motion and has also produced a copy of the arbitration agreement. (Memorandum at 4:1 – 5:16; Ameripour Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 2 at pp. 12-14.) Defendant has thus met its initial burden. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)

“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165; see also Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755 [“If the movant bears its initial burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual dispute as to the agreement's existence [.]”].) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)

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Here, Plaintiff submits his declaration, attached to which is a copy of the Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”) between him and the dealership, Westlake Coach Company LLC. (Moeini Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. 1.) The Court has reviewed the RISC and found that the arbitration provision at issue is not found within it.

Plaintiff asserts he inquired about the warranty during pre-sale communications and was assured that the vehicle was warranted under “Defendant’s express warranty.” But he further asserts that “[a]t no point during these pre-sale communications was I ever shown a copy of the warranty or otherwise informed by Dealer that any warranty claims against Defendant after the sale would be subject to a binding arbitration provision contained within the Owner’s Handbook.” (Id., ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff also asserts as follows: To the best of my memory, I was never personally provided with a copy of any Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information booklet when I purchased the Subject Vehicle. Additionally, I was never given notice by either Dealer or Defendant that a subsequent enforceable Arbitration Provision existed inside the Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information booklet. Nor was I ever given notice by either Dealer or Defendant that I was required to opt out of this post-sale “Arbitration Agreement” within thirty (30) days of my purchase.

I only became aware of the alleged post-sale “Arbitration Agreement” and its opt-out procedures by virtue of the instant Motion. Thus, prior to this Motion, I was completely oblivious to the post-sale “Arbitration Agreement” that is buried within the Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information booklet’s approximately 50 pages. Therefore, I did not assent to arbitration. (Id., ¶ 5.)

Further, Plaintiff asserts that he never signed any agreement to arbitrate, nor relied on the Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information booklet to confirm the enforceability of Defendant’s express warranty or in alleging his statutory claims under Song-Beverly. (Id., ¶¶ 6-7.) The Court finds Plaintiff’s declaration testimony sufficient to shift the burden back to Defendant, who retains the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of an agreement.

In its reply, Defendant points to the allegations of the Complaint, citing paragraph 9, in which Plaintiff alleges: “Plaintiff received an express written warranty in which Defendant HMA undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the Vehicle or to provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance for a specified period of time.” (Complaint, ¶ 9.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot use the warranty as the foundational basis for his claims only to disavow the provisions of the warranty with which he disagrees. (Reply at 2:22 – 6:22.)

The Second Appellate District’s recent decision in Kostandian v. American Honda Motor Co. (2026) ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___, 2026 WL 1495175 is instructive, although its facts are distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiff leased an alleged defective Acura, eventually filing suit in which claims were alleged against the dealer and the manufacturer, including warranty claims. (Id. at *1.) Both the lease agreement and the warranty booklet contained arbitration provisions.

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(Id. at *1 - *2.) The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and the defendants appealed. (Id. at *1.) As to the manufacturer, the trial court found that it could not enforce the arbitration agreement because it was not a signatory to the agreement or an assignee. (Id. at *2.) Further, as to the warranty booklet’s arbitration, “the trial court indicated such provisions are viewed with a high degree of skepticism as they bind consumers who remain silent during the opt-out period.” (Id. at *3.)

Moreover, “the court explained warranties generally do not impose obligations on the buyer. The court concluded respondent's acknowledgment of receiving warranty information was insufficient to show he mutually assented to the arbitration agreement.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal initially found that the manufacture had established the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, summarizing the defendants’ evidence as follows: Appellants produced a copy of this booklet containing American Honda Motor's express warranties for the subject vehicle and an arbitration agreement.

Appellants also recited verbatim the relevant provisions of the booklet's arbitration agreement in their moving papers. The agreement's language indicates any disputes between respondent and American Honda Motor as to their relationship, including any claims related to respondent's warranty and the performance or manufacturing of American Honda Motor's products, is to be decided by arbitration, not a judge or jury. The agreement also specifies respondent may opt out of arbitration within 30 days after the vehicle's delivery date, but respondent is bound to the agreement if he does not opt out.

