Kassandra Reyes v. Joseph Cappalla

In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court treats the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. (Tarin v. Lind (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 395, 403–404.)

1 CDCR is also sued as the State of California. 2 Plaintiff’s prayer seeks “injunctive relief as described above” against CDCR, along with monetary damages. However, none of Plaintiff’s causes of action seek injunctive relief or describe the type of relief sought. 1

II. Government Claims Act (Act)

In order to assert a claim against a public entity or state employee for money damages, a litigant must first present a claim to the state entity. (Gov. Code, §§ 945.4; 950.2; N.G. v. County of San Diego (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 63, 72; Watson v. State of California (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.) 3 Here, Defendants are a state agency and a state employee, and Plaintiff’s claims in her first, and third through seventh causes of action are for money damages; therefore a claim must have been presented in order for to Plaintiff to sue.

For a claim to be properly submitted, it must include certain specific information. (Gov. Code, § 910.) A claim shall be presented to the state by either delivering it to an office of the Department of General Services, or by mailing it to the Department of General Services at its principal office. (Gov. Code, § 915(b).) A claim shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance even though it is not delivered or mailed as provided, if, within the prescribed time, the claim is actually received by the office of the Department of General Services. (Gov. Code, § 915(e)(2); DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 989-992 [compliance is deemed satisfied only by actual receipt by the statutorily designated persons or agency].)

The claim must be filed with the public entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action for personal injury or property damage, and one year for other causes of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) If a claim is not timely made, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim, but only if the application is filed within one year after accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.4.)

A plaintiff may not file suit until the claim has been acted upon or deemed rejected. (Gov. Code, § 945.4.) Timely presentation of a claim is a condition precedent to suit and an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209, as modified (Oct. 10, 2007) [superseded by statute on other grounds].) “A plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. Otherwise, his complaint is subject to a general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal 4th 1234, 1243.)

“Even if the public entity has actual knowledge of facts that might support a claim, the claims statutes still must be satisfied.” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990; see also Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 374 [“It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in the face of the public entity's actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim. Such knowledge-

3 A plaintiff does not need to file a separate claim against the public employee for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee, but presentation of a claim against the employing entity is a prerequisite to suit against the employee. (Gov. Code, § 950.2; Olden v. Hatchell (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1034.)

standing alone-constitutes neither substantial compliance nor basis for estoppel.”]; Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1121-1123 [pendency of Labor Commission complaint did not toll period for filing government claim].)

III.

Discussion

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she obtained a “right to sue” from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing on July 14, 2023. (Cmpl., ¶ 19.) However, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that she presented a claim to the Department of General Services prior to filing the complaint. Alleging facts showing compliance with the Act is an element of her claims at issue here.

Plaintiff argues in opposition that she has substantially complied with the Act. 4 “Under the doctrine of substantial compliance the court may conclude a claim is valid if it substantially complies with all of the statutory requirements for a valid claim even though it is technically deficient in one or more particulars. [Citation.]” (Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 713.)

Plaintiff contends that the right to sue notice and underlying complaint were sent via certified mail to CDCR and Mr. Cappalla with a signed receipt on or about July 17, 2023, and July 19, 2023. Plaintiff further contends that the CDCR complaint contains references that Plaintiff “was sexually harassed and battered by her Supervisor Joseph M. Cappalla while in the course and scope of employment with CDCR.” Plaintiff further contends that is undisputed that on May 25, 2023, Kassandra filed her complaint with the EEO coordinator with CDCR, and that this complaint regarding “harassment, sexual harassment, sexual assault and battery” put Defendants on sufficient notice of the acts alleged in Plaintiffs complaint. (Opp. p. 10, l. 3—p. 11, l. 12.)

However, none of the above facts are alleged in the complaint and Plaintiff has alleged neither strict nor substantial compliance with the Act. Moreover, “[t]he claims statutes must be satisfied even in the face of the public entity's actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.” (Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 363, 374.)

The doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply when a claim was never presented to or received by the Department of General Services. (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 989-992; see also Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 770; Life v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 894, 900-901 [substantial compliance under the statute demands that the misdirected claim be “actually received” by the appropriate person or board]; Johnson v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 217 Cal. App. at p. 697 [“The doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity.”].)

4 The Court cannot consider counsel’s declaration in deciding the motion as it is not available from the facts stated in the pleadings. However, it may be relevant to deciding whether Plaintiff could allege facts on amendment. 3

None of the authorities cited by Plaintiff establishes that CDCR’s knowledge of her claims constitutes compliance or substantial compliance with the Act. There is no ambiguity or question that in this case, the Department of General Services is the statutorily designated agency to receive Plaintiff’s claim. (Gov. Code, § 915(b).) The facts set forth in Plaintiff’s opposition, even if they were alleged, fail to show that Plaintiff presented a claim to the Department of General Services or any of its offices, or that the Department of General Services or any of its offices actually received a claim from Plaintiff. Thus, a claim was not presented, and the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply.

Under Government Code section 910.8, Plaintiff argues that it was the duty of CDCR to notify Plaintiff that her claim was insufficient, and that because it did not, the defense is waived under Government Code section 911. (Opp., p. 9, l. 21-p. 10, l. 2.) However, that argument presupposes that a claim was presented to the Department of General Services, which apparently did not occur here.

ORDER

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to Plaintiff’s first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action.

Plaintiff requests leave to amend should the motion be granted. In light of the above, Plaintiff shall come prepared to discuss if and how she can amend her complaint to allege compliance with the Act.

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