Lilliana S. Detagle vs. Julia L. Jenness as trustee of the Carter Jenness Family Trust

Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CCP §§ 583.310 and 583.360.

“[A]n action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant.” (CCP § 583.310.) “[A]n action shall be dismissed after notice to the parties, if the action is not brought to trial within the time prescribed in this article.” (CCP § 583.360(a).) Dismissal is mandatory and not subject to extension,

34-2020-00287717-CU-OR-GDS: Lilliana S. Detagle vs. Julia L. Jenness as trustee of the Carter Jenness Family Trust 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

excuse, or exception, except as expressly provided by statute. (CCP § 583.360(b).) “In computing the time within which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall be excluded the time during which any of the following conditions existed: (a) [t]he jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended; (b) [p]rosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined; (c) bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (CCP § 583.340.)

The time during which one of the three conditions existed is excluded in computing the five year period. (Tamburina v. Combined Ins. Co. of America (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 323, 328.) “A circumstance of impracticability will not toll the statutory five-year deadline unless the plaintiff shows a ‘causal connection’ between the circumstance and moving the case to trial.” (Id., at 333.)

The determination “of whether the prosecution of an action was indeed impossible, impracticable, or futile during any period of time, and hence, the determination of whether the impossibility exception to the five-year statute applies, is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.” (Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1271.) “What is impossible, impracticable or futile must be determined in light of all the circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves.” (Moran v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 229, 238.)

As acknowledged by Defendant in the motion, civil jury trials were suspended by the Sacramento Superior Court from March 17, 2020 until January 4, 2021 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant correctly notes that the five-year statute was extended by 71 days as a result (the number of days between October 26, 2020 and January 4, 2021).

Here, the complaint was filed on October 26, 2020. Five years from that date was October 26, 2025. With the additional 71 days due to the suspension of jury trials, that date was extended to January 5, 2026 (the 71st day fell on Sunday, January 4, 2026).

In opposition Plaintiff argues that the case should not be dismissed because the parties reached a settlement. It is true that “[a] line of cases holds that ‘the time during which a settlement agreement is in effect tolls the five-year period, for the reason that attempting to bring an action to trial when all issues have been resolved through settlement would be futile’ within the meaning of section 583.340(c).” (Seto v. Szeto (2022), 86 Cal.App.5th 76, 87 [citations omitted].) “[A] timely and enforceable settlement agreement which finally disposes of all issues in the underlying lawsuit renders section 583.310 et seq. ‘legally irrelevant’ because it is futile to try to bring to trial issues that have been resolved by the settlement, even if the settlement later becomes null and void for failure of a condition precedent to performance.” (Id. at 87 [citations omitted].) It

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00287717-CU-OR-GDS: Lilliana S. Detagle vs. Julia L. Jenness as trustee of the Carter Jenness Family Trust 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

is also true that both Plaintiff and Defendant filed notices of settlement in October 2023.

However, as pointed out in reply, and even confirmed in Plaintiff’s opposition, the parties never reached a completed settlement of this action such that the five-year period would be tolled. Indeed, the correspondence attached to Plaintiff’s opposition reflects that on October 6, 2023, Defendant’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s former counsel to indicate that he was authorized to make a “settlement offer of $8,000, with the condition of a recorded document that settles the property line issue.” (de Tagle Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. 2.)

Plaintiff then informed her former counsel that she would accept the $8,000 “and them taking care of the new property line recording.” (Id. ¶ 3, Exh. 3.) Plaintiff’s former counsel emailed Defendant’s counsel on October 6, 2023, and stated that Plaintiff would accept the offer if Defendant paid for a lot line adjustment. (Id. Exh. 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Defendant’s counsel on February 2, 2024 to state that “[m]y client has fired me because this deal isn’t done.” (Kolb Reply Decl. Exh. A.)

Defendant’s counsel responded with an email forwarding “proposed settlement documents” and stating that it is “our hope that we can conclude the settlement in short order.” (Id.) The settlement documents included a proposed easement. Defendant’s counsel then corresponded with Plaintiff over the following months. Defendant’s counsel indicated that Defendant would not agree to a formal lot line adjustment and instead again offered to move forward with an easement. (Id. Exh. B.) Defendant’s counsel declares that Plaintiff did not respond until May 25, 2025.

In the May 25, 2025, email, Plaintiff demanded between $14,000 and $20,000 for an easement. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that no settlement was ever finalized as she expressly states in her opposition that “[f]rom October of 2023, until August of 2025, I have tried to compromise and settle with Defendant.” (Opp. 3:3-4.) Plaintiff further states that in May 2025, she emailed Defendant’s counsel “trying to find a solution to assist Defendant, Julia L. Jenness in resolving this matter of Settlement” and that in July 2025 she emailed Defendant’s counsel to state that she would be filing a small claims action “if we did not come to a settlement by August 30, 2025.” (Id. 3:6-12.)

Plaintiff then filed a small claims action against Defendant seeking $12,500. (de Tagle Decl. ¶ 7.)

