Masaoka v. Ayres Self Storage

At his deposition, plaintiff clarified his allegations by testifying as follows. At the time of the incident, plaintiff loaded a bed frame (weighing about 100-120 lbs.) and 7-10 boxes (each weighing about 50-80 lbs.) onto two rolling carts that were already in the subject freight elevator, closed the elevator entrance access door, and pushed the “up” button to send the items to the second floor. (Holaday Decl. at Ex. 1 [Pl. Depo. at pp. 47-53].) Plaintiff took the stairs and arrived at the second

floor before the elevator stopped moving. (Id. at Ex. 1 [Pl. Depo. p. 57].) Plaintiff waited for the elevator on the second floor, approximately 1.5–3 feet away from the elevator doors. (Id. at Ex. 1 [Pl. Depo. pp. 57-58].) When the elevator stopped moving, plaintiff heard a loud crash coming from the inside of the elevator and the elevator doors flung open on their own. (Id. at Ex. 1 [Pl. Depo. p. 58].) When the doors flung open, one of the doors “tore [his] shoe and the upper part of [his] foot was ripped open,” and “mangled” his foot. (Id. at Ex. 1 [Pl. Depo. pp. 60-61.) “Then something hit [him] in the forehead,” causing plaintiff to fall and hit the back of his head on the floor. (Ibid.)

Defendant contends that the litigation has no merit and that plaintiff has no reasonable probability of prevailing in this action based on the declaration of its expert mechanical engineer, Brad Rutledge, MS PE. (See Mtn. Memo. P&As at pp. 5, 14-20.) Mr. Rutledge’s declaration does not negate these allegations or otherwise show that there is no reasonable probability that plaintiff will prevail in this litigation, as discussed below.

Mr. Rutledge’s declaration does not establish that defendant was not negligent. Specifically, Mr. Rutledge declares the elevator displayed a Conveyance Permit with an expiration date of 1/25/17. (Rutledge Decl. ¶ 16.) He then declares that “[t]he subject elevator was inspected independently by the State of California Department of Industrial Relations Division of Occupational Safety and Health with Conveyance Permits issued before and after the claimed incident” (id. ¶¶ 6, 19, 23)—but fails to provide any relevant dates or otherwise state that the elevator was in fact properly permitted at the time of the incident on 10/22/21. (See id., in passim.)

Merely claiming that the elevator was properly permitted “before” the incident (which could be before 1/25/17) and “after” the incident does not show that it was properly permitted for use at the time of the incident. Mr. Rutledge further declares the subject elevator was serviced and “had maintenance performed on [5/5/21]” by a private elevator service company (Doc Pros) “approximately 5 months prior to the claimed incident” (id. ¶¶ 7, 20), but fails to provide any further information regarding this service visit, such as why the elevator needed service/maintenance in the first place or whether the requested service/maintenance was properly performed and/or fixed whatever issue it was meant to address.

Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate the litigation has “no merit” or that there is no reasonable probability that

the plaintiff will prevail based on the weight of the evidence. Defendant has also failed to provide any argument or authority as to how, on these facts, plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law. (See Mtn. Memo. P&As, in passim.)

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (d), (h).)

Trial is set for September 21, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. in Department C28. The parties are ordered to comply with the court’s standing order and Local Rule 317. Should plaintiff desire a trial by jury, plaintiff is ordered to post jury fees on or before August 21, 2026. Failure to post jury fees could result in a waiver of the right to a jury trial.

Defendant shall give notice of this ruling.

52. Matthew R. Petitioners Matthew R. Silver and Civica Law Group APC’s Silver and motion to appoint receiver is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Civica Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 564 [authorizing receivership].) Group APC While moving petitioners request a receivership to enforce an v. Curtis R. injunction which does not appear mandatory on its face, the Wright practical effect of the requested relief, allowing appointment of 2025- a receiver with broad powers over respondents’ business, is 01478015 barred by the appellate stay. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 916, subd. (a) [“the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby”]; Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1040-1041 [appellate stays re: mandatory vs. prohibitory injunctions]; Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189-190 [“In determining whether a proceeding is embraced in or affected by the appeal, we must consider the appeal and its possible outcomes in relation to the proceeding and its possible results ...

A trial court proceeding ... affects the effectiveness of an appeal if the possible outcomes on appeal and the actual or possible results of the proceeding are irreconcilable ... [or] if the very purpose of the appeal is to avoid the need for that proceeding”].)

As the motion is denied due to the appellate stay and the court does not reach the merits at this time, moving party’s request for judicial notice is also DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 295 [court is not required to take judicial notice of irrelevant documents].)

Petitioners shall give notice of this ruling.