Appellants presented a document, the final inspection at delivery sheet, showing respondent provided his signature and initials confirming his receipt of the owner's manual and warranty information.

Accordingly, appellants satisfied their initial burden of establishing an arbitration agreement as to American Honda Motor. Appellants presented a copy of the agreement, stated the relevant terms thereof verbatim, and provided the necessary allegations. The burden therefore shifted to respondent to dispute the existence of an arbitration agreement as to American Honda Motor. (Id. at *6.)

The Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff buyer failed to meet his burden in opposing the existence of the agreement, reasoning as follows: While respondent here posits there was no mutual assent since he did not receive the warranty booklet until after the sale was completed, no evidence was presented supporting this assertion. Respondent provided no declaration stating when he received the warranty booklet. Even if respondent had provided such statements, they would be at odds with his signings confirming he received the vehicle's warranty information as well as his pleadings indicating “representations were made [to respondent] in Manufacturer's New Vehicle Limited Warranty.” In addition, respondent does not argue he had no reason to believe he had a contractual relationship with American Honda Motor.

Thus, respondent failed to meet his burden of proof in disputing the existence of an arbitration agreement with American Honda Motor. (Id. at *7.)

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In reaching its decision, the court in Kostandian found it critical that the plaintiff buyer had failed to introduce evidence of when he received the warranty booklet. Here, Plaintiff has introduced evidence related to the presentation of the booklet: He asserts that he “was never personally provided with a copy of any Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information booklet when I purchased the Subject Vehicle.” (Moeini Decl., ¶ 5 [emphasis added].)

The court in Kostandian also placed importance on the fact that the plaintiff buyer had signed a document confirming receipt of the warranty information and also on the fact that his pleadings alleged that representations were made “in Manufacturer’s New Vehicle Limited Warranty.” Here, in contrast, Defendant has not introduced evidence that Plaintiff signed anything acknowledging receipt of the particular warranty booklet offered by Defendant in support of its motion and, as set forth above, the arbitration provision on which Defendant bases its motion differs from the one contained in the RISC.

Nor has Defendant submitted a declaration from any dealership employee, from its own representative, or from a custodian with personal knowledge showing that Plaintiff was provided the warranty booklet at or before the sale, that the arbitration provision was called to Plaintiff’s attention, or that Plaintiff had actual or inquiry notice of the opt-out procedure during the 30-day opt-out period. Defendant’s counsel’s declaration merely attaches the handbook and states that it is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Owner’s Handbook and Warranty Information.

Thus, Plaintiff’s declaration testimony is uncontradicted. Counsel’s declaration fails to establish that he has personal knowledge of the purchase and issuance of the warranty booklet to Plaintiff. Accordingly, it is insufficient to establish notice or assent.

The Court also rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s use of the vehicle constituted acceptance of the arbitration provision. Defendant’s argument is based on a term that is likewise “buried” in the same lengthy document. (See generally Moving Papers at 9:19 – 10:2.) A party generally is not bound by inconspicuous contractual terms that were not reasonably communicated before the alleged acceptance. (Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 987, 993 [“[A]n offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he was unaware, contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.”; Long v.

Provide Commerce, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 855, 862 [quoting Windsor Mills].) Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges receipt of an express written warranty and statutory warranty rights. But it does not allege that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate disputes with Defendant. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s post-sale use of the vehicle or alleged receipt of warranty repairs, without evidence of prior notice of the arbitration provision, does not constitute assent to arbitrate.

The Court also rejects Defendant’s equitable estoppel argument because Defendant, which has the ultimate burden of proof, has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the warranty it offers is the same one that was issued to Plaintiff.

In sum, Defendant has not carried its threshold burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between itself and Plaintiff. As such, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s unconscionability arguments.

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IV.

Disposition

For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies the motion to compel arbitration and the requested stay of proceedings.

Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling.

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