The record recited above and presently before the Court on this motion reflects that the parties were engaged in ongoing settlement negotiations but never reached an actual settlement entirely resolving this action. “The ‘salient factor’ for applying the tolling exceptions in section 583.340(c) ‘is whether during the period covered by the agreement, [a plaintiff] would have been acting in bad faith and in violation of the spirit of the agreement by proceeding with the prosecution of the action.’” (Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 91 [citations omitted].) Here, no agreement was ever reached and thus Plaintiff would not have been acting in bad faith by continuing to prosecute this action. There was no “timely and enforceable settlement agreement which finally dispose[d] of all issues in the [this] lawsuit.” (Id. at 87.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00287717-CU-OR-GDS: Lilliana S. Detagle vs. Julia L. Jenness as trustee of the Carter Jenness Family Trust 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

The fact that the parties were engaged in settlement negotiations (but had not reached a settlement) is not a condition which renders bringing the matter to trial impossible, impracticable, or futile for purposes of the five-year statute. Indeed, even where parties submit an action to mediation, tolling of the five-year statute does not apply. This so because “mediation is not an event outside the lawsuit; it is one means by which a settlement of the lawsuit may be reached.” (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins.

Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1096 [emphasis in original].) “It does not effectively abate the litigation as to all issues, as to all causes of action, and as to all parties.” (Id. [citations omitted].) Settlement negotiations are ordinary incidents of an action and do not provide a basis for tolling the five-year statute. Further, the fact that Plaintiff may have filed a separate small claims action has no bearing on whether it was impossible, impracticable, or futile to bring this action to trial within the five-year statute.

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant should be estopped from seeking dismissal based on the fact that Defendant filed the Notice of Settlement. “Equitable estoppel requires that (1) the party to be estopped was aware of the operative facts and either intended that its act or omission be acted upon, or acted in such a way that the party asserting estoppel rightfully believed it was intended; and (2) the party asserting estoppel was unaware of the facts and relied on the other party's conduct to its detriment.” (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 1097.)

Importantly, it is Plaintiff that has the burden to prove estoppel. (Id.) “Nowhere did those communications reflect an understanding that the five-year statute would be tolled.” (Id. at 1098.) Here, Plaintiff points to no evidence that Defendant ever indicated that the five-year statute would be tolled during any settlement negotiations. None of the communications before the Court on this motion contain any mention of the five-year statute. Further, there is no evidence that Plaintiff relied on any expressed agreement by Defendant to toll the five-year statute.

Indeed, Plaintiff presents evidence that she was contemplating further action against Defendant and in fact took such action when she filed her small claims case against Defendant. This evidence only bolsters the conclusion that the parties never reached a settlement or agreed that the five-year period would be tolled or extended. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that Defendant is estopped from raising the five-year statute.

Importantly, “case law predating and postdating the 1984 statutory revision has long held that ‘[f]or the tolling provision of section 583.340(c) to apply, there must be ‘a period of impossibility, impracticability or futility, over which the plaintiff had no control,’’ because the statute is designed to prevent avoidable delay. [citations omitted]” (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 1102 [emphasis in original].) Plaintiff has made no showing that there was some circumstance over which she had no control which prevented her from bringing this action to trial within the five-year period. The burden to bring this matter to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00287717-CU-OR-GDS: Lilliana S. Detagle vs. Julia L. Jenness as trustee of the Carter Jenness Family Trust 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 16D

trial was Plaintiff’s and the critical factor in determining whether to apply the “impossible, impracticable, or futile” exception is whether she was reasonably diligent at all stages of the litigation. (Tamburina, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 336.) Indeed, the diligence required of a litigant increases as the five-year deadline approaches. It is then that the greatest diligence is required. (Freedman v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 696, 703; Wale v. Rodriquez (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 129, 133). “[W]here a plaintiff possesses the means to bring a matter to trial before the expiration of the five-year period by filing a motion to specially set the matter for trial, plaintiff’s failure to bring such a motion will preclude a later claim of impossibility or impracticability.” (Sanchez, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1274.)

Plaintiff never brought such a motion and they cannot now claim impossibility, impracticability or futility.

“Neither the courts nor litigants have any legitimate interest in preventing a resolution of the lawsuit on the merits if, through plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence, the goals of [the five-year statute] have been met.” (Moran v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 229, 238.) “[A]lthough the interests of justice weigh heavily against disposing of litigation on procedural grounds . . . that policy will necessarily prevail only if a plaintiff makes some showing of excusable delay. [citations].” (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3rd 342, 347.) As noted, no such showing was made.

In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to satisfy its burden in demonstrating that the five-year statute was tolled on the basis that it was impossible, impracticable, or futile to bring this matter to trial.

The action was not brought to trial by January 5, 2026, which reflects the five-year period extended due to the time when civil trials were suspended. No stipulation to continue the action beyond the mandatory five-year deadline was executed. Dismissal is mandatory.

The motion is granted and the action is dismissed without prejudice. (CCP § 581(g); Franklin v. Wilson (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 187, 215.)

Pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312, Defendant shall submit a proposed order of dismissal without prejudice.