PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al.

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 03/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

Tentative Ruling

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25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 03/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Jane Deacon’s demurrer to self-represented Plaintiff Joseph Perez’s complaint is ruled upon as follows.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145- 148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

This matter was continued from February 3, 2026, to allow Defendant to comply with CCP § 430.41(a). Defendant has now done so.

In this action, Plaintiff alleges causes of action against numerous defendants for intentional interference with economic relationship, trade libel, slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and fraud. Plaintiff, who formerly operated a construction company, alleges that the various defendants engaged in a scheme to harm his reputation and business operations. He alleges that after he filed a mechanic’s lien in connection with work he performed for Mike Baddley, defendant Lopez began contacting Plaintiff’s clients and subcontractors and making false statements. (Comp. ¶ 29.)

Defendant Lopez allegedly posted on Facebook that Plaintiff was bribing the Contractors State License Board (“CSLB”). (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bugayong spread false statements that Plaintiff was not paying contractors and was insolvent. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges that Schaal left a voicemail for one of his clients falsely stating that Plaintiff “targeted minorities and churches”, had “over 70 victims” and was being “criminally investigated.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 35.) Plaintiff alleges that Schaal, Lopez and Bugayoung recruited Plaintiff’s former clients and subcontractors to file complaints against Plaintiff with the CSLB. (Id. ¶ 39.)

Plaintiff performed work for Schaal and Trujillo and the work was the subject of a civil lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff alleges that after the passing of his mother, Defendant Lopez conspired with Defendant Deacon to participate in the financial war by filing a probate action.

Defendant demurs to the fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the seventh cause of action for “civil conspiracy.”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 03/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (CCP § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d at 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318, William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 1616 fn.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.)

Fifth Cause of Action (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

Defendant first demurs on the basis that the IIED cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code § 47(b). Defendant contends that the gravamen of the IIED claim is that Defendant filed a probate action. (Comp. ¶ 51.) Defendant asserts that the only allegation of wrongful conduct is the filing of the probate action.

Civil Code § 47(b) provides that a privileged publication is one made in any “(1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law.” (CCP § 47(b).) The privilege is absolute and applies regardless of whether the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 03/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

communication was made with malice or the intent to harm. (Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302.) The litigation privilege extends not only to statements made during litigation or official proceedings but also to pre-litigation communications. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057.) “Pleadings and process in a case are generally viewed as privileged communications.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 763, 770.) Application of the privilege depends on whether the gravamen of the complaint is based on a privileged communication. (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal. 4th at 1062.)

Defendant’s argument would be persuasive if the complaint against Defendant was in fact premised on her act of filing a probate action. However, as the Court concluded when it denied Defendant’s special motion to strike, the complaint against Defendant is not premised on Defendant’s act of filing a probate action against Plaintiff. Rather, the complaint is premised on activity by multiple defendants in connection with allegations that they disparaged Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s business through contacts with his clients.

The complaint generally alleges the existence of a conspiracy among numerous defendants do to harm Plaintiff’s professional and personal life, including by disrupting relationships with Plaintiff’s clients and making disparaging remarks about Plaintiff’s business. When the Court denied Defendant’s special motion to strike, it recognized that the complaint alleges Defendant commenced a probate action when Defendant joined the conspiracy, but found that the filing of the probate petition is alleged to be the means by which Defendant is carrying out an unlawful plan to interfere with Plaintiff’s inheritance, to exhaust Plaintiff’s financial and emotional resources, and to force Plaintiff to abandon legal claims. (Comp. ¶ 55.)

As the Court found when it denied the special motion to strike, “[t]he basis of the complaint is not that Defendant filed a probate petition, but rather that ‘Defendants [including Jane Deacon] formed a combination and entered into an agreement to commit wrongful acts against Plaintiff. The object of the conspiracy was to destroy Plaintiff’s business and personal reputation through a coordinated sophisticated campaign of defamation, slander, fraud, and interference.’ (Complaint, ¶ 80.).” (January 6, 2026 Minute Order.)

Thus, this Court has necessarily concluded that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are not based on any type of privileged communication.

Further, Defendant’s argument regarding Civil Code § 47(b) is premised on her assertion that the only allegation against her is based on filing a probate petition. Again, the Court rejected this same argument when it denied Defendant’s special motion to strike. While Plaintiff alleges that Defendant filed a malicious probate petition regarding his mother’s estate, he also alleges that “Defendants”, which includes Defendant, “formed a combination and entered into an agreement to commit wrongful acts against Plaintiff. The object of the conspiracy was to destroy Plaintiff’s business and personal reputation through a coordinated sophisticated campaign of defamation, slander, fraud, and interference.” (Comp. ¶ 80.) The demurer is overruled to the extent that it is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 03/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

premised on Civil Code § 47(b).

However, the Court does agree that the cause of action is deficient as currently pled. “A cause of action for [IIED] exists where there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.)

Conduct is only 'extreme and outrageous' when it is 'so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Id.) Here, while Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant filed a “malicious” probate petition as part of a conspiracy to destroy his business and personal reputation, there are no actual facts alleged against Defendant in the complaint showing that Defendant engaged in any conduct which could be considered “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” As a result, the demurrer is sustained on this basis.

In sum, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained on the basis that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct.

Seventh Cause of Action (Conspiracy)

Defendant’s demurrer is sustained to the “civil conspiracy” cause of action with leave to amend for failure to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action

“Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-511.) Indeed, “[a] conspiracy cannot be alleged as a tort separate from the underlying wrong it is designed to achieve.” (McMartin v. Children’s Institute International (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1393, 1406.) “The conspiring defendants must have actual knowledge that a tort is planned and concur in the tortious scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose. (Kidron v.

Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1582.) “The elements of a civil conspiracy are ‘(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto; and (3) the damage resulting.’” (Mosier v. Southern Cal.Physicians Ins. Exch. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1048.)

Plaintiff’s allegations here are insufficient as to Defendant. Plaintiffs allege only that “Beginning on an unknown date but fully realized by December 2021, all named Defendants formed a combination and entered into an agreement to commit wrongful

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV019484: PEREZ vs SCHAAL, et al. 03/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 53

acts against Plaintiff. The object of the conspiracy was to destroy Plaintiff’s business and personal reputation through a coordinated sophisticated campaign of defamation, slander, fraud, and interference.” (Comp. ¶ 80.) “The Defendants each had knowledge of the conspiracy’s object and intended to aid in its achievement. They took numerous overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, including but not limited to: making false statements to clients, filing fraudulent CSLB complaints, coordinating their stories, recruiting others to join their efforts, and weaponizing a probate proceeding to inflict maximum emotional and financial harm.” (Id. ¶ 81.)

Here, the Court finds that the conspiracy allegations as they relate to Defendant are conclusory. To that end, the allegations are conclusory with respect to the formation and operation of the conspiracy and also as to any wrongful act or acts Defendant allegedly did pursuant to any conspiracy. On this basis, the demurrer is sustained.

To the extent that Defendant demurrer to the conspiracy cause of action on the basis that Code of Civil Procedure § 47(b) applies, the demurrer is overruled for the reasons stated above.

In summary, Defendant’s demurrer to the fifth and seventh causes of action is sustained with leave to amend for the reasons stated above. “If the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to the demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) Leave to amend is granted as this is Defendant’s first challenge to the pleading on which this Court has ruled.

The Court notes that Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s demurrer is barred because she failed to timely answer the complaint and is in default. The Court’s file reflects that Plaintiff’s request for entry of default against Defendant was rejected on December 10, 2025.

Plaintiff shall file and serve an amended complaint no later than March 19, 2026. Defendant shall file and serve a response within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the amended complaint is served by mail as modified by the CCP § 430.41 extension as necessary.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.